How do listing requirements impact firms: The case of AIM

Abstract

The restrictive listing requirements imposed by the Main Market of the London Stock Exchange results in the listing of high quality companies, while at the same time provides a higher degree of investor protection. These requirements can however be an obstacle for small and growing companies to go public and raise capital. Thus AIM has developed in order to facilitate the growth of these companies by its lighter listing requirements. This thesis is focused on three outcomes of the lighter listing requirements of AIM. First, AIM companies have a high ownership concentration and lower investor protection, thus enabling blockholders to have a significant impact on their value. This thesis finds that non-managerial and managerial blockholders have quadratic and cubic relationships with firm value respectively. Also, both types of blockholder increase the value of the firm until the first break point which is approximately 30 percent. This is almost exactly the point that the LSE defines as a cut-off point at which the blockholder is regarded as a controlling shareholder. Second, companies moving from the Main market to the AIM impair their information environment when entering the AIM; the information environment is measured by the stock’s liquidity and volatility. This thesis finds that firms experience lower trading activity and lower trading volume, which results in lower liquidity and volatility than matched companies that remain in the Main Market. Third, IPOs listing in the AIM are underpriced in order to compensate for risk. However, the level of underpricing can be alleviated by appointing a reputable Nomad. Underpricing facilitates IPOs to achieve higher aftermarket liquidity in two ways: First, directly by attracting investor attention; and second by diversifying ownership. However, aftermarket liquidity is evident for a longer period than other markets because of a longer lock up period.