Everybody Needs Help Sometimes: Facilitators of Soviet Defectors’ Publications

Kevin P. Riehle

To cite this article: Kevin P. Riehle (28 May 2024): Everybody Needs Help Sometimes: Facilitators of Soviet Defectors’ Publications, International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, DOI: 10.1080/08850607.2024.2345056

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/08850607.2024.2345056

© 2024 The Author(s). Published with license by Taylor & Francis Group, LLC.

Published online: 28 May 2024.
Everybody Needs Help Sometimes: Facilitators of Soviet Defectors’ Publications

Abstract: Soviet intelligence officer defectors arrived in their new countries lacking skills that translated easily into postdefection jobs. To earn money, they often turned to the one asset they had—their stories. To publish their stories, they had to work with a variety of facilitators who connected them with publishing companies and distributed their works. Those helpers can be characterized into four categories: activists/dissidents, academics, journalists, and intelligence practitioners. Helpers were sometimes connected to and supported by a Western government, particularly the United States or United Kingdom, and the resulting work reflected the Cold War ideological competition.

Dr. Kevin Riehle is a Lecturer in intelligence and international security at Brunel University London. He spent over 30 years in the U.S. government as a Counterintelligence Analyst studying foreign intelligence services, retiring as an Associate Professor of strategic intelligence at the National Intelligence University in 2021. He subsequently spent two years as an Associate Professor at the University of Mississippi, Center for Intelligence and Security Studies, before coming to Brunel. He received a Ph.D. in War Studies from King’s College London, an M.S. of Strategic Intelligence from the Joint Military Intelligence College, and a B.A. in Russian and Political Science from Brigham Young University. He has written on a variety of intelligence and counterintelligence topics, focusing on the history of Soviet and Eastern Bloc intelligence services. His latest book, The Russian FSB: A Concise History of the Federal Security Service, was published in March 2024.

© 2024 The Author(s). Published with license by Taylor & Francis Group, LLC.
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. The terms on which this article has been published allow the posting of the Accepted Manuscript in a repository by the author(s) or with their consent.
However, government sponsorship was not always the case, and some helpers expressed views that extended beyond the receiving government’s policy or that criticized the handling agency. In any case, most defectors could not have published their works without the helpers’ support.

During the Soviet era, thousands of Soviet citizens defected for a variety of reasons. The choice to defect was fateful, as defectors left everything behind: families, society, and livelihood. Those with translatable skills, such as merchant sailors, athletes, scientists, or artists, could sometimes find work that fit their expertise. For example, Valery Afanassiev, a concert pianist who defected in 1971, continued to play piano, and Mikhail Baryshnikov, a performer in the Kirov Ballet in Leningrad who defected in 1974, continued to dance. Even for prominent defectors such as these, postdefection life was not easy, and not all were so successful. Unskilled workers and Soviet Army privates arguably had it easier; they had less hesitation accepting whatever low-skilled employment they were offered.

Soviet intelligence officer defectors faced different challenges. They arrived in a new country without a job, often without a firm grasp of the local language, and most importantly, without skills that translated easily into a civilian workforce. They also frequently faced suspicion from the local security service and émigré communities because they had worked for the very Soviet service that ran agents against the receiving country, suppressed dissent, and pursued émigrés abroad.

Many turned to the one marketable asset they had—their story—leading them to write about their lives, operations, motivations, and disenchantments that led them to defect. Readers outside the Soviet Union were eager to read about the closed Soviet system, especially the mysterious and dreaded Soviet state security service. Accounts of Soviet intelligence service insiders drew reader interest and thus could make money for a defector. Consequently, numerous intelligence officer defectors published articles and books and received payment for them.

However, the local business environment and publishing procedures, which in the West are controlled by commercial entities, not the government, can be bewildering for a newly defected officer. Defectors could not usually navigate it alone; several who tried failed. They needed help and guidance and found people who offered help for various reasons. Those people can be categorized into four primary groups: academics, dissidents/activists, journalists, and intelligence practitioners. They supported defectors as ghostwriters, editors, publication facilitators, and translators.
While intelligence officer defectors’ published works were sometimes viewed as blatant government-sponsored propaganda, they more often represented the views of the helper, whether those views aligned with a government or not. Dissidents and activists exploited defectors to promote their political agendas. Academics desired to inform the world about the inner workings of the Soviet Union or Russia. Journalists spread the word about defectors to make headlines. Intelligence practitioners, sometimes the very individual who had handled a defector, advanced their views of a particular intelligence problem. These groups sometimes overlapped: activists worked as journalists; journalists and activists received invitations or support from intelligence agencies; intelligence practitioners sometimes became activists.

This article analyzes the four types of helpers: activists, academics, journalists, and practitioners, finding that all four groups contained a mix of government sponsorship and divergence from government propaganda. In some cases, especially during the Cold War, governments deliberately chose willing helpers who could turn defectors’ stories into written products. In others, defectors partnered with helpers to publicize their anti-Soviet political philosophies whether they agreed with prevailing government policy or not. In any case, the defectors could not have published their works without helpers’ support.

**ANTI-SOVIET ACTIVISTS/DISSIDENTS**

Anti-Soviet activists and dissidents were the first to assist Soviet intelligence officer defectors publish their stories. Before World War II, activists were often exiles from the Russian empire who had escaped the Bolshevik revolution. In later cases, they were Western communists who changed their political views to become anti-Soviet, usually in reaction to Stalin’s excesses. In all cases, they were motivated by their antipathy toward the Soviet Union and used defectors’ stories to advance those views.

The first activist facilitator was Vladimir Burtsev, who gained a reputation as an irritant to both the Tsarist Russian and the Bolshevik regimes. After spending time in France and Switzerland in the late Tsarist period, he returned to Russia after the February revolution of 1917 but was arrested during the Bolshevik revolution and escaped. He became a notable figure in Russian émigré circles in Paris for publicly exposing Soviet intelligence personnel along with their agents inside the émigré community. He published extensively in Paris and was familiar with the Russian-language outlets.

When a defector arrived in Paris in the 1920s or 1930s, people often introduced them to Burtsev, as occurred with two Unified State Political Directorate (OGPU) defectors, Yevgeniy Dumbadze and Georgiy Arutyunov (aka Georges Agabekov). Dumbadze was an OGPU officer from the Transcaucasus Soviet Socialist Republic assigned to Constantinople in 1927.
He defected from Turkey to Paris in June 1928, and a few months later he was introduced to Burtsev. On 16 March 1929, Burtsev published an article in the popular weekly émigré magazine Russia Illustrated that introduced Dumbadze, dramatically, but not entirely accurately, calling him the “first repentant chekist” and including a photo of him. The following four issues of Russia Illustrated ran Dumbadze’s serialized account, beginning with his “confession” and repentance. Burtsev was known for dramatic flair. In fact, Dumbadze was not the first—there had been several Soviet state security defectors who had published their revelations before him.


Simultaneously with preparations to publish Dumbadze’s book, another chekist, Georgiy Arutyunov, a senior OGPU officer who had led operations in the Middle East and South Asia, arrived in Paris from Constantinople. Arutyunov defected in June 1930 for two reasons: to publish his revelations about his OGPU employment and to pursue a young British woman, Isabelle Streeter, who had worked as his English language tutor in Constantinople. Arutyunov had been writing his memoirs for some time before his defection and had a draft ready to submit to a publisher as soon as he arrived in Paris. He initially approached Isabelle’s brother-in-law, Cecil Lee, who lived in Paris, asking him to assist with negotiating with a publisher. However, Lee considered Arutyunov “repulsive” and flatly refused.

Burtsev met Arutyunov soon after he arrived in Paris and began to support both of Arutyunov’s objectives, assisted by another Russian émigré journalist, Nikolay Vakar. However, Arutyunov’s stay in Paris was short. The French government expelled him in July 1930 at the instigation of Isabelle’s family, and he relocated to Brussels. Burtsev and Vakar continued to communicate with him in Brussels to help him locate Isabelle and negotiate with a publisher. Vakar tried to contact Isabelle’s family, but they never responded. Arutyunov never gave up, however, and he eventually succeeded in contacting Isabelle and they were married in Brussels in December 1930, despite her family’s objections.

OGPU: The Russian Secret Terror, were published the following year.\(^7\) Arutyunov’s revelations aligned well with Burtsev’s efforts to expose Soviet activities, despite doubts from the French and British security services about Arutyunov’s bona fides, inspired at least partially by Isabelle’s family’s view of him.

**Former Socialists Turned Anti-Stalinists**

By the 1930s, Max Eastman was an American journalist and anti-Soviet activist. Earlier in his life, however, he was involved in socialist political circles in the United States in the 1910s and edited prominent left-wing publications. He traveled to the Soviet Union from 1922 to 1924, witnessing the power struggle between Lev Trotsky and Iosif Stalin for leadership in the Soviet Communist Party. Eastman was partial to Trotsky, and the 1920s intra-party conflict tarnished his idealism toward Soviet communism. Stalin’s purges of the 1930s firmly persuaded him that the Soviet system needed to change. He became a strong opponent of Stalinism, and in 1941, he was hired as a literary editor for the conservative Reader’s Digest magazine.

One of those was Aleksandr Graff (aka Alexander Barmine), a Soviet military intelligence officer who had also become disenchanted with Stalin, especially after purges of old Bolshevik revolutionary leaders in the 1930s. Graff defected in July 1937 and published three articles in the New York Times in December 1937 that criticized Stalin’s purges. He published his first book, Memoirs of a Soviet Diplomat, in London in 1938.\(^8\) He undoubtedly received support to publish that book, although the identities of the helpers are unknown, and the book did not receive broad attention. Graff emigrated to the United States in spring 1939, living on the small proceeds from his first book, supplemented by working in a factory. Although he had been a general officer in the Red Army, he enlisted in the U.S. Army in December 1942 as a 40-year-old private and obtained U.S. citizenship. However, he was quickly discharged due to age and transferred to full-time duty as a linguist for the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) in January 1943.

Graff’s newspaper articles and book criticizing Stalin caught Eastman’s attention, and the two met soon after Graff arrived in the United States. Graff had reportedly read and agreed with Eastman’s writing about Stalin, and they began a cooperative relationship that resulted in a Reader’s Digest article titled “The New Communist Conspiracy,” in which Graff claimed that the Soviet Union controlled American leftists and labor activists.\(^9\) The article hit newsstands on 27 September 1944. Coincidentally, on the same day, the OSS sent Graff a letter terminating his employment. The OSS claimed no connection between the article and his dismissal; however, the article contradicted the U.S. government’s wartime alliance with the Soviet Union.\(^10\)
Then, in 1945, Graff published a second edition of his book, this time titled *One Who Survived*. The book contains multiple new chapters, including several that attack Stalin directly. Although Graff’s criticism of Stalin was at odds with wartime U.S. wartime policy—a left-wing newspaper even called him a Nazi sympathizer—the added chapters aligned closely with Eastman’s views. Eastman wrote in the introduction, “It is indeed remarkable, considering our diverse origins and the dissimilar paths we have traveled, how closely we agree on all phases of the Soviet experiment and its significance for socialist theory.” As U.S. postwar policy toward the Soviet Union became more confrontational, Graff’s anti-Stalinism became less divergent, and he later went on to work for Voice of America.

Eastman also helped another Soviet defector, Leiba Feldbin (aka Alexander Orlov), who defected from his People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs (NKVD) assignment in Spain in 1938. Feldbin reportedly made a deal with the NKVD that he would not reveal the secrets he possessed if Soviet state security left his mother-in-law in peace. He settled quietly in the United States and spent time writing his memoir, which by 1952 was ready to submit for publication. Feldbin, through a friend, approached Eastman, with whom he had several things in common. First was their hatred for Stalin. But they also had an acquaintance in common: Nikolay Krylenko, for whom Feldbin had worked in the early 1920s in the Soviet prosecutor’s office and with whose purge case Feldbin was connected in the 1930s, was the brother of Eastman’s wife, Yelena (Eliena) Krylenko.

Eastman introduced Feldbin to William White, an author with connections to *Life* magazine, who, like Eastman, had published articles critical of Stalin. The introduction led to five *Life* magazine articles in April and July 1953. It also led to editors at *Life* reviewing his book manuscript and recommending it to Random House publishers, who published it later in 1953. Feldbin and Eastman continued their relationship until Eastman died in 1969. The relationship led to the publication of Feldbin’s article, “How Stalin Relieved Spain of $600,000,000,” which appeared in *Reader’s Digest* in November 1966.

Feldbin’s publication efforts, facilitated by Eastman and smoothed by Feldbin’s connection to Yelena Krylenko’s brother, were more successful than his later attempt to publish his memoirs on his own. In June 1965, Feldbin wrote to Henry Luce, the founder of *Life* magazine, and asked to meet him regarding another book proposal. Luce’s secretary responded that Luce, who had mostly retired by that point, would not have time to meet with Feldbin. He tried again in the late 1960s, sending his manuscript to the University of Michigan Press, which distributed it to reviewers for comment. The reviewers were unanimously negative, claiming the manuscript contained numerous unsubstantiated claims. Feldbin fired back an angry letter accusing
the reviewers of bias. His memoir, *The March of Time*, was not published until 2004, over 30 years after Feldbin’s death and nearly 40 years after he had initially tried to have it published.

Like Eastman, Isaac Don Levine also began his career with pro-Bolshevik views. He was born in the Russian Empire and immigrated to the United States in 1911. He published a book in mid-1917, *The Russian Revolution*, about the February revolution and he welcomed the Bolshevik revolution later that year. The American and British governments viewed him as a rabid Bolshevik when he traveled to the Soviet Union in 1919 and suspected him of organizing Soviet propaganda activities in the United Kingdom. However, he later made a complete about-face and became a vocal anti-Soviet activist. That led him to support defectors’ publications.

One of those was Samuel Ginsberg (aka Walter Krivitsky), an NKVD illegal who had previously worked in Soviet military intelligence and who broke with the Stalinist regime in October 1937. He decided to defect soon after his friend and intelligence colleague Ignatiy Poretskiy (aka Ignace Reiss) was assassinated in Switzerland in September 1937. Ginsberg placed himself under the protection of French police; however, he began to view France as an increasingly risky place to live, partially because of Poretskiy’s assassination and partially because of the pending friendship agreement that Ginsberg predicted between Stalin and Hitler. He worked in Paris for a year after his defection writing articles for Russian émigré newspapers that formed some of the substance of his later book. By 1938, he began looking for an opportunity to emigrate to the United States, where he expected, in vain, to be safer. Ginsberg and Paul Wohl, a German intellectual whom Ginsberg had met in Berlin in 1925, agreed to work together. Wohl, who spoke English, went to the United States first to make arrangements, and Ginsberg and his family followed in November 1938. Wohl became Ginsberg’s agent in the United States, assisting with writing his memoir and arranging publishing contracts. He and another anti-Stalinist émigré writer, David Shub, also introduced Ginsberg to Levine soon after Ginsberg arrived in the United States.

Levine had gained a reputation for publishing anti-Stalin works during the 1930s and arranged for three articles based on Ginsberg’s material to run in the *Saturday Evening Post* in April 1939. Ginsberg, who did not speak English, dictated material to Levine and Wohl, who turned it into publishable articles. Five additional articles ran in the *Saturday Evening Post* over the following year. Wohl and Levine also negotiated with New York publisher Harper to compile Ginsberg’s writings into a book, which appeared later in 1939.

The articles and the book presented highly negative portrayals of Stalin, revealing Soviet clandestine activities in Spain and the purges of Soviet
military generals. Ginsberg even predicted in April 1939 the friendship agreement between Stalin and Hitler that was announced in August 1939. Those views aligned closely with Levine’s and Shub’s anti-Stalinism, although not with the views of the U.S. government at the time, which paid little attention to Ginsberg until his death in 1941. Ginsberg could not have published his materials without their help due to his lack of English language abilities.

Like Eastman and Levine, Herbert Romerstein joined the Communist Party of the USA as a young man but later converted to become a fervent anticommunist activist. He reportedly made the switch during the Korean War, which he viewed as communist hypocrisy. During the Cold War, he became known for his writing and congressional testimony about Soviet disinformation, and his anti-Soviet activism led to a job in the Office to Counter Soviet Disinformation at the U.S. Information Agency in the 1980s. Before that, he worked as a U.S. Congressional staffer for eighteen years, initially in the House Committee on Un-American Activities and ending in the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.

In his various roles, Romerstein crossed paths with multiple Soviet defectors, and in 1989, he coauthored a book with State Committee for Security (KGB) defector Stanislav Levchenko, *The KGB Against the ‘Main Enemy’.* Romerstein’s name was listed first on the book’s cover, indicating his leading role in preparing the book. Most of the book discusses early Soviet intelligence and disinformation activities that long preceded Levchenko’s career, but which aligned with Romerstein’s research. Romerstein’s facilitation lent gravitas and aid to Levchenko. Unlike Eastman and Levine, however, his partnership with Levchenko likely had U.S. government support and the resulting work fit with Cold War U.S. government policies toward the Soviet Union.

**National Alliance of Russian Solidarists (NTS)**

The anti-Soviet group NTS was actively attempting to penetrate and sabotage Soviet institutions during and after World War II. NTS was founded in the 1930s by young Russian activists who criticized the old White movement émigrés of being too passive and vowed to use force to overturn Soviet power. In fall 1949, Constantin Boldyreff, the U.S.-based leader of NTS and one of the group’s founders, met with two journalists, brothers Kermit and Milt Hill, in Washington, D.C., along with Congressman Wint Smith of Kansas. The meeting resulted in a three-part series of articles that introduced the NTS to a U.S. readership as an anti-Soviet group working underground inside the Soviet Union to establish a noncommunist government.
The meeting also included a discussion of a book manuscript written by an NTS member who had spent seven months as a junior officer in the Soviet military counterintelligence organization, Smersh, but who defected in Germany in August 1945. The officer was Mikhail Mondich, who wrote under the pseudonym Nicola Sinevirsky. His book tells of the violent and brutal measures Smersh took to maintain loyalty among Soviet citizens, which was exactly the message NTS, with Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) support, was trying to portray in its pursuit of a new, anti-Stalinist regime in the Soviet Union.28

NTS published portions of the book in its Germany-based newspaper Posev, and the NTS’s publishing house, Grani, published a Russian-language version of the book in 1948, titled Smersh: A Year in the Enemy’s Camp.29 The introduction to the 1948 book contains a phrase characterizing NTS’s hope: “[T]he appearance of this book proves that [Soviet state security] organs are not all-powerful.”30 The Hill brothers received the English manuscript during the 1949 meeting, and they worked with Boldyreff day and night for three weeks to edit it and prepare it for publication under the title Smersh in 1950.31 Mondich benefited from the NTS’s desire to publish anti-Soviet material.

NTS also took advantage of the February 1954 defection of KGB illegal Nikolay Khokhlov, who defected while on a mission to assassinate the Germany-based NTS leader, Georgiy Okolovich. Khokhlov was first exposed to the NTS when he worked in Germany in 1952. The NTS literature that he saw then claimed that anti-Soviet émigrés had penetrated the seemingly impenetrable Soviet Union and were working to overthrow the Soviet system. According to Khokhlov, the Ministry of State Security viewed the NTS as a serious threat and Okolovich’s assassination was a priority.32 However, Khokhlov began to see NTS not as a target but as an opportunity to leave his Soviet employment. When Khokhlov was dispatched to assassinate Okolovich in February 1954, he turned himself over to the NTS rather than following through with the assignment. The NTS passed him to the CIA in Germany.

Khokhlov’s first public exposure came on 23 April 1954, when the CIA arranged a press conference for him just four days after the global publication of a dramatic photo that appeared to portray Soviet defector Yevdokia Petrova being forcibly dragged to a Soviet aircraft in Australia. Khokhlov appealed to the Soviet government to allow his wife to emigrate, riding the emotional coattails of the Petrova photo. Khokhlov believed, based on his reading of Soviet reporting about the CIA and the NTS’s penetration of the Soviet Union, that he could be reunited with his family somehow. He soon came to realize that was not to happen. His appeal fell on deaf ears in Moscow, and his wife was arrested and never allowed to emigrate.
The NTS, however, took advantage of the publicity surrounding Khokhlov’s defection. Posev first ran a story on Khokhlov in May 1954. The CIA arranged for Khokhlov to appear before a closed session of the U.S. Senate Internal Security Subcommittee on 11 May, where he talked about his mission to assassinate Okolovich. On 21 May, he was interviewed by a staff member of the Internal Security Subcommittee, who asked him about the NTS and its mission. Just three days earlier, Constantin Boldyreff appeared before the same committee and described the NTS’s goal of overturning the Soviet government, mentioning Khokhlov’s assassination mission. Boldyreff began his prepared statement by criticizing the West for a policy of “ambiguity, indecision, and half measures.” Thanks to Khokhlov and his assassination mission, the NTS was gaining a hearing in the U.S. government.

Khokhlov was disappointed that his hopes of exfiltrating his wife went unmet. In 1957, Posev published Khokhlov’s autobiographical book, *The Right to Conscience*, in Russian, which was subsequently published in English and German. Khokhlov used the book to express frustration with his treatment in the West and the failure of his plan to save his wife. The book prompted a CIA reviewer to assert, “If the Russian edition of Khokhlov’s book is clandestinely circulating in the USSR, as he claims, his unfavorable description of American intelligence officers, their boorish conduct, rapacity, lack of depth and operational skill, and their inability to help him in any way, will not encourage defections to American intelligence.” Although his anti-Soviet views still aligned with the CIA’s Cold War positions, his views about the CIA itself reflected his personal disgruntlement. By the time Posev published Khokhlov’s book, the CIA had also begun to reduce its support for NTS, so its views possibly aligned with the NTS’s as well.

Another defector may have been tangentially connected to the NTS, although information about that connection is uncertain. Gerald Brooke is accredited as the translator of Boris Baklanov’s book *Nights Are Longest There*, published in 1972 under Baklanov’s pseudonym, A.I. Romanov. Baklanov served as a Smersh officer during World War II, defected in Austria in July 1947, and immigrated to the United Kingdom. Brooke was a Russian language teacher in London in 1965 when he and his wife traveled to the Soviet Union on vacation. The couple was arrested for distributing anti-Soviet literature, reportedly on behalf of the NTS, and sentenced to five years in prison. They were released in 1969 in exchange for Morris and Lona Cohen, two KGB illegals who were arrested in the United Kingdom in 1961. Brooke arrived back in the United Kingdom in July 1969 and resumed his teaching duties. His connection with Baklanov had begun before his 1965 trip to Moscow, as Baklanov also worked as a Russian language teacher in London. Baklanov’s book was published 25 years after his
defection; although there is no public information that directly ties him to the NTS, Brooke might have brokered a connection.

**United Kingdom–Based Activists**

Activists in the United Kingdom supported defectors’ publications, sometimes with British government support and sometimes independently. British conservative activist Geoffrey Stewart-Smith, a former British Army officer who held a parliament seat from 1970 to 1974, formed the Foreign Affairs Publishing Company in the mid-1960s at his home in Surrey, England. The company became known for publishing anti-Soviet literature, especially books that criticized the British left and linked Labor Party activists, as well as Irish republicans and South African anti-Apartheid activists, to the Soviet Union. Stewart-Smith had connections with the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office’s Information Research Department (IRD), the UK government office responsible for covert propaganda against the Soviet Union. Stewart-Smith's colleague and fellow anti-Soviet activist, Brian Crozier, had been a contact for the IRD since the 1950s, and Crozier and Stewart-Smith worked closely together in publishing IRD-supplied anti-Soviet materials.

It was likely through that connection that Stewart-Smith received the rights to publish the 1976 autobiographical book *Inside the KGB*, written by former KGB Third Chief Directorate officer Aleksey Myagkov. Myagkov had defected to British forces in Berlin in February 1974 and settled in West Germany. Stewart-Smith’s organization, the Foreign Affairs Research Institute, also published an article by Myagkov in 1977 titled “The Role of the KGB in World Affairs.” These fit directly into Stewart-Smith’s, and the IRD’s, theme of an ever-present Soviet threat.

Anatoliy Golitsyn, a KGB officer who defected in December 1961, also benefited from anti-Soviet activists who supported his publications. However, unlike Myagkov, he likely did it without government support. Golitsyn was a controversial individual whose revelations had a strong influence on CIA officers who believed in the Soviet “Master Plot,” which some officers denigratingly called the “Monster Plot.” Adherents to the “Master Plot” believed the Soviet Union was conducting a concerted campaign to deceive the world and destroy democracy. Some of Golitsyn’s reporting reinforced that belief, leading to divisions within the CIA about the bona fides of subsequent defectors, most notably Yuriy Nosenko, who defected in February 1964.

After initial debriefings and consulting tasks up to the mid-1960s, Golitsyn kept to himself for much of the 1970s. Then, in 1984, he published his first book, *New Lies for Old*, in which he advanced his theories about a global Soviet plot. Golitsyn says the book “presents my convictions that,
throughout that period [of his professional life], the West has misunderstood
the nature of changes in the communist world and has been misled and
outmaneuvered by communist guile.” His views directly challenged Western
governments that welcomed Mikhail Gorbachev’s policies to decrease tension
with Cold War adversaries.

Golitsyn’s first book attracted the attention in the early 1990s of British
anti-Soviet polemicist Christopher Story, who held similar conspiratorial
views about the Soviet Union as Golitsyn. Story ran the London publishing
company Edward Harle Limited and published the newsletter Soviet Analyst,
which claims to be “alone in fulfilling the very necessary function of
explaining and exposing the covert Soviets’ ultra-subtle Leninist deception
strategy—a proper understanding of which is a prerequisite to being able to
make sense of all contemporary global developments.” Before Story’s
involvement with Golitsyn, the Soviet Analyst had published an article by
KGB defector Aleksey Myagkov in 1977 titled, “Confessions of a KGB Officer,”
reminiscent of the “confessions” that Vladimir Burtsev published in the
1930s.

Deception, which purports to contain a series of memorandums
Golitsyn wrote for the CIA spelling out his (and Story’s) view of the
falseness of Soviet perestroika along with the West’s naïveté for
believing it. Golitsyn acknowledges Story in the book for “having the
courage to publish such a controversial book.” Story adds a foreword in
which he laments that the West had fallen into the Soviet Union’s
trap. Story then endorses the book on the Soviet Analyst newsletter
website, stating,

Subscribers to Soviet Analyst are strongly recommended to order The
Perestroika Deception, which provides the intellectual framework for
understanding the Leninist mentality and for grasping that the cynical
covert Soviet KGB-GRU [Main Intelligence Directorate] operatives
masquerading as “democrats” are not out of their minds: they are all
in Lenin’s mind.

Support by activists was pivotal for some former Soviet intelligence officers
to publish their stories. Anti-Soviet activists were eager to publish defectors’
works to bolster their efforts to reveal the evil nature of the Soviet regime.
Activists provided venues for defector publications that fit the activists’
views, with some, like Romerstein, Smith-Stewart, and initially the NTS,
receiving direct government support and aligning with Cold War government
narratives. Others, like Eastman, Levine, and Story, advanced views that
conflicted with the prevailing government narratives of the time. In either
case, defectors enjoyed their help in publishing their works.
ACADEMICS

The huge number of Soviet émigrés and refugees displaced by World War II, many in Germany, represented an unprecedented window into the closed Soviet society, including into Soviet state security. According to Columbia University sociology professor George Fischer, “For the first time, a source of information has become available which can throw light on the workings of Soviet life—a life which has never really been fully accessible to a foreign observer, no matter how hard he tried.”

That hope attracted academics to former Soviet intelligence officers. Academics approached contacts with defectors from the perspective of exploiting that window for knowledge, translating into opportunities for defectors to publish their stories.

Columbia University’s Research Program on the USSR

Boris Nicolaevsky, an exile from Bolshevik Russia, was a Menshevik and expert on Marx’s and Engels’ writings. He emigrated to the United States in 1940 and settled in New York, where he developed relations with Soviet experts at Columbia University. Those included David Dallin, a fellow Menshevik exile with whom he cowrote the groundbreaking 1947 book Forced Labor in Soviet Russia, the first English-language book that described in detail the Soviet labor camp system.

As part of his research into the Soviet Union, Nicolaevsky began corresponding with numerous Soviet refugees, mostly in Germany, after World War II. His correspondence included several former Soviet state security officers who had been captured and held in German prisoner of war camps and who switched their allegiance to Germany to fight against Soviet forces during the war. He asked them to write their stories, including their knowledge of Soviet state security operations and structure, promising to have their works published in the United States. Nicolaevsky’s contacts never directly yielded publications, but they did lead to other Columbia academics becoming defector helpers.

In 1950 and 1951, David Dallin traveled to Germany to interview Soviet refugees living in Germany, possibly related to Nicolaevsky’s earlier correspondence. Dallin’s interviewees included former Soviet intelligence and state security officers, who provided details of state security organization, missions, and leaders. Based partially on these contacts, Columbia University became a hub for supporting defectors’ publications in the early 1950s. In 1951, Columbia University professor Philip Mosely founded the Research Program on the USSR, with support from the East European Fund, which helped Soviet refugees immigrate to the United States. The purpose for the Research Program was to tap into the knowledge of Soviet émigrés and
publish their materials. David Dallin’s son, Alexander, was one of the program’s founders, and David’s brother, Simon Wolin, was a researcher.

Although there was no overt link between the Columbia program and the U.S. government, there were informal ties through which the CIA likely facilitated academics’ access to sources and in return benefited from the resulting publications. In 1947, Nicolaevsky traveled to Europe, in part sponsored by the U.S. European Command G-2 to research the Nazi theft of artworks from around Europe. Then, in April 1949, a CIA official contacted Nicolaevsky in New York and asked for information about one of his Soviet intelligence contacts. The CIA official did not explain how he knew to contact Nicolaevsky. CIA ties went as far as CIA Director Allen Dulles receiving an honorary doctoral degree from Columbia University in 1955.

The Research Program published multiple books and monographs written by Soviet experts, including former intelligence and state security officers. Among them was a volume coedited by Simon Wolin and Robert Slusser titled *The Soviet Secret Police*. The volume included essays by Vyacheslav Artemyev, who had corresponded with Nicolaevsky a few years earlier, and a more recent Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) defector, Grigoriy Burlutskiy, who defected by walking across the border from Soviet Central Asia into Afghanistan in 1953. Artemyev also published separate monographs and contributed to other books by the Research Program on the USSR, including one titled *Political Controls in the Soviet Army*, which was edited by the young Zbigniew Brzezinski. Artemyev later worked for the U.S. Army as a Soviet expert and published ten articles in the U.S. Army’s journal *Military Review* between 1962 and 1969.

Wolin also edited and provided an introduction for a 1962 book by Aleksandr Kaznacheyev, who defected from the Soviet embassy in Rangoon, Burma, in June 1959. Kaznacheyev was flown to the United States immediately after he offered to defect, and he began talking about his mission as a KGB co-optee, which included translating disinformation messages and spotting Burmese sources. The U.S. government publicized his defection as soon as he arrived in the United States. In September 1959, journalist Arnold Beichman wrote an article, “He Quit Communism,” for the *Christian Science Monitor* describing in detail Kaznacheyev’s defection. Kaznacheyev also provided an essay for the October 1959 monograph titled “The Disillusioned: 12 Million Refugees from Communism,” a propaganda publication by an otherwise unknown author Mark Piros.

The newspaper articles and the propaganda piece likely received direct but unacknowledged support from the U.S. government, which exploited Kaznacheyev’s willingness to criticize the Soviet system. Kaznacheyev went on the speaking circuit later in 1959, appearing before the National Press Club in Washington, D.C., and giving testimony in the U.S. Senate. His
Senate testimony came just a few days after his article “Soviet ‘Operation Burma’” ran in the anticommmunist magazine, *The New Leader*, in which Kaznacheyev described Soviet intelligence activities, particularly disinformation operations. The magazine was a natural choice: David Dallin had previously served on the editorial staff of *The New Leader*, and Nicolaevsky and Wolin, as well as David Shub and Max Eastman, were contributors to the magazine. However, *The New Leader* at times struck an even more aggressive anticommmunist tone than the U.S. government did, and while it reportedly had a relationship with the CIA, that relationship was “characterized as much by conflict as by cooperation.” Wolin facilitated and wrote the introduction for Kaznacheyev’s 1962 book, *Inside a Soviet Embassy*, which presented an uncomplimentary picture of Soviet diplomatic life. Allen Dulles noted Kaznacheyev in his 1964 book, *The Craft of Intelligence*, in which he asserted Kaznacheyev’s portrayal of Soviet diplomats debunked the image of the “ugly American.”

Robert Slusser, also from the Research Program on the USSR, published a book under the program’s auspices in 1953 titled *Soviet Economic Policy in Postwar Germany*. The book provided a publication venue for another MVD officer known only by the pseudonym Nikolay Grishin, who had worked at the Soviet “Vismut” uranium mine in East Germany. The mine was managed by MVD officers, whom Grishin listed in a monograph he wrote earlier for the Research Program. That monograph subsequently appeared as a chapter in Slusser’s 1953 book. The Columbia Research Program on the USSR ended up extending help to numerous former Soviet intelligence and state security officers.

Christopher Andrew

The flow of defectors slowed in the 1960s and 1970s, which, along with suspicion among some CIA officers that defectors were dispatched as deception agents based on the “Master Plot,” limited academics’ access to them. An academic entered the scene again in the late 1980s, when British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) invited Cambridge University professor Christopher Andrew to compile materials KGB defector Oleg Gordievskiy brought out of the Soviet Union. Andrew was a well-regarded academic on the topic of intelligence. The relationship led to three books, the most prominent of which, *KGB: The Inside Story*, quickly became a bestseller when it appeared in 1991. The book is only partially based on Gordievskiy’s revelations derived from his research in KGB First Chief Directorate operational files, which are cited in the book’s endnotes simply as “Gordievsky.” It places those revelations in the context of a greater volume of published works that describe the history of the KGB supplied by Andrew. Two smaller, less prominent books appeared over the following
year. The first was initially titled *Instructions from the Center* and later published as *Comrade Kryuchkov’s Instructions*,68 and the next was *More Instructions from the Centre*, published in 1992.69 Although the latter two books sold fewer copies, they were more concentrated on Gordievskiy’s revelations.

Andrew was invited again to SIS headquarters in October 1995, three years after the defection of KGB officer Vasiliy Mitrokhin. The SIS had exfiltrated Mitrokhin from the Soviet Union in September 1992 and subsequently brought six crates of notes he had accumulated during his 13 years of employment in the KGB’s archives. Andrew worked with Mitrokhin over the following three years to compile a record of the KGB’s history using Mitrokhin’s notes alongside other published works that placed the notes into context and added credibility. That partnership resulted in two large volumes: *The Sword and the Shield* in 1999 and *The World Was Going Our Way* in 2005.70 In contrast to Gordievskiy’s first book, the proportion of Mitrokhin’s books that come from his exfiltrated materials is much higher. Andrew was named the official historian of the British Security Service (MI5) amid his work on Mitrokhin’s second book.

Academics like Dallin, Wolin, and Andrew provided valuable help for intelligence officer defectors. They had access to publication venues and government organizations that desired to publicize defectors’ stories. Their books allowed Soviet defectors like Artemyev, Kaznacheyev, Gordievsky, and Mitrokhin to tell their stories about Soviet intelligence activities, which they would not have been able to do alone.

**JOURNALISTS**

Journalists were the most common defector helpers. Their motivations for helping were a mix of anti-Soviet politics and the pursuit of a scoop. A defector’s first introduction to a journalist was often brokered by an intelligence service that arranged the publication to expose Soviet clandestine activities, sometimes with the journalist’s witting knowledge of an intelligence service’s involvement and sometimes without it.

MVD officer Yuriy Rastvorov defected in Japan in January 1954 and received broad press coverage. The U.S. Department of State organized a press conference in Washington in August to announce that Rastvorov had been granted asylum and where Rastvorov explained publicly his motives for defecting. Soon after the press conference, Robert Eunson, the Associated Press bureau chief in Tokyo, published an article in the *Saturday Evening Post* giving details of the defection and the U.S. Army Counter Intelligence Corps operation that precipitated it.71 Then, beginning in November, *Life* magazine ran a three-part series of articles under Rastvorov’s byline that discussed Soviet politics and infighting within the Soviet leadership.72
Rastvorov received $25,000 for the articles. The name of the helper who facilitated these articles is not public; however, in 2006, Serge Kovaleski, the son of Rastvorov’s CIA handler, Fred Kovaleski, wrote about the Rastvorov case and claimed that the *Life* magazine articles were written “with the unmistakable input” of the CIA. While the CIA was undoubtedly involved and the information aligned with U.S. propaganda objectives, the information was legitimately Rastvorov’s.73

Another 1950s defector, Kaarlo Tuomi (aka Robert Sastamoinen) was a GRU illegal who entered the United States in late 1958 and operated for only three months until the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) arrested him and doubled him against the GRU. He retired from being a double agent in 1963 and settled quietly in the United States. Tuomi emerged from obscurity when John Barron published two articles about him in *Reader’s Digest* in April and May 1970. The stories were later combined in Barron’s book *KGB: The Secret Work of Soviet Agents* in 1974.74

After Barron’s initial articles, Tuomi began telling his story publicly, traveling to small colleges and community groups and speaking to student audiences. During that period, he met Finnish journalist Sakari Määttänen, who had worked for Finnish newspapers since the early 1960s. Määttänen lived in New York City on a journalism exchange in 1963 and 1964, and again from 1966 to 1973. Määttänen met Tuomi during the latter period, likely through Tuomi’s involvement in the Finnish emigré community.

With Määttänen’s help, Tuomi published his memoirs in Finland in 1984 with the title *Stateless Story: Memoirs of a Finnish-American Spy*.75 There is no indication that Määttänen was associated with an intelligence service, and Tuomi’s connection to him was likely based on personal outreach, not government sponsorship. The book tells Tuomi’s personal story, with uncomplimentary references to both the Soviet and U.S. intelligence systems. Tuomi died in 1995, and an English translation of his book was published posthumously in 2014, titled *Spy Lost*, with an introduction by American espionage historian John Earl Haynes. Haynes noted that some of the material that Tuomi revealed in the book indicates that he likely did not receive approval from the U.S. government for its content, especially references to KGB officer Dmitriy Polyakov, who Tuomi claimed was one of his trainers while he was preparing for his assignment as an illegal.76

In 1967, the CIA ruled, “Should a defector publish a book in the U.S., he may do so on his own; publication will not be supported by the CIA.”77 This decision was in response to the report of the Katzenbach Committee, which investigated covert CIA support to U.S. educational institutions and student groups. It was also possibly a lesson learned from an episode in which the CIA engineered the publication of another story, *The Penkovsky Papers*. KGB defector Petr Deryabin was tasked with drafting the book in his role as
a contractor for the CIA. The CIA tasked Deryabin in 1963 to translate and ghostwrite a book compiling debriefings of Oleg Penkovsky, a GRU officer whom the British SIS had recruited in 1961, but who was arrested and eventually executed in 1963. Deryabin took more literary license in his draft than the CIA desired, adding fictitious aspects to Penkovsky’s story rather than presenting a story in which, according to a CIA memo requesting authority to publish the materials, “Penkovsky-the-man which thus emerges is not only an accurate one, but one which is interesting and believable.” The CIA turned to a seasoned Time magazine journalist and World War II intelligence officer, Frank Gibney, to rewrite Penkovsky’s story to achieve its more believable objective. Nevertheless, the CIA continued to support Deryabin and likely had a hand in publishing his 1959 memoir, The Secret World, which the same Frank Gibney cowrote and edited. Both books were published by the same New York publishing company, Doubleday.

There were times, such as Deryabin’s book and the book about Penkovsky, when intelligence services engaged journalists directly and fed them material for deliberate influence purposes. Those interactions were usually with conservative, anti-Soviet journalists who were eager to publish defectors’ revelations about the menacing KGB. But sometimes even the author was unaware of an intelligence service’s involvement.

The 1967 prohibition against publishing defectors’ books applied to the United States but did not affect the CIA abroad. About the same time as the prohibition was announced, the CIA arranged for the South African Security Service (SASS) to pass information to Barbara Carr, a South African journalist who unwittingly became the voice for a CIA covert influence campaign. The SASS gave Carr a package of data about Yuriy Loginov, a KGB illegal who had volunteered his services to the CIA in 1961, but who was subsequently arrested for espionage in South Africa in 1967. The CIA arranged the arrest because adherents to the conspiratorial “Master Plot” believed falsely that Loginov was part of a Soviet provocation plan. The material led to Carr’s 1969 biography of Loginov, Spy in the Sun. The information about Loginov’s background that Carr included in her book came directly from CIA debriefings, even retaining American colloquialisms. However, it omitted reference to Loginov’s approach to the CIA in 1961 to paint him as a loyal Soviet officer, not a defector. Tom Mangold claims that Carr was unaware of the CIA’s hand behind her book until he interviewed her in 1989.

The CIA’s publication prohibition also did not govern the FBI, which continued to connect defectors to journalists. John Barron was probably the most prolific writer to tell defectors’ stories. In addition to his 1970 articles about Tuomi, he published the stories of three other KGB-affiliated defectors: Vladimir Sakharov, a KGB co-optee and GRU reserve officer who
defected in Kuwait in 1971\textsuperscript{83}; Dalibar Valushek (aka Ludek Zemenek), a KGB illegal who defected in the United States in 1977\textsuperscript{84}; and an illegal agent known in the West as Chang Fen, who defected while establishing his legend in Africa in 1983.\textsuperscript{85} Although Sakharov published his own book six years later (see below), Barron’s material, which tells Sakharov’s story mixed with government-sponsored narratives, is the first detailed public treatment of him. The level of detail in Barron’s accounts of defectors indicates that he received direct support from the U.S. Intelligence Community, probably the FBI, thus not falling under the CIA’s prohibition.

The FBI later also reportedly paved the way for Pete Earley, a \textit{Washington Post} journalist and author of multiple books, to write \textit{Comrade J} about Russian Foreign Intelligence Service defector Sergey Tretyakov. Earley claimed to have agreed to the project reluctantly only after an FBI special agent persuaded him that Tretyakov was “the real deal” who had read Earley’s 1997 book about Aldrich Ames, \textit{Confessions of a Spy}.\textsuperscript{86} Tretyakov defected in October 2000, and although the U.S. Department of State announced in January 2001 that his asylum request had been granted, Tretyakov did not reveal himself publicly until Earley’s book was published in 2007. Earley conducted over a year of interviews with Tretyakov, with FBI and CIA sponsorship, and researched many of his revelations independently, sometimes raising counterarguments and rebuttals from the people Tretyakov names in his story.

Journalist-supported defector books did not always align with government views. Umberto Tosi, a \textit{Los Angeles Times} journalist and author of several books, supported Vladimir Sakharov’s 1980 autobiographical book \textit{High Treason}.\textsuperscript{87} Unlike Barron, who was a regular author on the topic of intelligence, Tosi was an unusual choice for collaborating on a defector’s book. His previous books had discussed sports psychology, and it is unclear how or when Sakharov connected with him. At the end of his book, Sakharov tells of having been settled in southern California after his debriefings ended and falling into doldrums until realizing he needed to take charge of his own life.\textsuperscript{88} He enrolled in a U.S. university under an assumed name and eventually received a Ph.D. in international relations and international law. At some point after 1975, he connected with Tosi, who helped him write his memoir, in which he explains his upbringing, defection, and disenchantment with his CIA handlers. His disgruntlement toward the CIA makes it unlikely that the CIA engineered his connection to Tosi.

In some cases, journalists and authors who ghostwrote or contributed their names to a defector’s work were selected based solely on their prominence and name recognition. Andy O’Brien was a well-known sports journalist for the \textit{Montreal Standard} when he ghostwrote Igor Gouzenko’s 1948 book, \textit{The Iron Curtain}.\textsuperscript{89} Gouzenko’s book built on a series of articles that ran in
Cosmopolitan magazine in February 1947. The Royal Canadian Mounted Police informed MI5 and the FBI of the upcoming articles in December 1946, stating that Gouzenko was contracting directly with the magazine as a “completely free agent” and was receiving no support from the Canadian government. Gouzenko reportedly received $50,000 for the Cosmopolitan articles, which were produced into a 1948 film, The Iron Curtain. Similarly, Frederick Forsyth, a recognized spy novelist, wrote a foreword for Vladimir Kuzichkin’s 1990 memoir, Inside the KGB, and Forsyth’s name appeared on the cover. In these cases, no information is available regarding whether an intelligence service connected the defectors with the writers.

Journalists like Gibney, Barron, and Earley supplied defectors with publication venues, writing support, and name recognition. They often had direct government sponsorship, usually overt, although in Carr’s case, it was covert.

INTELLIGENCE PRACTITIONERS

Former intelligence personnel, in some cases the person who had handled the defector, have been involved in publishing several defectors’ books. For some, their former employers were directly involved, while others worked independently. Even the participation of intelligence practitioners did not guarantee that the publications were government-sponsored propaganda. Sometimes, they represented the personal views of the helper rather than a government-sanctioned or inspired perspective.

Those who received government support included Michael Thwaites, an Australian Security Intelligence Organization (ASIO) officer who was involved in the operation that led to the defections of Vladimir and Yevdokia Petrov in Australia. Thwaites was one of Vladimir Petrov’s primary debriefers, and he spent 18 months with the Petrovs at an ASIO safe house in Sydney helping them write their memoir, which was published in 1956 as Empire of Fear. The book was published only two years after the Petrovs’ defection with a clear propaganda purpose at a time when the West was ramping up anti-Soviet rhetoric. Up to 1953, most postwar Soviet intelligence defectors, except for Igor Gouzenko, remained in obscurity. After Stalin’s death, Western powers began to encourage the publication of defectors’ stories, including those by and about Yuriy Rastvorov, Yevgeniy Khokhlov, Grigoriy Burlutskiy, and the Petrovs.

Burlutskiy’s story was written by another intelligence-related helper, Charles W. Thayer, who had served in the OSS during World War II and then in the Office of Policy Coordination, a covert action planning element within the U.S. Department of State that was merged into the CIA when the agency was created in 1947. Thayer was caught up in McCarthyite allegations of sexual immorality and forced to resign in 1953. Nevertheless, he published a July 1954 Life magazine biography of Burlutskiy, who had
defected the previous year. Thayer’s article parallels closely the information that Burlutskiy provided in CIA debriefings, but his choice as its author was surprising considering the security concerns raised against him.

Joseph Culver Evans joined the CIA in its early days and specialized in Soviet operations, participating in Operation GOLD, the Berlin tunnel operation in the 1950s. He was the ghostwriter for Petr Deryabin’s 1998 book *Inside Stalin’s Kremlin*, which was published six years after Deryabin’s death. It was Deryabin’s fourth book, each having been written with a different coauthor. The book’s manuscript was completed in 1989, before Deryabin’s death, but was not published until nine years later, with the help of his son, Peter Deryabin, Jr. The publisher was Brassey’s in Washington, D.C., which specialized in military and defense-related books. A publisher’s note states that Deryabin delayed the book’s publication to lower the risk of retribution and to protect former colleagues; however, the main reason for the delay was likely Deryabin’s work as a contractor for the CIA until 1981. The difference between *Inside Stalin’s Kremlin* and Deryabin’s other books is that it was written in the first person, recalling personal experiences, while the others were the result of postdefection research.

With others, the sponsorship of their service is not as clear. Career CIA officer Tennant Bagley collaborated on the books of two KGB defectors with whom he had significant personal contact as a CIA officer: Deryabin and Anatoliy Golitsyn. Bagley retired from the CIA in 1972 and did not hide his disagreement with CIA policy toward the Soviet Union after his retirement. With both Deryabin’s and Golitsyn’s books, Bagley represented his personal views about the machinations of the KGB in the 1960s and 1970s “Master Plot.” Golitsyn’s 1990 book, *The KGB: Masters of the Soviet Union*, cowritten with Bagley, portrays the KGB as an all-powerful organization that rules the Soviet Union. It previews themes in Golitsyn’s 1995 book *The Perestroika Deception*. The analysis aligned with Bagley’s approach to the KGB since the 1960s, although it did not match the U.S. government’s line on the question of the Soviet Union.

Edward Gazur, a retired FBI special agent, published two books about NKVD officer Leyba Feldbin (aka Alexander Orlov). Gazur was assigned as Feldbin’s FBI handler in 1971 and, by his own admission, became more a friend than a professional contact. Feldbin died in 1973, and Gazur was named executor of his estate. He initially published the book *Alexander Orlov: The FBI’s KGB General* in 2001, in which he provided information from debriefings of Feldbin over 30 years after his defection. Then, in 2004, Gazur organized the publication of Feldbin’s memoirs, *Alexander Orlov: The March of Time*, which Feldbin had tried to publish in the 1960s but failed. Gazur’s representation of Orlov’s work reflects his sympathetic views of Feldbin, not government-inspired propaganda.
Donald Mahar’s book *Shattered Illusions* chronicles the life of KGB illegal Yevgeniy Brik, who turned himself over to Canadian authorities in 1953, operated as a Canadian double agent for over a year, and was then lured back to the Soviet Union in 1955 and arrested. After the Soviet Union dissolved, Brik contacted British intelligence and asked to emigrate to Canada, and Mahar was Brik’s handler after his return to Canada in the 1990s. Mahar’s work is based on his debriefings of Brik. Far from being sympathetic, as Mazur was with Feldbin, Mahar portrays Brik as an undisciplined philanderer who broke rules and got into trouble.104 His book, published long after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, was more a dual biography of Brik and Royal Canadian Mounted Police Corporal James Morrison, a Soviet-recruited agent who compromised Brik to the KGB and led to his 1955 arrest.

Other former intelligence personnel also supported defectors’ books. Ira Winkler was a former analyst at the U.S. National Security Agency, who, according to the book flap, was involved in “covert operations for several American intelligence agencies.” He cowrote Stanislav Lunev’s 1998 book *Through the Eyes of the Enemy*, published by conservative Regnery Publishing.105 Winkler had left intelligence employment by the time he worked with Lunev and had started a corporate security company, and it is unclear how he became involved in the writing process. But his help allowed Lunev to publish his story.

Intelligence practitioners had special access to information about defectors, often knowing them personally. Their collaboration gave defector works a feeling of credibility. However, former practitioners were not always objective voices or conduits for government-sponsored propaganda. Their support was sometimes for their own benefit as much as for the defector’s.

CONCLUSION

Defectors’ helpers did for defectors what they could not do for themselves. By assisting with formally publishing their articles and books, helpers connected defectors to appropriate publication venues, marketed defectors’ works, and gave defectors broader visibility. Formal publication came with two major advantages: quality of publication and distribution of books. It also facilitated translation of some of the books into English and other languages, broadening their reach further.

Unsurprisingly, most helpers held conservative anti-Soviet views and supported defectors either to facilitate Western government-sponsored propaganda or to advance their personal political agendas. In some cases, governments directly fed material to activists, journalists, or academics, or tasked practitioners to support a defector. In those cases, such as the Petrovs’ book, Carr’s book about Loginov, or Thayer’s article about Burlutskiy, the
helpers facilitated both the defector and government propaganda. However, government sponsorship was not guaranteed because some helpers, like Isaac Don Levine during World War II, the NTS after the war, or Umberto Tosi in the 1980s, expressed views that conflicted with government policy or criticized the handling agency. Activists like Vladimir Burtsev, Constantin Boldyreff, and Christopher Story were especially virulent in their anti-Soviet views and used defectors to advance their own political philosophies that sometimes contradicted government policy. Academics were usually more objective in their representation of defectors’ views but also had connections to government-sponsored anti-Soviet efforts. Journalists had a mix of personal motives to get the scoop and support from governments, with some, Pete Earley, writing as close to objective journalist works as they could even with government-supplied information. Intelligence practitioners portrayed their personal views that sometimes, due to their close access to defectors, either sympathized with them or showed the defector warts and all.

Regardless of the helpers’ motivation and affiliation, defectors benefited from their facilitation, which allowed them to tell their stories to a broad audience. Those who tried to publish independently were either rejected outright or published into obscurity. Only with the help of local supporters were Soviet intelligence officers successful in broadcasting their stories.

DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

REFERENCES

1 Vladimir Burtsev, “Е. Думбадзе: Первый Раскаявшийся Чекист” [E. Dumbadze: The First Repentant Chekist], Russia Illustrated, No. 12 (201), 16 March 1929.

2 The first “repentant chekist” to publish his story was an individual named Stefens, whose memoir, titled “Нравы и Работа ГПУ” [The Mores and Work of the GPU], appeared serially in the Paris émigré newspaper Vozrozhdenie in 1926. Stefens did not require a helper, because, according to his memoir, he walked into the offices of Vozrozhdenie and offered his story.

3 See, for example, “Исчезновение Думбадзе” [Dumbadze’s Disappearance], Vozrozhdenie, 1 March 1930, p. 1.

4 Yevgeniy Dumbadze, Na Sluzhe Cheka i Kominterna [In the Service of the Cheka and the Comintern] (Paris: Mishen, 1930).


Georgiy Agabekov, ЧК за рабо́той [The Cheka at Work] (Berlin: Strela, 1931); OGPU: The Russian Secret Terror (translated by Henry W. Bunn) (New York: Brentano’s, 1931).


Letter from F. S. Gilday to A. Barmine, dated 27 September 1944, NARA, RG 226, Entry UD 160, Box 27.


Samuel Sillen, “Nazi 105s Fired Reader’s Digest Anti-Soviet Slanders at GIs,” Daily Worker, 23 July 1945, p. 3.

Barmine, One Who Survived, p. xiv.


Alexander Orlov letter to Henry Luce, 10 June 1965, National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), Alexander Orlov Collection, Box 2.

Blind reviews of Orlov’s book and Orlov’s response, all undated, but as Orlov’s response references his November 1966 Reader’s Digest article, the reviews are later than that, NARA, Alexander Orlov Collection, Box 3.


Isaac Don Levine file, TNA, KV 2/1585.


31 Sinevirsky, editor’s note, pp. ix–xi.


38 B. Aleksandrov and K. Raspevon, “Mr. Brooke’s Trip was a Failure,” *Pravda*, 23 July 1965, translation available in CIA FOIA Reading Room, CIA-RDP75-00149R000100510040-4.pdf.


Aleksei Myagkov, Inside the KGB: An Expose by an Officer of the Third Directorate (Richmond, Surrey: Foreign Affairs Publishing, 1976).


Rocca and Dziak, Bibliography on Soviet Intelligence and Security Services, p. 67.


Story, “Soviet Analyst.”


Central Intelligence Group telegram to G-2 U.S. Forces European Theater (USFET), 22 April 1947, CIA FOIA Reading Room, CIA-RDP81-00706R000100260060-7.

Letter from Carmel Offie to Nicolaevsky, 29 April 1949, HIA, Nicolaevsky Collection, Box 497, Folder 35 (microfilm reel 386).


59 Mark Piros, “The Disillusioned: 12 Million Refugees from Communism,” October 1959, publication information not available. The monograph is available in the CIA FOIA Reading Room, CIA-RDP81-01043R004100140007-0, possibly indicating that the CIA was involved in its preparation.
66 Nikolay Grishin, Члены Геолого-Разведочной Группы No. 1 [Members of the Geologic Research Group No. 1], Columbia University Research Rare Book and Manuscript Library, Program on the USSR Archives.
Robert Eunson, “How We Nabbed Russia’s No. 1 Spy,” Saturday Evening Post, 25 September 1954, p. 27. Eunson does not mention MI6 involvement, either because he was not aware of it or because he was not authorized to mention it.


Yuri Rastvorov, “Beria’s Plot” and “The Soviet Hand in Korea,” HIA, Nikolaevsky Collection, Box 295, Folder 21.


Barbara Carr, Spy in the Sun (Cape Town: Howard Timmins, 1969).


Ibid., pp. 307–311.


Letter from S. T. Wood to Percy Sillitoe, 12 December 1946, TNA, KV 2/1419, serial 53a.


Manuscript reviewer comments, undated, NARA, Alexander Orlov papers, Box 3.
