Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://bura.brunel.ac.uk/handle/2438/26992
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dc.contributor.authorAbrusci, E-
dc.contributor.authorMackenzie-Gray Scott, R-
dc.date.accessioned2023-08-19T08:58:52Z-
dc.date.available2023-08-19T08:58:52Z-
dc.date.issued2023-07-21-
dc.identifierORCID iD: Elena Abrusci https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7436-5369-
dc.identifier.citationAbrusci, E. and Mackenzie-Gray Scott, R. (2023) 'The questionable necessity of a new human right against being subject to automated decision-making', International Journal of Law and Information Technology, 31 (2), pp. 114 - 143. doi: 10.1093/ijlit/eaad013.en_US
dc.identifier.issn0967-0769-
dc.identifier.urihttps://bura.brunel.ac.uk/handle/2438/26992-
dc.description.abstractCopyright © The Author(s) 2023. The development and interest in decision-making that is or can be automated have opened the doors of debate regarding the form and substance of related means of regulating its application. Part of this discourse involves proposals advocating for the creation of a new human right not to be subject to an automated decision. This article questions whether such a right is necessary in light of existing substantive rules under legal frameworks already applicable to automated decision-making, specifically data protection, non-discrimination and human rights. There are also procedural challenges requiring treatment if automated decision-making is to be adequately addressed by application of the law. Exploring these challenges helps appreciate the significance of ensuring that existing substantive law is better implemented for the purpose of protecting human beings in settings where automated decision-making poses risks to individuals and groups.</jats:p>en_US
dc.description.sponsorshipBritish Academy (grant no. BAR00550-BA00.01).en_US
dc.format.extent114 - 142-
dc.format.mediumPrint-Electronic-
dc.languageEnglish-
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publisherOxford University Press (OUP)en_US
dc.rightsCopyright © The Author(s) 2023. Published by Oxford University Press. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted reuse, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.-
dc.rights.urihttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/-
dc.subjectlaw and technologyen_US
dc.subjectautomated decision-makingen_US
dc.subjectdata protectionen_US
dc.subjectnon-discriminationen_US
dc.subjecthuman rightsen_US
dc.subjectprocedural safeguardsen_US
dc.titleThe questionable necessity of a new human right against being subject to automated decision-makingen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1093/ijlit/eaad013-
dc.relation.isPartOfInternational Journal of Law and Information Technology-
pubs.issue2-
pubs.publication-statusPublished online-
pubs.volume31-
dc.identifier.eissn1464-3693-
dc.rights.holderThe Author(s)-
Appears in Collections:Brunel Law School Research Papers

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