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DC Field | Value | Language |
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dc.contributor.author | Iossa, E | - |
dc.contributor.author | Legros, P | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2011-03-18T16:31:58Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2011-03-18T16:31:58Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2004 | - |
dc.identifier.citation | RAND Journal of Economics, 35(2): 356-372 (Summer 2004) | en_US |
dc.identifier.issn | 0741-6261 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://www.jstor.org/stable/1593695 | en |
dc.identifier.uri | http://bura.brunel.ac.uk/handle/2438/4836 | - |
dc.description | This is the official published version. Copyright @ 2004 RAND | en_US |
dc.description.abstract | Third-party audit provides incentives to an agent whose actions affect the value of an asset. When audit intensity and outcome are unverifiable, we show that with interim-participation constraints the optimal mechanism may use only the auditor's report, disregarding the agent's information. Furthermore, the auditor obtains the asset and the agent a monetary compensation, when a high asset value is reported. This suggests regulating renewable resources or utility networks by giving entrants the option to buy the right to use the asset at a predetermined price, and financially rewarding incumbents for good performance. | en_US |
dc.description.sponsorship | The second author used financial support of the Communaute francaise de Belgique (projet ARC 98/03-221) and EU TMR Network contract no. FMRX-CT98-0203. | en_US |
dc.language.iso | en | en_US |
dc.publisher | Blackwell Publishing on behalf of The RAND Corporation | en_US |
dc.title | Auditing and property rights | en_US |
dc.type | Research Paper | en_US |
Appears in Collections: | Economics and Finance Dept of Economics and Finance Research Papers |
Files in This Item:
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Fulltext.pdf | 491.13 kB | Adobe PDF | View/Open |
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