Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://bura.brunel.ac.uk/handle/2438/26373
Title: Positional preferences and efficiency in a dynamic economy
Authors: Aronsson, T
Ghosh, S
Wendner, R
Issue Date: 14-Feb-2023
Publisher: Springer Nature
Citation: Aronsson, T., Ghosh, S. and Wendner, R. (2023) 'Positional preferences and efficiency in a dynamic economy', Social Choice and Welfare, 0 (ahead-of-print), pp. 1 - 27. doi: 10.1007/s00355-022-01447-x.
Abstract: Copyright © The Author(s) 2023. In an endogenous growth model, we characterize the conditions under which positional preferences for consumption and wealth do not cause inefficiency and derive an optimal tax policy response in cases where these conditions are not satisfied. The concerns for relative consumption and relative wealth partly emanate from social comparisons with people in other countries. We distinguish between a (conventional) welfarist government and a non-welfarist government that does not attach any social value to relative concerns. We also compare the outcome of Nash-competition among local/national governments with the resource allocation implied by a global social optimum both under welfarism and non-welfarism.
URI: https://bura.brunel.ac.uk/handle/2438/26373
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-022-01447-x
ISSN: 0176-1714
Other Identifiers: ORCID iDs: Sugata Ghosh https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8431-0473; Ronald Wendner https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1938-1424.
Appears in Collections:Dept of Economics and Finance Research Papers

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