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No. 2 WANTS, NEEDS & INTERESTS

KEITH M DOWDING



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
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Abstract

WANTS, NEEDS AND INTERESTS

Keith M. Dowding

I develop three theses - ontological, epistemological and methodological - about interests. The first shows that, due to the relationship between wants and needs, individuals may not always be aware of their own best interests. The second shows that for many interests an observer may sometimes be in as good or a better position than the individual to judge this best interests. The third shows that we can discover individual interests by studying behaviour, but we require both a theory of action and knowledge of individuals' choice situation. This approach is compatible with the tenets of liberalism and mainstream political science whilst allowing for the possibility of more 'radical' conclusions about power and freedom.



1. Introduction

'Preferences', 'wants', 'needs', 'desires' and 'interests' are all used in political analysis. The precise meanings of and relationships between these words are hotly contested; some would say they are essentially contestable.¹ Perhaps 'preferences', 'wants' and 'desires' are the closest in meaning, though I may be said to prefer x to y whilst not really wanting either. An individual's preference scale goes all the way down to hates and fears. In some sense, I may be said to want to do whatever I do, yet it cannot be said that I desire to do everything I do.² 'Need' is rather different. Individuals may have needs which they do not want, whether 'need' is defined intrinsically or only instrumentally. I shall argue that it is best to define 'need' only instrumentally; nevertheless I may still have needs which I do not want. I may want x, and need to do y in order to get it, yet at the same time prefer not to do y (see section 3). 'Interests' is perhaps the most encompassing term of them all. I shall argue that one's interests are not only dependent upon one's wants and desires,³ but also upon one's needs. I shall defend three theses.

(1) 'Ontological Thesis' - what is in one's interests is much more than what one merely wants or desires, because

interests are partially dependent upon needs. Individuals may be wrong about their own interests because they are unaware of the particular needs concomitant upon their desires. We can make sense of 'objective' interests without entirely divorcing those interests from individuals' own deep-rooted desires.

(2) 'Epistemological Thesis' - whilst some interests are entirely dependent upon certain wants and desires which may be said just to happen (they are endogenous to an individual), most interests are also dependent upon factors external to the individual (they are exogenous to the individual). If we can know an individual's endogenous wants and desires, we may then be able to discover his interests in precisely the same way as he does himself. Thus interests may be said to be 'objective' in a further sense; they are open to inspection by all and individuals do not have privileged access to their own interests.

(3) 'Methodological Thesis' - we can discover individuals' interests by studying their behaviour. But the behavioural method must include both a theory of action and knowledge of individuals' choice situation. Behaviouralism has been attacked by many political scientists; rather what they mean to criticise is not behaviouralism as such, but bad behaviouralism.⁴ That is, behaviouralism which has neither a theory of action nor takes into account all the relevant features of individuals' choice situations. However, armed with innocuous assumptions about wants and desires and with

analysis of the conditions under which choice is made, we can discover what individuals' interests are. We are then in a position to decide which policies are likely to further those interests and which are likely to hinder them.

These three theses may sustain conclusions more 'radical' than the analysis of interests normally associated with behaviouralism. They allow us to maintain an empirical political science whilst recognizing that individuals are not always the best judges of their own interests. We may maintain critiques of early pluralist accounts of the distribution of power in modern society without importing further normative assumptions.⁵

2. 'Privileged Access'

Starkly opposed to the 'Ontological Thesis' above is the claim of 'privileged access'. This states that individuals are the best (or only judges) of their own interests. This view tends to equate wants or desires with interests. It has been described as an empirical claim. What at any moment I believe to be in my own interests is in fact at that moment in my interests. It is not something I can be wrong about.⁶ A weaker version of it includes counterfactuals. What I hold to be in my interests may not in fact be so; and if I were to be given the correct information at the time of the belief claim I may recognize

this. In any given interest claim therefore, I recognize that I may be wrong, though at the time I assume I am not. If I believe that nuclear power is dangerous because the scientists tell me so and expensive because the economists tell me so, then I may well calculate that it is in my interests for Britain to have coal- or oil-fired power stations rather than nuclear ones. But if the scientists and economists are wrong and nuclear power is safe and inexpensive in the long run, then I may well make a different calculation. This failure on the part of individuals to understand their own interests is a failure in belief acquisition and/or mode of reasoning. It does not suggest that individuals may make errors in their judgements about intrinsic value. It could only lead to this further error in so far as judgements about intrinsic value depend upon individuals beliefs about the world and their modes of reasoning.⁷

I take this to be an innocuous conclusion. After all, we are all, bar the most bigoted, willing to admit that some of our beliefs are wrong, even if we do not know which ones. In the preface paradox, the philosopher writes in the preface to her book, that whilst she believes that each of her conclusions is true, she knows that some are false. I will analyse the nature of this type of incorrect beliefs about interests in order to make better sense of the idea of 'objective' interests.

3. Wants and Needs.

'Need' has proved to be a controversial topic in political theory because of competing views about what humans need in order to lead a flourishing life. A debate in these terms is bound to be morally loaded and I will not belittle it.⁸ There are certain needs to be met before individuals can lead flourishing lives and many of these may be demonstrated with careful empirical analysis. But I am going to analyse the topic of 'need' (here) purely as a modal term.⁹ It is compatible with Brian Barry's statement that 'need' cannot by itself provide a justificatory principle for some policy because

"no statement to the effect that x is necessary in order to produce y provides a reason for doing x. Before it can provide such a reason y must be shown to be (or taken to be) a desirable end to pursue."¹⁰

In order to produce some desired ends individuals may have certain needs of which they are unaware. 'Need' is a modal term expressing a necessity, such that to say X needs to perform some action, A, or requires some object, A, is to say that it is necessary for X to do A; but it is a prospective necessity: that is, it is only necessary because X wants something else.¹¹ 'Need' expresses a relation, which is a certain kind of necessity, between one of a number of options (the one that is said to be needed) and, in this case, an individual. What is said to be needed must be some state of affairs, and if a particular

good, action or policy is the only thing capable of standing in a causal relation between the need and the satisfaction of that need it must be necessary too. Thus individuals may seem to have some intrinsic needs because they are so closely tied to the desired states of affairs. But the need must always be justified with relation to the further object.

Thus the use of 'need' here is not normative, for it is the existence of the further object that makes the need necessary, not its value or desirability. The use is objective. Further, there is a logical difference between wanting and needing. Want, unlike need, has no necessary reference to some further object in virtue of which it is wanted. White says:

"Hence, the idea of a reason is differently related to needs and wants. Someone can want to V either for some reason or just because one wants to V; but one cannot need to V just because one needs to V. There has to be an explanation of why he needs to V."¹²

It is not strictly true that individuals may want to V for no reason at all. We have to be able to make sense of purported wants, but the reasoning which allows this is not related to those wants in the same way as it is related to needs. Whilst we can understand that individuals have tastes which differ from our own and not question them, we have to be able to make sense of their expression. I do not have to give reasons why I have a sweet tooth, but if I expressed the belief that I had a sweet tooth yet did not

like chocolate, or sugar, or sweetcakes or anything ordinarily considered sweet that professed belief would require explanation. Bizarre desires for "water on the head" may not even be intelligible.¹³ Even simple wants must make sense. More complex wants may also need justification. Life-plans, for example, need justification. To proclaim a desire to get married but be unable to say why one desired marriage would be puzzling.

A further and deeper difference between wants and needs arises through the intensionality of the mental. If an individual needs an object under some particular description of it, it does not follow that he needs a particular object, just one which falls under that description. But whilst one can want something under one description but not under another, one cannot need something under one description rather than another.

"To want to kill the man who is blocking your escape does not [entail] wanting to kill your own son, even though it is your son who is blocking your escape. What one needs, on the other hand, one needs whatever its description. If in order to escape, one needs to kill the man blocking one's way and the man is one's own son, then one needs to kill one's own son."¹⁴

The reason for this is the intensionality of the mental, namely that

"what we believe or want or favour is always some proposition or other...what we take for reflecting upon are...bits of reality considered under [various] aspects."¹⁵

Whilst I may have my own (perhaps peculiar) reasons for wanting something, I cannot have my own reasons for needing something. Those reasons are general (objective) reasons and not individual (subjective) ones. However, the assignation of utility or value to something depends upon the way we understand it - we value it under some particular descriptions and not others. Any ascription of wants entails, given the extant circumstances, a set of needs. These needs hold, no matter what the individuals recognize about them. I want to escape and hence need to kill the man blocking my escape. I may want not to kill my son who happens to be the man blocking my escape. Two wants here happen to conflict. Once that conflict is recognized, one want may disappear. Our wants are not clearly formulated prior to our experience of the environment, and during our experience of it they change. A recognition of the needs of our desires may well change those desires, but the desires and their needs should be carefully separated in analysis.

So there are at least two ways I may be wrong in believing that some course of action is in my interests. Firstly, I may be right in believing that I need u in order to get the desired x, but be unaware that u also leads to the consequence y which is feared more than x is desired. (If u is truly necessary for x to be satisfied then this is the same as saying that I desire x under one description but not under another.) Secondly, I may desire x yet be

unaware that I need u in order to get it and so oppose u despite my desire for x outweighing my opposition to u.

Thus the 'Ontological Thesis' - individuals may be wrong about their own interests because interests are dependent upon the needs which spring from one's own desires. Individuals may be unaware of these needs and hence unaware of their own interests. Analysis of interests in terms of needs gives an objective account of interests.

4. The 'Epistemological Thesis'

How do individuals develop desires? For the 'liberal' analysis of interests this does not matter. That individuals have them is good enough. We proceed from there. For the purposes of political analysis the 'liberal' approach is a good start, from which we may provide a reflexive account that says more about desire generation.

We may begin with an ostensive categorical distinction. There are two sorts of interest 'endogenous' and 'exogenous'.¹⁶ A simple way of putting the distinction suggests that endogenous interests are ones that we just have. We like apple pie and we thus have an interest in the production of good-quality apple pies. We can say we have our endogenous interests in virtue of our personal

characters (however those characters are developed). An exogenous interest is one which we have in virtue of the circumstances in which we find ourselves. A coal miner has an interest in the wages and work conditions of coal miners, a shop assistant in the wages and work conditions of shop assistants. So do the owners or managers of coal mines and shops, though of course the two sets of interests may be in direct conflict. These interests can be said to be exogenous because person i only has a particular interest in the wages and work conditions of coal mines because he is a miner. If i was a shop assistant then, whilst he might still desire that coal miners be well paid and work under safe conditions, he has a more particular interest in the wages and working conditions of shop assistants. And the interests of shop assistants and coal miners may come into conflict. Person i would also have different interests if he were the owner of the coal mine. He would have these different interests whilst remaining unaltered under every other description. This analysis does not entail that interests are structurally determined, though it does imply that interests are structurally suggested. That is, when deciding what our interests are, the most important considerations are those aspects of the reality around us which affect us most deeply.

We do not need to make any particular assumptions about individual desires in this thesis. A careful analysis of a particular individual's behaviour, given his beliefs, can

allow us to understand his desires, and to criticize them if they are based upon false belief, or to criticize his actions if they are not the best means to his ends. Given his actions and wants, we can discover his belief set, and likewise criticize that if it does not fit in with the reality around him. However, we do need to make particular assumptions about underlying desires under the methodological thesis. A model explaining the actions of individuals in the above examples might assume that ceteris paribus individuals desire higher rather than lower wages for themselves and better rather than worse work conditions. They assume that ceteris paribus owners of factors of production prefer higher rather than lower profits, and so far as this is achieved by paying lower wages and having poorer working conditions for employees then that is what they desire. But I take these assumptions as innocuous. The analysis only requires the central assumption of neo-classical economic theory, viz rational individuals allocate resources in order to maximize their marginal utility. Different models can operate with different types of standard economic assumption; self-interest, altruism or a mixture of both. It can assume that people are more willing to help their family, friends, workmates or countrymen than aliens. It can use any set of assumptions about personal desires to argue that individuals have interests externally defined by the position which they occupy in the social system. Having said that, however, we may not wish to hold that

desires may vary without restriction. Barry and Rae suggest that interest:

"always appears to have carried an emphasis on material advantage and thus to find its home especially in economic and quasi-economic discourse."¹⁷

We may thus not want to say that it is in someone's interests to have food sent to Ethiopia, even though she is morally committed to famine relief.

The ostensive categorical distinction is what it states. It is ostensive definition of two categories which makes a distinction which may be useful for social analysis. But the distinction is hard to maintain as a natural category. Dunleavy, for example, treats the anti-nuclear movement as an endogenous group. For some purposes, that is adequate; people do decide whether or not they think nuclear power is a good or bad thing. The decision to join or leave the group set is a decision. In Hirschman's terms, once one has decided to leave Exit is easy, indeed the decision to leave is Exit from the identity set.¹⁸ But of course, individuals do not make important decisions like these in a vacuum. They make decisions within the social situation in which they find themselves. We would be likely to define as exogenous an individual's interests in relation to nuclear power if he worked at a nuclear power station. But I think the distinction is useful for social scientific research, as I shall show when discussing the 'methodological thesis'.

This analysis has an important epistemological point. The considerations which enter into an individual's own calculations of his best interests are precisely the same considerations which enter into anyone else's calculations of that individual's best interests. If we make the right assumptions about his desires and we know his situation as well as he does, then we can make the same calculation. If we know his situation better than he, then we can calculate his interests better than he can.

This conclusion may be controversial. But it is also incontrovertible. In order to dispute it the critic must argue against the modal status of 'need' and/or against the fact that individuals make decisions in the light of the reality that they perceive around them. But the desire to dispute the conclusion proceeds from the natural fear that it entails that individuals should be ordered around by those better able to calculate their interests.¹⁹ The argument does not entail this conclusion, though it does imply it. But implications are cancelable and, in given cases, this implication may be cancelled by a whole host of good reasons. I am not going to consider those good moral reasons here. I will simply state that at times it may be right to force people to do against their will what is in their best interests, but that generally speaking it is not. When those right times occur in political situations will always be controversial. However, my interest in this paper is not with moral questions of policy formation, but

rather with social scientific methodology. The argument above justifies a behavioural approach to political analysis, yet it questions the way some behaviouralists have gone about their work. I wish to spell out a 'Methodological Thesis' which follows from the Ontological and Epistemological ones. In doing so I will argue that more 'radical' accounts of the structure of interests and power may be sustained than previous behaviouralists have suggested.

5. The 'Methodological Thesis'

Much of the debate over the nature of political interests has been couched in terms of Steven Lukes' suggested three types of analysis. Firstly, the 'liberal' view which

"takes men as they are and applies want-regarding principles to them, relating their interests to what they actually want or prefer, to their policy preferences as manifested by their political participation."

Secondly, the 'reformist' position, which sees that not all wants and preferences are revealed by the political system; but, whilst it still equates interests with preferences, it

"allows that this may be revealed in more indirect and sub-political ways - in the form of deflected, submerged or concealed wants and preferences."

And finally, the 'radical' view which

"maintains that men's wants may themselves be a product of a system which works against their interests, and, in such cases, relates the latter

to what they would want and prefer were they able to make the choice."²⁰

The distinction between the three, whilst partly normative as Lukes argues, is largely methodological. Lukes believes that the first definition is required for behaviouralist approaches to political analysis. However, this is only so if we equate interest and action. Such an equation is most clearly seen in the work of Bentley,²¹ but also emerges less explicitly in many modern analyses. A fairly circumspect analysis of interest in the liberal tradition is given by Nelson Polsby when he says:

"It is...compatible with other pluralist beliefs to assert, at least a priori, that what an individual or group wants, or what they say they want, or in some way indicate they want is, by definition, what their political interests are."²²

Polsby is aware of some of the costs of such a definition. It makes it difficult to raise the issue of the relationship between preferences and interests as otherwise defined. For example, it makes it difficult to analyse the suggestion that someone acted against their own best interests. So Polsby suggests two supplementary axioms:

- (1) the relationships between the causes and effects are frequently well and generally understood in a large number of situations in which human beings are faced with choices that have direct consequences for their overall value positions,
- (2) people generally try to maintain or improve their overall value positions. When they choose not to maintain

or improve their overall value positions in situations where the causes and effects are clearly specified and well known, they can be said to be acting against their own interests.²³

The first supplementary axiom ignores the major problem with Pilsby's definition. An individual does not just have a list of preferences but an ordered set. Often, some preferences may contradict others, or the promotion of some interests may cut across the promotion of others. But there may be a possible world in which both interests may be pursued even though this may not be realized or considered feasible in the short run. Furthermore, individuals may not realize that situations and objects may go under several descriptions and so not perceive that some desired object they recognize under one description is not in their interest under another.

This axiom also ignores the collective action problem popularized by Mancur Olson.²⁴ Olson argues that rational self-interested individuals will not necessarily act in order to promote common or group interests. Individuals may calculate that the costs of acting are greater than the expected benefits consequent upon that act. But that is not to say that individuals do not have an interest in the outcome to which they could contribute. An agent's interests constitute part but not all of her reasons for a particular action. The agent must also consider the possibilities open to her. These possibilities will depend

not only upon the way she assesses them but also upon the actual means by which the action is available to her. Thus such behaviouralist methods operate without a theory of action.

It may be objected that individuals' interests are revealed by action since the action is the practical conclusion of a rational calculation. The pros and cons of possible alternative courses of action are weighed up and the course chosen reveals what that individual believes to be best for himself. It is true that 'ideally' he may prefer a to b, but does not act so as to help bring about a since the costs of that action outweigh a's extra value over b. Thus the individual calculates that the inaction which helps bring about b is in his interest. Thus we could argue that the apathy of blacks in Baltimore in 1964 was in their interests as individuals.²⁵ But such an argument hides a number of highly dubious assumptions.

Firstly, it assumes that the situation of the person making the practical deliberation is neutral regarding his interests. It does not allow for the possibility that it is not in the individual's interests to be in the conditions under which he makes the deliberation. I may be about to join the union but decide not to when I am told that if I do I will lose my company house.²⁶ Secondly, it ignores freeriding. The individual may calculate that his chances of being pivotal in bringing about x are remote, and hence the expected extra benefits consequent upon his

doing action a to help bring about x are less than the expected costs of doing a. If it turned out that he was pivotal he would do a.²⁷ Thirdly, it assumes that if two people (A and B) value some outcome x, and A is prepared to pay £10 for it whilst B only £5, then A values x twice as much as B. But this is only true if A and B have exactly the same disposable income. £10 may be chicken-feed to A, but £5 the daily income of B.²⁸ It is relative costs that are important.²⁹

If we assume that wants as revealed by actions exhaust individual interests, then we cannot allow for the possibility that an individual could not articulate an interest that is outside of her feasible set, or what she believes is her feasible set. Individuals may choose one course of action rather than another simply because they prefer its results. But often some courses of action are preferred over others because the interests they promote are either (a) the most 'immediate', that is, the most easily perceived, or (b) are the more easily promoted. For example, the interests of groups of workers are often more immediate and perceivable than the interests of consumers. But all producers are also consumers.

In fact Polsby objects to Crenson's study of the air pollution issue in Gary and East Chicago on similar grounds. He says:

"Many people trade off air pollution against employment, and it is not necessarily the case that they do so unwittingly. Therefore merely showing that in some communities a given issue is

raised and tends to lead to a particular conclusion does not discriminate between the possibility in other communities that an issue is being suppressed and the possibility that a genuine consensus exists although that consensus is contrary to what an observer can find elsewhere."³⁰

In Gary, individuals may well have felt that pursuing clean air policies would lower their employment prospects. But this does not show that they had no interest in having clean air: it merely shows that they had a greater interest in employment. It also says nothing about the power relations between the steel employers and the townsfolk. If we recognize the distinction between 'needs' and 'wants' specified above, then we do not need to impute a power relation between the townsfolk and steel company. In fact, I can see little evidence for such a power relation in Crenson's book. Rather what Crenson shows is how political entrepreneurs or political movers were able to get the air pollution issue on to the agenda despite the problems of collective action faced in East Chicago and Gary.³¹ Crenson notes that the individuals in Gary do not do a certain action a, which is inconsistent with what he believes their interests to be. This may be explained by the fact that they have other, prima facie conflicting interests which override the interests that Crenson imputes. They do b in order to get y (employment), in order to get z (clean air) they need to do a. But as far as the individuals are concerned, doing b implies doing not-a. Thus they must choose between ends y and z. But

doing not-a does not mean that they do not have an interest in z just that that interest has been overridden by y. However, there may be a state of affairs, in which y and z are compatible. In order to achieve this, they need u. In this example what is needed is pollution controls throughout the United States, so that no community is relatively disadvantaged by them. If the United States steel industry then suffers from competition abroad, world-wide ordinances are required. These are just larger and larger collective action problems.

If the conflict is truly a collective action problem then u may be attainable. Individuals may not have realized that they need u, or if they have realized this they may believe that the costs are prohibitive. Lack of collective organization affects their power, but we do not need to impute unanalysable power to the steel owners in order to see this. Remember the famous quotation from Schattschneider: "organization is the mobilization of bias".³² It is the lack of organization that affects their power.

In collective action problems certain needs are requisite for certain of our desires. In order for collective action to occur, some conditions need to be fulfilled whether or not any individuals want those conditions to be fulfilled. Often those conditions include the lobbying power of an effective group organization. Or the workings of a bureaucracy, or higher taxation, or

greater competition in a particular market. If certain requirements are necessary to overcome collective action problems, then we need them, whether or not we 'ideally' want them. The problem is that the ideal world is usually not a possible one.

The individual costs of acting to promote policies that are in our interests may be greater than the benefits we expect from their promotion. In fact they may be so great that we do not even think such interests are feasible. In order for them to be promoted or made feasible we need to move to a situation in which the costs are less, and where the outcome appears feasible. Our wants may thus be less restricted. We can begin rationally to desire outcomes that before seemed impossible. In this way we may be able to sustain the heart of Lukes 'radical' definition of interests within a behaviouralist framework to political analysis. For, in so far as the choice situations in which individuals find themselves restrict the feasible set, they may be said to work against their wider interests. All that we require for such a fusion is the realization that we cannot study human behaviour without a theory of action and without the understanding that situations channel individual action just as collective actions create situations.

I left aside the question of the normative implications of the ontological and epistemological theses above. The normative implication of the methodological thesis is

similarly worrying to the 'liberal'. If we admit that individuals may not be the best judge of their own interests, how do we avoid observer bias in analysis of the political system? Observer bias enters anyway in the type of questions that any observer poses, and simple observation of action cannot tell us what individuals believe their interests to be, precisely because of the collective action problem. Some interests have to be assumed for the sake of analysis. This is just as true for liberal pluralist studies of the New Haven sort as for any other. All too often the observer bias claim turns into an ontological claim which equates the interests of individuals with the manner in which they act. But the answer to our question is not simple. In any given interest ascription the analyst must justify that ascription.³³ There is no general formula by which to judge such ascriptions. Each must be examined in the light of the arguments which support them. This is so, of course, because the analyst may mistake the interests of his subjects in precisely the same manner in which the subjects may get them wrong. We all use the same sort of evidence in interest ascription and we are ^{all} equally subject to the problem of knowledge.

- 1 S. Lukes, Power: A Radical View (Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1974) W. Connolly, The Terms of Political Discourse (2nd edition, Oxford, Martin Robertson, 1983). See A. Reeve and A. Ware, 'Interests in Political Theory' British Journal of Political Science, 13 (1983), 379-400 for a review of the literature on interests.
- 2 T. Nagel, The Possibility of Altruism (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1970), pp. 7-17.
- 3 This is true whether the dependence is direct or indirect.
- 4 A recent example is P. Dunleavy and B. O'Leary, Theories of the State: The Politics of Liberal Democracy (London, Macmillan, 1987), pp. 18-19.
- 5 I also believe that this approach may dampen some of the issues on the question of 'essential contestability', though nothing in this paper attacks this thesis directly. I argue against essential contestability in K. Dowding 'Conceptual Analysis and Essential Contestability', 1990.
- 6 L. von Mises, Human Action (London, William Hodge, 1949), pp. 11-29.
- 7 This is a tricky issue I do not wish to enter into here. Reeve and Ware, 'Interests in Political

Theory', pp. 388-400 and J. Elster, Ulysses and the Sirens: Studies in Rationality and Irrationality (Revised edition, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1984) consider some of the inconsistencies about wants and values that false belief and fallacious reasoning may lead people.

- 8 S. Lukes, 'Alienation and Anomie', in his Essays in Social Theory (London, Macmillan, 1977) pp. 74-95 discusses the idea of the essential needs of persons in Durkheim and Marx. Essentialism regarding the nature of persons is important in Charles Taylor's work, see the essays in C. Taylor, Philosophy and the Human Sciences: Philosophical Papers vol. 2 (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1985).
- 9 D. Miller, Social Justice (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1976) pp. 122-150 attempts to make sense of 'need' as something intrinsic rather than instrumental, but he still defines needs as those things which are necessary or essential for each individual to pursue his life-plan, p. 134. I do not see how we can get away from a modal analysis of need.
- 10 B. Barry, Political Argument (London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1965) p. 48. We do not have to operate with mere 'wants' under the analysis given here. We can operate with 'life-plans', 'conception of the good' or whatever. Further, should one want to add that individuals have 'essential natures' one merely

argues that certain conditions must be fulfilled before individuals can be in a state in which they are able to create desires for themselves, rather than have them caused by external factors.

- 11 My analysis follows A. White, Modal Thinking (Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1975), here p. 103.
- 12 White, Modal Thinking, p. 110.
- 13 I once asked for "water on the head" when feverish. I believe I was requesting a glass of water.
- 14 White, Modal Thinking, p. 112.
- 15 F. Schick, 'Under Which Descriptions?', in A. Sen and B. Williams (eds.), Utilitarianism and Beyond (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1982), p. 253.
- 16 See P. Dunleavy, 'New Directions in Group Theory', presented to the Political Studies Association, 1986, for a similar distinction.
- 17 B. Barry and D. Rae, 'Political Evaluation' in F. Greenstein and N. Polsby, Political Science: Scope and Theory: Handbook of Political Science vol. 1 (Reading, Mass., Addison-Wesley, 1975), p. 382.
- 18 A. Hirschman, Exit, Voice and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations and States (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1970).
- 19 To dispute the conclusion on these grounds is to hold what C. Taylor calls the "Maginot Line strategy",

- 'Whats Wrong with Negative Liberty', in his Philosophy and the Human Sciences, p. 217.
- 20 Lukes, Power, p. 34.
- 21 A. Bentley, The Process of Government (ed. P. Odegard, Harvard, Belknap Press, 1967).
- 22 N. Polsby, Community Power and Political Theory (2nd edition, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1980), p. 225.
- 23 N. Polsby, Community Power, p. 225.
- 24 M. Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups (2nd edition, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1971).
- 25 That apathy is described and decried in P. Bachrach and M. Baratz, Power and Poverty: Theory and Practice (New York, Oxford University Press, 1970).
- 26 J. Gaventa, Power and Powerlessness: Quiescence and Rebellion in an Appalachian Valley (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1980) pp. 96-99. General management tactics to discourage unionization are described in C. Crouch, Trade Unions: The Logic of Collective Action (Glasgow, Fontana, 1982), pp. 45-55, see also C. Offe and H. Wiesensthal, 'Two Logics of Collective Action: Theoretical Notes on Organizational Form', Political Power and Social Theory, 1 (1980), 67-115.
- 27 T. Schelling, 'Hockey Helmets, Daylight Saving, and Other Binary Choices', Journal of Conflict Resolution, 19 (1973) 441-461 and M. Taylor, The

Possibility of Cooperation (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1987) describe conditions under which such calculations are made.

- 28 This error is made in the 'Demand Revealing' literature, see for example the description in D. Mueller, Public Choice (Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1979) pp. 72-84.
- 29 R. Goodin and J. Dryzek, 'Rational Participation: The Politics of Relative Power', British Journal of Political Science, 10, (1981) 273-292, examine relative costs in relation to the decision to vote.
- 30 Polsby, Community Power, p. 217. M. Crenson, The Unpolitics of Air Pollution: A Study of Non-Decisionmaking in the Cities (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press, 1971).
- 31 See K. Dowding, 'Collective Action and the Dimensions of Power' 1987, see also I. McLean, Public Choice: An Introduction (Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1987), pp. 35-36.
- 32 E. Schattsneider, The Semi-Sovereign People (New York, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960), p. 71, emphasis added.
- 33 I take this to be the upshot of the excellent discussion of desire ascription in G. Smith, 'Must Radicals be Marxists? Lukes on Power, Contestability and Alienation', British Journal of Political Science, 11 (1981), pp. 412-414.