Corporate financing in transition: Implications for institutions and ownership

Abstract

The present thesis examines the implications of ownership and institutions for corporate financing in Central and Eastern Europe. There are three empirical chapters (chapters 2, 3 and 4). Chapter two examines the role of business networks for firm external financing. Our central hypothesis here is that firms’ affiliation to business association is likely to be beneficial in securing external finance (especially bank finance) in countries with weak legal and judicial institutions, as it helps banks and financial institutions to minimize the underlying agency costs of lending. Using recent EBRD-World Bank BEEPS data, we find some support to this central hypothesis in our sample.

Importance of foreign banks for economic development of CEE countries has been emphasized in the literature though there is wide dispersion in foreign investment in the region. In this context, chapter three (i.e., the second empirical chapter) focuses on the implications of corruption for foreign bank entry and ownership structure in Central and Eastern European countries. The chapter argues that the presence and persistence of corruption (both absolute and relative) may adversely affect costs of setting up as well as running day-to-day operations of foreign banks in host emerging economies. Using primarily Bankscope bank-level data we find that greater absolute and relative corruption may lower foreign bank entry, greater relative corruption may encourage foreign greenfield entry in our sample; while relative corruption is not significant for foreign takeover. The latter highlights the importance of encouraging foreign investors from countries with similar institutions.

Finally, considering the implications of ownership for bank capital and performance in chapter four (the final empirical chapter) in light of the focus on bank capital and capital regulation in discussions after the recent banking crisis, we argue that the relationship between bank capital and bank performance crucially depends on bank ownership structure. Using Osiris data we examine foreign greenfield and other joint venture (JV) differential effect of high bank capital on bank performance. A significant positive effect of foreign Greenfield (as opposed to JV) bank capital on bank performance, after controlling for all other factors is found. We attribute this to better governance compared to varied ownership arrangement in other joint venture banks.

Thus wide dispersion in the quality of institutions and ownership explains a great deal of variation in the economic performance of countries in the region. We hope findings of this thesis would inform policies and will also influence future research.