Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://bura.brunel.ac.uk/handle/2438/23610
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dc.contributor.authorRollason, W-
dc.contributor.authorHirsch, E-
dc.date.accessioned2021-11-26T10:08:32Z-
dc.date.available2021-11-26T10:08:32Z-
dc.date.issued2021-07-01-
dc.identifierORCID iDs: Will Rollason https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5250-8370; Eric Hirsh https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1690-9871.-
dc.identifier.citationRollason, W. and Hirsch, E. 'Compliance: Politics, Sociability and the Constitution of Collective Life', Journal of Legal Anthropology, 5 (1), pp. 1 - 31. doi: 10.3167/jla.2021.050101.en_US
dc.identifier.issn1758-9576-
dc.identifier.urihttps://bura.brunel.ac.uk/handle/2438/23610-
dc.description.abstractCopyright: © The Author(s) 2021. What kind of phenomenon is it when ordinary people in the United Kingdom unexpectedly abide by government advice on social distancing in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, even anticipating constraints on their activities? These happenings demand that we engage anthropologically with compliance – acts or activities that conform, submit or adapt to rules or to the demands of others. At present, there is no ‘an thropology of compliance’. Rather, the discipline has inherited traditions of thought about compliance – as a necessary aspect of sociability or a morally suspect complicity, demanding resistance. These assumptions remain unexamined, but profoundly shape anthropological scholar ship. This introduction aims to show how and why compliance might be a useful heuristic for anthropology. We define compliance as that set of means by which actors strive to accommodate themselves to others in their collective life. We argue that this conception of compliance allows us to multiply the kinds of phenomena we can call ‘political’. It allows us to think about the political constitution of ‘radical’ difference, but to avoid making people identical with their cultural or conceptual worlds. By showing what compliance is and how it operates in and on social life, we ought therefore to be able to recover both specific forms of suffering and inequality and the ways in which social lives are constitutively different.en_US
dc.format.extent1 - 31-
dc.format.mediumPrint-Electronic-
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publisherBerghahn Booksen_US
dc.rightsCopyright: © The Author(s) 2021.-
dc.rights.urihttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/-
dc.subjectanthropologyen_US
dc.subjectcomplianceen_US
dc.subjectCOVID-19en_US
dc.subjectcollective lifeen_US
dc.subjectsocial lifeen_US
dc.subjecttyrannyen_US
dc.titleCompliance: Politics, Sociability and the Constitution of Collective Lifeen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.3167/jla.2021.050101-
dc.relation.isPartOfJournal of Legal Anthropology-
pubs.issue1-
pubs.publication-statusPublished-
pubs.volume5-
dc.identifier.eissn1758-9584-
Appears in Collections:Anthropology
Dept of Social and Political Sciences Research Papers

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