Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://bura.brunel.ac.uk/handle/2438/21253
Title: The interface between the General Authority for Competition and regulatory agencies in Saudi Arabia: Obstacles & Reforms
Authors: Alkahtani, Turki Mesfer
Advisors: Malinauskaite, J
Keywords: Saudi Competition Law;General Authority for Competition;Regulatory agencies;Saudi legal system;Sharia
Issue Date: 2020
Publisher: Brunel University London
Abstract: This thesis investigates the impact of the introduction of Competition Law in three regulated sectors in Saudi Arabia, namely Telecommunications, Electricity and Civil Aviation. The analysis aims to test the current practices of the Council of Competition and the regulatory agencies of the regulated sectors regarding how competition is regulated and explore the challenges and obstacles that these institutions face in the performance of their functions. Additionally, this Thesis discusses the interplay between Competition law and the sectoral regulations in the Saudi system. While Competition Law is enforced by the Council of Competition in the whole market, the sectoral regulations are enforced by the regulatory agencies in the regulated markets, and each sectoral regulation has its own competition rules. The main issue in this regard is the conflict between the provisions of Competition Law and the competition rules included in the sectoral regulations. Also, the absence of a clear relationship between the Council of Competition and the regulatory agencies, which leads to conflicts of institutional jurisdiction between these authorities and the double consideration of cases by both the Council of Competition and the regulatory agencies. The thesis attempts to fill this gap by examining the viability of adopting two main models: exclusive and complementary. The exclusive model grants exclusive power to power to the Council of Competition to enforce Competition Law exclusively in the regulated markets. In contrast, adopting the complementary model of delineating the relationship between these institutions would lead to a division of power between the Council of Competition and the regulatory agencies by mandating authority for the regulatory agencies to enforce Competition Law or the competition rules in the sectoral regulations. If this model is chosen it needs to set up clear mechanisms for cooperation and coordination among those authorities, so that the existing enforcement problems are eradicated.
Description: This thesis was submitted for the award of Doctor of Philosophy and was awarded by Brunel University London
URI: http://bura.brunel.ac.uk/handle/2438/21253
Appears in Collections:Law
Brunel Law School Theses

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