The United States’ psychological strategy board and operations coordinating board: national assessments and the Middle East, 1951 - 1958

Abstract

This study examines the American intelligence community (IC) and the national security planning and coordination elements tasked with developing strategy and policy for the Middle East from the end of the Second World War to the invasion of Lebanon in 1958. While the history of American-Middle East foreign policy has been covered in the literature extensively, what has yet to receive the proper attention has been the role of special ‘planning and coordination elements’ established within the American intelligence and national security architecture after the Second World War. This study focuses on two of these elements: specifically, the Psychological Strategy Board (1951-1953) and the Operations Coordinating Board (1953-1961). This study asks the questions: can newly declassified archival material now available on the Psychological Strategy Board and the Operations Coordinating Board be used to provide greater context and new insights into America’s Cold War policy in the Middle East from (1951 – 1958)? What were these two coordination boards and what were the strategy and policy impacts that they had on American foreign policy to the Middle East? In the process, this study provides a comprehensive history of these two under-studied (and significant) boards adding substantially to our understanding of the American national security and intelligence history.