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Full metadata record
DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Kojima, N | - |
dc.coverage.spatial | 25 | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2007-07-05T14:43:44Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2007-07-05T14:43:44Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2004 | - |
dc.identifier.citation | Economics and Finance Working papers, Brunel University, 04-06 | en |
dc.identifier.uri | http://bura.brunel.ac.uk/handle/2438/961 | - |
dc.description.abstract | The level of the IPO spread taken by the underwriter is a controversial issue. Some claim that the level is too high and attributes it to collusion between investment banks while others contend to the contrary. The paper examines the spread in the framework of conflicts of interests between the issuer, the underwriter and the informed investor. The argument is developed, based upon incentives for the underwriter. It is shown that the issuer should have the spread large enough for the underwriter to stay faithful to the issuer. | en |
dc.format.extent | 242960 bytes | - |
dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | - |
dc.language.iso | en | - |
dc.publisher | Brunel University | en |
dc.subject | IPO spread, asymmetric information, mechanism design | en |
dc.title | The IPO spread and conflicts of interests | en |
dc.type | Research Paper | en |
Appears in Collections: | Economics and Finance Dept of Economics and Finance Research Papers |
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