Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://bura.brunel.ac.uk/handle/2438/17511
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dc.contributor.authorFischer, S-
dc.contributor.authorGrechenig, K-
dc.contributor.authorMeier, N-
dc.date.accessioned2019-02-20T12:03:54Z-
dc.date.available2016-09-29-
dc.date.available2019-02-20T12:03:54Z-
dc.date.issued2016-09-29-
dc.identifier.citationFrontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience, 2016, 10 (SEP)en_US
dc.identifier.issn1662-5153-
dc.identifier.issnhttp://dx.doi.org/10.3389/fnbeh.2016.00180-
dc.identifier.urihttp://bura.brunel.ac.uk/handle/2438/17511-
dc.description.abstractWe run several experiments which allow us to compare cooperation under perfect and imperfect information in a centralized and decentralized punishment regime. Under perfect and extremely noisy information, aggregate behavior does not differ between institutions. Under intermediate noise, punishment escalates in the decentralized peer-to-peer punishment regime which badly affects efficiency while sustaining cooperation for longer. Only decentralized punishment is often directed at cooperators (perverse punishment). We report several, sometimes subtle, differences in punishment behavior, and how contributions react.en_US
dc.description.sponsorshipMax Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goodsen_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publisherFrontiers Mediaen_US
dc.subjectcooperationen_US
dc.subjectpublic gooden_US
dc.subjectcentralized punishmenten_US
dc.subjectimperfect informationen_US
dc.subjectanti-social punishmenten_US
dc.subjectperverse punishmenten_US
dc.titleMonopolizing sanctioning power under noise eliminates perverse punishment but does not increase cooperationen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.identifier.doihttp://dx.doi.org/10.3389/fnbeh.2016.00180-
dc.relation.isPartOfFrontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience-
pubs.issueSEP-
pubs.publication-statusPublished-
pubs.volume10-
Appears in Collections:Dept of Economics and Finance Research Papers

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