Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://bura.brunel.ac.uk/handle/2438/27466
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dc.contributor.authorAdams, M-
dc.contributor.authorKastrinaki, Z-
dc.date.accessioned2023-10-30T08:54:23Z-
dc.date.available2023-10-30T08:54:23Z-
dc.date.issued2023-08-17-
dc.identifierORCID iD: Zafeira Kastrinaki https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6090-5405-
dc.identifier.citationAdams, M. and Kastrinaki, M. (2023) 'Do Co-opted Boards Affect the Financial Performance of Insurance Firms?', Journal of Financial Services Research, 0 (ahead of print), pp. 1 - 29. doi: 10.1007/s10693-023-00418-2.en_US
dc.identifier.issn0920-8550-
dc.identifier.urihttps://bura.brunel.ac.uk/handle/2438/27466-
dc.description.abstractCopyright © The Author(s) 2023. We examine the performance-effects of Chief Executive Officer (CEO) co-opted boards in United Kingdom (UK) property-casualty insurers. We report that board insiders appointed in the aftermath of CEO succession reduce profitability, but bolster solvency. Enhanced solvency also results when the CEO is a financial expert and when proportionately more inside directors are selected by a CEO who is a financial expert. We further find enhanced profitability-effects for insurance experienced co-opted outside directors, while large investors improve solvency. However, the internal or external origin of the CEO does not affect financial outcomes. We consider that our results could have commercial and/or public policy implications.en_US
dc.format.extent1 - 29-
dc.format.mediumPrint-Electronic-
dc.languageEnglish-
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dc.rightsCopyright © The Author(s) 2023. Rights and permissions: Open Access. This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License, which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons licence, and indicate if changes were made. The images or other third party material in this article are included in the article's Creative Commons licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the article's Creative Commons licence and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder. To view a copy of this licence, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/.-
dc.rights.urihttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/-
dc.subjectco-opted boardsen_US
dc.subjectprofitabilityen_US
dc.subjectsolvencyen_US
dc.subjectinsuranceen_US
dc.subjectJEL classification G22en_US
dc.titleDo Co-opted Boards Affect the Financial Performance of Insurance Firms?en_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1007/s10693-023-00418-2-
dc.relation.isPartOfJournal of Financial Services Research-
pubs.issueahead of print-
pubs.publication-statusPublished online-
pubs.volume0-
dc.identifier.eissn1573-0735-
dc.rights.holderThe Author(s)-
Appears in Collections:Brunel Business School Research Papers

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