Firm’s value, financing constraints and dividend policy in relation to firm’s political connections

Abstract

The relationship between politicians and firms has attracted a considerable amount of research, especially in developing countries, where firms’ political links are a widespread phenomenon. However, existing literature offers contradicting views about this relationship, espicially regarding the impact of firms’ political connections on firms’ market-performance. Furthermore, there is limited evidence on the impact of firms’ political connections on some of the important corporate decisions, including firms’ investment- and dividend-policies. Therefore, this thesis seeks to fill these gaps by offering three empirical essays with Jordan as a case study. The first essay examines the impact of firms’ political links on their values by controlling for macroeconomic conditions. Also, in the extended models, by specifying three major events which occurred after 2008, namely, the establishment of the Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC), the Global Financial Crisis, and the Arab Uprisings, we investigate the effects of these events on the relationship between firms’ political ties and their value. The findings of this essay indicate that politically-connected firms have higher values compared to their non-connected counterparts in Jordan. Moreover, it is found that firms with stronger political-ties have higher values than firms with weaker ties. Furthermore, the positive effect of political connections continues, even after controlling for the macroeconomic conditions, though the latter are considered to be more important than political connections for firm valuation due to their impact on the share price. Interestingly, findings show that the events occurring after 2008 do not seem to have affected the relationship between political connections and firm value since the significant positive impact of political-ties on firm value persists during the post-event period. The second empirical essay studies the role of political connections in mitigating firms’ financing-constraints. Moreover, it investigates the effect of the strength of political connections in alleviating these constraints. Finally, it looks at the impact of the above-mentioned three events which occurred after 2008, notwithstanding the new banking Corporate Governance Code issued in 2007. Findings of this essay reveal that firms’ political connections are important in mitigating their financing-constraints. Furthermore, the results show that stronger political connections seem to reduce financing-constraints more than weaker connections. Finally, findings show that the impact of firms’ political connections has diminished during the post-event period (2008 – 2014). The third essay examines how a firm’s political connections can affect its dividend-policy. It also considers the impact of the strength of political connections on dividend-policy. Finally, we extend the empirical analysis by investigating any shift in the relationship between political connections and dividends due to the events of the Global Financial Crisis, the Arab Uprisings, and the adoption of the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). Results of this essay reveal that a firm's political connections have a significant positive impact on both the propensity to pay dividends and the dividend-payout ratio. Regarding the impact of the strength of political connections on dividends, it is found that firms with weaker political connections pay out more in dividends than firms with stronger connections. In terms of the impact of the events which occurred after 2008 on the relationship between political connections and dividends, the findings show that the impact of these connections on dividends is eliminated.