Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://bura.brunel.ac.uk/handle/2438/21174
Title: Preselection and expert advice
Authors: Schulte, E
Felgenhauer, M
Keywords: Reputation;cheap talk.;safe haven
Issue Date: 6-Oct-2016
Publisher: Springer Verlag
Citation: Schulte, E., Felgenhauer, M. Preselection and expert advice. Int J Game Theory 46, 693–714 (2017). doi: 10.1007/s00182-016-0551-9
Abstract: We study the effects of preselection on an expert’s advice about the execution of a project if its execution yields more precise estimates about the expert’s expertise. The in troduction of a preselection stage, in which the decision maker evaluates the project before asking for advice, alters the expert’s perception of the problem. We identify conditions under which preselection occurs in equilibrium. We show that if the expert adjusts his behavior, the option to preselect may reduce the expected utility of the decision maker.
Description: "The final authenticated version is available online at https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-016-0551-9
URI: http://bura.brunel.ac.uk/handle/2438/21174
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00182-016-0551-9
ISSN: 0020-7276
Appears in Collections:Dept of Economics and Finance Research Papers

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