Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://bura.brunel.ac.uk/handle/2438/28438
Full metadata record
DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorRiehle, K-
dc.date.accessioned2024-02-29T16:23:23Z-
dc.date.available2024-02-29T16:23:23Z-
dc.date.issued2024-03-10-
dc.identifierORCiD: Kevin Riehle https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8711-9842-
dc.identifier.citationRiehle, K. (2024) 'The Ukraine War and the Shift in Russian Intelligence Priorities', Intelligence and National Security, 0 (ahead of print), pp. 1 - 17. doi: 10.1080/02684527.2024.2322807.en_US
dc.identifier.issn0268-4527-
dc.identifier.urihttps://bura.brunel.ac.uk/handle/2438/28438-
dc.description.abstractThe war in Ukraine has transformed Russian intelligence activities. It has drawn the bulk of Russian intelligence collection resources, both inside Ukraine and further afield, to focus on war-related, often low-level operational/tactical targets. Even strategic collection is related to the war, especially directed toward bolstering Russia’s global reputation. However, the war has also led to the dismantling of a large portion of Russia’s intelligence apparatus, including both human and signals intelligence, especially in Europe, just when it is needed the most. It has prompted greater scrutiny and international counterintelligence cooperation against Russian intelligence activities than has been seen since the 1980s. Russia’s own actions have drawn those reactions. Nevertheless, Russian intelligence services are resilient and persistent. They learn from mistakes and adapt to changing circumstances.en_US
dc.format.extent1 - 17-
dc.format.mediumPrint-Electronic-
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dc.publisherRoutledge (Taylor & Francis Group)en_US
dc.rightsCopyright © 2024 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. The terms on which this article has been published allow the posting of the Accepted Manuscript in a repository by the author(s) or with their consent.-
dc.rights.urihttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/-
dc.subjectRussiaen_US
dc.subjectUkraineen_US
dc.subjectRussian invasionen_US
dc.subjectintelligenceen_US
dc.subjectFSBen_US
dc.subjectGRUen_US
dc.subjectSVRen_US
dc.titleThe Ukraine War and the Shift in Russian Intelligence Prioritiesen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2024.2322807-
dc.relation.isPartOfIntelligence and National Security-
pubs.issue00-
pubs.publication-statusPublished online-
pubs.volume0-
dc.identifier.eissn1743-9019-
dc.rights.licensehttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/legalcode.en-
dc.rights.holderThe Author(s)-
Appears in Collections:Dept of Social and Political Sciences Research Papers

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat 
FullText.pdfCopyright © 2024 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. The terms on which this article has been published allow the posting of the Accepted Manuscript in a repository by the author(s) or with their consent.715.74 kBAdobe PDFView/Open


This item is licensed under a Creative Commons License Creative Commons