Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://bura.brunel.ac.uk/handle/2438/27364
Full metadata record
DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorGorelkina, O-
dc.contributor.authorGrypari, I-
dc.contributor.authorHengel, E-
dc.date.accessioned2023-10-11T12:11:21Z-
dc.date.available2023-10-11T12:11:21Z-
dc.date.issued2022-07-26-
dc.identifierORCID iDs: Olga Gorelkina https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0873-8873; Erin Hengel https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2039-3521-
dc.identifier.citationGorelkina, O., Grypari, I. and Hengel, E. (2023) 'The theory of straight ticket voting', Social Choice and Welfare, 60 (3), pp. 365 - 381. doi: 10.1007/s00355-022-01418-2.en_US
dc.identifier.issn0176-1714-
dc.identifier.urihttps://bura.brunel.ac.uk/handle/2438/27364-
dc.descriptionSupplementary Information is available online at https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s00355-022-01418-2#Sec150 .-
dc.description.abstractCopyright © The Author(s) 2022. This paper explores the effects of the straight-ticket voting option (STVO) on the positions of politicians. STVO, present in some US states, allows voters to select one party for all partisan elections listed on the ballot, as opposed to filling out each office individually. We analyse the effects of STVO on policy-making by building a model of pre-election competition. STVO results in greater party loyalty of candidates, while increasing the weight of non-partisan voters’ positions in candidate selection. This induces an asymmetric effect on vote shares and implemented policies in the two-party system.en_US
dc.description.sponsorshipMax Planck Society.en_US
dc.format.extent365 - 381-
dc.format.mediumPrint-English-
dc.languageEnglish-
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dc.publisherSpringer Natureen_US
dc.rightsCopyright © The Author(s) 2022. Rights and permissions: Open Access. This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License, which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons licence, and indicate if changes were made. The images or other third party material in this article are included in the article's Creative Commons licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the article's Creative Commons licence and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder. To view a copy of this licence, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/.-
dc.rights.urihttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/.-
dc.titleThe theory of straight ticket votingen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-022-01418-2-
dc.relation.isPartOfSocial Choice and Welfare-
pubs.issue3-
pubs.publication-statusPublished-
pubs.volume60-
dc.identifier.eissn1432-217X-
dc.rights.holderThe Author(s)-
Appears in Collections:Dept of Economics and Finance Research Papers

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat 
FullText.pdfCopyright © The Author(s) 2022. Rights and permissions: Open Access. This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License, which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons licence, and indicate if changes were made. The images or other third party material in this article are included in the article's Creative Commons licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the article's Creative Commons licence and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder. To view a copy of this licence, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/.1.17 MBAdobe PDFView/Open


This item is licensed under a Creative Commons License Creative Commons