The Intelligence-Led National Security Architecture of Ghana and its Three Pre-Conditions

An Overlooked Asset but Key to the Country's Long-Term Domestic Stability

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A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for Doctor of Philosophy

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Appreciations

During the challenging times, the only thing that kept me going without given up was my faith, which is the Christian faith. Therefore, my utmost gratitude goes to my Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ, who is the author and finisher of my faith.

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Abstract

In chronological order, this dissertation takes the reader through the story of Ghana, covering many decades of its historical and political journey to date. Whilst doing so, it also explains how such a journey helped define the evolution of the country's intelligence-led national security architecture from the pre-colonial era to what it is today. Besides going through the decades, it also zooms in analytically on the relevance of the architecture under respective governments throughout the country's history. The historical analysis indicated that throughout Ghana's history, whenever a new administration assumes office and immediately puts in place an intelligence-led national security architecture to help attain and maintain domestic stability, is when the country is most stable. However, whenever there is absence of intelligence-led national security architecture, the country's political and security landscape becomes unstable. Such trend has been consistent since independence to date, and not only that when one pushes further back into pre-independence as part of Ghana's backstory, the trend is still applicable. This analysis helped establish that there is a relationship between the country's domestic stability and its intelligence-led national security architecture, which embodies three pre-conditions: (1) Establish National Security Institutions, (2) Embark on Intelligence Activities, and (3) Implement Interagency Intelligence Coordination. Additionally, the age of the country's democracy, the political and security landscape of the sub-region where Ghana is situated, and Ghana's security sector governance, and oversight responsibilities; have all been evaluated to help argue the relationship between the role of the intelligence-led national security architecture and current domestic stability. Hence underscoring the relevance of the pivotal role being played by Ghana's intelligence-led national security architecture in the fight to maintain stability in the country.

Declaration

I declare that The Intelligence-Led National Security Architecture of Ghana and its Three Pre-Conditions: An Overlooked Asset but Key to the Country's Long-Term Domestic Stability, is my own work. It has not been submitted for any degree or examination in any other university, and that all the sources I have used or quoted, have been indicated and acknowledged by complete references.

Joe Eshun
Date.................................
Signed..

Contents

Table of tables

Table of figures

List of Acronyms

AAS   African Affairs Secretariat

AFRC   Armed Forces Revolutionary Council

BNI   Bureau for National Investigations

BTA   Bureau for Technical Assistance

CAR   Central African Republic

CIA   Central Intelligence Agency

CenSec   Central Security Committee

PPT   Chadian Progressive Party

CDS   Chief of the Defence Staff

CMO   Comprehensive Multi-Disciplinary Outline

CHRAJ   Commission on Human Rights and Administrative Justice

CPP   Convention People's Party

CIU   Counter-Intelligence Unit

CID   Criminal Investigations Department

CVC   Citizens' Vetting Committee

CEPS   Customs, Excise & Preventive Service

DI   Defence Intelligence

DRC   Democratic Republic of Congo

D3 MIU   Department III Military Intelligence Unit

DGDI   Director General of Defence Intelligence

DISEC   District Security Councils

DOVVSU   Domestic Violence and Victim Support Unit

EOCO   Economic and Organised Crime Office

ECOMOG   Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group

ERP   Economic Recovery Programme

FIC	Financial Intelligence Centre
FSG	Fire Service of Ghana
FSRB	Foreign Service Research Bureau
FAM	Free Africa Movement
GAF	Ghana Armed Forces
GIS	Ghana Immigration Service
GCPF	Gold Coast Police Force
GCR	Gold Coast Regiment
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
HIC	High-Income Country
IGP	Inspector General of Police
IMET	International Military Education and Training
IMF	International Monetary Fund
JIC	Joint Intelligence Committee
KANU	Kenya African National Union
KAU	Kenyan African Union
KPU	Kenya People's Union
LDC	Local Defence Committees
LIC	Local Intelligence Committees
MIC	Middle Income Country
MI6	Military Intelligence 6
MIU	Military Intelligence Unit
MoD	Ministry of Defence
MTTD	Motor Traffic and Transport Directorate
MUSEC	Municipal Security Councils
NB	Narcotics Board
NACOB	Narcotics Control Board

NAL	National Alliance Liberals
NAC	National Assessment Centre
NDC	National Democratic Congress
NIC	National Investigation Committee
NLC	National Liberation Council
NLM	National Liberation Movement
NLMWT	National Liberation Movement for Western Togoland
NRC	National Redemption Council
NSA	National Security Adviser
NSC	National Security Council
NSCS	National Security Council Secretariat
NSS	National Security Secretariat
PSCDI	Parliamentary Select Committee on Defence and Interior
PFDJ	People's Front for Democracy and Justice
PNDC	People's National Defence Council
PNP	People's National Party
PESTELO	Political, Economic, Social, Technological, Environmental, Legal & Organisational
P&T	Post and Telecommunication
PDD	Presidential Detail Department
PGC	Presidential Guard Company
POGR	President's Own Guard Regiment
PSG	Prisons Service of Ghana
PP	Progressive Party
PT	Public Tribunals
REGSEC	Regional Security Councils
RB	Research Bureau
RD	Research Department

RU	Reserves Unit
RAF	Royal Air Force
RCAF	Royal Canadian Air Force
RWAFF	Royal West African Frontier Force
SLO	Security Liaison Officer
SSG	Security Sector Governance
SSO	Security Sector Oversight
SSR	Security Sector Reform
SIGINT	Signals Intelligence
SPOC	Single Point of Contact
SAS / TU	Special African Service / Technical Unit
SB	Special Branch
SECE	Special Executive for Counter Espionage
SIU	Special Intelligence Unit
SMC I	Supreme Military Council 1
SMC II	Supreme Military Council 2
SSD	Special Services Division
UGCC	United Gold Coast Convention
UK	United Kingdom
UNC	United National Convention
UN	United Nations
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
UP	United Party
US	United States
WANS	West African National Secretariat
WCU	Wireless and Communications Unit
WIPOL	Wireless Police

WWI   World War I

WWII   World War II

YPM   Young Pioneer Movement

Timeline – National Security Architecture of Ghana

50,000 B.C.E.   The proof of human existence was first found in modern Ghana.

2,000 B.C.E.   Settlement ensued, which was followed by farming and cattle raising activities in the Savana area.

ca. 100 C.E.   Iron and gold smelting activities fuelled the rapid expansion of settlement from the Savana area into the rainforest.

Development, building and amassing of lethal weaponry began by different ethnic groups in the area.

ca. 1000   Emergence of the Akan and Ga Adangbe tribes from the rainforest and the Shai Hills.

Although contained to specific areas, there were periodic clashes between pastoralist and farming communities. Such clashes occurred on seasonal basis throughout the region with varied frequency.

There were also occasional but organised and lethal clashes between ethnic militias of communities due to property disputes.

1076   After the conquest by the Almoravid General Abu-Bakr Ibn-Umar, the Ghana empire (not modern Ghana) disintegrated. This resulted in its inhabitants and agricultural activities shifting southwards of sub-Sharan Africa joining inhabitants of modern Ghana, to begin new village settlements. The Kingdom of Ghana, which comprised of different clans including a unified Akan clan was formed out of such settlements.

12th and 13th Centuries   A boom in gold trade and other minerals brought prosperity to the Akan clan. However, due to what was reported to be a dispute with a local king, the unified Akan clan ultimately disintegrated.

14th and 15th Centuries   The Akan clan disintegration led to the formation of new kingdoms and sub-kingdoms, such as the Ashanti, Fanti, Akuapem, Bono, Kwahu, Akyem, Agona, Wassa, Akwamu, Anyin, Baoulé, Chakosi, Sefwi, Nzema, Ahanta, Jwira-Pepesa and others.

Every single one of those kingdoms had an independent security apparatus in place for the protection of their respective territories. This created a proliferation of rival security setups across the Kingdom of Ghana.

1471   The Portuguese first set foot on the coastal shores of the country but left.

1482   The Portuguese returned to settle in the country to get involve in the trade of gold and other resources. Subsequently, the Portuguese also named the country as 'Al Mina', in other words the Gold Coast.

16th and 17th Centuries   Continuous conflicts and battles between native kingdoms during this era, resulted in the capturing of smaller kingdoms by the larger ones, who subsequently expanded their territories to create empires.

1598   The Dutch arrived at the Gold Coast to partake in the lucrative trade.

17th and 18th Centuries	This era witnessed the emergence of dominant empires (Ashanti, Fanti, and Denkyera) in the country, who also possessed formidable security forces.
1637	The Dutch defeated the Portuguese and drove them out of the Gold coast.
18th and 19th Centuries	The Ashanti empire expanded its territory significantly by defeating other small kingdoms, to become extremely powerful with superior military might.
	Other European countries including the Danish, Swedish, Germans and the British all arrived at the Gold Coast in different years during this era, to participate in the lucrative trade. This resulted in altering the geographic landscape in the country, by creating the Dutch Gold Coast, Danish Gold Coast, Swedish Gold Coast, German Gold Coast, and British Gold coast, with each country having an autonomous security architecture to protect their respective territories.
	With different territories, this era witnessed significant military activities in the Gold Coast. These included conflicts and battles between rival native empires, and/or between a native empire and an European country, and/or between one European country against another. Hence creating a volatile security landscape in the country during that period.
	In this same era, all the European countries with the exception of Britain eventually exited the Gold Coast.
1823 - 1900	Five major wars were fought between the Ashanti and British empires in the Gold Coast. The British lost the first two, the third ended in a stalemate due to a pandemic outbreak, and the Ashanti empire lost the final two of the wars fought.
	With the Ashanti empire defeated, the country was finally under the full control of the British.
	During this period, Gold Coast Police Force (GCPF) was also formed by the British, and in 1865 was formalised into dual policing to undertake armed and civilian police duties, respectively.
1901	This year marked the beginning of colonisation in the Gold Coast. Hence for the first time a centralised internal security architecture was carved out of the GCPF by the colonial regime.
	The internal security architecture was purposely created to ensure uninterrupted flow of resources from the source of extraction in the Gold Coast to the ports, ready to be shipped to mainland Britain. The architecture was also created to put an end to the proliferation of different security set-ups in the Gold Coast.
1901 - 1948	The internal security architecture comprised of General Police, Escort Police, and Mines & Railways Police. It was also followed by the creation of a Marine Police, and subsequently the formation of a Criminal Investigations Department (CID).
	There was bare minimum intelligence work, if any at all, undertaken by the internal security architecture during this era.

There was also in existence a military outfit called the Gold Coast Regiment (GCR). The GCR formed part of the broader West African Frontier Force (WAFF) and was used to protect the territorial boundaries of the Gold Coast against other European powers who also had neighbouring African countries as colonies.

February 1948

Widespread riots across the Gold Coast, which took the colonial regime by surprise.

Post-February 1948 to 1957

In desperate attempt to avoid a repeat of the 1948 Riots, the colonial regime immediately reorganised the internal security architecture and incorporated significant intelligence work as part of its duties.

CID was reinforced, Special Branch (SB) and subsequently a Reserve Unit (RU) were all created in 1948. It was followed by the creation of a Wireless and Communications Unit (WCU) in 1950, and also the establishment of a Women's Branch Unit (WBU) in 1952.

In order to be able to obtain the required intelligence needed to avoid a repeat of the 1948 Riots, SB branches were created in every province of the Gold Coast. Additionally, an Intelligence Coordination Committee called the 'Central Security Committee' (CenSec) was also set up. A local Security Liaison Office role was also created, and a former MI5 agent called Robin 'Tin-eye' Stephens was posted into the Gold Coast to occupy that position.

CenSec met weekly at the police headquarters in Accra, the capital of the Gold Coast. CenSec comprised of the Colonial Governor, Colonial Secretary, Officer Commanding the GCR, local SLO and Commissioner of Police. Furthermore, Local Intelligence Committees (LICs), which were "indigenised version of sub committees of the Defence Committee" were also established. These LICs were chaired by provincial Chief Commissioners and were composed of District Commissioners and local Police Officers.

Finally, a clear distinction of intelligence collection duties was created between 'political intelligence' and 'security intelligence'. CenSec was charged with political intelligence work whiles SB was made responsible for security intelligence work.

06 March 1957

This was the day that the Gold Coast attained independence and was renamed Ghana.

1957 - 1966

Dr Kwame Nkrumah, the leader of the "Big Six" that fought for the struggle of independence became the first President of Ghana.

Nkrumah inherited the GCPF and the GCR, which became known as the Ghana Police Service and the Ghana Armed Forces, respectively. The latter was believed to have been left in a very poor state; especially its Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) gathering machinery. However, with significant reformation and subsequent modernisation, the first national security architecture was created.

The first national security architecture consisted of a CID, SB, Military Intelligence Unit (MIU), Foreign Service Research Bureau (FSRB) and an African Affairs Secretariat (AAS), which was carved out of the FSRB.

CID was made responsible for national security-related investigative duties and criminal intelligence work. SB was charged with domestic national security-related intelligence work, and the MIU was tasked to perform military intelligence role. Personnel of the FSRB, were attached to embassies abroad to undertake foreign intelligence collection work. Whilst the AAS was attached to the FSRB, with its personnel specifically tasked to collect intelligence abroad to support Nkrumah's Pan-African agenda.

During this same period, Nkrumah embarked on a diversification programme by reaching out to different countries on separate occasions to help improve how the architecture and its personnel performed intelligence work. Such countries included India, United States, Soviet Union, Israel, China, German Democratic Republic, and Italy. However, series of assassination attempts on Nkrumah's life in Ghana, significantly altered the landscape of national security work undertaken in the country.

Due to reasons stated above, Nkrumah created a separate security architecture, which operated parallel to the already established national security architecture.

This alternate security architecture consisted of a Department III Military Intelligence carved out of the MIU, a Special Intelligence Unit (SIU), Counter-Intelligence Unit (CIU), President's Own Guard Regiment (POGR), Presidential Detail Department (PDD), Bureau for Technical Assistance, an All African Service also known as Technical Unit, and a Young Pioneer Movement (YPM). All these agencies were tasked to undertake intelligence work and were ordered to report directly to the President.

21 February 1966	Nkrumah's administration was ousted through a military coup d'état orchestrated by a military junta called, the National Liberation Council (NLC).
1966 - 1969	The NLC instantly dissolved Nkrumah's 'multifaceted' intelligence apparatus and abolished the AAS. The already established national security architecture was reorganised. The FSRB was renamed the Research Bureau (RB), its personnel were reshuffled and subsequently tasked to actively embark on foreign intelligence collection for the regime's protection against the Eastern bloc and Nkrumah's allies abroad. Additionally, the MIU was initially disbanded and later reintroduced into the national security setup to help protect the regime. Finally, an intelligence coordinating body called the Special Executive for Counter Espionage (SECE), was also formed with the help of Western intelligence agencies. Its personnel operated across the African continent to counter threats posed by Nkrumah loyalists based in other African countries.

The reorganised national security architecture took the shape of a CID, SB, MIU, RB and SECE. |
| **01 October 1969** | On this day, the NLC handed over power to Dr. Busia's democratically elected political party called the Progress Party (PP), to form a new government. |

01 October 1969 - 31 December 1981	Throughout this period, there were numerous changes of governments, mostly through military coup d'états. Although the fundamental structures of the national security architecture were barely altered, with the exception of the SECE which was disbanded, there were significant alterations at the top of the echelon of almost all the national security agencies thus, the CID, SB, MIU and RB. Such changes occurred based on tribal affiliations and not on professional merit.
31 December 1981	Second successful military coup d'état by Flight Lieutenant Jerry John Rawlings.
1982 - 1992	During this period, the national security architecture was significantly transformed by Rawlings' military regime known as the People's National Defence Council (PNDC).
	The PNDC upon assuming power, immediately dissolved the national security architecture completely and rebuilt it. The CID and its personnel were reshuffled, while the MIU was disbanded for good to create the Defence Intelligence (DI). SB was dismantled and replaced by the formation of the Bureau for National Investigations (BNI). The BNI then became the arm of the new national security architecture charged with internal intelligence duties and was civilianised. Former personnel of the SB were reshuffled into either the BNI or the CID. 'A' level leavers and new university graduates with specialised skills were also recruited into the BNI. A Special Services Division (SSD) based at the office of the Head of State (Rawlings) was also created to handle all national intelligence and security-related matters.
	A National Security Adviser (NSA) role was eventually created, who was answerable to the Head of State, and was based at the National Security Secretariat (NSS) located at the capital in Accra. Therefore, all SSD's duties were transferred to the NSA. Activities of the national security architecture were also decentralised with sub-offices created in the regional, and district capitals, as well as within the local levels across the country. All information and/or intelligence were passed on to the NSS, where the national intelligence assessment and coordination took place. Final intelligence products were then fed back down the chain to help address emerging threats in the relevant regions and/or districts.
November 1992	Rawlings, after ruling Ghana for 11 years with his PNDC military regime, won a general election with his National Democratic Congress (NDC) political party, which transitioned Ghana back into a democratic country.
07 January 1993	The 1992 Constitution of the Republic of Ghana, which provided the basic charter for Ghana's fourth attempt at a republican democratic government was introduced.
	This Constitution served as the supreme law of the land. It outlined the sharing of power among the President, Parliament, Cabinet, Council of State, and an Independent Judiciary. It put in place checks and balances for the Executive, Legislative and Judiciary, so that no arm of government possessed more power over the other. As part of the constitution, the Executive authority was shared between the President, the twenty-five member Council of State, and numerous advisory bodies, including the National Security Council (NSC).

1996	The 1992 Constitution was amended, and a significant amount of attention was given to the intelligence and security community in the country by creating the Security and Intelligence Act 526. A clear definition for how the intelligence and security agencies operated with a legal backing was stated in the Security and Intelligence Act 526.
1996 - 2020	During this period, post the Fourth Republic, there has been several successful change of governments, democratically through the ballot box. Despite that, apart from the RB, which had its name changed to the Research Department (RD), the core structures of the national security architecture, and how it operated has been maintained under the constitution. Although there have been some minor additions and subtractions to the architecture as a whole, such changes have made no significant difference to the architecture's organisational structure.
	The outlook of the current national security architecture comprise of the Office of the President, NSC, BNI, RD, DI, CID, Financial Intelligence Centre (FIC), National Assessment Centre (NAC), Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), Economic and Organised Crime Office (EOCO), Armed Forces (Army, Navy and Air Force), Police Service, Prison Service, Customs Excise and Preventive Service (CEPS), Immigration Service, Narcotics Control Board (NACOB), and Fire Service. All of whom have sub-divisions in the regional, municipality, and district capitals, as well as within the local levels across the country. At the apex is the National Security Council Secretariat (NSCS), which is home the National Security Coordinator.
	The NSC, BNI, RD, DI, CID, FIC, NAC and JIC are all agencies charged to undertake national security intelligence work, with the NSCS responsible for centralised intelligence coordination. Whilst the Military, Police Service, Prisons Service, CEPS, Immigration Service, EOCO, NACOB and Fire Service are all security agencies that rely on intelligence to undertake national security-related investigative work.
2020	Introduction of the 2020 Security and Intelligence Act 1030 to replace the 1996 Security and Intelligence Act 526.
	Section 12 of the Security and Intelligence Act 1030 renames the BNI to the National Intelligence Bureau (NIB).

Chapter 1: Introduction

Ghana is an independent nation located in Sub-Saharan Africa, a sub-region mostly characterised by political and security instabilities such as, military coup d'états, civil unrest, political violence, armed banditry, civil wars, and other threats.[1] Despite the sub-region being significantly unstable, Ghana's political and security landscape has been stable for over four decades now, highlighting a significant achievement in which Ghanaians pride themselves.[2] Many commentators have attributed the domestic stability in the country to multifaceted factors including Ghana's practice of democracy, its traditional system, religious practices, and/or its economic policies.[3] Although these factors may have in one way, or another contributed toward Ghana's domestic stability; analysis into Ghana's historical journey highlights that they do not show the strongest correlation.

That said, what this dissertation alternatively demonstrates within the same historical analysis is, there is a clear relationship between the country's intelligence-led national security architecture's role and its long-term domestic stability. This relationship shows that the continuous timely interventions of the country's intelligence-led national security architecture in the past four decades, averted several major incidents that had the potential to plunge Ghana into chaos. Not only did such actions help attain domestic stability, they also ensured its sustenance and maintenance for the said duration. This has helped Ghana's democracy, economic policies, traditional systems, and religious practices, to thrive. These have been extensively demonstrated further with examples to help justify this assertion. Therefore, it is this dissertation's central argument that the key to Ghana's long-term domestic stability of its political and security landscape; has been the pivotal role being played by its intelligence-led national security architecture.

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[1] Samuel Aryeetey-Attoh. *Geography of Sub-Saharan Africa*, (Germany: Prentice Hall, 2010), pp 136-148
[2] Wilmot Nah Adekoya. Exploring Ghana's Strategies for Stability: Lessons for Postwar Reconstruction, [PhD Thesis] Walden University, (2016).
[3] Eshun, J. 'What is the Key to Domestic Stability in Ghana', Virtual Debate with Ten Ghanaian Professionals, Zoom, 21 August, (2020). Also see; Aryee, Joseph. *Politics, Governance, and Development in Ghana*, (London: Lexington Books, 2019).

This dissertation draws a clear distinction between what it refers to as 'national security institutions', and what constitutes 'intelligence-led national security architecture.' The latter comprises of three pre-conditions that work collectively together, whilst the former is one of the pre-conditions that constitute the three, as illustrated in the table below. Accordingly, this author assesses that the absence of even one of these pre-conditions will threaten Ghana's long-term domestic stability.

Table 1: Pre-conditions for Intelligence-Led National Security

INTELLIGENCE-LED NATIONAL SECURITY ARCHITECTURE		
Pre-condition 1	**Pre-condition 2**	**Pre-condition 3**
Establish National Security Institutions	Embark on Intelligence Activities	Implement Interagency Intelligence Coordination
Protect and defend national interests against known and unknown threats	Offers eyes and ears within and outside country's territorial borders	Makes architecture situationally aware of magnitude and scope of overarching threats [4]

Pre-condition 1 embodies the idea that established 'national security institutions' help the country project its readiness to defend its citizenry, and institutions from potential threats. This serves as a deterrent towards potential perpetrators with hostile intent to destabilise Ghana's landscape. This assessment is corroborated by the country's constitution, which states that one of the roles of Ghana's national security institutions is to "protect the state against threats of espionage, sabotage, terrorism, hijacking, piracy, drug trafficking, and similar offenses."[5] Pre-condition 2 on the other hand compliments pre-condition 1 by ensuring that intelligence work becomes an integral part of national security activities. This is done by incorporating specialised intelligence agencies into the security apparatus to provide eyes and ears within and outside the country's territorial boundaries. This assessment is corroborated by the national security institutions clear constitutional responsibilities to;

> "Collect, analyses retain and disseminate as appropriate information and intelligence respecting activities that may constitute threats to the Security of the State and the government of Ghana."[6]

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[4] Image created by the author
[5] Government of Ghana. *Freedom & Justice: 1992 Constitution of the Republic of Ghana*, (Accra: Ministry of Justice / Allshore Co, 2005), pp 60-63
[6] Ibid

Not only does the above quote corroborate pre-condition 2, activities of the national security institutions which occur at the national, regional, municipal, district, and local levels[7] also re-affirm the importance of pre-condition 2. Pre-condition 3 ensures that all the intelligence collected is holistically managed, shared, and well-coordinated to help ascertain what is going on within and outside the country's territorial borders.[8] Hence from this dissertation's assessment, pre-condition 3 also brings to the table the art of becoming situationally aware of one's environments and surroundings, adding to what the preceding two pre-conditions collectively offers. Pre-condition 3 also buttresses the national security institutions' abilities to make timely decisions, because 'situational awareness' signifies the importance of gaining an awareness of the enemy before the enemy gains a similar awareness.[9] Collectively, all three pre-conditions constitutes the intelligence-led national security architecture of Ghana. Proactively, this has been the key to the country's protection through the architecture's ability to understand and counter the magnitude and scope of emerging threats likely to impact domestic stability. No wonder the country's national security strategic overview clearly states that the role performed by the architecture ensures that there is 'political tolerance, stability, security, and peace in Ghana and the sub-region.'[10] This strategic overview reinforces the claim made about a relationship between Ghana's intelligence-led national security architecture and its domestic stability.

This relationship also highlights that throughout Ghana's history, whenever all three pre-conditions are met and maintained at the beginning of a new administration, and throughout its term in office, the country is most stable. However, when there has been an absence of all

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[7] "Ghana's Constitution of 1992 with Amendments through 1996", Part IV: The National Security Council, Functions of the National Security Council. *Constitute Project Organisation*, 2020, p 55, [online resource] available from, https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Ghana_1996.pdf?lang=en. Accessed on 01 May 2020

[8] "Section 42 of 1996 Security and Intelligence Act 526." *Ghana's Constitution*.

[9] Stanton, N.A, P.R.G Chambers, and J Piggott. 2001. "Situational Awareness and Safety." *Safety Science* 39 (3): 189–204. https://doi.org/10.1016/s0925-7535(01)00010-8.

[10] "Ministry of National Security", PART A: Strategic Overview of the Ministry of National Security, Core Functions. *Republic of Ghana*, 2017, p. 2 [online resource] available from, https://www.mofep.gov.gh/sites/default/files/pbb-estimates/2017/2017-PBB-MNS.pdf. Accessed on 01/05/2020

three, or even an omission of one or two of these pre-conditions, the country's landscape has been destabilised. Throughout this dissertation, the National Liberation Council (NLC)[11], Rawlings[12], and post-Rawlings eras have been used to demonstrate the relationship between attaining domestic stability and meeting all three pre-conditions. Whilst the Nkrumah[13], Busia, Acheampong, Akufo, and Limann eras have also been used to show the link between the instability of the country's landscape and the absence of one or two pre-conditions. In addition, if one pushes even further back into Ghana's pre-independence history, this relationship still demonstrates a strong correlation, as shown below.

Table 2: Presence of preconditions and the impact on national stability

Era / Period	Security Architecture's Activities	Results
Pre – Colonial **(Absence of all three pre-conditions)**	• Scattered Security Architecture • No coordination	• Destabilised Landscape • Unable to defend country • Conquered by the British
Colonial Rule **(Absence of 2nd & 3rd pre-conditions)**	• Centralised Security Architecture. • No intelligence work and coordination prior to February 1948.	• Unable to realise changing political and security environment • Creating a dangerous and unstable landscape leading to decolonisation
Nkrumah's Democratic Government **(Absence of 3rd pre-condition)**	• Created first national security architecture (NSA) • Incorporated intelligence work • Discouraged intelligence coordination	• Unable to understand the changing political and security environment • Creating a dangerous and unstable landscape resulting to demise by military coup d'état
NLC Military Regime **(Presence of all three pre-conditions)**	• Major reorganisation of the NSA • Reformed the domestic intelligence arm of the NSA, thus Special Branch (SB) • Incorporated intelligence work and its centralised coordination into the NSA	• Stabilised the country's landscape • Able to avert military coup attempts • Handed over power successfully to a democratic government
• Busia Democratic Government • Acheampong's NRC Military Regime • Acheampong's SMC I Military Regime • Akuffo' SMC II Military Regime • Rawlings' AFRC Military Regime • Limann's Democratic Government **(Absence of 2nd & 3rd pre-conditions)**	• Barely reorganised the NSA • Ineffective intelligence work and no centralise intelligence coordination in the NSA	• Over a decade of violent, dangerous, and destabilised landscape. • The defeat of the last administration in that era through a military coup
Rawlings' PNDC Military Regime **(Presence of all three pre-conditions)**	• Major reorganisation of the NSA • Disbanded domestic intelligence (SB) to create the Bureau for National Investigations (BNI) • Incorporated intelligence work and its centralised coordination into the NSA	• Averted military coup attempts • Stabilised the country's political and security landscape for a decade • Successfully transitioned country into a democracy
Rawlings' NDC Democratic Government **(Presence of all three pre-conditions)**	• Maintained structure of NSA, its intelligence work and centralised coordination • Reformed NSA with constitutional backing • Most importantly maintained its centralised intelligence coordination	• Sustained the country's stabilised landscape • Maintained its democratic system • Successfully handed over power through a democratic system to opposition political party
Democratic Rule Continuation Post – Rawlings to Date **(Presence of all three pre-conditions)**	• Maintained the structure of NSA, its intelligence work and centralised coordination.	• Ensured continuous stabilisation to present

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[11] CIA-RDP79-00927A006400010003-0. 'Ghana's Complex Road Toward Civilian Rule', Weekly Summary Special Report, Approved for Release 2006/12/19

[12] CIA-RDP83S00855R000100040004-7. 'Ghana: Outlook for the Rawlings Regime', Intelligence Assessment, Approved for Release 2008/07/30

[13] CAB 129/89/10 – 'Recent Events in Ghana', Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, 19th September 1957

[14] Image created by the author

Thirdly, intelligence becoming an integral part of the country's national security architecture can be traced back to pre-independence. In 1900, when the country then known as the Gold Coast became a British colony, the colonial regime put in place an internal security institution to help achieve its strategic goal for being in the country. Almost half a century later, the regime (British Colony) introduced intelligence activities and interagency intelligence coordination into the activities of its internal security institution after February 1948.[15] The 1948 Riots in the Gold Coast and the rise of nationalism at the end of WWII, coupled with the British post-war economy, saw a change in the region. In the Gold Coast, the British saw the need to engage in activities such as political and security intelligence collection, collation, analysis, and dissemination to ensure the colonial regime's survival.[16] That said when the first national security architecture was formed after independence in 1957, the pattern of control inherited from the British colonial regime by Ghana was eventually cast aside for an entirely new format. This included the orchestration of a programme of military diversification in which new security institutions were formed and existing ones split up."[17] This was done as a result of Nkrumah's perceptions of best practices being used from around the world.

Nonetheless, intelligence remains an integral part of the country's national security set-up.[18] Every successive government after independence in one way or another, used the country's national security architecture to ensure the survival of their administration and/or regime.[19] This was the norm until a shift in the status quo from 31st December 1981, when there was a change in government as a result of a putsch. This new military administration significantly reformed the national security architecture, by ensuring all three pre-conditions were in place.

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[15] AIR 40/1746 – 'Intelligence Reports and Papers', 31 May 1945
[16] Richard Rathbone. 'Political Intelligence and Policing in Ghana in the Late 1940s and 1950s' in, *Policing and Decolonisation: Politics, Nationalism, and the Police, 1917-65*, by Anderson, David & Killingray, David. eds., (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1992), p. 84
[17] Simon Baynham. 'Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes?' The Case of Nkrumah's National Security Service, *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 23:1 (1985), pp. 87-103
[18] "The National Security Council, Ghana's Constitution of 1992 with Amendments through 1996.", *Constitute Project*, 2020, [online resource] available from, https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Ghana_1996.pdf?lang=en. Accessed on 01 May 2020
[19] Kwaku Gyening Owusu. Military Coups in Ghana, 1969-1985; A By-Product of Global Economic Injustices? [MSc Thesis] Linköpings Universitet-Sweden, (2008), pp 36 - 56

The administration established national security institutions, embarked on intelligence activities, and implemented interagency intelligence coordination[20], which represented all three pre-conditions.

In addition to ensuring the new military administration's survival, this government, led by Jerry Rawlings also arguably; used the newly reformed intelligence-led national security architecture to help lay the foundation towards national development.[21] Ghana, just like any other country in the sub-region, had no privileged past and/or history compared to the rest of its neighbours.[22] However, today, the country's political and security landscape has been stable for over four decades in otherwise an unstable sub-region.[23] Since January 1982, attempts to start military coup d'états, civil unrest, political violence, civil wars, and/or other forms of security threats with the potential to destabilise the country's landscape, have either been contained and/or foiled from impacting the peace in the country.[24] This also underscores the significance of the correlation between the consistency of maintaining domestic stability in Ghana and the role of the country's intelligence-led national security architecture.

Before elaborating further on this dissertation's thesis, it contextualises the phraseology 'intelligence-led national security'; which is a combination of the terminologies, 'intelligence' and 'national security'. Throughout the years, attempts to define and/or explain how these two terminologies operate, have always been associated with controversies due to the lack of universally acceptable definitions for both terms. Beginning with 'national security' there is

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[20] KB Quantson, *Ghana: National Security*, Security Problems of the June 4 Revolt, (Accra: Bestas Press-NAPASVIL Ventures, 2003), p 69 onwards.

[21] Eshun, J. 'Security and National Development During Rawlings' Era', Virtual Conversation with a Retired Naval Officer & Former Senior PDC Operative, Microsoft Teams, 21 June, (2020).

[22] Bello-Schünemann, Julia and Moyer, Jonathan D. 'Structural pressures and political instability Trajectories for sub-Saharan Africa', Key Findings, *Institute for Security Studies*, 9, (2018), p. 2

[23] Cook, Nicolas. *Ghana: Current Issues and U.S. Relations in Brief*, Congressional Research Service, 2019, [online resource] available from, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R45260.pdf. Accessed on 01/05/2020

[24] Eboe Hutchful. 'Pulling back from the Brink Ghana's Experience', in, *Governing Insecurity: Democratic Control of Military and Security Establishments in Transitional Democracies*, by Cawthra, Gavin. Luckham, Robin., eds., (London: Zed Books, 2003), pp 78-90.

presently no unilateral definition in academic literature for this terminology.[25] However, national security work has always formed an important but controversial part of the modern state[26]; hence no one way has been identified as more or less successful.[27] Whilst when it comes to seeking a catch-all definition for the term intelligence, such action according to Davies is like one barking up the wrong tree.[28] That said, these two terminologies, as far as Ghana's constitution is concerned[29], are inextricably linked.[30] This is because Ghana's constitution links the two terminologies by emphasising the importance of:

> "Ensuring the collection of information relating to the security of Ghana and the integration of the domestic, foreign and security policies relating to it so as to enable the security services and other departments and agencies of the Government to co-operate more effectively in matters relating to national security."[31]

The preceding quote appears to be Ghana's defacto constitutional definition for intelligence, which was put in place during one of the stages of national security reform, under the Security and Intelligence Act 526 of 1996.[32] Not only does this definition stress the significance of the 'national security institutions' to embark on intelligence work and to coordinate the intelligence for national security purposes, embodying all three pre-conditions; the definition also emphasises the vital relationship between the role of the architecture, and maintaining a stable political and security landscape in Ghana. These important points reinforce this dissertation's central argument by corroborating its thesis, as it underscores the relationship between the architecture's vital role and domestic stability in the country, at least theoretically. Thus, even

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[25] Lucia Retter, Erik Frinking, Stijn Hoorens, Alice Lynch, Fook Nederveen and William Phillips. *Relationships Between the Economy and National Security: Analysis and Considerations for Economic Security Policy in the Netherlands*, (Cambridge: RAND Corporation, 2020), p. 35

[26] Herman, Michael. *Intelligence power in peace and war*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. i

[27] Bolton, Laura. 'National Security Office responsibilities and functions', *Institute of Development Studies*, (2017).

[28] Philip Davies. 'Ideas of Intelligence, Divergent National Concepts and Institutions', in, *Secret Intelligence*, by Andrew, Aldrich & Wark., eds., (London: Routledge, 2009), p. 12

[29] "Ghana's Constitution of 1992 with Amendments through 1996", Part IV: The National Security Council, Functions of the National Security Council. Constitute, 2020, p 55

[30] Moses.Y Jatuat. "Role of Intelligence, Institutions and Legal Framework in Ghana", National Security. *Academia*, 2020, [online resource] available from, https://www.academia.edu/40038957/NATIONAL_SECURITY_Role_of_Intelligence_Institutions_and_Legal_Framework_in_Ghana. Accessed on 01/05/2020

[31] "Ghana's Constitution of 1992 with Amendments through 1996", Part IV: The National Security Council, Functions of the National Security Council. *The Constitute*, 2020, p 55

[32] "Security and Intelligence Agencies Act", 1996 (Act 526), Arrangement of Sections. *New-NDPC*, 2001, [online resource] available from, https://new-ndpc-static1.s3.amazonaws.com/CACHES/PUBLICATIONS/2016/09/04/SECURITY+AND+INTELLIGENCE+AGENCIES+ACT,1996+(ACT+526).pdf. Accessed on 15/01/2020

though one can also push correlation between the intelligence-led national security architecture and domestic stability further back into Ghana's history as demonstrated earlier. Additionally, although Act 526 was recently replaced with Section 12 of the Security and Intelligence Agencies Act, Act 1030 of 2020[33], the defacto definition of intelligence remains; as it stresses the importance of meeting all three pre-conditions to help maintain domestic stability. Presently, Ghana's intelligence-led national security architecture comprises of multidimensional agencies including an intelligence coordinating body called the National Security Council (NSC). The other agencies also include a domestic (internal) intelligence agency called the Bureau for National Investigations (BNI), recently renamed as the National Intelligence Bureau (NIB) under the 2020 Act 1030; a foreign (external) intelligence agency called the Research Department (RD); a Defence Intelligence (DI) of the Ghana Armed Forces; a Criminal Investigations Department (CID) tasked with criminal intelligence work; a Financial Intelligence Centre (FIC); an Economic and Organised Crime Office (EOCO); the Ghana Armed Forces (Army, Navy and Air Force); Police Service; Prison Service; Customs Excise and Preventive Services; Immigration Service; Narcotics Control Board; and the Fire Service. [34] All of these agencies fall under two broad categories, which are intelligence agencies charged with undertaking intelligence work for national security purposes; and security agencies that rely on intelligence work to support investigations for national security purposes.

Each one of the national security institutions (except for the Research Department), which is a foreign intelligence agency has a sub-division operating at the national, regional, municipal, district, and local levels. The NSC performs the overarching role of supervising intelligence coordination, using the top-down and bottom-up approach. It also ensures that activities of the RD are incorporated into the broader national security spectrum of work for domestic stability

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[33] Sefanam Agbobli. "Why BNI Changed Name to National Intelligence Bureau (NIB)." *The Ghana Report*, 2020, [online resource] available from, https://www.theghanareport.com/why-bni-changed-its-name-to-national-intelligence-bureau-nib/. Accessed on 10/03/2020
[34] "Ghana's Constitution of 1992 with Amendments through 1996", Part IV: The National Security Council, Functions of the National Security Council. *The Constitute*, 2020, p 55

and is situated at the National Security Secretariat.[35] With such multidimensional agencies, the architecture is better-placed in tackling all forms of security threats to Ghana, including those uniquely associated with sub-Saharan Africa. These include preventing tribal conflicts, kidnapping, armed banditry, election-related conflicts, and the nexus of transnational organised crime and terrorism, from impacting the country's domestic stability. In addition, Act 1030 of 2020 widens the span of the architecture's response capabilities to counter security challenges such as counter-intelligence and cyber threats.[36]

As far as this dissertation is concerned, such a collective system provides the architecture with eyes and ears within and outside Ghana's territorial boundaries; whilst effectively coordinating intelligence gathering to provide situational awareness of overarching emerging threats. This makes it possible for the architecture to prepare and protect the country from potential threats; whilst preventing perpetrators from operating freely within the country's territorial borders.[37] For the past four decades, this is what has continued to make the country's terrain hostile for perpetrators to operate easily with impunity[38]; and has ensured the domestic stability of Ghana's political and security landscape. For example, tribal conflict has been one of the main triggers of civil wars in many countries in sub-Saharan Africa.[39] However, Ghana's national security institutions, their intelligence activities and interagency intelligence coordination, allowed for the successful containment of the 2004 and 2008 deadly tribal conflicts at Dagbon,

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[35] "Ghana's Constitution of 1992 with Amendments through 1996", Part IV: The National Security Council, Functions of the National Security Council. *The Constitute*, 2020, p 55
[36] Sefanam Agbobli. "Why BNI Changed Name to National Intelligence Bureau (NIB)." *The Ghana Report*, 2020, [online resource] available from, https://www.theghanareport.com/why-bni-changed-its-name-to-national-intelligence-bureau-nib/. Accessed on 10/03/2020
[37] "Ministry of National Security", PART A: Strategic Overview of the Ministry of National Security. *Republic of Ghana*, 2017, p. 2
[38] Eshun, J. 'Security and National Development During Rawlings' Era', Virtual Conversation with a Retired Naval Officer & Former Senior PDC Operative, Microsoft Teams, 21 June, (2020).
[39] Mohamed Suliman. *Ecology, Politics and Violent Conflict*, (United Kingdom, Zed Books, 1999), p. 33

in the Northern region of Ghana[40]; as well as in Yendi, and Bawku in the Upper East region[41], from impacting the rest of the country, and maintaining domestic stability.[42]

Finally, there are alternate arguments that Ghana is experiencing long-term domestic stability because of its democratic system, religious practices and/or its traditional system. However, where the strengths of this thesis supersede the alternate arguments is that the constitutional responsibilities of Ghana's intelligence-led national security architecture, which are shown in the table below reveals why it is the primary key to domestic stability in the country.

Table 3: Part of the Constitutional Responsibility of Ghana's Intelligence-Led National Security Architecture

(a) collect, analyses retain and disseminate as appropriate information and intelligence respecting activities that may constitute threats to the security of the State and the government of Ghana;
(b) safeguard the economic well-being of the State against threats posed by the acts or omissions of persons or organisations both inside and outside the country;
(c) protect the State against threats of espionage, sabotage, terrorism, hijacking, piracy, drug trafficking and similar offences;
(d) protect the State against the activities of persons, both nationals and non-nationals, intended to overthrow the government of Ghana or undermine the constitutional order through illegal political, military, industrial or other means or through any other unconstitutional method; and
(e) perform such other functions as may be directed by the President or the Council.[i]

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[i] Government of Ghana. *Freedom & Justice: 1992 Constitution of The Republic of Ghana*, (Accra: Ministry of Justice / Allshore Co, 2005), pp 60-63   [43]

The contents in the diagram indicate that having an intelligence-led architecture in place, has been the prerequisite needed to support the very institutions designed to ensure the success of Ghana's democratic systems, economic policies, and/or religious practices, as stated in bullet points (b), (d) and (e) above. Constitutionally, they make the architecture responsible for the operational effectiveness of the systems put in place to ensure the success of the alternate arguments. These are achieved by offering security assurances and protection for relevant institutions and their personnel.[44] This also helps to secure a conducive and peaceful

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[40] Ovadia, Jesse Salah. "Stepping Back from the Brink: A Review of the 2008 Ghanaian Election from the Capital of the Northern Region." *Canadian Journal of African Studies / Revue Canadienne Des Études Africaines*, 45:2, (2011), pp 310-40.
[41] Clementina Amankwaah. *Election-Related Violence: The Case of Ghana*, (Nordiska Afrikainstitutet: UPPSALA, 2013), p. 13
[42] Infoletrre Gratuite. "IRIN Focus on the Yendi crisis." *The New Humanitarian*, 2002, [online resource] available from, https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/fr/node/202203. Accessed on 27/09/2020
[43] Image created by the author
[44] "Section 12(c) of 1996 Security and Intelligence Act 526." *Ghana's Constitution*.

environment for the said institutions to succeed, as part of the architecture's duties. This assessment is corroborated by the conventional wisdom that the prevention of "disruptive effects on society, economic performance or critical processes, such as democratic decisionmaking processes", depend on national security.[45] Without the intelligence-led national security architecture adhering to its constitutional responsibilities to secure and sustain domestic stability, it would have been difficult for all the alternate arguments to achieve their goals.

KB Quantson, Ghana's former National Security Coordinator, and a former Director of Ghana's BNI; once reminded Ghanaians that national security 'must not be taken for granted', otherwise it could lead to an 'awfully dangerous mess' that could over time, 'implode or explode.' Quantson advised authorities to embark on effective security that embraces a collective approach, coupled with needed attention in a people-centred manner, as a pre-requisite for the survival of Ghana as a nation.[46] It is therefore not surprising that Marcus Awelinga, also a former Director of BNI, cautioned that "the nation will be plunged into chaos within one month should the BNI be scrapped", whilst emphasising that this 'is not an understatement'.[47]

The relevance of this dissertation is that it walks the reader through Ghana's historical journey from the pre-colonial era to date, underscoring the significance of the security architecture in determining the trajectory of the country's political and security landscape. It covers in detail how the country's national security architecture has operated and evolved through its changing phases to becoming the backbone of the country's stability today. This is the only work that attributes Ghana's long-term domestic stability to the role of its intelligence-led national

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[45] Lucia Retter, Erik Frinking, Stijn Hoorens, Alice Lynch, Fook Nederveen and William Phillips. *Relationships Between the Economy and National Security: Analysis and Considerations for Economic Security Policy in the Netherlands*, (Cambridge: RAND Corporation, 2020), p. xii

[46] KB Quantson. 'Beyond the Frontiers of National Security', *Occasional Papers*, No. 37 (2008): Pages 1 – 5.

[47] Moses.Y Jatuat. "Role of Intelligence, Institutions and Legal Framework in Ghana", National Security, *Academia*, 2020

security architecture. The comprehensive historical context helps to closely study and outline the activities of the country's security sector. Further, this dissertation helps to establish trends and patterns used to develop the three pre-conditions that underscore this central argument. These preconditions apply not only in Ghana but can generally be applied to assess the stability of nations around the modern world. This dissertation is therefore the only all-encompassing document which covers Ghana's national security architecture's journey in its entirety, while bridging the current knowledge-gap in the area under study.

That said, there are the alternate arguments put forward by other commentators on this subject matter. This dissertation engages these opposite arguments on two fronts, (i) prevailing wisdom on the key to Ghana's domestic stability, in which this dissertation demonstrates why they are not accurate; and (ii) established discussions on Ghana's intelligence-led national security architecture and demonstrates why they are not detailed enough.

Chapter 2: The Myth of Ghana's Domestic Stability

Prevailing Wisdom

Currently, there is no work that comprehensively attributes Ghana's domestic stability to the pivotal role being played by the country's intelligence-led national security architecture. However, one work that comes close to directly addressing this question with the role of Ghana's security sector, is Eboe Hutchful's work, 'Pulling Back from the Brink: Ghana's Experience'.[1] In addition to security and other diverse factors, Hutchful, also attributes the stability in Ghana to a combination of three forms of action taken by former President Jerry Rawlings. Hutchful claims that the extreme measure taken by Rawlings to execute nine senior officers (three of whom were former heads of states) during the 1979 revolution, also helped control the 'instrument of violence' that existed principally within factions of the armed forces. Such a decision coupled with other actions taken by Rawlings, according to Hutchful prevented Ghana from falling into the 'familiar conflict trajectories', which at that period had engulfed the sub-region. These other actions alluded to by Hutchful include, (i) Rawlings' second successful military coup to take over power for the second time from a democratically elected administration, whom he had previously handed over power to three months earlier; and (ii) the regime's decision to actively play a significant role in the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), to help coordinate national and regional security concerns. Hutchful's take on this question under discussion, to some degree, aligns with this dissertation's narrative. However, unlike Hutchful, this dissertation rather attributes the long-term domestic stability in Ghana to the role being played by its intelligence-led national security architecture.

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[1] Eboe Hutchful. 'Pulling back from the Brink Ghana's Experience', in, *Governing Insecurity: Democratic Control of Military and Security Establishments in Transitional Democracies*, by Gavin Cawthra and Robin Luckham, ed., (London: Zed Books, 2003), p 82.

Unlike Hutchful whose work appears to directly answer the question of what has made Ghana successful in attaining a stable landscape in an unstable sub-region; Joseph Aryee, indirectly, appears to address the same issue from a different perspective to Hutchful. In his book, *Politics, Governance, and Development in Ghana*[2], Aryee attributes the stability in Ghana to multiple factors. These include: democratic conditions; economic expansion coupled with other forms of social friction; ethnicity, equitable and social inclusion; as well as the roles of traditional authorities and civil societies in the country's transition, which have been put in place to help address inequalities in Ghana.

A major work undertaken by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), entitled 'Ghana: Sustainable Development Goals'[3], also indirectly attributes the country's stable landscape to collective factors. However, the UNDP study relates Ghana's achievement to its robust growth, which has always been biased in favour of extractive and capital-intensive services sector; and claims that it is what has helped create a "stable democratic governance". Aryee and the UNDP are both far from acknowledging the intelligence-led national security architecture's contribution to the country's success in their respective literature. Therefore, they do not speak to the true fundamental factors which brought about domestic stability.

Similar to the preceding publications, Youry Lambert, in his book *Ghana: In Search of Stability, 1957-1992*[4], also indirectly attributes Ghana's stabilised landscape to multiple factors. Where Lambert differs from preceding literature is that he assesses the country's landscape based on the role of the army, the structure of Ghanaian society, forms of state power organisation, the struggle for political power, and ethnic and religious factors in politics. Lambert makes the assertion that Ghana's political stability is based on its democratic forms, which is also a prerequisite for the country's social and economic progress.

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[2] Ayee, Joseph. *Politics, Governance, and Development in Ghana*, (London: Lexington Books, 2019).
[3] "Ghana: Sustainable Development Goals", Eradicate extreme hunger and poverty. *United Nations Development Programme*, 2020, [online resource] available from, https://www.gh.undp.org/content/ghana/en/home/post-2015/mdgoverview/overview/mdg1.html. Accessed on 01/05/2020
[4] Lambert, Youry. *Ghana: in search of stability, 1957-1992*, (Westport: Praeger, 1993).

Concurrently, the Ghana Investment Promotions Center (GIPC), also attributes Ghana's sustained stability to collective factors. In its study, 'Political Stability: A Strong and Stable Democracy'[5], the GIPC indirectly links Ghana's stability to its "strong religious sentiments", coupled with its "strong sense of national identity and unity that supersedes other affiliations such as ethnicity and tribe".[6] Further, Monika Różalska, in her article 'Between Tradition and Modernity – The Role of Chiefs in the National Development and Local Governance in Ghana'[7], also indirectly links the country's stabilised landscape to multifaceted factors. Różalska appears to attribute Ghana's stability to its 'two decades of rapid economic growth and relatively peaceful transitions of power after elections'[8]; coupled with the role of traditional leaders, and their relationships and coexistence with the local and state government institutions. For this reason, Różalska describes Ghana 'as a leader of democracy and stability in Sub-Saharan Africa', and also acknowledges Ghana as 'one of the fastest developing and safest countries in the region.'

Finally, despite the fact that this discussion regarding the root cause of stability has been pervasive across the country, scholarly literature is scarce, particularly at the peer-reviewed and PhD levels. However, there are a handful of MA graduates who have attempted to take on the topic, and these works merit inclusion in the broader debate. Kofi Afful, also indirectly links Ghana's stabilised landscape to various factors collectively. In his MA thesis entitled, Traditional Governance Influence on Democracy in Africa[9], Afful relates Ghana's stability to its stable democracy, which has been a combined effort between traditional rulers and state governments. Afful subsequently, argues that making traditional rulers act as a possible

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[5] "Political Stability: A Strong and Stable Democracy." *Ghana Investment Promotion Centre*, 2020, [online resource] available from, https://www.gipcghana.com/invest-in-ghana/why-ghana/political-stability.html - Accessed on 02/04/2020

[6] "Political Stability: A Strong and Stable Democracy." *Ghana Investment Promotion Centre*, 2020, [online resource] available from, https://www.gipcghana.com/invest-in-ghana/why-ghana/political-stability.html - Accessed on 02/04/2020

[7] Różalska, M. 'Between Tradition and Modernity – The Role of Chiefs in the National Development and Local Governance in Ghana'. *Politeja*, 42, (2016) pp 379-402.

[8] Ibid

[9] Kofi Afful. Traditional Governance Influence on Democracy in Africa [MA Thesis], City College of New York, 2015.

significant link between government and the citizens will create an atmosphere where all parties stand to benefit and strengthen Ghana's stability.

The alternate arguments fail to acknowledge that the very institutions put in place to ensure the successful administering of policies designed for the success of democracy, religious practice, and the economy, actually require a safe, stable environment to succeed. Such an environment also has to be sustained and maintained for a longer duration, for policies to thrive and make a difference. Further, the protection and safety of these institutions and their personnel also need to be guaranteed for them to operate successfully. All of these factors can only be achieved by effectively countering potential security challenges that are likely to threaten the survival of such institutions. Therefore, although conditions addressed by the previous authors might have played a role toward achieving domestic stability in Ghana, it is the vital role of the intelligence-led national security architecture, which has made the real difference. To further demonstrate this, a review has been undertaken to focus on what appears to be the two most touted arguments, religious and democratic practices.[10]

Religious Practice

From a broader religious practice argument standpoint, a major study undertaken by the UK Commonwealth Commission (CC), entitled, 'Civil Paths to Peace: Commonwealth Commission on Respect and Understanding'[11], makes a general case for the importance of religion towards peace and stability in a country (not necessarily Ghana). The CC claims that religious faith has 'always been a particularly powerful force in the construction of identity' and is often a force for good. It reiterates that because all religions in the world inherit values from the promotion of 'love and understanding, respect and hope, care by the strong for the weak, and societies based on justice, fairness, co-existence and harmony' it makes religious faith a

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[10] Aryee, Joseph. *Politics, Governance, and Development in Ghana*, (London: Lexington Books, 2019)
[11] Commonwealth Commission. 'Civil Paths to Peace: Commonwealth Commission on Respect and Understanding' in, *Peace and Democratic Society*, by Amartya Sen, ed., (Cambridge: Open Book Publishers, 2011), pp 65-67

significant tool for unity. Therefore, relationships built on common understanding develop, that violence is eschewed, and respect characterises interactions. Violence cannot be maintained between people who understand and respect each other. This appears to highlight how vital a tool religion can be, when seeking to maintain peace and stability in society and/or within the broader boundaries of a country.

Nora Kofognotera Nonterah's work on 'The Challenges of Interfaith Relations in Ghana'[12], also associates peace and stability in a country to religious practice. Unlike the CC study which generalises the religious practice argument, Nonterah's work directly focusses on Ghana. This work looks at programs and activities of religious groups in Ghana towards peacebuilding. Nonterah highlights how religion holds a significant stake in Ghanaian society, which contributes to the country's peaceful atmosphere. Nonterah assesses that religious pluralism practised in Ghana, makes it 'very common to find people of different faiths coexisting within the same family and community, who also share common public or workplaces.' Therefore, Nonterah argues that the existence of such harmony and understanding between members of different religious groups in Ghana, opens up the opportunity to create inter-religious dialogue within the society. This enables different religious groups to embark on peace-talks in areas where there are conflicts in Ghana, encouraging peace and stability in the country.

Kofi Quashigah's work on 'Religion and the Secular State in Ghana'[13] also throws light on the role of religion in Ghana and how it has been a significant pillar in Ghanaian society. From a different but complimentary perspective, Quashigah argues that religion was and always has been and largely remains, an integral part of the Ghanaian lifestyle and tradition. For this reason, religion plays a more significant role within the Ghanaian society by forming part of its

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[12] Nora Kofognotera Nonterah, 'The Challenges of Interfaith Relations in Ghana', in *Pathways for Interreligious Dialogue in the Twenty-First Century*, by Latinovic, V. Mannion, G. and Phan, P., eds., (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), pp 197-200

[13] Quashigah, Kofi. 'Religion and the Secular State in Ghana', in Javier Martínez-Torrón & W. Cole Durham, Jr. 'Religion and the Secular State La religion et l'État laïque', *International Center for Law and Religion Studies*, XVIII, (2010), pp 331-339.

citizens' social and public life; as well as governmental activities in Ghana. Therefore, Quashigah claims that to maintain peace in Ghana, there is the need to acknowledge the significance of religion and guarantee the respect for religious liberty, which is the natural and constitutional right of every individual.

Following a similar narrative to Quashigah's work is Raphael Avornyo, who also weighs in on the stability in Ghana by indirectly relating the stabilisation in the country to both religion and its democratic practices. In his work, 'Perceptions about the Role of Religion in Ensuring Peace in Ghana's Body Polity: A case Study of Ghana's Political Party Functionaries'[14], Avornyo claims that:

> "After experiencing massive social, political and economic upheavals in Ghana between 1966 and 1992, Ghana ushered in constitutional democracy in 1992. Since that period, the country, compared with her neighbours, has been enjoying relative political stability. Prior to adopting the Western type of democracy, after gaining independence in 1957, religion played a significant role in ensuring peace and stability of the body polity."[15]

Despite these arguments, this dissertation asserts that the role of religion in society can also function as a 'double-edged sword', and therefore could be detrimental to a country's stability. The CC's work also corroborates such an assertion by acknowledging how religious faith throughout history has sometimes been used to promote the interest of those with destructive aims. Hence in addition to its positives, the CC also makes the counter-argument that because religion can justify, inspire, empower, and not be proved wrong; it can also act as a 'legitimising discourse for violence' thus, due to its advantage it has over purely political ideologies.[16] No wonder in Nonterah's work also attributed the source of conflict in Ghana to the "misuse" and "misunderstanding" of religion.[17]

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[14] Avornyo, R. 'Perceptions about the Role of Religion in Ensuring Peace in Ghana's Body Polity: A case Study of Ghana's Political Party Functionaries', *European Scientific Journal,* 9:19, (2013).
[15] Ibid
[16] Commonwealth Commission. 'Civil Paths to Peace: Commonwealth Commission on Respect and Understanding' in, *Peace and Democratic Society*, by Amartya Sen, ed., (Cambridge: Open Book Publishers, 2011), pp 65-67
[17] Nora Kofognotera Nonterah, 'The Challenges of Interfaith Relations in Ghana', in *Pathways for Interreligious Dialogue in the Twenty-First Century*, by Latinovic, V. Mannion, G. and Phan, P., eds., (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), pp 197-200

These counter-arguments evoke some degree of doubt into the argument that religious practice fosters stability. From this dissertation's viewpoint, if Ghana's stability has come about as a result of its citizens being peaceful due to their religious values, then why are many of the other countries in the sub-Saharan region who are also religious[18] not stable? Furthermore, taking Ghana's own history into consideration, although its citizens were not any less religious during the 1970s, its political and security landscape during that period was significantly destabilised, to the extent that it almost became a failed state.[19] However, this dissertation asserts that religion did not play a significant role in maintaining Ghana's long-term stability.

Democratic Practice

Another major argument which is also touted as a reason for Ghana's stabilised landscape has been its democratic practice. A study by Boafo-Arthur on *Democracy and Stability in West Africa: The Ghanaian Experience*[20], appears to attribute stabilisation in Ghana to its decades of peaceful multiparty democracy. Unlike some countries in the sub-region that end up in widespread conflicts and/or civil wars due to disagreements in general election results, Boafo-Arthur argues differently in Ghana's case. He claims that in Ghana, political actors have continuously used the appropriate democratic institutions in addressing their grievances, which has led to the resolution of several potentially destabilising electoral disputes.[21]

For this reason, Boafo-Arthur justifies the important role played by Ghana's democratic system in helping to create a stabilised landscape, by referring to 'how potentially destabilising election-related disputes had been resolved using the courts since the 1992 elections.'[22]

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[18] Quashigah, Kofi. Religion and the Secular State in Ghana, in Javier Martínez-Torrón & W. Cole Durham, Jr. 'Religion and the Secular State La religion et l'État laïque', *International Center for Law and Religion Studies*, XVIII, (2010), pp 331-339.
[19] Cogneau, Denis. Mesplé-Somps, Sandrine. Spielvogel, Gilles. 'Development at the Border: Policies and National Integration in Côte D'Ivoire and Its Neighbors.' *The World Bank Economic Review*, 29:1 (2015), pp 41-71
[20] Boafo-Arthur, Kwame. *Democracy and Stability in West Africa: The Ghanaian Experience*, (Uppsala: DCPR, NAI, 2008).
[21] Boafo-Arthur, Kwame. *Democracy and Stability in West Africa: The Ghanaian Experience*, (Uppsala: DCPR, NAI, 2008).
[22] Ibid

Therefore, he argues that Ghana's democratic practice has helped avert potential conflicts in the country. Boafo-Arthur then claims that democratic practices in Ghana have helped promote peace and subsequently create stability in the country.

Larry Diamond, in his book, *In Search of Democracy*[23], also attributes stability in Ghana to various factors, including its democratic practice. However, Diamond evaluates the global status and prospects of democracy in Ghana by developing a 'comprehensive theoretical inventory of the conditions for democracy'[24]. As part of the evaluation, Diamond considers many factors including ethnic, linguistic and the broader structures, which comprise society as a whole. These include the essence of a civil society that incorporates economic and social factors that relates to the level of development, extent of inequality, and class structure. In so doing, Diamond was able to ascertain whether these factors coincided with and reinforced one another, or instead, cut across and softened one another. Similar to Boafo-Arthur, Diamond concludes by attributing the quality of democratic institutions and the effectiveness of governance as a key condition for a stable democracy.[25]

Concurrently to Boafo-Arthur's and Diamond's works, Robert Pinkney's book *Democracy and Dictatorship in Ghana and Tanzania*[26], also leans toward a similar narrative, attributing Ghana's stabilised landscape to its democratic practices. Unlike the two preceding authors, Pinkney, compares Ghana's democracy to Tanzania's by acknowledging the historically long periods of single-party and military rule in both countries. As part of the process, Pinkney makes a clear distinction between the nature of democracies in Ghana and Tanzania, by considering the conditions which have made the emergence of multi-party politics possible in both countries. In doing so, Pinkney claimed that Ghana has a track record of political conflict,

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[23] Diamond, Larry. *In Search of Democracy*, (London: Routledge, 2016).
[24] Ibid
[25] Diamond, Larry. *In Search of Democracy*, (London: Routledge, 2016).
[26] Pinkney, Robert. *Democracy and Dictatorship in Ghana and Tanzania*, (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1997)

however, it has been difficult to channel this along stable democratic lines. Whereas with Tanzania it has a long record of political stability but little experience of party competition.[27]

Despite that contrast, Pinkney also shows where both countries align. Pinkney acknowledges that currently, there are still potential obstacles to the respective democratic developments in both countries. However, he attributes multi-party politics and democratic practices of both countries to the current stabilisation within their respective territorial borders. Alternatively, Pinkney also appreciates that there is still more work to be done. He therefore encourages both countries to extend their respective democracies beyond free elections and freedom of speech.

Furthermore, Graham, Gyampo, Faanu and Yobo, in their work, 'The Third Peaceful Transfer of Power and Democratic Consolidation in Ghana'[28], attribute the stability in Ghana to multiple democratic factors. These are the existence of a multi-party system, implementation of electoral reforms, presence of vibrant civil society and media, and acceptance of democratic norms behaviourally, attitudinally and constitutionally by Ghanaian citizenry and political elites.

Graham et. al. give recognition to the role of democracy in helping Ghana attain a stabilised landscape. However, the study was also quick to caution that although the country has been able to embark on peaceful transfer of political power on multiple occasions, its democracy is not yet consolidated. For this reason, the authors in this same report also question the viability of Ghana's democratic practice as the reason for the country's stability. They question its viability by referring to how its electoral processes continue to be burdened with immense flaws that weaken the integrity of elections and poses a threat of democratic relapse.[29] Graham et. al. subsequently highlight the monumental flaws within Ghana's democratic practice, which is also touted as the key to the country's stability. These are enormous powers of the president

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[27] Ibid
[28] Graham, Emmanuel & Gyampo, Ransford & Faanu, Pamphilious & Yobo, Eric. 'The Third Peaceful Transfer of Power and Democratic Consolidation in Ghana', *Pan African Studies (Africology)*, 10 (2017), pp 99-127.
[29] Ibid

and executive branch, ethnic or tribal politics, post-election violence, limited policy influence of civil society, and the deliberate effort at tagging civil society with a view to gagging them.[30]

Taking a closer look at this democratic practice argument, this dissertation argues that although the transfer of political power in Ghana through the ballot box has been adhered to successfully since 1992, having democratic systems in place, does not necessarily guarantee stability in a country. Ethridge and Handelman once stated, "democracy does not guarantee political stability".[31] Additionally, it is also important to highlight many countries in sub-Saharan Africa, at some point in history had their democracy overturned through military coup d'états. Thus, despite having democratic systems in place, such democratic practices did not guarantee stability in such countries; they still experienced destabilisation of their respective security landscapes.[32]

Weaknesses in the prevailing wisdom

A closer look into Ghana's history confirms that the country's democratic practice is not the key to its long-term stability. Prior to Jerry Rawlings' democratically elected government in 1992, there were other democratically elected administrations that came into power but had their respective administrations abruptly ended through military interventions.[33] Those military takeovers attracted further military coup attempts, with varying levels of success. Hence such malign activities threw the country into turmoil and subsequently destabilised Ghana's landscape for a decade. Furthermore, the coups and attempted coups fostered lawlessness and disorder. Mostly, these instances were associated with violence, which destabilised the

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[30] Graham, Emmanuel & Gyampo, Ransford & Faanu, Pamphilious & Yobo, Eric. 'The Third Peaceful Transfer of Power and Democratic Consolidation in Ghana', *Pan African Studies (Africology)*, 10 (2017), pp 99-127.
[31] Marcus E. Ethridge, Howard Handelman. *Politics in a Changing World*, (United Kingdom: WADSWORTH, 2013), p.402
[32] Yomi Kazeem. "Takeover: What is a coup? These 40 African Countries Could Help Explain." *Quartz Africa*, 2017, [online resource] available from, https://qz.com/africa/1130009/what-is-coup-zimbabwe-joins-40-african-countries-that-have-had-coups/ Accessed on 10/03/2020
[33] Naunihal Singh. *Seizing Power: The Strategic Logic of Military Coups*, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2014), p.5

country to the verge of becoming a failed state, if not already at the time.[34] This confirms the viewpoint that having democratic systems in place does not guarantee the political and security stability of a country.

When Jerry Rawlings took-over power through a military coup on 31st December 1981, (from a democratically elected government), Ghana experienced relative stability in the decade that followed under his leadership, despite the fact that it was a military dictatorship.[35] What appeared to be significant compared to prior military takeovers in Ghana was that Rawlings, after taking over, immediately reformed the country's national security institutions. Such reformation incorporated intelligence activities and interagency intelligence coordination. Additionally, the architecture was also strategically organised to have eyes and ears within and outside the country's territorial borders. Since all malign activities (military coup, civil unrests, terrorism, or any illegal activity with the potential of destabilising the country), which are designed to destabilise a country require planning, such a national security outfit proved pivotal in preventing and/or addressing any such eventualities.

With eyes and ears everywhere, Rawlings' military regime was able to disrupt and foil numerous military coups attempts against the government, with some orchestrated domestically and others with the support of foreign powers.[36] Additionally, the regime was also able to address tribal conflicts and avoid potential civil wars from destabilising the country's landscape. The significant difference made by such a well-organised intelligence-led national security architecture, to secure the country's stability and ensure its transition into a true democracy after a decade, was undeniable. Not only that; the architecture has also remarkably

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[34] Cogneau, Denis. Mesplé-Somps, Sandrine. Spielvogel, Gilles. 'Development at the Border: Policies and National Integration in Côte D'Ivoire and Its Neighbors.' *The World Bank Economic Review*, 29:1 (2015), pp 41-71

[35] Eboe Hutchful. 'Pulling back from the Brink Ghana's Experience', in, *Governing Insecurity: Democratic Control of Military and Security Establishments in Transitional Democracies*, by Gavin Cawthra and Robin Luckham, eds., (London: Zed Books, 2003), p 88.

[36] Eboe Hutchful. 'Pulling back from the Brink Ghana's Experience', in, *Governing Insecurity: Democratic Control of Military and Security Establishments in Transitional Democracies*, by Gavin Cawthra and Robin Luckham, eds., (London: Zed Books, 2003), p 90.

been able to protect and defend the democratic systems put in place, allowing Ghanaians to decide who governs their country through the ballot box in past general elections. These elections sometimes end up with power being transferred from one opposing political party to the other for over four decades now under a stabilised landscape. Therefore, considering the discussion so far, this dissertation takes a stance that democratic practice in Ghana has not been the reason for its long-term domestic stability.

This thesis demonstrates that throughout Ghana's history, the point at which the country has effectively integrated intelligence activities and interagency intelligence coordination into its national security institutions' duties, is when the country is most stable. Therefore, the prevailing wisdom that the democratic system, religious practices, economic policies, and traditional values are the reasons for Ghana's stability, do not show the strongest correlation. Further, when one takes a closer look at the available scholarship on Ghana's national security architecture, such works are also not sufficiently developed. Although these are really good literature, they barely capture the architecture's significance in a balanced manner. Overall, they are too partial in their assessment to be able to realise the pivotal role played by the country's intelligence-led national security architecture, in bringing long-term stability in Ghana as demonstrated below.

Established Discussions on Ghana's National Security Architecture

The role played by Ghana's intelligence-led national security architecture for Ghana's stability has barely been recognised in available literature. Although Hutchful, acknowledges that in Ghana, restoring professionalism and efficiency within its security sector allowed the [country] to restore its own credibility as the primary source of security for its citizens[37], no literature significantly argues the prospect of Ghana's national security architecture being the key to its

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[37] Eboe Hutchful. 'Pulling back from the Brink Ghana's Experience', in, *Governing Insecurity: Democratic Control of Military and Security Establishments in Transitional Democracies*, by Cawthra, Gavin and Luckham, Robin., eds., (London: Zed Books, 2003), p 90.

stability. Meanwhile, in recent years, discussions on Ghana's security sector have intensified due to the increasing awareness within the intelligence and security profession about the current and emerging challenges in sub – Saharan Africa.

Commentators, including academics, policymakers, and the media, have all shown significant interest in researching this subject-matter. Topics of interest which have dominated most discussions focus on the security sector reform, oversight, and/or governance in Ghana. However, when it comes to research work that focuses on the national security architecture of Ghana as the central theme, there appears to be only a handful of published material available. All such documents appear to share a common theme; an assessment on the effectiveness of the country's national security architecture and/or its security sector in relation to governance in the country. This, therefore, evidently raises the question, why has such an important factor (national security architecture) barely been comprehensively considered as a key to Ghana's success story? One exception is Jatuat's article, "National Security: Role of Intelligence, Institutions and Legal Framework in Ghana"[38], which acknowledges the good work done by the 'national intelligence agencies' of Ghana. This raises another significant question, which is, how is the national security architecture and/or its security sector perceived by authors who have shown interest in writing on the subject-matter?

It has become apparent that although there has been significant work done on this subject-matter in recent years, each literature differs from the other in its own distinct way. While each document covers different but limited periods of the architecture's history therefore lacking consistency, none of the literature provides a complete picture of the architecture's history and its entire evolution to date. This has contributed to the presently available conventional wisdom being limited, scattered, or sometimes incomplete information, creating a significant knowledge gap. This highlights a sharp contrast between this dissertation and other literature

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[38] Jatuat, Moses.Y. "Role of Intelligence, Institutions and Legal Framework in Ghana", National Security.

on both the consistency and perception front. To begin with is the consistency of information available on the national security architecture's journey.

David Killingray in his book, *Policing the Empire: Government, Authority, and Control, 1830-1940*[39], covers a specific period of the country's security architecture's history. This book offers an insight into how a formal system of policing in the Gold Coast was developed prior to 1913, when the British consolidated its colonial control over the country. Killingray's book explains the outlook of the country's security sector and how it operated in that era; through maintenance of law and order, as well as its para-military activities. The book provides some pre-colonial context of the country's security set-up and landscape. Therefore, it is very useful for piecing together the architecture's historical journey; yet, it only covers a limited time frame. Like other literature on this subject-matter, Killingray's book forms part of the currently incomplete and/or scattered information available on the security sector's evolution.

Frederick Cooper's book, *Decolonization and African Society*[40] also covers the country's security sector's history from 1930 to 1948. Cooper explains how a series of continuous strike actions during this time gradually altered the country's future political and security landscape. It further explains why such strike actions were pivotal in shaping the outlook and operational activities of the security sector in that era and thereafter. Where Killingray left off in 1940, Cooper extended this work to 1948. Together, both books contribute pieces of the puzzle needed to make sense of the architecture's entire historical journey and its relevance to the country's stability today.

Contrary to preceding books, Clive Emsley and Haia Shpayer-Makov's book on *Police Detectives in History, 1750-1950*[41], briefly but directly touch on alterations made to the security

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[39] Killingray, David. *Policing the Empire: Government, Authority, and Control, 1830-1940*, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1991)
[40] Cooper, Frederick. *Decolonization and African Society*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996)
[41] Clive Emsley, Haia Shpayer-Makov. *Police detectives in history, 1750-1950*, (Aldershot: ASHGATE, 2006)

architecture in the Gold Coast immediately after the 1948 Riots. Emsley and Shpayer-Makov's section about the Gold Coast specifically focuses on the country's security architecture in the post February 1948 Riots.[42] Emsley and Shpayer-Makov provide a bit more context about the country's political and security landscape beyond 1948. They explain how the internal security architecture of the Gold Coast post-February 1948 was significantly transformed to operate differently from previous years. Emsley and Shpayer-Makov's book describes the sudden shift of the country's political and security landscape in that era. It explains how the change of the landscape pushed the colonial regime to embark on immediate reinforcement of the Criminal Investigations Department (CID), and led to the creation of the Special Branch (SB) with branches in every province. This book further articulates that there was the establishment of an Intelligence Coordination Committee that met weekly at the police headquarters in the country. Together, Emsley and Shpayer-Makov offer valuable information on the outlook of the country's security architecture, how it operated, and the security environment it operated in during that era. That being said, although Emsley and Shpayer-Makov, provide some of the key information to help fill some of the gaps in the architecture's history, it only covers a specific period of the architecture's historical journey, reinforcing how scattered such information currently is.

Richard Rathbone's work on the 'Police Intelligence in Ghana in the late 1940s and 1950s'[43] also directly though briefly, touches on changes made to the security architecture in the Gold Coast after the 1948 Riots. Rathbone's work, explains how the intelligence gathering duties of the architecture in the post-1948 Riots environment were specifically outlined, distinguishing between political and security intelligence collection work. Rathbone's work corroborates how the colonial regime embarked on immediate reinforcement of the CID. It also discusses the creation of SB in every province in the country, and the establishment of an 'intelligence

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[42] Ibid
[43] Richard Rathbone. 'Police intelligence in Ghana in the late 1940s and 1950s', in, *Policing and Decolonisation: Politics, Nationalism, and the Police, 1917-65*, by David Anderson & David Killingray., eds., (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1992), pp 84-101

coordination committee' that met weekly at the police headquarters in the country. Rathbone describes how intelligence gathering was significantly improved in the Gold Coast. This offered further insight into how the internal security architecture operated. Where Rathbone's work is notable is that it distinguishes between the architecture's activities in 1940 to February 1948 from its operations in February 1948 to the 1950s (post-Riots era). Rathbone's work also provides some of the key information to help make sense of how Ghana's national security architecture evolved. Again however, Rathbone's work only covers a certain timeframe, and does not explain the national security architecture's journey in its entirety. Therefore, the significance of this dissertation is that it is the only work that covers the evolution of the Ghanaian national security architecture from the pre-colonial era to the present day.

Just like all the documents reviewed already, Georgina Sinclair's book on *At the End of the Line*[44], also covers a specific era of the architecture's history. Sinclair briefly touches on the political and security landscape of the Gold Coast between the late 1940s and early 1950s. However, Sinclair's book distances itself from the field by focussing on describing the country's political and security landscape during this period. Sinclair uniquely narrates in graphic detail the turbulent state of the country's security landscape in that era and how troop-carrying vehicles, signals equipment, riot equipment, (batons, steel helmets, tear gas, wicker shields) and armoured-car units had to be urgently brought into the [Gold Coast] colony in the wake of the 1948 Riots. Sinclair explains how the 1951 Watson Commission's recommendations were embarked on by the colonial regime to help drastically change the political and security environment of the Gold Coast. Unlike the other authors, Sinclair's book offers an insight into how the above activities altered the trajectory of the political and security landscape into reshaping the internal security architecture. With an alternate explanation this book describes how the internal security was reshaped during the post-1948 Riots, until it became the

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[44] Georgina, Sinclair. *At the End of the Line*, Quote of John Coles, Colonial Policing, and the Imperial Endgame 1945-80, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2006).

country's first national security architecture after independence. However, once again Sinclair's work also only covers a specific but limited scope of the architecture's history.

In a completely different narrative, Roger Gocking's book on *The History of Ghana, Independence the Nkrumah Years*[45], walks the reader through almost Ghana's entire history from the pre-colonial era to 2004. Gocking is one of the few authors who goes to such an extent to cover the back story of Ghana. This sets his book apart from preceding works and shares some commonality with this dissertation, which also covers an extensive background. However, where Gocking focuses on how Ghana's political, economic, and social landscape evolved, this dissertation examines the evolution of Ghana's national security architecture evolved. Thus, even though Gocking's book covers all the government and regime changes in the country, its focus was not on the vital details about how the nation's security architecture evolved. Yet, Gocking's book provides vital information on how the political and security landscape of the country evolved from the pre-colonial era to 2004. Therefore, Gocking's book contributes to some of the relevant information needed to make sense of how Ghana's intelligence-led national security architecture evolved.

Contrary to the preceding author, KB Quantson's book *Ghana: National Security*[46], provides a comprehensive first-hand information. This book outlines in chronological order the changing dynamics of the country's political and security landscape after independence in 1957, to the end of Rawlings' military regime in 1992. Unlike any of the previously reviewed literature, Quantson explains that he witnessed first-hand, how most of the military coup d'états were planned and executed in the country, from Nkrumah's era to the period of Rawlings' military regime. Already working within the national security apparatus, Quantson, was able to explain what made the architecture effective in foiling numerous attempted military coup d'états. He

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[45] Gocking, Roger. *The History of Ghana, Independence the Nkrumah Years*, (London: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2005).
[46] Quantson, KB. *Ghana: National Security*, (Accra: Besta Press - NAPASVIL VENTURES, 2003).

also notes what caused the prevention of successful coup d'états that led to regime changes and influenced the evolution process of the national security architecture throughout that period. Quantson's book offers first-hand insight into how the national security architecture evolved and operated within a specific period with surgical precision. However, Quantson barely describes Ghana's national security architecture's outlook prior to 1982. Further, Quantson barely refers to the architecture's historical journey in the colonial era, let alone the pre-colonial period, or its outlook and activities beyond (2002) Rawlings' rule. Once again, this book only covers a limited period in the architecture's history and not its entirety; therefore, reinforcing the significance of this dissertation.

Another book by Quantson, *Ghana: Peace and Stability: Chapters from the Intelligence Sector*[47] was released earlier and it looks at the security sector from a different perspective. It provides in detail, and for the first time some of the security challenges faced by the architecture in the past. Like his earlier work, the book also brings to the forefront how tribalism began to pose a significant threat to national security for the first time in the architecture's history. Furthermore, similar to his work reviewed earlier, this book also offers an insight into how the national security architecture undertook its business, and it operated mostly after March 1957 to the early half of the 1990s. While this book reveals vital information that contributes significantly toward making sense of the architecture's historical journey, it only covers a limited period, and therefore, does not provide a comprehensive account. Both Quantson's books above were published in the early 21st century and do not account for the current security environment in Ghana. However, a more recent book of his, entitled, *Security in the Hand of God*[48], addresses some of the shortcomings of his other two books, and some aspects of the current security environment and challenges in Ghana.

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[47] Quantson, Kofi B. *Ghana: Peace and Stability*, Chapters from the Intelligence Sector, (Accra: Advent Press - NAPASCOM, 2000)

[48] Quantson, Kofi B. *Security in the Hand of God*, My Amazon Testimony, (Toronto: University of Toronto, 2016)

Another work on Ghana's security landscape that mainly focuses on the present-day national security architecture and the challenges it faces, is an article called 'The Changing Face of Internal Security Threats in Ghana'[49], published by UK Essays. This article zooms in on how the challenges being faced by the architecture have rapidly evolved in recent years. This article also highlights the need for a reciprocal evolvement within Ghana's national security architecture and how it operates; a viewpoint shared by this dissertation. Another commonality is that this article comprehensively outlines the security threats that currently face the country's national security architecture to highlight the magnitude of such challenges. That being said, this article focuses mainly on what the military needs to do to counter such security threats. This dissertation, on the other hand, recognises that addressing such significant challenges in a country, requires a collective effort from its entire national security apparatus aided by intelligence in order to effectively address such issues. This point of view is alluded to in the HM government's "National Security Capability Review".[50] The review advocates for the use a new national security doctrine known as the Fusion Doctrine, to help improve collective approach to national security. The aim of this doctrine is to improve on the creation of the National Security Council by using 'security, economic and influence capabilities to maximum effect to protect, promote and project national security, economic and influence goals.'[51]

It is therefore not surprising that KB Quantson aligns with the prior statement in his work entitled, 'Beyond the Frontiers of National Security'.[52] This work highlights that security is a 'fundamental prerequisite for the survival of humankind and should be regarded as the elixir that sustains the stability of society.'[53] He further relates an ineffective security in a country to

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49 "The Changing Face of Internal Security Threats in Ghana", The Role of the Ghana Army. *UK Essays*, 2018, [online resource] available from, https://www.ukessays.com/essays/education/the-changing-face-internal-security-threats-ghana.php?vref=1. Accessed on 10/05/2020
50 "National Security Capability Review", Summary, Including the second annual report on implementation of the National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015. *HM Government*, 2018, [online resource] available from,
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/705347/6.4391_CO_National-Security-Review_web.pdf. Accessed on 10/05/2020
51 Ibid
52 "Beyond the Frontiers of National Security", Occasional Papers, *Institute of Economic Affairs, Ghana,* no. 37 (2008).
53 Ibid

an 'awfully dangerous mess' that could overtime, 'implode or explode' and therefore, affect the progress of the country in question.[54] For this reason, Quantson cautioned Ghanaians not to take security for granted 'as things appear to be normal'. He therefore suggests the need for a collective approach, coupled with 'the needed attention in a people-centred manner' as 'a pre-requisite for the survival of a nation.'[55] All of this aligns with this dissertation's narrative. Having said that, similar to every document reviewed so far, this work also only covers a specific era of the architecture's history, as it barely touches on its precolonial and colonial periods. This once again identifies another literature which does not provide a comprehensive picture of how the security landscape of the country evolved to its present state.

One of the very few pieces of literature with a similar narrative to this dissertation is Moses Jatuat's work on 'National Security: Role of Intelligence, Institutions and Legal Framework in Ghana'[56]. Jatuat acknowledges how 'National Security' and 'Intelligence' are 'increasingly becoming common among many people', including 'law enforcement personnel, security, social & political commentators and the general public.'[57] Jatuat's work however attributes the reason why people are becoming increasingly aware of intelligence and national security to them 'becoming more concerned about their safety and security.' What makes Jatuat's work notable is that it assesses activities of the 'national intelligence agencies' through the lenses of the country's legal framework and positions itself as an advocate for increasing 'education on the subject of national security and intelligence'.[58] Similar to this dissertation, Jatuat also sees the terms 'national security' and intelligence as 'inextricably linked'. Jatuat's work acknowledges that 'national intelligence agencies have done very well under the fourth Republic to maintain peace, security and stability of Ghana', a view shared by this dissertation.

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[54] "Beyond the Frontiers of National Security", Occasional Papers, *Institute of Economic Affairs, Ghana,* no. 37 (2008).
[55] Ibid
[56] Moses.Y Jatuat. "Role of Intelligence, Institutions and Legal Framework in Ghana", National Security.
[57] Ibid
[58] Ibid

Kumi Ansah-Koi's work on 'The Security Agencies and National Security in a Decade of Liberalism'[59], is comparable to this dissertation's narrative as well as Jatuat's. Ansah-Koi also attributes stabilisation in Ghana to the role of its national security architecture. As Ansah-Koi claims;

> "A striking feature of the first decade of the Fourth Republic in Ghana has been the success of the security agencies in maintaining the integrity and security of the de jure government, and thus in rolling back, or keeping at bay, Ghana's praetorian guards' and its image of being a praetorian polity."[60]

Ansah-Koi's work also outlines in chronological order (although very brief), how the country's security forces always played a role in events which led to changes in regimes. It also elaborates on how the regime changes altered the country's political landscape from the February 1948 Riots to December 1981 coup d'état. In doing so, this work acknowledges how security personnel and agencies have always been of prime concern on issues pertaining to security and national politics in Ghana. Ansah-Koi's work briefly covers the architecture's background from 1948 to 1993. It does not offer the up-to-date account of the architecture's history needed for a more balanced assessment of why it has been the most vital tool for the country's stability.

There are also primary sources including officially documented lecture notes, communications, incidents, observations, et cetera, which contain useful information about the architecture's history. Some of these official primary sources help to make sense of Ghana's political and security environment in the past, filling in some of the gaps within the national security architecture's historical journey.

For instance, a declassified Special Branch report on a lecture delivered by Nkrumah on 6th March 1949, outlines the Nkrumah's discussions about the riots which occurred from February

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[59] Kumi Ansah-Koi. 'The Security Agencies and National Security in a Decade of Liberalism', in, *Ghana: One Decade of the Liberal State*, by Kwame Boafo-Arthur. (London: Zed Books Ltd, 2007)
[60] Ibid.

1948 to March 1949.[61] This report offers an insight into activities of the colonial regime's internal security architecture, including the sort of political and security intelligence they collected during that period, and how they pursued such intelligence. This puts into context the lengths to which Intelligence Operatives in that era were prepared to go in order to undertake such duties. Sources like these substantiate the argument that the colonial regime's decision to discount the importance of intelligence work prior to the 1948 Riots, came at a cost of early decolonisation.

A declassified estimate by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) entitled 'Pan-African Agitation on the Equator'[62] also offers a valuable insight into the country's political and security environment historically. This document focuses on Kwame Nkrumah, Ghana's first President. It demonstrates Nkrumah was perceived by Western intelligence agencies as someone who is not a mere extremist but also a person that appears to encourage Communism by doing nothing to stop its influence in Africa. Further, this document highlights that Nkrumah's activities appear to have been of significant concern to the political and security interest of the West in not just Ghana, but also Nigeria, Kenya, and Uganda. While this material only covers a very limited aspect of Nkrumah's activities, it offers valuable information to help put into context the scale of Nkrumah's Pan-African ambitions. Documents of this nature help to make sense of Nkrumah's decision to create a 'multifaceted' intelligence network within the country's first national security architecture.

Another document entitled 'Cheddi Berret Jagan'[63], is a British Intelligence surveillance report officially documented on Jagan, Nkrumah's associate. This report details how Jagan's movements in Africa and in the UK were closely monitored for months by MI6 and Special

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[61] KV 2/1847 - Report sent by the SLO in the Gold Coast to the West Africa Security Office at Accra in the Gold Coast on 9th March 1949 regarding a lecture delivered by Nkrumah on 6th March 1949.
[62] CIA-RDP81-01036R000100130069-2. 'Pan-African Agitation on the Equator', Secret, Central Intelligence Agency, Information Report, Approved for Release 2000/09/01.
[63] KV-2-3619 – 'Jagan, Dr. Cheddi Berret. Jagan, Janet Rosalie', See SLO Trinidad's correspondence to the Office of The High Commissioner to The United Kingdom in Accra, and subsequent surveillance reports.

Branch. Jagan's interactions with delegations from the USSR and his subsequent dealings with other Russians, which were followed by Jagan later being spotted having several talks with key members of Nkrumah's government, were all officially documented in this report. This document offers some degree of insight into how the political and security landscape in the country was being shaped under Nkrumah's leadership. This document helps develop understanding of the factors that influenced Nkrumah to set up his national security architecture the way he did.

Another declassified CIA material entitled 'Ghana: Outlook for the Rawlings Regime'[64], provides a window into how the US government assessed Ghana's political and security landscape during the early years of Jerry Rawlings' PNDC regime. In this document, Western intelligence agencies estimated that Rawlings' regime offered a greater opportunity for Communist countries including Libya to nurture a radical, anti-Western regime in Ghana than ever existed, since the overthrow of President Nkrumah in the mid-1960s. This document echoes the concerns of the West at the time, which was a concern that Libya, Cuba, and the Soviet Union, could gain a significant foothold in Ghana. To help provide insight into the country's political and security landscape at the time, this document elaborated on activities concerning Ghana's security forces, and its citizens in exile who were busy soliciting foreign support for a military coup in Ghana.

Further, a CIA interagency intelligence assessment entitled, 'Ghana: The Rawlings Regime One Year Later'[65] assessed that the greatest threat to Rawlings' regime did not come from the numerous exile groups plotting its demise but from discontent within factions of the military. Further, public dissatisfaction with the regime was also running high due severe food shortages and increased unemployment. Additionally, the country's scant resources at the

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[64] CIA-RDP83S00855R000100040004-7. 'Ghana: Outlook for the Rawlings Regime', Intelligence Assessment, Approved for Release 2008/07/30
[65] CIA-RDP86T00303R000300420015-9. 'Ghana: The Rawlings Regime One Year Later', Interagency Intelligence Assessment, Approved for Release 2008/05/19

time were further to be strained, due to the influx of perhaps as many as two million Ghanaians being expelled from Nigeria as illegal aliens. Collectively, the CIA assessed that the situation in the country was conducive for coup plotting.[66]

The CIA document addresses the volatility of Ghana's political and security landscape a year after Rawlings' PNDC military regime took over. It helps put into context the magnitude of security challenges faced by the regime after assuming office. The document serves as a good starting point to measure how the changes to the national security architecture under Rawlings made the difference by countering all those threats to help stabilise the country's landscape today.

One of the downfalls of relatively recent endeavours to understand Ghana's security sector's history is that few researchers have taken into consideration the full historical background and institutional structure of the nation. Rather, these projects have focused on limited perspectives, and have not gone into significant detail of critical factors that, when ultimately entrenched, led to durable stability in Ghana, despite a series of internal and external threats that permeated the nation. Meanwhile, an investigation is a fact-finding exercise to obtain all relevant information on a matter at stake , and not part of the information.[67] Therefore, without obtaining all information, arriving at conclusions with only partially obtained evidence, could skew final judgement on matters under investigation. This has been the trend witnessed in some of the recently published works on Ghana's security sector.

Criticisms of Ghana's Security Architecture

One of the recently published pieces of literature, which also covers a limited period of Ghana's security sector's history is Patrick Obuobi's work on 'Evaluating Ghana's Intelligence

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[66] Ibid.

[67] Gunter, Whitney, and Christopher Hertig. "An Introduction to Theory, Practice and Career Development for Public and Private Investigators." *International Foundation for Protection Officers*, 2005, p. 1, [online resource] available from, https://ifpo.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/intro.pdf. 01/12/2022

Oversight Regime.'[68] Obuobi provides a brief historical context into how the architecture evolved, focussing on the country's landscape from 1966 to 1981 as a cycle of coup d'états, and associates activities of its security sector during that period with 'human rights abuses, brutalities, and suppressive regimes.' Like previous literature, Obuobi briefly covers the security sector's history. He appears to draw parallels between activities of the security sector during the aforementioned period to present by associating its current practices with some degree of human rights abuses, brutalities, and suppressions. Obuobi argues that such activities 'continue to undermine Ghana's effective management of its security sector, particularly the intelligence services'. This statement appears to associate the national security architecture with some form of rogue activities, which in this dissertation's opinion could be subjective but goes a long way to undermine all the significant achievements by the architecture. Obuobi characterises Ghana as an emerging democracy. However, he also compares the standards of Ghana's security sector, especially its intelligence agencies to those of the United Kingdom (UK) and United States (US); both of which are considered advanced democracies. Doing so puts the Ghanaian security sector at a disadvantage to begin with, as such comparison is done from an unequal playing field. This makes it difficult to really appreciate the magnitude of what Ghana's security sector, and for that matter its national security architecture, has been able to achieve. If Obuobi's work had comprehensively covered the security sector's history, it would have reflected the magnitude of its achievements today, hence likely altering some of the alternate perspectives.

Kwesi Aning and Ernest Lartey's article on 'Parliamentary Oversight of the Security Sector: Lessons from Ghana'[69], briefly covers the history from 1957 to 2001. Aning and Lartey acknowledge improvement made in Ghana for having in place parliamentary oversight for its security sector activities. However, like Obuobi's work, this article ends up focussing more on

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[68] Patrick Peprah Obuobi. 'Defence Intelligence, Evaluating Ghana's Intelligence Oversight Regime', *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence*, 31:2, (2018), pp 312 - 341
[69] Kwesi Aning and Ernest Lartey. 'Parliamentary Oversight of the Security Sector: Lessons from Ghana', *Centre on International Cooperation*, (2009).

the sector's limitations. Aning and Lartey sharply criticise the Intelligence and Security Act 526 of Ghana's constitution, which legally defines the scope in which Ghana's national security architecture operates. As part of the reproach, this article claims that the Act 526 has 'no clear-cut guidance as to what the oversight committee is expected to do and areas where its mandate is expected to cover.'[70] Aning and Lartey vehemently criticise what they claim to be 'legal lapses' in the system, for the country not having anything in place to compel the national security apparatus to be cooperative to parliamentary oversight into its activities.[71] For this reason, Aning and Lartey appear to portray the security sector in the country as uncooperative towards parliamentary scrutiny, as it hides under the guise of what Aning and Lartey describe as the 'so called 'sensitive' information.' Based on this assertion, they proceed to offer some recommendations by comparing how Ghana's security sector is being run and/or scrutinised with those of the US, UK, and Australia (advanced democracies), unlike Ghana, which is an emerging democracy. This is an unbalanced comparison, thereby resulting in unfairly portraying Ghana's security sector as ineffective.

Prosper Nii Nortey Addo's work, 'Ghana's foreign policy and transnational security challenges in West Africa'[72] also appears to focus more on the ineffectiveness of the country's national security architecture than its effectiveness. Addo argues that despite Ghana having in place different sub-regional conventions and protocols with other countries to help address transnational threats; 'Ghana's strategies for addressing transnational security threats have not gone much beyond the rhetoric of addressing the problems.'[73] Similar to Obuobi, Aning and Lartey, Addo also claims that law enforcement agencies, which are part of the security sector, are ineffective in dealing with transnational security challenges. He then goes on to attribute the ineffectiveness to them being inadequately equipped, and plagued with 'corrupt

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[70] Kwesi Aning and Ernest Lartey. 'Parliamentary Oversight of the Security Sector: Lessons from Ghana', *Centre on International Cooperation*, (2009).
[71] Ibid
[72] Prosper Nii Nortey Addo. 'Ghana's Foreign Policy and Transnational Security Challenges in West Africa', *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, 26:2, (2008), pp 197-211
[73] Ibid

leadership and institutional practices, security lapses and lack of interagency coordination, and inadequate resources for addressing the problem.'

Aning's work, 'A Comparative Analysis of Security Sector Governance (SSG) in West Africa: The Ghana Case'[74], also looks into the country's security sector from 1957-2004. It focuses on the sector's governance, the institutions charged with governing duties, and their respective processes. What is noticeable about Aning's work is that it defines the security sector in Ghana under two broad categories: statutory and non-statutory institutions. Unlike most other literature, Aning assesses the governance of the country's security sector through the lens of the political set-up in which the sector operates and the roles it performs. Aning undertakes such an assessment on the basis of how the sector is being governed, by evaluating the different facets of the legal and institutional frameworks which underpin governance of the sector in Ghana. Aning appears to portray an angle that aligns with Obuobi, as he focusses more on the security sector's ineffectiveness rather than its effectiveness. Further, he characterises the sector, its key institutions charged with oversight responsibilities, and its personnel as 'weak' in administering their duties.

Contrary to preceding documents, Osei Bonsu Dickson's work on the '21st Century National Security Architecture of Ghana'[75] offers an insight into the operational activities of the current national security architecture. Dickson initially gives an account of the architecture through describing its organisational outlook, current mandate, roles, responsibilities, legal framework, the threats it faces, its coordination, intelligence surveillance, crisis management, rapid response, contingency planning, and covert operations. Dickson's work provides an insight into the present-day national security architecture and how they operate. The purpose of this

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[74] Aning, EK. 'A Comparative Analysis of Security Sector Governance in West Africa: The Ghana Case', *West Africa-wide Security Governance Project of the Foundation*, (2004), p. 2
[75] Osei Bonsu Dickson. "21st Century National Security Architecture of Ghana." *Academia*, 2019, [online resource] available from, https://www.academia.edu/39999310/THE_21ST_CENTURY_NATIONAL_SECURITY_ARCHITECTURE_OF_GHANA. Accessed on 10/05/2020

work is to expound on the mandate, roles, and responsibilities of Ghana's national security architecture in the 21st century, thereby, barely acknowledging its historical context.

Eboe Hutchful, on the other hand had a relatively balanced approach in weighing the abilities of the country's security sector and not necessarily its intelligence-led national security architecture. In his work, 'Pulling Back from the Brink: Ghana's Experience'[76], Hutchful, similar to Jatuat, highlights the success of Ghana's security sector. However, dissimilar to Jatuat, Hutchful attributes Ghana's stabilised landscape to the security sector's effort in suppressing threats, unearthing coup attempts in the country and foiling terrorists' plots; all of which align with what this dissertation depicts. Hutchful therefore acknowledges the sector's effectiveness including its 'comprehensive and coordinated approach to security assessment and problem solving.' Hutchful claims that the security sector, in some respects, was at the centre of Ghana's remarkable transformation, in terms of ensuring the regime's survival and providing the stable environment needed for policy reform.[77]

That being said, similar to Aning and Obuobi, Hutchful proceeds to be very critical of the sector, by highlighting several shortcomings including the sector's lack of transparency regarding control of the security forces and complaint of human rights abuses. This again appears to overshadow the architecture's significant achievement.

Following a similar pattern, Paschal Anayenle Badong, in his work, 'Security Provision in Ghana: What is the Role and Impact of Non-State Actors?'[78] describes the security landscape in Ghana as 'diverse and not homogenous.'[79] He appears to split the country's security

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[76] Eboe Hutchful. 'Pulling back from the Brink Ghana's Experience' in *Governing Insecurity: Democratic Control of Military and Security Establishments in Transitional Democracies*, by Cawthra, Gavin. Luckham, Robin., ed., (London: Zed Books, 2003), pp 78-90.
[77] Ibid
[78] Paschal Anayenle Badong. "Security Provision in Ghana: What is the Role and Impact of Non-State Actors?", *African Leadership Centre*, 5 (2009), pp 5-6 [online resource] available from, https://www.issuelab.org/resources/21725/21725.pdf. Accessed on 04/08/2020
[79] Ibid

challenges into two broad categories: national security, and law and order. Although from a national security perspective, Badong describes Ghana as 'a relatively peaceful country in a largely restless and turbulent subregion,' from a law-and-order perspective, he also characterises the country's landscape with an increase in all types of crimes, including murder, rape, and armed robbery. Badong attributes the security challenges to the inaction and abandonment of the police, military, intelligence agencies, para-military organisations including the immigration Service, and other 'statutory institutions mandated to provide security related services.[80] Badong also describes state security and law enforcement agencies, particularly the police, who all form part of the country's national security architecture as corrupt, inefficient, and unable to provide any security dividend, thereby fuelling the sense of insecurity. Badong's work attempts to link the current national security architecture to the colonial era, and also acknowledges that the colonial security architecture was put in place only 'to provide security for the economic exploitation of the country'.[81]

Comparably, Aning, Birikorang, and Lartey's work entitled 'The processes and Mechanisms of Developing a Democratic Intelligence Culture in Ghana,'[82] appears to heavily zoom in on the shortfalls of the country's security sector rather than its positives. Aning, Birikorang, and Lartey's work succinctly touches on the outlook and activities of some of the agencies which were formed after independence through to the Fourth Republic (1992) and beyond. Aning, Birikorang, and Lartey in chronological form refer to historic policies which were introduced under previous regimes to support activities of the country's intelligence sector, which operated under their respective administrations. That being said, just like most of the preceding authors, Aning, Birikorang, and Lartey are overly critical of the security sector, as

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[80] Paschal Anayenle Badong. "Security Provision in Ghana: What is the Role and Impact of Non-State Actors?", *African Leadership Centre*, 5 (2009), pp 5-6 [online resource] available from, https://www.issuelab.org/resources/21725/21725.pdf. Accessed on 04/08/2020
[81] Ibid
[82] Kwesi Aning, Emma Birikorang and Ernest Lartey. 'The processes and Mechanisms of Developing a Democratic Intelligence Culture in Ghana', in, *Intelligence Elsewhere: Spies and Espionage Outside the Anglosphere*, by Philip H. J. Davies, Kristian C. Gustafson., eds., (Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 2013)

they associate every single one of those policies with some sort of wrongdoing by the country's intelligence agencies.

Aning et al made references to a list of bills. These are (i) 'The Security Services Bill' of 1963, which was associated with a countermeasure used to target Nkrumah's opposition; (ii) 'The Law of Protective Custody' in 1966, associated with the NLC's detention without trial after it ousted Nkrumah; (iii) 'The Elections and Public Officers Disqualification Decrees' in 1968 (NLCD 223), associated with placing a ban on anyone linked to Nkrumah's CPP from holding public office for 10 years; (iv) The Subversion Decree of 1972 (NRCD 90), associated with civilians being tried by military laws and tribunals; (v) The Armed Forces (Special Powers) Decree of 1973 (NRCD 236), associated with detention for indeterminate period in military barracks; all the way through to (vi) 'The Preventive Detention Law of 1982 (PNDCL 4) under Rawlings' PNDC regime, which it associated with arresting and detaining persons deemed dangerous to national security for long periods without trial; and (vii) 'The Habeas Corpus (Amendment) Law' of 1984 (PNDCL 92), which it claimed it was 'promulgated to prohibit the court from examining the grounds upon which anyone had been detained.' In summary, they painted the country's intelligence agencies prior to 1992 as some form of rogue entities that targeted Ghanaians and not necessarily operating in the interest of national security.

Further, Aning, Birikorang, and Lartey also appear to suggest that the intelligence culture and/or intelligence services of Ghana in the post-1992 era also operate based on 'narrow power interests of the ruling regime' with limited accountability.[83] Unlike some of the other literature already reviewed, Aning, Birikorang, and Lartey narrow in on activities of the country's domestic intelligence agency, the BNI by associating its activities with what will be

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[83] Kwesi Aning, Emma Birikorang and Ernest Lartey. 'The processes and Mechanisms of Developing a Democratic Intelligence Culture in Ghana', in, *Intelligence Elsewhere: Spies and Espionage Outside the Anglosphere*, by Philip H. J. Davies, Kristian C. Gustafson., eds., (Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 2013)

deemed as unlawful, unprofessionalism, and impunity.[84] While they offer brief credit to the BNI for complying with legal guidance in regard to specific cases, overall, Aning, Birikorang, and Lartey's work seem to significantly highlight more negatives than positives. This adds to the negative narrative being associated with the country's national security architecture, rather than acknowledges the vital role it has played throughout the country's history.

It must be noted that this dissertation also acknowledges some of the shortcomings of the country's security architecture, especially its historic failures. By no means does this dissertation claim that the country's security apparatus has been perfect throughout its existence; far from it. That said, this dissertation takes a contrasting view that, if the literature being reviewed had comprehensively covered the security sector's history more broadly rather than in a relatively limited scope, it might have helped tone down some of the strong positions presented. Works exploring a longer timeframe would have highlighted that regardless of all the ineffectiveness associated with the architecture, outlining its entire journey inadvertently reveals the magnitude of its achievements through the current day. This would demonstrate that being able to maintain stability in the country's political and security landscape for four decades and more, overrides any of the criticisms highlighted above.

Where this dissertation distances itself from all the reviewed literature is that it breaks new ground by being the first to trace how the architecture has evolved from the pre-colonial era to date. While doing so, it also uses this historical journey to demonstrate the security architecture's significance to the country's stability, especially where it relied on intelligence activities and interagency intelligence coordination. This dissertation confidently walks the reader through Ghana's national security architecture's history from the pre-colonial era to present, while at the same time, describing its outlook (organisational structure, schedule,

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[84] Kwesi Aning, Emma Birikorang and Ernest Lartey. 'The processes and Mechanisms of Developing a Democratic Intelligence Culture in Ghana', in, *Intelligence Elsewhere: Spies and Espionage Outside the Anglosphere*, by Philip H. J. Davies, Kristian C. Gustafson., eds., (Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 2013)

intelligence coordination, management, roles, jurisdiction, perceived threats, and response), as well as highlighting similarities and differences at every stage throughout its evolution. Uniquely, this allows the dissertation to establish historical trends and patterns, thereby placing this work on much firmer ground to embark on a more balanced assessment of the architecture's effectiveness, and offering an alternate but compelling narrative on the architecture's effectiveness, which supersede all other claims.

Conclusion

Whilst other commentators have attributed Ghana's domestic stability to a range of factors, the alternate arguments are only successful because the architecture has been effective in maintaining a stable landscape; which creates a conducive environment for such factors to thrive. This reenforces this dissertation's argument that the primary key to the long-term political and security stability in Ghana is the pivotal role being played by the country's intelligence-led national security architecture. This is corroborated by analysis of Ghana's history in subsequent chapters. Nonetheless, what makes other commentators on Ghana's security sector also miss the architecture's key contribution to domestic stability is that quite often, the historical background of the country's security sector is not extensively covered. For many of these commentators, the history of the country's intelligence-led national security architecture began with the 1992 Constitution and/or the 1996 Security and Intelligence Act 526 of Ghana. This leaves just a few writers who use the 31st December 1981 military coup d'état as the baseline for the beginning of the architecture's historical journey.

As a result, only a handful of authors who look beyond 1981 use the period right after 1957, that is, after independence, as the benchmark where the architecture's historical journey commenced. Arguably, this leaves about one or two authors who venture into the colonial era, and the pre-colonial era to make sense of such a historical journey; which has created a significant knowledge gap with the backstory barely being told. Further, it has also impacted on most of the assessments on the effectiveness of the architecture and its relevance to the

country. This dissertation traces the history of Ghana's present-day intelligence-led national security architecture into the pre-colonial era. This helped identified trends and patterns, to establish premises consisting of the three pre-conditions, that helped in developing an inference which shows a correlation between the intelligence-led national security architecture and domestic stability.

Chapter 3: Methodology

Introduction

This dissertation hypothesises that three pre-conditions are required to maintain a nation's domestic stability. Pre-condition 1 entails the establishment of national security institutions to protect and defend national interests against known and unknown threats. Pre-condition 2 is met when the national security agencies are charged with undertaking intelligence activities to support national security work, by offering eyes and ears within and outside a nation's territorial borders. Pre-condition 3 ensures that there is an interagency intelligence coordination mechanism in place to offer situational awareness of magnitude and scope of threats. At the same time, Pre-condition 3 provides an overarching control strategy to counter such concerns. It is hypothesised that together, the three pre-conditions make up an intelligence-led national security architecture and provide a primary support for domestic stability.

To test this hypothesis, inferential analysis is applied against data collected from eras of Ghana's political history. Analysis was drawn from documents (which underwent document analysis) and interviews[3] to test the validity and necessity of the three preconditions as a requirement for state stability. Using this evidence allowed the researcher to test each of the preconditions and make broader inferences about the conditions required to achieve stability.

Table 4: Pre-Conditions for Intelligence-Led National Security

INTELLIGENCE-LED NATIONAL SECURITY ARCHITECTURE		
Pre-condition 1	**Pre-condition 2**	**Pre-condition 3**
Establish National Security Institutions	**Embark on Intelligence Activities**	**Implement Interagency Intelligence Coordination**
Protect and defend national interests against known and unknown threats	Offers eyes and ears within and outside country's territorial borders	Makes architecture situationally aware of magnitude and scope of overarching threats

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[3] Patterson Emily S., Roth Emilie M., and Woods David D. "Aiding the Intelligence Analyst in Situations of Data Overload: A Simulation Study of Computer Supported Inferential Analysis Under Data Overload." *United States Airforce*, 2001, [online resource] available from, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA395332.pdf. Accessed on 27/06/2022

Conceptual Framework (CF)

The conceptual framework serves to demonstrate how the preconditions work together to establish the stability of a nation. The absence of any precondition indicates a weakness that could hamper a government's ability to effectively respond to an internal or external threat. For example, when pre-condition 1 is not established, pre-conditions 2 and 3 cannot not exist, as the absence of pre-condition 1 means there are no institutions in place to protect and defend the country. Without such institutions, intelligence activities for national security purposes become counter-productive. If precondition 1 exists, but the second precondition is not met, then precondition 3 cannot be fulfilled. The absence of Pre-condition 2 will result in no eyes and ears in place to undertake intelligence activities for national security purposes, and therefore coordination by extension cannot exist. This creates missed opportunities to understand the threat landscape and to offer effective counter-measures, creating a dangerous and unstable domestic landscape.

When pre-conditions 1 and 2 are met, but pre-condition 3 remains absent, this could create a lack of overarching situational awareness. If one agency has awareness and the other does not, it can be crippling and detrimental to maintaining domestic stability. This will negatively impact understanding of the scope and magnitude of emerging threats and could result in pursuing an ineffective to meaningless response, creating a dangerous and unstable domestic landscape. Therefore, having pre-condition 3 establishes a system where situational awareness is shared across multiple entities for the purpose of a unified response to ensure domestic stability. Finally, when pre-conditions 1, 2, and 3 exist, this constitutes an intelligence-led national security architecture which can counter emerging and existing threats to ensure long-term domestic stability.

Table 5: Permeation of Pre-Conditions and Outcome

No Pre-con 1	→	No Pre-con 2	→	No Pre-con 3	→	Unstable Landscape
Yes Pre-con 1	→	No Pre-con 2	→	No Pre-con 3	→	Unstable Landscape
Yes Pre-con 1	→	Yes Pre-con 2	→	If no Pre-con 3	→	Unstable Landscape
Yes Pre-con 1	→	Yes Pre-con 2	→	Yes Pre-con 3	→	Domestic Stability

This hypothesis is tested against Ghana's history, from the precolonial era through the modern day. It tests eras of Ghana's history, to identify the presence or absences of the three pre-conditions. It further tests whether the intelligence led-architecture has the ability to provide early warning and respond to internal and external threats. Finally, this allows observation of the links between the absence of even one or two of these pre-conditions, and the degree of stability or destabilisation.

Research Base/Depth of Information Acquired

To comprehensively assess the reasons for the effectiveness of the present-day national security architecture of Ghana, it was imperative that the genesis of the country's security landscape was considered as the focal point. Although the phraseology 'genesis' could mean many things in general, in the context of this dissertation, the terminology was used to highlight what era in history could be considered as a reasonable starting point to help undertake such an assessment in a methodical order. While the term methodology could be associated with its challenges, undertaking a comprehensive and methodical evaluation of a country's security

architecture from over a century ago to date, highlighted even more significant limitations. Such limitations included challenges of knowing which era to begin with difficulties of recovering all relevant information[4], and identifying and addressing knowledge gaps. This dissertation considered the country's political and security environment in 1471 (when the first Europeans arrived on the shores of the country), as its starting point. In so doing, this offered a significant research base and depth to help unravel a near-holistic picture of how effective the country's national security architecture has been in recent years.

Research Collection

As part of the research collection, this research work is aimed at focussing on exploring new phenomena and/or looking at previously researched phenomena from a different perspective.[5] Therefore, this dissertation is mostly based on qualitative rather than quantitative research, largely because the outcome of this research work will not be measurable and/or quantifiable. The question under investigation required more of a descriptive and analytical approach to arrive at a subjective but logical conclusion.[6] Further, because this dissertation can be classified as an intelligence document due to the declassified intelligence materials used, subjective interpretation of events was vital towards answering the question under study effectively.[7] The qualitative approach was used because it was aimed at gaining a rich and complex understanding of Ghana's national security architecture, its responsibilities, and the experiences of people associated with the architecture.[8] The qualitative materials used were derived from both a combination of primary and secondary information.

[4] Elton, Geoffrey. *The Practice of History*, (United Kingdom: Wiley-Blackwell Publishers, 2002), p. 20
[5] Gabriel, Deborah. "Inductive and Deductive Approaches to Research." 2013, [online resource] available from, https://deborahgabriel.com/2013/03/17/inductive-and-deductive-approaches-to-research/. Accessed on 20/04/2020
[6] Neil, James. "Qualitative versus Quantitative Research: Key Points in a Classic Debate", Features of Qualitative & Quantitative Research – Qualitative. *Wilderdom*, 2007, [online resource] available from http://wilderdom.com/research/QualitativeVersusQuantitativeResearch.html. Accessed on 20/04/2020
[7] Neil, James. 2007, Ibid
[8] Alzheimer-Europe. "The four main approaches, Qualitative Research." 2009, [online resource] available from, https://www.alzheimer-europe.org/Research/Understanding-dementia-research/Types-of-research/The-four-main-approaches. Accessed on 20/04/2020

Primary Sources

For the collection of primary information/material, firstly, a combination of semi-structured, and open-ended/unstructured interview techniques were used. Furthermore, since this research relied heavily on qualitative material due to the descriptive nature of the subject matter in question[9]; face to face, and virtual interviewing approaches were adopted to allow both the interviewer and each interviewee to build some degree of mutual rapport and trust.[10] Using the open-ended/unstructured questioning gave participants the freedom to express themselves.[11] Subsequently, it also provided the interviewer the opportunity to ask follow-up questions and to delve deeper to gain a full understanding of the topic under discussion.[12] Questions were set to no limits on the range or length of responses. This allowed participants to explain their position, feelings, and/or experiences.[13]

Interviews were conducted on a one-to-one basis rather than a group interview of which the possibility of individual participants latching on each other's answers were avoided.[14] Whilst using the semi-structured technique was to obtain an alternate but constructive outcome. As part of the semi-structured questionnaire method, questions were prepared in advance to enable this author to guide the interview towards the satisfaction of the research objectives. Additionally, this author also applied the in-depth interview method to fully benefit from the personal and direct contact between interviewer and interviewees. For this reason, personal and unstructured interviews that aimed at identifying participant's emotions, feelings, recollections, and opinions regarding the subject matter under discussion were all used. This,

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[9] Virginia Braun and Victoria Clarke. "Successful Qualitative Research a Practical Guide for Beginners." *UWE*, 2013, [online resource] available from,
http://eprints.uwe.ac.uk/21156/3/SQR%20Chap%201%20Research%20Repository.pdf. Accessed on 28/062018
[10] Henrietta O' Connor. "Exploring Online Research Methods in a Virtual Training Environment." [online resource] available from, http://www.restore.ac.uk/orm/interviews/intprint3.pdf. Accessed on 28/06/2018
[11] "Four Basic Research Methods for Business Start-Ups", Qualitative Research Interviews. *British Library*, [online resource] available from, https://www.bl.uk/business-and-ip-centre/articles/4-basic-research-methods-for-business-start-ups. - Accessed on 28/06/2018
[12] Ibid
[13] Natasha Mack. Cynthia Woodsong. Kathleen M.Macqueen. Greg Guest. Emily Namey. 'Qualitative Research Methods: A Data Collector's Field Guide' *Family Health International*, (2005), p. 30
[14] Mark B. Palmerino. "One-on-Ones Put the Quality in Qualitative." *Center for Strategic Research in Boston*, 2006, [online resource] available from, https://www.csr-bos.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/Quirks-One-on-One-Interviews.pdf. - Accessed on 28/06/2018

offered 'flexibility in terms of the flow of the interview, thereby leaving room for the generation of conclusions that were not initially meant to be derived regarding a research subject.'[15]

Data Collection: Interviews

The academic literature around state stability is rife with theories that do not fully provide explanation for the presence or absence of stability. This thesis embarks on new examinations of the need for an intelligence-led national security architecture to provide state stability. Simultaneously, the understanding of Ghana's own intelligence-led national security architecture of research is under-developed; there are limited sources available. As a result, using official primary sources and secondary documents for document analysis was insufficient to answer all the questions that arose during the undertaking of this research. There were significant information gaps that required interviews to provide information not readily available in documents.

This research serves two purposes:: (i) to identify and establish the underpinnings of Ghana's stability, and (ii) to obtain and document historical information about Ghana's national security architecture for the first time, in a unified work. In order to accomplish these dual goals, the selection of participants for interviews were sampled under the two categories.

Sampling of Participants

Two separate groups of participants were purposely put together by this author to help obtain the required information. The first group of participants constituted of Ghanaian professionals who in their own rights have supported development in Ghana and therefore were well-positioned to articulate what they believe has been the key to domestic stability in Ghana.

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[15] Spyros Langkos. Athens as an international tourism destination: An empirical investigation to the city's imagery and the role of local DMO's [MSc Thesis], Athens University of Economics and Business, (2014)

These ten interviewees were chosen through convenience sampling, and consisted of Ghanaian nationals of varied professional disciplines, each of whom have advisory roles within the government of Ghana. These professionals have contributed significantly to Ghana's domestic stability and/or development. Participants were invited to open-ended interviews, where they were individually asked about why Ghana has maintained domestic stability for over four decades within such an unstable sub-region. This question underpinned the research and reinforced the merit of testing the hypothesis of the three preconditions.

The aforementioned approach helped manage the author's expectation with regards to participants' responses; which helped eliminate non-response rates in advance. On the other hand, this author also acknowledged some of the risks involved in using this method; of which the risk of deviating from the question under discussion was identified as the most significant of them all. Subsequently, due care was taken to minimise that from impacting the overall exercise.[23]

The second group comprised of past and present intelligence/security professionals in Ghana, who understand the history of the country's intelligence-led national security architecture. Purposeful sampling was used in this instance because it helped in "the identification and selection of information-rich cases related to the phenomenon of interest."[24]

Interviewees in the second group participated in individual, semi-structured interviews. Participants were asked direct security-related questions regarding Ghana's landscape on an individual basis to avoid any influencing and/or latching on other people's answers. Participants were selected in such a manner that almost every era in Ghana's living history was represented by someone with professional experience, who understood and was able to

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[23] Spyros Langkos. Athens as an international tourism destination: An empirical investigation to the city's imagery and the role of local DMO's [MSc Thesis] Athens University of Economics and Business, (2014)
[24] Palinkas, Lawrence & Horwitz, Sarah & Green, Carla & Wisdom, Jennifer & Duan, Naihua & Hoagwood, Kimberly. Purposeful Sampling for Qualitative Data Collection and Analysis in Mixed Method Implementation Research. *Administration and Policy in Mental Health*, 42, (2013).

speak about intelligence and security activities in different eras. These included the roles and duties of intelligence and security agencies, and how they operated and were managed. These questions included the following in the table below.

Table 6: Participants Questionaire

No.	Questions
1.	Was every successive administration/regime's national security architecture different from the previous government?
2.	Were there any changes to the national security setup after a change in government?
3.	If so, how did that differ and why were those changes necessary for successive administrations?
4.	In the grand scheme of things, how was the national security architecture structured?
5.	What were the individual roles/responsibilities of all the institutions/agencies that constituted the national security setup?
6.	What was the jurisdiction of each institution/agency that constituted the national security setup?
7.	Was there any coordination and if so, did the roles/responsibilities of individual agencies and/or their respective jurisdictions encouraged or discouraged coordination?
8.	How did each institution's/agency's hierarchical structure look like, including management?
9.	What impact did the national security setup of each administration/regime have on respective governments?
10.	How did that happen (description of brief historical context)?

Collectively, the answers obtained from the interviewees, combined with document analysis provided an overarching means to examine the hypothesis and the premises of the three pre-conditions. This allowed a testing of the hypothesis that the role of Ghana's intelligence-led national security architecture has been the key to its long-term domestic stability.

Additional information in the form of official primary sources were obtained from declassified Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) materials online, as well as from the National Archives in Kew, United Kingdom, to also help fill in some of the missing gaps. These included, Colonial Office records (CO Series), Foreign Office files (FCO Series), War Office files (WO Series), and Air Ministry (AIR) files such as the Code B sequence (files registered 1936-1953); all of which provided valuable information to help build a near-holistic picture of how effective the current national security architecture has been in recent years. These were combined with trips made to the Elmina and Cape Coast Castles in Ghana, where the slave trade took place;

whilst at the same time resorting to watching documentaries to compliment some of the missing information.

Secondary Sources

This author focused on the numerous pieces of published academic and professional literature available on the security sector of Ghana for secondary materials used, which included books, journals, articles, and other online resources. As part of the secondary source collection, this author visited the Political Science Department and the Balm Library of the University of Ghana to obtain relevant literature on the subject matter under study.

Publication / Document Analysis

Due to the fact that obtaining the relevant information was one of the major obstacles and/or limitations, a combination of both primary and secondary sources was needed. Information used to cover the post-1980 era of the country's security sector was mostly secondary material and pre-1980 were mostly primary sources, which helped fill in some of the missing gaps. Taking this into consideration, the form of qualitative research used to help interpret collected information for this dissertation was document analysis. This was important because it provided the basis to be able to embark on "a process of examining and interpreting data [material] in order to elicit meaning, gain understanding, and develop empirical knowledge".[25] Doing so helped give voice and meaning around the question under study for this dissertation. Most importantly, using document analysis helped to incorporate content of collected information into themes, thereby aiding in identifying trends and patterns.[26] This assisted in establishing a conceptual framework of the three pre-conditions, which helped to determine the central argument for this dissertation.

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[25] Corbin J. & Strauss A. *Basics of Qualitative Research*, (Los Angeles: Sage, 2008), p. 1
[26] "Document Analysis Methodology", *INFORMEDIA Services (IMS)*, St. Cloud State University, 2017, [online resource] available from, https://blog.stcloudstate.edu/ims/2017/04/11/document-analysis-methodology/#:~:text=Document%20analysis%20is%20a%20form,or%20interview%20transcripts%20are%20analyzed. Accessed on 02/04/2021

Research Design Limitations

Overcoming the issue of biases[27] from influencing the selection of participants was one of the significant concerns during the research design phase. Regardless of what one does, completely eradicating such a concern was impossible. Therefore, the task of integrating biases, values, beliefs, and principles, as part of the study, right from the onset, was significantly challenging.[28] This was because getting the right balance whilst incorporating the said factors into the research design was time-consuming and labor-intensive.[29] Consequently, the circumstances surrounding the collection of material and information collected, which make it impossible to generalise and/or interpret without any pre-conceived narrative was also one of the significant limitations.[30] Getting to grips with the potential volume of information that would have to be analysed, especially with this dissertation covering such a wide span of Ghana's history, was also significantly challenging. This highlighted reality to come to terms with such a task before assuming any form of a qualitative study.[31] Last but not least was the issue of credibility and reliability regarding participant selection and information collection. The burden of proof from validating to convincing end-users about the genuineness of obtained information had its setbacks, which posed some level of a hindrance to this dissertation at the design stage. No wonder Rudestam and Newton put the burden of proof solely on the researcher's ability to convince consumers about the credibility and reliability of collected information.[32] That said, during the interview stage, this author was able to at best present and communicate what the acquired material/information revealed in line with the purpose of this dissertation; reducing the impact of such limitations.[33]

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[27] Creswell, J. W. *Qualitative Inquiry & Research Design: Choosing Among Five Approaches*, (4th ed.). Thousand Oaks, (CA: Sage, 2014)
[28] Janesick, V. J. *"Stretching" Exercises for the Qualitative Researcher*, (3rd ed.). Thousand Oaks, (CA: Sage, 2011)
[29] Creswell, J. W. *Qualitative Inquiry & Research Design: Choosing Among Five Approaches*, (4th ed.). Thousand Oaks, (CA: Sage, 2014)
[30] Maxwell, J. A. *Qualitative Research Design: An Interactive Approach*, (3rd ed.). Thousand Oaks, (CA: Sage, 2013)
[31] Patton, M. Q. *Qualitative Research & Evaluation Methods*, (3rd ed.). Thousand Oaks, (CA: Sage, 2002)
[32] Rudestam, K. E., & Newton, R. R. *Surviving your Dissertation: A Comprehensive Guide to Content and Process*, (4th ed.). Thousand Oaks, (CA: Sage, 2015), p. 131
[33] Patton, M. Q. *Qualitative Research & Evaluation Methods*, (3rd ed.). Thousand Oaks, (CA: Sage, 2002)

Ethical Considerations

This research work relied on both primary and secondary materials. Whereby secondary materials were not enough to complete this dissertation, primary information through interviews and from official primary sources were used to help fill the gaps. Participant information sheets formally put together to inform potential interviewees about the purpose and aim of this research work were sent out before the interview. In addition, a consent form designed to advise participants on the part they will play and their right to withdraw at any time before and during their interview was also sent.[34] Participants verbally agreed to take part.

Since the research topic in question had the potential of being associated with some degree of political sensitivities, this author acknowledged the likelihood of some risks. For this reason, possible risks in undertaking interviews of such nature were considered and subsequently assessed by this researcher in advance and were graded as significantly low. This risk assessment was done under three broad categories which are risks to interviewees, interviewer, and Brunel University. In addition, the confidentiality of participants was and will continue to be respected and any information obtained is treated with the same degree of sensitivity. All information obtained is being stored on an encrypted laptop and any information transferred from one electronic device to the other was password protected.

Due to the nature of the subject matter in question, the right to anonymity was and is being fully respected and adhered to if applicable.[35] Subsequently, collected hardcopy materials were and are still being safely and securely stored to ensure that confidentiality is fully respected.[36] Only declassified materials were used and any information that could jeopardise

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[34] "Participant Consent Form." *Trinity College Dublin*, University of Dublin, [online resource] available from, https://www.tcd.ie/swsp/assets/pdf/Participant%20consent%20form%20template.pdf. – Accessed on 28/06/2018
[35] "Research Ethics: A Handbook of Principles and Procedures", Research Degrees Committee, *University of Gloucestershire*, 2008, [online resource] available from, http://www.glos.ac.uk/docs/download/Research/handbook-of-principles-and-procedures.pdf. - Accessed on 28/06/2018
[36] University of Gloucestershire, 2008.

ongoing intelligence and/or security operations was avoided. Having stated that, the most possible risk to participants was identified by this author as participants being affected by raw emotions at any point during the interview. This was envisaged as being likely due to the degree of security and political sensitivities associated with the subject matter. Hence, this researcher spoke to potential participants in advance regarding the theme that the line of questioning could take. For this reason, the participants' rights to refuse to answer any question and/or opt-out if they so required was highlighted to each one of them.[37] Following all the processes meant that any risk to participants and possible 'reputational damage' risk to Brunel University was significantly minimised. See appendices for copies of Participant Information Sheet; Indicative Sample Questionnaire; and BREO Approval Letter.

Conclusion

With the methodology explained, subsequent chapters apply the approach of the pre-conditions, while explaining Ghana's history and its national security architecture's evolution, starting from the pre-colonial era.

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[37] Jenny Graham, Ini Grewal and Jane Lewis, NatCen. "Ethics in Social Research: The Views of Research Participants." *Government Social Research*, 2007, [online resource] available from, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/497222/ethics _participants_tech_tcm6-5784.pdf. Accessed on 28/06/2018

Chapter 4: The Backstory of Ghana's Intelligence-Led National Security Architecture

Table 7: Pre-Conditions for Intelligence-Led National Security

INTELLIGENCE-LED NATIONAL SECURITY ARCHITECTURE		
Pre-condition 1	**Pre-condition 2**	**Pre-condition 3**
Establish National Security Institutions	Embark on Intelligence Activities	Implement Interagency Intelligence Coordination
Protect and defend national interests against known and unknown threats	Offers eyes and ears within and outside country's territorial borders	Makes architecture situationally aware of magnitude and scope of overarching threats

As part of the history of the present-day intelligence-led national security architecture of Ghana, this chapter covers the backstory in two sections, the pre-colonial and colonial eras. Starting with the pre-colonial era, this section has been written to walk the reader through the beginning of Ghana's history, whilst also explaining the genesis of the backstory to the country's modern-day intelligence-led national security architecture.[1]

4.1 Pre-colonial Era and the Internal Security Institutions

Politicos Historia of the Pre-Colonial Era

The medieval West African Ghana Empire was located approximately 500 miles north and west of modern-day Ghana. The empire-controlled territories included parts of Sénégal River, Niger rivers, modern-day Senegal, Mauritania, and Mali. After the 1076 conquest by the Almoravid General Abu-Bakr Ibn-Umar, the Ghana Empire disintegrated, which resulted in significant agricultural activities being shifted from the central to the southern part of Sub-Saharan Africa. Such an event gave rise to village settlements and eventually developed into larger kingoms, of which the Kingdom of Ghana was one of them.[2] A unified Akan clan made up of Ashanti, Fante, Wassaw, and other native Twi speakers formed part of the citizenry of the Kingdom of Ghana. Ancestors of the Akan clan were believed to have migrated from Lake Chad and the Benue River, which merges into the Niger River at Lokoja in Nigeria. It is

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[1] Public Records and Archives Administration Department (PRAAD)-Accra ADM 5/1/81, "Report on the Gold Coast Police for the Year 1904," 6 March 1905.

[2] "Ghana Empire", Military, *Global Security Organisation*, 2016, [online resource] available from, https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/africa/ghana.htm. Accessed on 06/07/2019

believed that after crossing the lower Niger River, the clan made their way through the forests of modern-day Benin and Togo before reaching the Ghanaian coast. This coast was made up of lands rich in gold and other natural resources, which encouraged trade between the natives and ultimately made them very prosperous. However, a dispute with a local king resulted in the unified Akan clan being split in two. One half became known as the group that was "loyal subjects gifted fan to the king" and the other half as the rebellious subjects who attempted to poison the king "with the deadly herb asun." Hence, the two separate factions became distinctively identifiable as the Fan-ti and Asun-ti, which later became known as the Fante and Ashanti states.[3] Besides, there are alternate historic explanations given for the split of the Akan tribe, in which emerged other Akan-born states, including Denkyira, and Akim–Akwapim, alongside the Fante and Ashanti states. There were other non-Akan states like Ga that also existed in the Kingdom of Ghana.

Despite the preceding summary, there was still very little known about the Kingdom of Ghana until the Portuguese arrived at its coastal shores in 1471. Upon arrival, the Portuguese discovered that there was an already established thriving gold trade between the natives and visiting Arab and Berber traders. Hence because of the Kingdom's abundant resources of gold, the Portuguese named it "A Mina" meaning "the Mine". The name A Mina was mispronounced by the natives as Elmina, which then became the name of the coastal shores where the Portuguese arrived.[4] The Portuguese also got involved in the trade and in 1482, came to settle at the coastal shores of the Kingdom of Ghana by building a fortress, which is now known as the Elmina Castle.[5] The Portuguese expanded their trade in gold, ivory, and slaves and eventually took full autonomy of that market.[6] In 1492, a Portuguese cargo ship

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[3] Mia Sogoba. "History of the Ashanti", Empire and Colonization. *Culture of West Africa*, 2018, [online resource] available from, https://www.culturesofwestafrica.com/history-ashanti-empire-colonization/. Accessed on 06/07/2019

[4] Graham M.S. Dann, A.V. Seaton. *Slavery, Contested Heritage, and Thanatourism*, (London: Routledge, 2001), p. 32

[5] Sylvia R. Frey, Betty Wood. *From Slavery to Emancipation in the Atlantic World*, (Abingdon: Routledge, 2013), p. 151

[6] Patrick Manning. *The African Diaspora: A History Through Culture*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), p. 87

was intercepted by a French buccaneer that was prowling off the coast. To their surprise, the cargo turned out to be full of gold and since then the European name for that part of Africa aptly became known as The Gold Coast.[7] In 1598, the Dutch also arrived at the coastal shores of the Gold Coast to participate in the booming trade of gold, ivory, and slaves.[8]

The affluent trade economy in the Gold Coast during the 16th and 17th centuries also led to the expansion of the Ashanti and Fante states, as well as the development of some new states. Some of the states quickly grew to dominate and exercise control over the smaller ones. The Ashanti state headed inland; captured many small states and expanded significantly. All these states were unified to create the Ashanti Kingdom, which later became the Ashanti Empire, with its capital in Kumasi.[9] The Ashanti Empire at the time also possessed significant military power to help protect the fortunes within its territorial boundaries.[10] In 1637 the Dutch captured Elmina Castle from the Portuguese and eventually drove them out of the Gold Coast.[11] Other European countries including the British joined in the trade to exploit the country's gold, ivory, other minerals, and slaves.[12] All the European powers coexisted in the Gold Coast by forming the Dutch Gold Coast, Danish Gold Coast, Swedish Gold Coast, German Gold Coast, and British Gold Coast.[13]

Threat Landscape in the Pre-Colonial Era

The threat landscape in the country at the time consisted of internal and external aggression. Military activities in the Gold Coast during that era were very stormy and turbulent, which often

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[7] "History of Ghana", The Gold Coast: 15th - 19th century, *History World*, 2019, [online resource] available from, http://www.historyworld.net/wrldhis/plaintexthistories.asp?historyid=ad43. Accessed on 07/08/2019

[8] Mark Meuwese. *Brothers in Arms, Partners in Trade: Dutch-Indigenous Alliances in the Atlantic World, 1595-1674*, (Boston: Brill, 2012), pp 72-73

[9] Mia Sogoba. "History of the Ashanti", 2018.

[10] Robert B. Edgerton. *The Fall of the Asante Empire: The Hundred-Year War For Africa's Gold Coast*, (London: Free Press, 1995), p. 12

[11] Volker Küster. *Reshaping Protestantism in a Global Context*, (London: Transaction Publishers, 2009), pp 55-56

[12] PRAAD-Accra CSO 21/17/2, Report of Committee of Experts on Slavery Appointed by the Council of the League of Nations. File 41/33; Also see, Melvin Eugene Page, Penny M. Sonnenburg. *Colonialism: An International, Social, Cultural, and Political Encyclopedia*, Gold Coast (Ghana), (Oxford: ABC-CLIO, 2003), p. 238

[13] Loftin, Joseph Evans Jr. The Abolition of the Danish Atlantic Slave Trade, [PhD Thesis], Louisiana State University, (1977).

resulted in bloody military confrontations.[14] The Ashanti Empire at the time was bordered by British-claimed territories along the coastal frontiers in the Gold Coast.[15] In their quest to expand dominance during the 19th century, the Ashanti Empire's aggression towards the Fante, Ga, Denkyira, and the Akim-Akwapim states resulted in reoccurring violent clashes. These conflicts included the war between the Ashanti-Empire and Ga-Fante in 1811;[16] as well as those between the Ashanti Empire and the Akim–Akwapim from 1814 to 1816.[17] Such activities by the Ashanti Empire significantly disrupted ongoing trade, which also posed security concerns for the European forts along the coastal frontiers of the Gold Coast. The British, Dutch, and the Danish had no other alternative than to reach amicable terms with the Ashanti Empire with regards to trade. Therefore, in 1817 a treaty of friendship called the African Company of Merchants was signed. This treaty recognised the Ashanti Empire's claim to sovereignty over a significant territory at the coastal frontiers and its inhabitants.[18]

Due to past aggression by the Ashanti Empire, some of the inhabitants along the coastal areas such as the Fante and Ga, willingly resorted to the British for protection against future Ashanti aggression. In 1821, the Crown Monarch of Britain abolished the African Company of Merchants. This subsequently placed the British-controlled territories of the Gold Coast under the command of Charles MacCarthy, who was then the governor of the colony of Sierra Leone. MacCarthy pursued a directive that encouraged inhabitants of the coastal frontiers to oppose the Ashanti rule and further put measures in place to close off major roads to the coast. These actions infuriated the Ashanti Empire, which triggered a series of fierce battles between the

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[14] Harvey M. Feinberg. *Africans and Europeans in West Africa: Elminans and Dutchmen on the Gold Coast During the Eighteenth Century*, Instability on the Gold Coast, (Philadelphia: The American Philosophical Society, 1989) pp 14-15

[15] John Arrowsmith. "Map of the west coast of Africa", 1842, Collection Items. *British Library*, 2011, [online resource] available from, https://www.bl.uk/collection-items/map-of-the-west-coast-of-africa. Accessed on 25/04/2020

[16] William Farquhar Conton. *West Africa in History: Sovereignty lost and regained*, The Gold Coast, (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1963), p. 87

[17] Lauren Benton and Jeppe Mulich. 'The Space Between Empires: Coastal and Insular Microregions in the Early Nineteenth-Century World' in *The Uses of Space in Early Modern History*, by Paul Stock., ed., (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), p. 156

[18] Robert B. Edgerton. *The Fall of the Asante Empire: The Hundred-Year War for Africa's Gold Coast*, The Bush is Stronger than the Cannon, (London: The Free Press, 1995), p. 72

Ashanti Empire and the British.[19] These battles then became known as the Anglo-Ashanti Wars that constituted several military conflicts from 1823 to 1900.[20]

In 1823, the British governor of the Fante region, Sir Charles MacCarthy rejected the Ashanti Empire's claim of the Fante territory. This sparked a military confrontation between 2,500 British Army and 10,000 Ashanti army called, the Battle of Nsamankow. On 22 January 1824, the Ashanti Empire defeated the British forces and killed MacCarthy.[21] Later that year was the Battle of Efutu and once again the Ashanti Empire defeated the British and their African allies, the Fante and the Denkyira, which forced the British to retreat to their colony in Sierra Leone in 1828.[22] Subsequently, negotiations between the Ashanti Empire and the British ensued and a deal was struck. The Ashanti accepted the Pra River as the boundary between the British-controlled Fante coastal region and the Ashanti Empire."[23] The African Company of Merchants was reinstated in the late 1820s; and in 1829, Captain George Maclean was appointed as the president of a local council of merchants. However, Maclean arrived in the Gold Coast in 1830[24] with the war officially ending in 1831.[25]

Maclean put in place effective measures that successfully avoided any confrontation with the Ashanti Empire between 1830 and 1843.[26] However, in the same year, Maclean was replaced by Commander Henry Worsley Hill.[27] Under the leadership of Worsley Hill in 1844, a special

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[19] PRAAD-Accra ADM/11/1727, Collection of Treaties with Native Chiefs on West Coast of Africa, pp 309-310; Also see, Melissa Bennett. "The West India Regiments in the Anglo-Ashanti War", 1873–74, *British Library*, 2017, [online resource] available from, https://www.bl.uk/west-india-regiment/articles/the-west-india-regiments-in-the-anglo-ashanti-war-1873-74. Accessed on 25/04/2020

[20] PRAAD-Accra, The History of the Gold Coast and Asante, pp 77-293; Also see, Samuel Momodu. "The Anglo-Ashanti Wars (1823-1900)." *Black Past Organisation*, 2018, [online resource] available from, https://www.blackpast.org/global-african-history/anglo-ashanti-wars-1823-1900/. Accessed on 25/04/2020

[21] Melvin Eugene Page, Penny M. Sonnenburg. *Colonialism: An International, Social, Cultural, and Political Encyclopedia* (Oxford: ABC CLIO, 2003) p 238. Also See, Samuel Momodu. 2018

[22] Samuel Momodu. "The Anglo-Ashanti Wars (1823-1900)", 2018

[23] Samuel Momodu. "The Anglo-Ashanti Wars (1823-1900)", 2018

[24] Ivor Wilks. *Asante in the Nineteenth Century: The Structure and Evolution of a Political Order*, The Treaties of 1831 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), p. 189

[25] Samuel Momodu. 2018

[26] Tapan Prasad Biswal. *Ghana, Political and Constitutional Developments*, (New Delhi: Northern Book Centre, 1992), pp 12-13

[27] Kwame Afadzi Insaidoo. *Ghana: A Time to Heal & Renew the Nation*, (Bloomington: Author House, 2007), p. 18

treaty was negotiated with a number of Fante and other local chiefs. This negotiated treaty was also part of "The Bond of 1844" which has been referred to above. Under this Bond, petitions that had previously been submitted by the inhabitants of the Coastal frontier during the era of Hill's predecessors, asking for the British protection against future Ashanti aggression, were all made formal. This bond also defined the responsibilities of Worsley Hill's jurisdiction over the protected areas, which was backed by a legal framework that made the coastal area a British colony. Worsley Hill was replaced in 1845 and between that year and the early 1850s, six different governors had been in charge of the Gold Coast.[28]

Despite the numerous changes in the governorship, the British were still able to effectively provide security for the coastal frontiers, which made the inhabitants widely acceptable to the support offered by the British. Subsequently, in 1852, under Stephen John Hill's governorship,[29] a legislative assembly was formed upon consultation with local chiefs and elders. This legislative assembly comprised of the council of chiefs who were made responsible for the constitution of the protectorate. However, the assembly had no authority to pass laws and/or levy taxes without the consent of the people. Despite the limitation of authority, stable governance still prevailed in the coastal area, of which they hardly encountered any such aggression from the Ashanti Empire due to the security offered by the British[30], which avoided warfare for 30 years.

Having said that, in 1863, the Ashanti challenged the British for sending their forces to occupy the coastal provinces that belonged to the Ashanti Empire. A large Ashanti force crossed the Pra River, which triggered a response from the British, African, and Indian troops. Illness took more casualties than the fighting and this war ended in a stalemate in 1864 with neither side

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[28] Crooks, J.J. *Records Relating to Gold Coast Settlements from 1750 to 1874*, Appendix A, List of Governors of the British Settlements on the Gold Coast from 1822-1874, (London: Routledge, 1973), p. 541
[29] John Coleman De Graft-Johnson. *African Glory: The Story of Vanished Negro Civilizations*, The Koromantee Negro at Home, (Baltimore: Black Classic Press, 1986), pp 166-167
[30] Maxwell A. Aziabah. *The Politics of Educational Reform in Ghana: Understanding Structural Persistence in the Secondary School System*, Analysis and Presentation of Results, (Gewerbestrasse: Springer, 2018), p. 100

claiming victory.[31] Towards the latter part of the 19th century, the British and the Dutch were the only European powers left trading in the Gold Coast. In 1867, the African rulers were enraged by an agreement between the British and the Dutch, in which the two countries would exchange forts without consulting the significant figures of the kingdoms along the coast. The chiefs of the coastal frontier met in early 1868 to establish a Fante Confederation, aimed at having a self-governing state free of European domination. The new Fante Confederation had its own executive council, a judiciary, an army, taxes, and was supported by a written constitution. Even though the Fante Confederation was short-lived, it was still effective to discourage the Dutch to abandon the Gold Coast.[32]

"In 1872 the Dutch withdrew from the Gold Coast, handing over their possessions to the British, hence making the British the only European power left."[33] The British on the other hand did not cave in to the Fante Confederation however, they tackled it covertly by exploiting the differences and rivalries among its members. Therefore, the British ultimately succeeded in breaking up the confederation in 1873. The British army consequently moved in to annex the whole of the confederation, south to the Ashanti Empire. The British then took possession of Elmina over which the Ashanti Empire claimed jurisdiction, and as such infuriated the Ashanti Empire.[34] Additionally, the departure of the Dutch whom the Ashanti considered reliable trading partners further outraged the Ashanti Empire. This resulted in a final assault being launched by the Ashanti in an attempt to invade the coastal frontiers of the Gold Coast.

However, between 1873 and 1874, the British responded by sending 2,500 strong troops, who were well–trained and better equipped with modern armoury, supported by several thousand

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[31] James Minahan. *Encyclopedia of the Stateless Nations: Ethnic National Groups Around the World*, Ashanti, (London: Greenwood Press, 2002), p.189

[32] Trevor R. Getz. *Slavery and Reform in West Africa: Toward Emancipation in Nineteenth-Century Senegal and the Gold Coast*, Anterproclamation Slavery and Society on the Gold Coast, The Waxing of Indigenous Coastal Elites: 1861-1873, (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2004), pp 64-66

[33] Ann Reed. *Pilgrimage Tourism of Diaspora Africans to Ghana*, (London: Routledge, 2015), p. 34

[34] Melvin Eugene Page, Penny M. Sonnenburg. Colonialism: *An International, Social, Cultural, and Political Encyclopedia*, (Oxford: ABC-CLIO, 2003), p. 32

Indian and African troops to attack the Ashanti Empire. With that significant technological advantage over the Ashanti army, the British defeated the Ashanti and briefly occupied its capital Kumasi.[35] In a decade after between 1894 and 1896, another war ensued, and the British decided to capture the whole of the Ashanti Empire. The Ashanti Empire was once again defeated and the King of the Ashanti Empire, Prempeh I was captured and sent to exile in the Seychelles Islands when the war ended in 1896.[36] The final war took place from March through to September 1900, when a rebellion was led by the Queen Mother of the Ashanti Ejisu, known as Nana Yaa Asantewaa.[37] This resulted in the death of 1000 British troops and 2000 Ashanti troops, making the total number of deaths more than the initial four wars combined.[38] The British finally defeated the Ashanti Empire and the Queen Mother was captured and also sent into exile in the Seychelles.[39] The chaotic threat landscape in the country was a result of the composition of the security architecture in that era.

Security Architecture (Pre-Conditions 1,2,3) in the Pre-Colonial Era

Pre-Condition 1

During the pre-colonial era, there were no security institutions put in place with a mandate to protect the inhabitants and territories of the Gold Coast. The composition of the security institutions during that era comprised of police activities within the British-controlled territories[40] and military activities by different countries (including Britain) and kingdoms/empires that had controlled territories in the Gold Coast.[41]

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[35] Micheal Clodfelter. *Warfare and Armed Conflicts: A Statistical Encyclopedia of Casualty and Other Figures, 1492-2015*, Second Ashanti War: 1873-1874, (North Carolina: McFarland & Company, 2017), p. 206
[36] Emmanuel Akyeampong. 'Asante in the Second Half of the Nineteenth Century' in *Yaa Asantewaa and the Asante-British War of 1900-1* by A. Adu Boahen., (Accra: Sub Saharan Publishers, 2003), p. 13
[37] CO 96/378/307 – List sent by Nathan to Chamberlain, 19 March 1901; CO 96/528/9916 – Fell, Notes on chiefdoms, 03 March 1914
[38] John H. Hanson. *The Ahmadiyya in the Gold Coast: Muslim Cosmopolitans in the British Empire*, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2017), p. 200
[39] Sandra M. Grayson. *Symbolizing the Past: Reading Sankofa, Daughters of the Dust, & Eve's Bayou as Histories*, (Oxford: University Press of America, 2000), p. 32
[40] "Brief fact about the Ghana Police Service", Our History. *Ghana Police Service*, 2008, [online resource] available from, https://police.gov.gh/en/index.php/our-history/. Accessed on 03/06/2018
[41] David Eltis. *The Rise of African Slavery in the Americas*, Productivity in the Slave Trade (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 133

Police Activities

Policing during that era was originally organised by traditional authorities led by local kings or chiefs. They did this by employing unpaid messengers to carry out executive and judicial functions in their respective communities. This was the case until it was eventually professionalised by the British and subsequently compartmentalised. In 1821, professional policing was introduced by the British colonial authorities in the Gold Coast.[42] The colonial administrator at the time, Captain George Maclean, was also the governor of the Gold Coast. Maclean recruited 129 men to patrol the trade routes between Ashanti and the coastal areas of the Gold Coast. In addition to their patrol duties, they also protected colonial merchants and officials around the Christianborg Castle, the residence of the colonial governor.[43]

On 6th March 1844, internal security became known as the Gold Coast Corps; thus, comprising of Militia and Police.[44] At this point, the British signed 'The Bond of 1844' with the chiefs of natives in the British Protectorate territories.[45] By 1873, during the period of aggression against the Ashanti communities, membership of the internal security increased drastically, after the governor sought the assistance of the British military stationed in Nigeria. Men from northern Nigeria, Sierra Leone, and Northern Territories of the Gold Coast were recruited into the police force. This included 700 Hausa men from northern Nigeria who were brought in to establish and maintain control in the Gold Coast.[46] It is imperative at this stage to point out that during that era all commissioned officers were British. The police during that period embraced both policing and military functions in the Gold Coast;[47] and in 1876 was renamed the Gold Coast

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[42] "Brief fact about the Ghana Police Service." *Ghana Police Service*, 2008

[43] Crooks, J.J. *Records Relating to Gold Coast Settlements from 1750 to 1874*, The Gold Coast Records, (London: Routledge, 1973), pp 293-296

[44] Mitchel P. Roth. *Historical Dictionary of Law Enforcement*, Appendices, (London: Greenwood Press, 2001), p. 439

[45] PRAAD-Accra 3139/56, Correspondence Relating to The Bond of 1844; Also see, Crooks, J.J. *Records Relating to Gold Coast Settlements from 1750 to 1874*, The Gold Coast Records, (London: Routledge, 1973), pp 293–296

[46] PRAAD-Accra ADM, 1/1/48, Ellis to the War Office, 30 June 1879; Also see, Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative. "The Police, The People, The Politics", Police Accountability in Ghana, The British come to town – Colonial Policing, *Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative*, 2007, p. 11

[47] Deflem, Mathieu. 'Law Enforcement in British Colonial Africa: A Comparative Analysis of Imperial Policing in Nyasaland, the Gold Coast, and Kenya.' *Police Studies*. 17, (1994), pp 47-50.

Constabulary.[48] Subsequently, the need for a civilian police force became apparent[49] and in 1894 a police ordinance was passed to create a civilian police force in the Gold Coast. Four hundred members of the previous constabulary were recruited into the new force[50] and a clear distinction was drawn between civil and military forces in the same year.[51] The governor directed the local organisation and conduct of the civil police and was the commander-in-chief of the military.[52] This further leads on to the outlook of military activities in the Gold Coast during that era.

Military Activities

All the European powers in the country at the time had a significant military presence to serve as a deterrent and protection for the resources acquired within their respective territories in the Gold Coast.[53] The Gold Coast had one of the highest footprint of European military setups globally, outside Europe. Furthermore, the Fante Kingdom, Denkyira Kingdom, and other kingdoms in the southern states; and along the coastal frontiers of the Gold Coast also had military capabilities of their own to protect their respective territories.[54] Most importantly, there was also the existence of a formidable Ashanti army in the Gold Coast that protected the Ashanti Empire with superior military power.

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[48] Francis D Boateng and Isaac Nortey Darko. 'Our past: The effect of colonialism on policing in Ghana', *International Journal of Police Science & Management*, 18:1, (2016), p. 14

[49] NAUK-CO 96/272, Re-Organization of the Civil Police Force, 16 April, 1896.

[50] Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative. 'The Police, the People, the Politics', Police Accountability in Ghana, The British come to town – Colonial Policing, *Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative*, 2007, p. 11

[51] PRAAD-Accra ADM 5/1/72, A.W. Kitson, "Civil Police Annual Report, 1895," 2 April 1896.

[52] David Killingray. 'Guarding the Extending Frontier: Policing the Gold Coast, 1865-1913', in *Policing the Empire: Government, Authority and Control, 1830–1940*, by D.M Anderson and D Killingray., eds., (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1991), p 111; Also see, PRAAD-Accra ADM 5/1/74, A.W. Kitson, "Gold Coast Police–Annual Report," 12 February 1898.

[53] Dietrich Koster. "Map of the Dutch, Portuguese, Danish, Swedish and Brandenburg forts in Ghana", The European Forts in Ghana. *Colonial Voyage*, 1998, [online resource] available from, https://www.colonialvoyage.com/european-forts-in-ghana/. Accessed on 25/04/2020

[54] T. C. McCaskie. 'Denkyira in the Making of Asante', *Journal of African History*, Vol 48, (2007), pp 1 - 25

Pre-Conditions 2 and 3

There was the non-existence of pre-condition 2 and 3 in this era. Every kingdom and/or empire had its own means of collecting and sharing information or intelligence. The Ashanti Empire for instance invented the 'Fontomfrom', which was also known as the 'Asante talking drum.' With this tool at hand, the Ashanti Empire was able to drum messages to distances of over 300 kilometres (200 miles), which was arguably as rapid as a telegraph. The drums were able to produce distinct tones, punctuations, as well as phrases qualified by the Ashanti accents; of which when heard by the natives, made perfect sense to them but not to natives from different tribes. For example, standard phrases from the talking drum called for chieftaincy meetings, it was used to warn the military about imminent dangers, issue precise orders as to when to pick up arms, when to be ready for assault, and who the target enemy/adversary is. It was also used to widely announce the death of significant figures within the governing body of the empire.[55] Just like the Ashanti Empire, every other empire also had its own unique but distinct way of passing on information or intelligence to plan a military assault against adversaries and/or push out alerts for imminent threats; like the Denkyira Empire's Fontomfrom.[56]

Detrimental Outcome for the Non-Existence of Pre-Conditions

The geographic makeup of the Gold Coast in this era consisted of different kingdoms and empires.[57] Each empire and/or kingdom had its own separate autonomous security architectures, keeping their respective territories safe.[58] These kingdoms and empires did not necessarily share a common interest, which always put them at loggerheads with each other.[59] There was a lack of national consciousness among the different kingdoms and empires. This

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[55] Paul Schauert. *Staging Ghana: Artistry and Nationalism in State Dance Ensembles*, (Bloomington & Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2015), p. 165

[56] Joseph S. Kaminski. *Asante Ivory Trumpet Music in Ghana: Culture Tradition and Sound Barrage*, (Surrey: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2012), p. 72

[57] Gocking, Roger. *The History of Ghana*, (London: Greenwood Press, 2005), pp 17-37

[58] T. C. M C Caskie. *Denkyira in the making of Asante c. 1660 – 1720*, School of Oriental & African Studies, University of London, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp 1 -10

[59] Davidson, Basil. *West Africa before the Colonial Era: A History to 1850*, (London: Routledge, 2014), p. 224

meant that there was no awareness and/or appetite to put in place security institutions with a common purpose of defending the country; signifying an absence of pre-condition 1. The non-existence of pre-condition one resulted in every kingdom and empire undertaking their own intelligence activities; highlighting the lack of pre-condition 2. This meant that there was no interagency coordination between the kingdoms and empires for the country's defence; implying the non-representation of pre-condition 3.

This lack of unified security architecture inhibited the ability of the various kingdoms from being able to pick up all the warning signals, which indicated that the Europeans were capitalising on their differences.[60] This, coupled with ongoing numerous conflicts and wars between the different kingdoms at that time[61], subsequently increased the violence in the country, which made its landscape volatile and dangerous[62], and further deepened the instability in the country.[63] When all the stated factors are pieced together, including the lack of national consciousness, it became impossible for the native kingdoms to form a united front and coordinate their security outfits to defend the country from becoming a British colony.[64] Upon finally defeating the Ashanti Empire, a resident commissioner with civil and criminal jurisdiction was appointed by the British to oversee the Ashanti territories.[65] As part of the colonial project, some of the security personnel and structures that already existed in the fallen kingdoms were consolidated to form part of the colonial regime's internal security foundation.[66] This changed

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[60] Melvin Eugene Page, Penny M. Sonnenburg. *Colonialism: An International, Social, Cultural, and Political Encyclopedia*, (Oxford: ABC-CLIO, 2003), p. 32

[61] Claridge, W Walton. *A History of the Gold Coast and Ashanti*, Introduction, (London: Forgotten Books Ltd, 2016), pp x – xii

[62] James B. Minahan. *The Complete Guide to National Symbols and Emblems*, (California: Greenwood Press, 2010) p. 841

[63] Melvin Eugene Page, Penny M. Sonnenburg. *Colonialism: An International, Social, Cultural, and Political Encyclopedia*, (California: ABC CLIO, 2003), p.32

[64] Wilks, Ivor. *Asante in the Nineteenth Century: The Structure and Evolution of a Political*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), p xlviii

[65] A. Adu Boahen. *Yaa Asantewaa and the Asante-British War of 1900-1*, Preface, (Accra: Sub Saharan Publishers, 2003), p. 19

[66] Public Records and Archives Administration Department (PRAAD)-Accra ADM 5/1/81, "Report on the Gold Coast Police for the Year 1904," 6 March 1905.

the outlook of the country's security institutions permanently[67], as colonisation of the Gold Coast begun in 1900.

4.2. Colonial Era of the Gold Coast and Its Internal Security Institutions

Politicos Historia During 1901 to 1948

With the coastal regions already a British colony, in 1901 and 1902, the Ashanti empire and the Northern territories respectively became part of the broader British colony of the Gold Coast.[68] A decade after taking over the entire Gold Coast, the British were already exporting over £1million worth of gold annually; as well as the export of other minerals. By 1916, the Gold Coast had begun mining manganese as well, mostly to the benefit of the colonial masters. Despite all of this, these benefits also came at a cost to the development of the Gold Coast. Almost the first two decades (1901 – 1918) of British colonisation in the Gold Coast were characterised by inadequate roads and railways, as well as very limited and ill-equipped hospitals, schools, and a lack of professionally trained tutors. Education was provided by the missionary societies and there was more demand for schools than places available.[69] For instance, in 1918, there were 204 government and government-assisted schools, with a total enrolment of 25,496 in the country. Education was mostly, but not entirely, literate and there were almost no good technical and industrial schools. Health-wise, a few hospitals had been built in the principal centres of European population, but mostly looked after Europeans only. The few health facilities that existed were unable to meet the people's needs.[70]

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[67] Momodu, Samuel. "The Anglo-Ashanti Wars (1823-1900)." *Black Past*, 2018, [online resource] available from, https://www.blackpast.org/global-african-history/anglo-ashanti-wars-1823-1900/. Accessed on 09/05/2020
[68] Albert, Blaustein. Gisbert, Flanz. *Constitutions of the Countries of the World*, (New York: Oceana Publications, 1971), p.41
[69] "Development Plans of Guggisberg Prior to 1957." *Wiki Educator*, 2019, pp 1-8 [online resource] available from, https://wikieducator.org/images/c/cb/Development_plans_of_Guggisberg_prior_to1957.pdf. Accessed on 25/05/2020
[70] "Development Plans of Guggisberg Prior to 1957." pp 1-8

Having said that from 1919 to 1927, under the governorship of Sir Gordon Guggisberg, the British pursued an indirect rule system; which meant that the British ruled the Gold Coast through the use of native chiefs, who were seen as custodians of colonial authority. Guggisberg also embarked on a ten-year developmental plan by tackling three key areas of the Gold Coast economy; which were transport, industry, and agriculture. There was a significant improvement in educational systems, medical facilities, and the transportation sector. Guggisberg built a harbour in Takoradi, extended the existing railway network linking major cities in the country, as well as improving existing roads, and constructing new ones.[71] Furthermore, on 10th July 1919, a declaration was signed between Britain and France over Togoland, offering part of Togoland to France. This created a clear demarcation, which presently separates modern-day Ghana from Togo.[72]

Additionally in 1919, the Geological Department discovered diamonds and in 1920, commercial scientific production began.[73] During Guggisberg's tenure in office, three provinces namely Western, Central and Eastern were created in the Gold Coast in 1925. Each of the provinces had a Provincial Council of Chiefs, which was made up of Paramount Chiefs in that particular province. All three Councils were further constituted into a Joint Provincial Council of Chiefs, who were represented in the Legislative Council. This representation was made up of six unofficial members of the Legislative Council, which comprised of three from the Eastern, two from Central, and one from the Western Provinces. All these were part of an effort to devolve some local governing powers to the natives.[74]

Finally, coming to the end of his tenure in 1927, Guggisberg built four trade or industrial schools to serve the coastal regions, Ashanti, and the Northern Territories; as well as building

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[71] "Development Plans of Guggisberg Prior to 1957." pp 1-8
[72] Ian, Brownlie. Ian, Burns. *African Boundaries: A Legal and Diplomatic Encyclopaedia*, Ghana-Togo, (London: C Hurst & Co, 1979), pp 261-263
[73] "Development Plans of Guggisberg Prior to 1957." pp 1-8
[74] Kwame, Antwi-Boasiako. Okyere, Bonna. *Traditional Institutions and Public Administration in Democratic Africa*, (UK: Xlibris, 2009), p. 154

the Achimota college, which is currently one of the most prestigious schools in modern-day Ghana.[75] After the tenure of Guggisberg, there was still a steady increase of financial backing for increasing state and mission schools. As a result of the Asquith Commission in 1943, the country's first higher education establishment called the University College was opened in 1948, now known as the University of Ghana.[76]

Despite the accomplishments, there were also some limitations to the legacy of Guggisberg's indirect rule policy. This policy limited nominations for local government positions to the chiefs, and at the same time deliberately created a barrier between the chiefs and their educated subjects. This subsequently succeeded in providing the Gold Coasters with less voice in the central government affairs, which continued even after his governorship.[77] Such activities infuriated the educated elites who viewed the chiefs as mere figureheads that had allowed the provincial councils to be controlled by the colonial regime.[78] This triggered significant outcry for more representation and as a result, two more unofficial Gold Coasters were added to the Executive Council in 1943.[79] However, as the African colonies were still viewed by the British as the source for desperately needed resources to help strengthen the post-World War II (WWII) economy of Great Britain; any political change in the Gold Coast that would place significant power in the hands of Gold Coasters would have been to the detriment of British interest.[80]

Nonetheless, the British still took a chance by embarking on a new but courageous constitution in the Gold Coast in 1946 called the 'Burns Constitution'. This new constitution was written

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[75] "Development Plans of Guggisberg Prior to 1957." pp 1-8
[76] "Establishment of The University." *University of Ghana*, 2018, [online resource] available from, https://www.ug.edu.gh/about/university-history. Accessed on 25/04/2020
[77] Nana James Kwaku Brukum. The Northern Territories of the Gold Coast Under British Colonial Rule, 1897-1956, [PhD Thesis], University of Toronto, 1997.
[78] 'Educating an African Leadership: Achimota and the Teaching of African Culture in the Gold Coast', Colonial Romanticism, Indirect Rule, and African Culture, *Africa Today*, 49:3, (2002), p.7
[79] LaVerle Berry. *Ghana: A country study*, The Growth of Nationalism and the End of Colonial Rule, Early Manifestations of Nationalism, (Washington DC: Library of Congress, 1994), pp 24-26
[80] "Was the Gold Coast 'Decolonised' or Did Ghana Win its Independence?" A Resource for Key Stage 4, Faculty of History. *University of Oxford*, 2017, p. 1, [online resource] available from, https://www.history.ox.ac.uk/files/teachingresourceghanasindependencepdf. Accessed on 25/04/2020

and subsequently introduced to abolish the concept of the official majority in the legislative council. As a result of this, a new legislative council comprising of the Governor as the President, six government officials, six nominated members, and 18 elected members was formed. This made the Gold Coast the first African colony to have a native majority in the legislative council. Furthermore, this new constitution also made way for Ashanti territory's representation for the first time.[81] However, although elected members (Gold Coasters) were in a clear majority in the legislative council, (which was welcomed by the majority of Gold Coasters, as well as the British press who described it as the most democratic in Africa and a major step towards self-government); the power of the executive however still resided with the governor who was responsible for the legislative council. Therefore, leaving a group of educated elites still unsatisfied, which significantly contributed to the emergence of nationalist sentiments in the Gold Coast.[82]

As the country developed economically, with the focus of power gradually shifting into the hands of the chiefs; the sentiment for nationalism begun to grow gradually among the educated elites. A momentous opposition group made up of some educated elitists called the United Gold Coast Convention (UGCC) was formed on 4th August 1947. Although the immediate demand of the UGCC was to replace the chiefs on the legislative council with educated elites, their ultimate aim was to demand self-governance "in the shortest possible time".[83] The then-London-based educated elite, Gold Coaster, and Pan-African activist, Dr. Kwame Nkrumah, was invited by the leadership of the UGCC to become its General Secretary.[84] Before continuing, here is an outline of a brief profile of Kwame Nkrumah.

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[81] Tapan Prasad Biswal. *Ghana, Political and Constitutional Developments*, National Movement and Constitutional Development, (New Delhi: Northern Book Centre, 1992), pp 27-38

[82] David Ernest Apter. *Ghana in Transition*, Towards Autonomy, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972), pp 164-166

[83] Kwame Botwe-Asamoah. *Kwame Nkrumah's Politico-cultural Thought and Policies: An African-centered Paradigm for the Second Phase of the Second African Revolution*, Early Anti-Colonial Movements, (London: Routledge, 2005), p. 97

[84] Obed Yao Asamoah. *The Political History of Ghana (1950-2013): The Experience of a Non-Conformist*, Changing the Traditional Political Schism in Ghana, Forming the NDC, (UK: Author House, 2014), p. 424

Demystifying Kwame Nkrumah: Idealist, Socialist, or Nationalist?

Kwame Nkrumah; an educated elite from the Nzema tribe of the Gold Coast was born on 21st September 1909. He was one of the locals who benefited from the establishment of the Achimota school in 1927 by Governor Guggisberg, which was then known as the Prince of Wales College. In 1930, he obtained a certificate in teaching[85] and at the same time developed a significant interest in 'anti-colonial resistance movements and ideologies, notably including Black Nationalism'.[86] In 1935, Nkrumah travelled abroad to further his education by attending the Lincoln college in Pennsylvania in the United States of America (USA), which was historically a black college, where he obtained a scholarship.[87] During that era, Black Nationalism, including Garveyism and Pan-Africanism as well as the formation of black student unions and associations had gained momentum in the USA and Canada. In addition to his academic ambitions, Nkrumah also worked alongside young people from numerous colonies in Africa, of which he helped create most of the black unions, associations, and activism in the USA and Canada.[88]

In 1939, he graduated with a BA in Economics and Sociology and was appointed as an assistant lecturer in Philosophy at the same college. Nkrumah spent about 10 years in the USA and during that period he earned certificates in Philosophy, Theology, and Sociology.[89] As someone who had always been an enthusiastic advocate towards the struggle for African freedom, Nkrumah was able to align himself with some of the radical activists such as Grace-Lee Boggs, CLR James, Raya Dunayevskaya, and Elaine Brown, who later became the leader

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[85] Kiluba L. Nkulu. *Serving the Common Good: A Postcolonial African Perspective on Higher Education*, (Oxford: Peter Lang, 2005), pp 57-58

[86] Kiven Tunteng. *From Pan Negroism to African Paramountcy: The Role of Kwame Nkrumah*, (Montreal: Vanier College Press, 1977), p. 72

[87] Kojo A. Quartey. *A Critical Analysis of the Contributions of Notable Black Economists*, Kwame Nkrumah – The African Socialist, (London: Routledge, 2017), p. 49

[88] Asemanyi, Abena Abokoma and Anita Brenda Alofah. 'A Rhetorical Analysis of Osagyefo Dr. Kwame Nkrumah's Independence Speech', *IISTE - International Knowledge and Sharing Platform*, 43, (2015), pp 1 - 2

[89] Solimar Otero. *Narrating War and Peace in Africa*, Struggles for Independence, (Rochester: Rochester Press, 2010), p. 34

of the Black Panther Party for Self Defence.[90] Upon leaving the United States in 1945, Nkrumah enrolled in a doctoral degree course in Anthropology at the London School of Economics but soon left to join the University College in London to study Philosophy. During his time in the United Kingdom, he aligned himself with many Black Nationalists including George Padmore of Trinidad, Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya, Peter Abrahams of South Africa, Hastings Banda of Malawi, and W.E.B DuBois of the USA.[91]

Taking prior discussion into consideration, Nkrumah at this point had become significantly exposed to radical sentiments of Black Nationalism[92] and had even published a pamphlet entitled "Towards Colonial Freedom". He also played a significant role in organising the fifth Pan African Congress in Manchester, which was pertinent towards the independence of colonies in Africa and the British West Indies. This made Nkrumah and his ideology gain international recognition, which helped him develop a significant network. The close relationship developed between Nkrumah and Padmore helped widen Nkrumah's political turf into the West Indies as part of his Pan African environment to operate in. It was also from Padmore, a staunch believer in socialism, that Nkrumah gained a great deal of understanding of socialist ideas. This made Nkrumah become attracted to Marxism-Leninism partly because of its militant condemnation of 'imperialism, colonialism, and racial and national oppression.'[93]

Furthermore, during that congress, Nkrumah also made his bid to the West African leaders present by setting up a West African National Secretariat (WANS). The motto was the "three S's - Service, Sacrifice and Suffering. Its aims were to commence revolutionary work in any

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[90] Robin D. G. Kelley and Betsy Esch. *Afro Asia*, Black Like Mao: Red China and Black Revolution, Revolutionary Political and Cultural Connection Between African Americans and Asian Americans, (London: Duke University Press, 2008), pp 97 – 154

[91] Felix Macharia Kiruthu. *Voices of Freedom: Great African Independence Speeches*, (Nairobi: Cana Publishers, 2001), p. 22

[92] Robin D. G. Kelley and Betsy Esch. *Afro Asia*, Black Like Mao: Red China and Black Revolution, Revolutionary Political and Cultural Connection Between African Americans and Asian Americans, (London: Duke University Press, 2008), pp 97 – 154

[93] Udida A. Undiyaundeye. 'Kwame Nkrumah and Pan-African Consciousness 1957-1966', Gestation Period, Historical Research Letter, *IISTE - International Knowledge and Sharing Platform*, 44, (2018), pp 1 - 3

part of the African continent towards the ultimate goal of establishing a Union of African Socialist Republics."[94] He was appointed as the General Secretary of the WANS and was elected as the regional secretary of the Pan-African Federation. Contextualising all of the said events, Nkrumah as of that period had become internationally well-known as a radical Black Nationalism activist, who had gained significant credence and popularity across the African continent; however, he had also attracted the attention of Western intelligence agencies, especially MI6 and CIA as a possible Communist.[95]

Kwame Nkrumah's Drastic Shake-Up of the UGCC's Status Quo

Nkrumah's tenure at the UGCC significantly changed the threat landscape in the Gold Coast during this period. Colonisation of the Gold Coast had its advantages and disadvantages for both Britain and the Gold Coast and vice versa. Some of the positives for the Gold Coast include the building of transportation networks, health, education, and other social amenities that continue to benefit the country today.[96] That said, such developmental projects also helped facilitate the exploitation and exportation of raw materials into mainland Britain; which benefited the British but relatively came at a significant disadvantage to the development of the Gold Coast.[97] Therefore, when Nkrumah arrived at the Gold Coast, he joined up with the other leaders of the UGCC namely Ebenezer Ako-Adjei, Edward Akufo-Addo, Joseph Boakye Danquah, Emmanuel Obetsebi-Lamptey, and William Ofori Atta (also known as the "Big Six" of Ghana's political history), to vehemently challenge such injustices.[98] Nkrumah's tenure with

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[94] Ama Barbara Biney. Kwame Nkrumah: An Intellectual Biography, Nkrumah the Activist to Leader of the CPP, 1945-1951 - Activism in London, 1945-1947, [PhD Thesis], University of London, (2007), pp 56 - 70
[95] "The Greatest African Leaders", Political Life. *Joburg Post*, 2019, [online resource] available from, http://www.joburgpost.com/articles/12182. Accessed on 25/04/2020
[96] Barbara Ingham. 'Colonialism and the Economy of the Gold Coast 1919-1945', in *Development Studies and Colonial Policy*, by Barbara Ingham, Colin Simmons., eds., (London: Frank CASS, 1987), pp 250-253
[97] Remi JEDWAB & Alexander MORADI. "Colonial Investments and Long-Term Development in Africa", Introduction. *Tufts*, 2012, pp 1 – 4 [online resource] available from, https://ase.tufts.edu/economics/documents/seminars/jedwabColonialInvestments.pdf. Accessed on 25/04/2020
[98] Anja Osei. *Party-Voter Linkage in Africa: Ghana and Senegal in Comparative Perspective*, Evolution of Political Parties in Ghana, (Heidelberg: Springer VS, 2012), p. 105

the UGCC was described as a very 'stormy' one, and with the support of the other leaders he began pursuing a nationalist agenda.[99]

Threat Landscape in the Colonial Era Prior to the 1948 Riots

The UGCC criticised the indirect rule system and fervently accused the colonial regime for the shortages, inflation, unemployment, and reoccurring scuffles in the country. Therefore, as a consequence, the growth of nationalist sentiments began to emerge in the country.[100] The UGCC shared the view that the British were taking advantage of the country[101] by exploiting and exporting its natural resources including gold, metal ores, diamonds, ivory, pepper, timber, grain, and cocoa; not forgetting cheap labour, which helped fuel the already growing nationalist sentiments.[102] Due to a combination of additional factors, which are described further in this chapter, the nationalist sentiments only escalated to their most heightened level[103], which resulted in what had been described as the 'watershed' moment in the history of the country. The watershed moment was the 1948 Riots which took the colonial regime by surprise[104], due to its decision to operate an internal security institution that mainly focussed on ensuring uninterrupted flow of resources from the Gold Coast to mainland Britain.

As such, the security institutions were ill-equipped to pick up warning signals of changing political and security sentiments in the country; especially its inability to effectively anticipate the growing nationalist sentiments before they escalated. It all began with the return of the Gold Coast's ex-servicemen from WWII. Upon returning to the Gold Coast after WWII,

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[99] David Owusu-Ansah. *Historical Dictionary of Ghana*, Nkrumah, Kwame (1909-1972), (Plymouth: Roman & Littlefield, 2014), p. 240

[100] Usman ABASS. 'The Growth of Nationalism and Independent Ghana', The Position of Women in the Social and Political History of Ghana, *Türk Dünyası İncelemeleri Dergisi/Journal of Turkish World Studies*, (2017), pp 141 - 162

[101] John MacBeath and Sue Swaffield. 'Ghana: Resolving the Tensions Between Colonial Values and Contemporary Policies', in *School Level Leadership in Post-conflict Societies: The importance of context*, by Simon R. P. Clarke, Thomas A. O'Donoghue., eds., (Abingdon: Routledge, 2013), p. 49

[102] Tony Cleaver. *Economics: The Basics*, Extracting the Wealth of Nations on the Old Gold Coast, (Abingdon: Routledge, 2011), p. 197

[103] Kevin O'Sullivan. 'Discontent in the Gold Coast', The wind of change: decolonisation in British West Africa, *Ireland's History Magazine*, 14:4, (2006).

[104] Frederick Cooper. *Decolonization and African Society: The Labor Question in French and British Africa*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p.248

gratifications promised to the ex-servicemen by the colonial regime were unmet. Furthermore, members of the GCR also returned to find foreigners dominating the economy, coupled with housing shortages, and other economic and political grievances.[105] Additionally, imported consumer goods after WWII had also become very scarce and expensive in the Gold Coast. Prices of such goods were so high that it made living costs unbearable for the majority of Gold Coasters. For those reasons, the returning ex-servicemen established a Union in 1946 to help pursue their unmet promised gratifications. In addition to this, the European firms responsible for imported goods in the country were also vehemently blamed for such hardship in the Gold Coast.[106] The British government, however, maintained a non-committal stance and therefore did not attempt to help alleviate the growing hardship in the country. Consequently, the Gold Coasters accused the British of colluding with these firms, which sparked public discontent nationwide. As a consequence, a large campaign to boycott European goods was launched in the Gold Coast in January 1948.[107]

Despite the late effort made by the colonial regime to intervene by negotiating with campaign leaders, Gold Coasters were still dissatisfied with the outcome. National consciousness rapidly accelerated; especially when ex-servicemen, groups of urban African workers and traders, and some educated elites inspired mass support, which led to a major revolt across the country beginning on the 28th February 1948[108] as explained below.

Events Leading to the 1948 Riots

As part of pursuing their unmet gratifications, some GCR ex-servicemen who had returned from WWII embarked on a peaceful demonstration on 28th February 1948. This protest aimed

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[105] Kevin O'Sullivan. 'Discontent in the Gold Coast', The wind of change: decolonisation in British West Africa, *Ireland's History Magazine*, 14:4, (2006).
[106] Chester Morton. "The causes of the 1948 riots in the Gold Coast." *Virtual Kollage*, 2016, [online resource] available from, https://www.virtualkollage.com/2016/12/the-causes-of-1948-riots-in-the-gold-coast.html. Accessed on 25/04/2020
[107] John A. Arthur. *The African Diaspora in the United States and Europe: The Ghanaian Experience*, (London: Routledge, 2008), p. 6
[108] Robert, Tignor. *W. Arthur Lewis and the Birth of Development Economics*, The Gold Coast, (Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2006), p. 115

to submit a petition to the colonial governor in the colonial office at Christiansburg Castle. This petition sought to improve economic conditions and to increase employment for veterans. The protest march soon took a tragic turn after a superintendent at the Castle ordered the police (native officers) to shoot at them. When the police refused, the superintendent opened fire at the protesters killing three (Sergeant Adjetey, Corporal Attipoe, and Private Ordartey Lamptey) and wounding over 60.[109] This triggered initial violent riots in Accra on 28th February 1948, which soon spread to major towns and cities across the country.[110] The sudden eruption developed into extensive chaos and lootings of European-owned shops across all major towns and cities in the country.

The aforementioned incident ultimately resulted in violent clashes between colonial police and African nationalists, including ex-servicemen from the GCR. Hence escalating into widespread disturbances and violence all over the Gold Coast.[111] The event that lasted from 28th February to 16th March 1948, soon became known as the 1948 Riots.[112] Military forces were called in to assist, roads were closed down, traffic redirected, and curfew imposed. Further military reinforcements were brought in and all necessary measures were put in place to safeguard the population, which eventually ended the riots.[113] The loss of life and property far exceeded the immediate causes of the riots. In total 29 people died, 235 seriously injured, £2 million worth of damage to property.[114]

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[109] John A. Arthur. *The African Diaspora in the United States and Europe: The Ghanaian Experience*, (London: Routledge, 2008), p. 6

[110] John D. Hargreaves. *Decolonization in Africa*, Growing Hopes of Independence, (London: Routledge, 2014), p. 123

[111] Joan Nwasike, Dunstan Maina. *Key Principles of Public Sector Reforms: Commonwealth Case Studies*, Endnotes, (London: The Commonwealth, 2018), p. 135

[112] "British Gold Coast/Togoland (1946-1957)." *University of Central Arkansas*, 2019, [online resource] available from, https://uca.edu/politicalscience/dadm-project/sub-saharan-africa-region/british-gold-coasttogoland-1946-1957/. Accessed on 25/04/2020

[113] "Gold Coast (Rioting, Accra)", Commons Sitting → Oral Answers to Questions. *Hansard*, vol 448, cc37-9, 01 March 1948 [online resources] available from, https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1948/mar/01/gold-coast-rioting-accra. Accessed on 25/04/2020

[114] "The Tales of June 4 and the 1948 Riots." *Justice Ghana*, 2019, [online resource] available from, http://justiceghana.com/blog/our-country/history-and-politics/the-tales-of-june-4-and-the-1948-riots/. Accessed on 25/04/2020

Internal Security Architecture

Precondition 1

The security institutions put in place by the Colonial Regime were the Gold Coast Police Force (GCPF), which served as internal security, and the Gold Coast Regiment (GCR), charged with protecting the country's borders against external aggression. The GCPF and GCR made up the pre-condition 1 initially created by the Colonial Regime.

Pre-conditions 2 and 3

Prior to the 1948 Riots the Colonial Regime did not see the need to incorporate intelligence activities into the duties of its internal security institution, let alone implementing interagency coordination. This signified the absence of pre-conditions 2 and 3. These lapses meant that the internal security institution failed to grasp the intensity of the changing dynamics in the country's political and security environment, and therefore was unprepared. This resulted in the 1948 Riots, which has been described as the 'watershed point' in the history of the country. However, after the 1948 Riots, significant changes were made to the political and security landscape in the Gold Coast. These included reorganising its internal security institution and the need to embark on active intelligence activities to help avert similar incidents in the future, as described below.

Security Landscape After the 1948 Riots

Pre-Condition 1 (Post 1948)

Although the colonial regime made significant changes to its security apparatus in the Gold Coast, it still maintained its security outlook under the original two broad categories of GCPF and GCR. The GCPF was still responsible for internal security, and the GCR continued to principally defend the frontiers of the Gold Coast from any external aggression. However, the

significant changes mentioned above mostly occurred within how the GCPF was re-structured and operated, with very little changes made to the GCR.

The Gold Coast Regiment (GCR)

It all began in 1879 when personnel from the Hausa Constabulary of Southern Nigeria were put together to form the Gold Coast Constabulary. The purpose for the creation of this constabulary was to perform internal security duties in the British colony of the Gold Coast.[115] However, in 1901 when the entire Gold Coast fell under British rule after the Ashanti empire was defeated, the Gold Coast Constabulary was renamed the GCR. The GCR formed part of the broader West African Frontier Force, which undertook mostly external duties outside the Gold Coast.[116] It consisted of 9,980 Africans[117] and raised a total of five battalions for service during World War I (WWI).[118] Between 1914 and 1916, the GCR served with excellence by undertaking a significant role against the German colonies of Togoland and the Cameroons and in the East Africa war.[119] It is believed that the first shots ever fired by the British alliance during World War 1 were done by the Gold Coast regiment, during their campaign against neighbouring Togoland (now Togo), a German colony.[120]

Subsequently, the success of the GCR during the campaign against Togoland meant in 1915 and 1916 the British War Office considered using them elsewhere as imperial forces to boost manpower.[121] For that reason, many people were recruited as non-combatant soldiers (gun and transport carriers) during WWI. By the end of the war, nearly 10,000 Gold Coasters had

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[115] Deflem, Mathieu. 'Law Enforcement in British Colonial Africa: A Comparative Analysis of Imperial Policing in Nyasaland, the Gold Coast, and Kenya', *Police Studies*, 17:1 (1994), pp 45-68.

[116] E. Howard Gorges. *The Great War in West Africa*, (Uckfield: Naval Military Press Ltd, 2004), p. 96

[117] "Africa in World War I (1914 – 1918)." *Brighton & Hove Black History*, 2019, [online resource] available from, https://www.black-history.org.uk/projects/black-and-asian-soldiers-during-ww1/africa-in-world-war-i-1914-1918/. Accessed on 25/04/2020

[118] "Africa in World War I (1914 – 1918)." 2019), *Brighton & Hove Black History*.

[119] Colonel J. Hagan. 'The Role of the Gold Coast Regiment Towards the Defeat of the Germans in Africa During World War I', in *Africa and the First World War 1914-1918: Remembrance, Memories and Representations After 100 Years*, by De-Valera NYM Botchway, and Kwame Osei Kwarteng., eds., (Cambridge: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2018), pp 2-11

[120] CO 1069/386 - Overview, British Gold Coast in 1914

[121] CO 1069/386 - Overview, British Gold Coast in 1914

been recruited relatively to the 1,400 at the beginning of the war.[122] The GCR continued to serve the colonial regime throughout subsequent years, and during WWII raised nine battalions. In that era, it is believed that there were approximately 65,000 Gold Coasters serving in the GCR with most of their duties being overseas. They participated in campaigns in East Africa and Burma and manoeuvres in the Gambia, including the battles at Kenya's Northern Frontier District, Italian Somaliland, and Abyssinia. For instance, there were approximately 30,000 Gold Coasters that served with the British in Burma to fight against the Japanese"[123].

It therefore appears that the role played by the GCR during both WWI and WWII was so significant for such a contribution to be downplayed.[124] For example, on June 27, 1942, the United States (US) Army activated the Air Transport Command in Cairo under Brigadier General Shepler W. Fitzgerald. After ten days, Fitzgerald moved the headquarters to Accra, the capital of Ghana, where he organised the Africa-Middle East Wing. During late 1942, the US Army expanded its presence in Accra by activating the 12th Ferrying Group Headquarters, the 41st Ferrying Squadron, and the 42nd Ferrying Squadron. The 12th Ferrying Group, which was part of a transportation network reaching from the United States, via Africa, to the China-Burma-India theatre of operations, ensured the movement of personnel and materials through Senegal, Ghana, and Chad.[125]

The GCR, although barely benefited from any major changes, contrarily, it was rather at a disadvantage as it appears that its technical segments 'suffered badly especially the signals and the intelligence-gathering machinery.'[126] Regardless, the GCR continued to serve under

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[122] CO 554/31 - Gold Coast Regiment, British Gold Coast in 1914
[123] Jim Jones. "Routes to Independence in Africa." *Saylor Organisation*, 2010, p. 9 [online resource] available from, https://resources.saylor.org/wwwresources/archived/site/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/POLSC325-Routes-to-Independence-in-Africa.pdf. Accessed on 25/04/2020
[124] Thomas Ofcansky. 'National Security', by LaVerle Berry., ed., in *Ghana a Country Study*, Development of the Modern Army, (Washington DC: U.S Government Printing Office, 1995), pp 268-269
[125] Ibid
[126] A. R. Alhassan. "Military Intelligence in Ghana." *All Africa*, 2001, [online resource] available from, https://allafrica.com/stories/200107020013.html. Accessed on 25/04/2020

the colonial administration by undertaking external duties and was still regulated by the War Office in London. It was not involved in maintaining the day-to-day law and order internally in the Gold Coast, however, it continued to exist until it became known as the Ghana army and formed part of its national security architecture after independence in 1957.[127]

The Gold Coast Police Force (GCPF)

On the other hand, the GCPF which was mainly the internal security institution, after the 1948 Riots, went through a major overhaul, as the need for such a restructure became apparent in the Gold Coast. There was the formation of the Reserves Unit (RU) in 1948, which was responsible for controlling future riots and preventing destabilisation of the colonial regime. Furthermore, a Wireless and Communications Unit (WCU) was also created in 1950, and in 1952, a Women's Branch Unit (WBU) was also formed.[128] As part of the restructuring, the colonial regime also significantly improved the internal security institution in the Gold Coast through modernising, enlarging, better equipping, and most importantly the decision to 'Africanise' its personnel. The general recruitment process into the internal security setup was done through a newspaper advertisement and/or through word of mouth, especially after the police had put up notices in the various stations nationwide. This was then followed by different levels of processes and criteria that a candidate had to go through and meet respectively, before being assessed as suitable for the RU, WCU, or the WBU. Candidates were initially selected to undergo a further selection process for training. This was followed by a subsequent selection to rule out people with deformities, scars, amputations, and those that wore glasses. Successful candidates at this stage were then asked to write an examination paper and were further selected for medicals.[129]

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[127] Ross Baker. 'The Air Forces of Tropical Africa', in Air University Review, *The Professional Journal of United States Air Force*, 19, (1967), p. 65

[128] "Our History." *Ghana Police Service*, 2017, [online resource] available from, https://police.gov.gh/en/index.php/our-history/. Accessed on 25/04/2020

[129] Eshun, J. 'Composition of Internal Security Architecture Prior to 1948', Interview with Ghanaian Official, Highgate London, 07 February, (2012).

All those who failed the medicals were dismissed and did not proceed to training. Candidates that passed the medicals were taken on but had to write another examination before being sent to the main depot where all training commenced.[130] The training lasted for six months and after training, the recruits were put on probation for six months to monitor their performance. During that period, anyone that violated the status quo was dismissed and discharged. However, the recruits that successfully completed attained the status of a full constable and were sent to their respective departments which had been decided by their examination performance.[131] Membership, selection process, organisational structure, coordination and management, and the role (operation) of each unit within the internal security architecture are all outlined below.

Reserves Unit (RU)

Membership comprised of people with a little educational background who mostly ended up with the top position of a Warrant Officer. This unit mostly constituted of stout and well-built men. There were no women in the unit and members were mostly people from the Northern Region of the Gold Coast. Officers in this unit mostly possessed buttons and not rifles. However physical statures of members were in a way that the mere sight of them was very intimidating. Their salary was different from the regular police and they were very diligent and dedicated to their work. The same as the CID and SB, coordination and management of the RU was done by a human function called the command, control, and communication system. Primary roles of this unit included that they had to combat riotous mobs, following the 1948 riots in the country[132] and also control crowd disturbances. The RU was known to deal harshly with street demonstrators and protestors. It undertook routine watch duties and daily patrols and was to ensure that they mastered the instructions for how to control a riot. This was

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[130] Eshun, J. 'Composition of Internal Security Architecture Prior to 1948', Interview with Ghanaian Official, Highgate London, 07 February, (2012).
[131] Eshun, J. 'Composition of Internal Security Architecture Prior to 1948', Interview with Ghanaian Official, Highgate London, 07 February, (2012).
[132] "Our History." *Ghana Police Service*, 2017, [online resource] available from, https://police.gov.gh/en/index.php/our-history/. Accessed on 25/04/2020

provided in the police pamphlet called "Riot Control", especially during industrial unrests in 1949.[133]

Wireless and Communications Unit (WCU)

The WCU of the Police service was under the control of Europeans at the time. The Post and Telecommunication (P&T) Institution was the main body that managed the wireless unit. Planning, Engineering, Installation, and maintenance of the machines and equipment were done by technicians from P&T. At the establishment of this Unit, personnel were taken through intensive training programs to assume complete control of the planning, engineering, installation, and maintenance aspects of the unit which, for many years, had been in the hand of the P&T department. The newly established WCU was headed by a British called Ferguson who was deputised by a native Gold Coaster in the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police called Agama. Ferguson eventually handed over power to Agama who subsequently recruited another Gold coaster called Quarshie (a former P&T employee) to assist as the deputy. Quarshie then recruited people from the P&T into the WCU as Police Officers. These recruits joined the police force with significant experience in working on the wireless machines of the Police Service. Upon joining the force, the new recruits worked on its limited VHF and HF equipment, which were for both short and long-distance coverage respectively. Quarshie and the team further proceeded to employ other men and women as radio operators and also men who solely worked on the machines. The main headquarters of the then Wireless Department was located at the police main barracks in the Central Business District of Accra, where all transmission was done.[134]

As part of its coordination and management, the Division was headed by the Director of Communications who advised the Commissioner of Police. The Director advised on the type

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[133] Deflem, Mathieu. 'Law Enforcement in British Colonial Africa: A Comparative Analysis of Imperial Policing in Nyasaland, the Gold Coast, and Kenya'. *Police Studies*. 17, (1994), pp 47-50.
[134] Eshun, J. 'Composition of Internal Security Architecture Prior to 1948', Interview with Ghanaian Official, Highgate London, 07 February, (2012).

of equipment to be purchased, which was done through the Director-General/Technical and General Services, and also oversaw their installation, maintenance, and servicing. He was responsible for the administration of the Division and also for the training of the personnel as well as their postings. In the Regions and Divisions, Assistant WIPOL was responsible to Headquarters through the Regional Commanders on general administrative matters and to the Director of Communications on technical matters. The primary role for this department was to be used as a formal police information room in Accra, by the then governor of the Gold Coast.[135] This provided radio communication to support the ever-increasing role of the then Gold Coast Police Force, the internal security organisation of the Gold Coast Colony. Their operation covered the CID Headquarters and the Regional centres including the mining towns. The head of division advised the Police Commissioner, through the Directors of General Services and Technical Services, on the type of equipment to be purchased. The head also advised on installation, maintenance, and servicing of purchased equipment.[136]

Women Branch of the Police Service

This Unit was established with 12 officers and members were mainly local Gold Coasters. Coordination and management were done by a human function called the command, control, and communication system[137] and it was their role to be responsible for juvenile crimes and offences committed against women and children.[138]

Pre-Condition 2 (Post 1948)

In a dramatic move, the colonial administration actively embarked on intelligence gathering activities to help prevent a repeat of the 1948 Riots in the future. The 1948 crisis coupled with

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[135] "Our History." *Ghana Police Service*, 2017, [online resource] available from, https://police.gov.gh/en/index.php/our-history/. Accessed on 25/04/2020
[136] Eshun, J. 'Composition of Internal Security Architecture Prior to 1948', Interview with Ghanaian Official, Highgate London, 07 February, (2012).
[137] Eshun, J. 'Composition of Internal Security Architecture Prior to 1948', Interview with Ghanaian Official, Highgate London, 07 February, (2012).
[138] "Our History." *Ghana Police Service*, 2017.

the changing nature of intelligence gathering underscored the urgency for immediate reinforcement of the Criminal Investigations Department (CID) and the Special Branch (SB). It also led to the setting up of an intelligence coordinating committee that met weekly at police headquarters. This internal security setup, which comprised of a central intelligence committee, the police, the army, a security division of the Chief Secretary's office, Special Branch, and its district subsidiaries, was replicated across many British colonies.[139] As part of the restructuring of the internal security architecture in the Gold Coast, the CID was reinforced to support a newly created SB in 1948, which was charged with closely monitoring political opponents and gathering intelligence to protect the colonial regime.[140] The same selection process was used to determine who gets selected for a CID or SB role.[141]

In addition to strengthening pre-condition 2, a local Security Liaison Officer' (SLO) was also appointed[142] and an intelligence coordinating body called the 'Central Security Committee' (CenSec) was also established soon after the Riots in 1948. CenSec comprised of the colonial governor, colonial secretary, officer commanding the GCR, local SLO, and Commissioner of Police.[143] Furthermore, Local Intelligence Committees (LICs), which were "indigenised version of sub-committees of the Defence Committee" was established. These LICs were chaired by provincial Chief Commissioners and were composed of District Commissioners and local police officers.[144] Subsequently, a clear distinction of intelligence collection duties was created between 'political intelligence' and 'security intelligence'.[145] CenSec was charged with political intelligence work and SB was made responsible for security intelligence work. [146]

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[139] Emsley C, and Shpayer-Makov H. *Police detectives in history: 1750-1950*, (London: Routledge, 2017), p. 212
[140] Georgina Sinclair, *At the End of the Line*, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2010), p. 85.
[141] Eshun, J. 'Composition of Internal Security Architecture Prior to 1948', Interview with Ghanaian Official, Highgate London, 07 February, (2012).
[142] KV 2/1847 – SLO R. Stephens sends a Special Branch report on the lecture delivered by Nkrumah in Accra, to Police Advisor to the Colonial Office Chief Secretary, West African Council, 06 March 1949
[143] TNA, CO1035/36 - Organisation of Intelligence in the Colonies: Gold Coast, 1956. Correspondence of letters between Sir Charles Arden Clark, Governor of the Gold Coast, and Alan Lennox Boyd, Secretary of State for the Colonies, 27 June 1956. Reply to Circular 458/56, 28 April 1956.
[144] Davey Gregor. Intelligence and British decolonisation: The development of an imperial intelligence system in the late colonial period 19441966, [PhD Thesis], Kings College, (2017), pp 169 – 170.
[145] Emsley C, and Shpayer-Makov H. *Police detectives in history: 1750-1950*, (London: Routledge, 2017), p. 212
[146] Deflem, Mathieu. 'Law Enforcement in British Colonial Africa: A Comparative Analysis of Imperial Policing in Nyasaland, the Gold Coast, and Kenya', *Police Studies*, 17:1, (1994), pp 45-68.

Criminal Investigations Department (CID)

Membership of the CID mainly comprised of literate recruits made up of locals who had undergone a series of examinations at the training grounds and passed with good grades but not necessarily excellent grades. Top-level positions within the CID were handled by the British with the locals taken the low-level roles. This department performed all the criminal investigations work.[147] Coordination and management were done by a human function called the command, control, and communication system. This was an information system employed within a military organisation that incorporated strategic and tactical systems. The commander was the governor of the colony.[148] This system was the same used throughout all different strands of the Police Force. The CID investigated issues deemed or classified as criminal by the colonial governor. The department made a provision in the criminal code which makes it an offence not to do all that is reasonably necessary to prevent the commission of a felony (the more serious crimes are called felonies). It made sure that peace and tranquillity prevailed at all times and also ensured the smooth running of trades, businesses, and infrastructural developments that benefited colonial administration in the Gold Coast.

Special Branch (SB)

Membership consisted of both British and locals with the top-level positions again occupied by the British. Selection of locals into the Special Branch was based on an excellent performance in examination undertaken at the training grounds. Those who excelled with distinction were positioned at the Special Branch. The reason for this was that the department always needed operatives with very high intellect to undertake security intelligence work. They were highly disciplined and had a cordial relationship with colleague officers. Special Branch operatives operated in plain clothes.[149] Senior-level positions were held by the British and the last British senior officer resigned two years after independence but carried on as an adviser

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[147] Interview with a Ghanaian Official (2012).
[148] Interview with a Ghanaian Official (2012).
[149] Eshun, J. 'Composition of Internal Security Architecture Prior to 1948', Interview with Ghanaian Official, Highgate London, 07 February, (2012).

after his resignation.[150] Similar to the CID, coordination, and management in SB were done by a human function called the command, control, and communication system. The primary role of the SB was to undertake security intelligence collection however it ended up performing political intelligence work as well.[151] SB monitored closely political opponents of the colonial regime and gathered intelligence for the protection of the regime.

As part of its function, it gathered information on the precise significance of unrest in the country[152] and drafted procedures for the collection and recording of such intelligence through committees at the regional and district levels. Furthermore, the SB collected intelligence in public meeting places, other social gathering areas, business places, marketplaces, and mainly anywhere that locals gather for one reason or another. Collection was undertaken by a regional or district or sub-district British police officer who compiled them into a report form and disseminated them to designated officers.[153] Its working papers included reports of Local Intelligence Committees, chaired by the Provincial Chief Commissioners, which produced reports based very largely upon more detailed reports from District Commissioners and local police officers. Designated officers received and recorded all intelligence and then disseminated it to the District Intelligence Committee under the chairmanship of the District Commissioner. The committee met monthly to sift items from operatives and to comment on their reliability. The SB then maintained a distribution list that indicated the structure of how intelligence gained was disseminated. They were also to collate and selectively distribute summaries of intelligence to CenSec, a coordinating body, beginning the implementation of pre-condition 3. These secret summaries from SB provided an extremely important element

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[150] Rathbone Richard. 'Police Intelligence in Ghana in the late 1940s and 1950s', in *Policing and Decolonisation: Nationalism, Politics and the Police in 1917 -1965*, by David M. Anderson and David Killingray., eds., (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1992), pp 84 - 104
[151] KV 2/1847 – Extracts from S.B. Gold Coast Summary No. 3. Re United Gold Coast Convention Mentioning Nkrumah, 19 July 1948
[152] Ibid.
[153] Interview with a Ghanaian Official (2012).

in the clutch of working papers used by the weekly meetings of CenSec, which was concerned with political intelligence'[154]

Pre-Condition 3 (Post 1948 Riots)

To coordinate intelligence in the Gold Coast after the 1948 Riots, an 'Intelligence Coordination Committee' was set up by the colonial regime. This Committee was later renamed the CenSec who met weekly to discuss political intelligence matters. Its membership was made up of the colonial governor, colonial secretary, the officer commanding the GCR, a local SLO, and the commissioner of police. As part of their role, CenSec was provided with summaries of intelligence every week by SB and the LICs, which were discussed during their weekly meetings. They demanded from the country's district commissioners to 'report any evidence discovered; with regards to infiltration of communist propaganda in their districts, as well as reactions of the locals'[155]. CenSec set out guidelines for senior colonial officers whenever they dealt with visiting press. They insisted that there was no direct evidence of organised communism in the Gold Coast; although it was obvious that some of its methods had been adopted and its jargon of anti-imperialism and anti-colonisation (sic) were being used. They also provided Whitehall with regular updates on communist influence and its future impact (short-term and long-term) on the Gold Coast.[156]

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[154] Rathbone Richard. 'Police Intelligence in Ghana in the late 1940s and 1950s' in *Policing and Decolonisation: Nationalism, Politics, and the Police in 1917 -1965*, by David M. Anderson and David Killingray., eds., (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1992), pp 84-104
[155] Rathbone Richard. 'Police Intelligence in Ghana in the late 1940s and 1950s' in *Policing and Decolonisation: Nationalism, Politics, and the Police in 1917 -1965*, by David M. Anderson and David Killingray., eds., (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1992), pp 84-104
[156] Ibid.

SLO Role

A local SLO who was an MI5 representative known as Robin 'Tin-eye' Stephens as shown in the image[157] on the next page was appointed with direct access to the governor, Sir Charles Arden-Clarke.

Figure 1: Image of Lt Col Robin Stephens

The Monocled World War II Interrogator

Robin "Tin Eye" Stephens became known for "breaking" captured German spies without laying a hand on them

MI5 Master interrogator Lt. Col. Robin "Tin Eye" Stephens, commandant of Camp 020 (Security Service MI5)

Stephens was an attaché to the West African Council, as well as the LICs in the Gold Coast; and was to work closely with the SB, the army, interior minister, and the governor.[158] His experience as the head of MI5's wartime interrogation centre, Camp 020, and previously supplying the Colonial Office with reports on West African National Secretariat's (WANS) activities in London, was evident in his powerful personality and influence exhibited in Accra.[159]

As part of the role of the local SLO, Stephens eavesdropped on activities of Nkrumah, his associates, as well as other political activists in the Gold Coast, and continued to report on the growing popular support for Nkrumah's radical views and demands. Hence, it is believed that

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[157] King, Gilbert. "The Monocled World War II Interrogator." *Smithsonian Magazine*, 2011, [online resource] available from, https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/the-monocled-world-war-ii-interrogator-652794/. Accessed on 25/04/2020

[158] Davey Gregor. Intelligence and British decolonisation: The development of an imperial intelligence system in the late colonial period 19441966, [PhD Thesis], (Kings College 2017), pp 169 - 170

[159] Christopher Andrew. *The Defence of the Realm*, (London: Penguin Books, 2012), pp 84 - 90

"in June 1949 Stephens forecasted accurately that, when a general election was held, Nkrumah's newly established Convention People's Party (CPP) was likely to win."[160] In addition to the local SLO was also the head of the Security Service Overseas Service, Sir John Shaw, who together were tasked to remain in close personal touch with the colonial regime in Accra. Hence between the two of them, monitored the political and security development in the Gold Coast with keen interest, using all forms of techniques, including communication intercepts. Shaw advised the colonial governor on the need to build a successful relationship with Nkrumah and why it was crucial to the smooth transfer of power, as well as Britain's future relationship with the Gold Coast after independence.[161] The SLO was to continue attending the committee even after independence when appropriate.[162] The colonial regime had supreme control over internal security institution[163] as illustrated below.

Post-1948 Internal Security Architecture

Figure 2: Post-1948 Internal Security Architecture

[164]

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
[160] Ibid

[161] Christopher Andrew. *The Defence of the Realm*, (London: Penguin Books, 2012), pp 84 - 90

[162] Davey Gregor. Intelligence and British decolonisation: The development of an imperial intelligence system in the late colonial period 19441966, [PhD Thesis], Kings College, (2017), pp 169 - 170

[163] John Kwadjo Osei-Tutu. *Forts, Castles and Society in West Africa: Gold Coast and Dahomey, 1450-1960*, (Boston: BRILL Leiden, 2018), p. 260.

[164] Author's own Sketch

Consequential Outcome of Introducing Pre-Conditions 2 and 3 Late

The stated alterations significantly improved the intelligence collection capabilities of the internal security institution and were well coordinated. Hence becoming an intelligence-led internal security architecture, as it embodied all three pre-conditions. Communications between Nkrumah and his associates both within and outside the Gold Coast were constantly being intercepted and were continuously being translated into intelligence briefings and disseminated in a well-coordinated manner amongst the relevant agencies.[165] Furthermore, movements of Nkrumah and his associates in the Gold Coast and abroad, as well as every single activity of theirs were closely monitored for intelligence gathering purposes.[166] Undertaking such political and security intelligence work was crucial because it was deemed vital at the time to help the regime develop a broader understanding of the emerging nationalists' sentiments across its entire colonies and not just the Gold Coast.[167] This was because it became obvious that just like in other colonies, the British had failed to grasp the sophistication of the nationalist movement.[168]

Hence from the Gold Coast's perspective, it clearly became apparent that it was due to the absence of intelligence work and intelligence coordination (second and third pre-conditions) before 1948 Riots. Meanwhile, even after the riots, although intelligence activities were enhanced, the regime still operated an internal security architecture whose priority was still on protecting commerce to 'safeguard Britain's interests in postcolonial liaison with the Republic of Ghana.[169] This assertion is corroborated with the crucial fiscal policy decision taken by the

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[165] KV 2/1848 – Extracts from report re – forthcoming African Forces Conference from the Security Office of the Gold Coast to S.L.O. West Africa mentioning Nkrumah, Extracted on 24/11/1949
[166] KV 2/1849 – Extracts form intercepted letter from W.E.B. Du BOIS, Vice Chairman of the Council on African Affairs, New York to George PADMORE, 22 Cranleigh House, Cranleigh Street, N.W.1 MENTIONING NKRUMAH and Pan-African Congress, Extracted on 16 August 1951
[167] KV 2/1849 – Full text of a speech broadcast by Mr. Kwame Nkrumah Leader of Government Business, 28 June, [vehemently accusing colonial government practices to the detriment Gold Coasters] obtained by the British Information Services (An Agency of the British Government), in Washington D.C. on 05 July 1951.
[168] Wagner, S. British Intelligence and Policy in the Palestine Mandate, 1919-1939 [PhD thesis], Oxford University, UK (2014).
[169] Chase Andrew Arnold. The 'Cat's Paw of Dictatorship': State Security and Self-Rule in the Gold Coast, 1948 to 1957 [PhD Thesis] University of California, (2019), p. 8

colonial regime in the post-1948 Riots era, which was heavily commercial than security-minded.[170] Not only that, during the post-1948 era, the British also embarked on a £1 million agricultural/commercial project in the Northern part of the Gold Coast; and by the early 1950s, split the project into an agricultural unit and a road construction company. It was reported that 'while agriculture continued to flounder, the construction company generated significant profits.' Hence after the independence of the Gold Coast in 1957, 'the scheme entered into voluntary liquidation', after failing to produce profitable crops on a significant scale; and for this reason, sold its asset to the newly Nkrumah government.[171] Therefore, this dissertation arguing below that these actions inhibited the regime's ability to fully grasp the magnitude of the threats it faced, including growing nationalism, which ultimately led to the end of colonial rule in the Gold Coast.

Conclusion (Dots Connection and Road to Freedom)

Connecting the Dots in the Backstory

Besides this chapter being written as the backstory of Ghana's history, as well as the genesis of its intelligence-led national security architecture, it also reaffirms the three pre-conditions that underpin this thesis. Initially the several kingdoms/empires that existed in the country controlled their respective territories. Within these territories, law and order were enforced by a combination of traditional leaders, local chiefs, police, and various military establishments that belonged to the different kingdoms/empires. Several European countries also had acquired territories inside the Gold Coast and therefore, had their security institutions to protect their respective controlled jurisdictions. Due to lack of national consciousness and the heightened rivalry/enmity among the various native kingdoms/empires, who viewed each

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[170] Stephen Hymer. "The Political Economy of the Gold Coast and Ghana." *Elischolar*, Discussion Papers. 81, (1969), pp 31-32 [online resource] available from,
https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1080&context=egcenter-discussion-paper-series. Accessed on 02/10/2020
[171] Jeff D. Grischow. A History of Development in the Northern Territories of the Gold Coast, 1899-1957, [PhD Thesis], Queen's University, Kingston, Ontario, Canada, (1999), pp 280-283

other as adversaries rather than allies at the time[172]; this resulted in creating a scattered security landscape with no centralised coordination.

Hence the Gold Coast was characterised "by the lack of higher authority, which generated a climate of uncertainty that manifested itself through maximization of military power, formation of alliances and wars."[173] The situation created a very turbulent and vibrant political and security landscape during that era in the Gold Coast, making it dangerous and unstable[174]; creating a conducive environment for colonisation to be initiated. From this dissertation's assessment, the Gold Coast being highly concentrated with adversarial security set-ups[175], coupled with each kingdom/empire pursuing its unilateral information collection for their respective survival, and with no coordination; highlight the absence of all three pre-conditions. This made the idea of developing any form of national consciousness in that era near impossible, as loyalty was attributed to ethnicity. Hence the lack of national consciousness meant that the natives did not recognise the entire territory as one country. Therefore, were more focused on securing their respective kingdoms and/or empires[176], which created a deep wedge of rivalries and suspicions between them, triggering numerous wars, and destabilising the landscape.[177] Thus, despite the native kingdoms/empires practising their respective traditional religions, coupled with booming commerce, and thriving economy. These developments ultimately contributed to creating a chaotic environment, which made it possible for Britain to successfully initiate a move towards colonisation. Resulting in the declaration of the entire country as a British protectorate and subsequently a British colony, beginning

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[172] Claridge, W Walton. *A History of the Gold Coast and Ashanti*, Introduction, (London: Forgotten Books Ltd, 2016), pp x – xii

[173] Valerie Anne Yankey-Wayne. Great Power Politics Among Asante and its Neighbours in the 18th and 19th Centuries, An Offensive Realist Explanation [PhD Thesis] Abstract, University of Calgary, 2017

[174] James B. Minahan. *The Complete Guide to National Symbols and Emblems*, (California: Greenwood Press, 2010) p. 841

[175] James B. Minahan. *The Complete Guide to National Symbols and Emblems*, (California: Greenwood Press, 2010) p. 841

[176] Austin, Gareth. 'Labour and land in Ghana, 1874-1939: A shifting ratio and an institutional revolution', *Australian Economic History Review*, 47:1, (2007), pp. 3-5

[177] Claridge, W Walton. *A History of the Gold Coast and Ashanti*, Introduction, (London: Forgotten Books Ltd, 2016), pp x – xii

colonisation of the Gold Coast in 1900[178]; changing the outlook of the country's security institutions permanently.[179]

Dissimilar to the pre-colonial period, during the colonial era, Britain transformed the country's scattered security environment to a centralised internal security structure under the British colony in the Gold Coast, which made a relative difference.[180] That being said, unlike preceding paragraph, which attributed destabilisation in the pre-colonial period to the non-existence of all three pre-conditions; the colonial era demonstrates that despite the colonial regime creating a centralised security institution (first pre-condition), its failure to incorporate intelligence work (second pre-condition) and intelligence coordination (third pre-condition) into the institution's duties before February 1948, meant that it only possessed one out of the three pre-conditions.

The absence of the second and third pre-conditions made the regime unable to ascertain realities on the ground, regarding the changing political and security environment nation-wide.[181] Therefore, despite the booming economic and commercial activities coupled with major infrastructural developments being pursued in the country at the time[182], failure to grasp the gradual political shift in the country; ultimately resulted in creating an unstable landscape post-1948 Riots. Continuous protests, demonstrations, and civil disobedience[183], alongside growing nationalist sentiments at the time, further destabilised the country's political and security landscape. Hence arguing that although the other two pre-conditions were added after the 1948 Riots[184], it made no difference. This is because the nationalist sentiment had taken

[178] Samuel Momodu. "The Anglo-Ashanti Wars (1823-1900)." *Black Past*, 2018, [online resource] available from, https://www.blackpast.org/global-african-history/anglo-ashanti-wars-1823-1900/. Accessed on 09/05/2020
[179] Momodu, Samuel. "The Anglo-Ashanti Wars (1823-1900)", *Black Past*, 2018.
[180] CO 700/GOLDCOAST45 – Gold Coast Defence Scheme, 1903
[181] CO 96/795/31312/2 - Governor Creasy declared that the Nkrumah, Danquah and four others (Big-Six) were responsible for the riots and possibly other disturbances in Gold Coast Colonial Secretary's Report (Governor to Secretary of State) on 5th March 1948.
[182] Dalton, John H. "Colony and Metropolis: Some Aspects of British Rule in Gold Coast and Their Implications for an Understanding of Ghana Today." *The Journal of Economic History*, 21: 4, (1961): 552-65.
[183] CO 96/795/31312/2 – Creasy blaming railway and mine strikes on the Big-Six
[184] CO 537/4728 - Gold Coast, Political Intelligence Reports, 14 July, 24 October, 14, 28 November, 5, 12, December 1949

root at the time and the situation was out of control[185]; forcing the regime to hastily embark on a decolonisation plan for the independence of the Gold Coast.

Although the British pursued a similar concept of colonisation in sub – Saharan Africa, what triggered decolonisation are many and complex factors, varying from one country to another. Unlike this chapter's argument above, Batota-Mpeho attributes decolonisation to three key elements. These are, "colonised peoples' thirst for independence, the Second World War which demonstrated that colonial powers were no longer invulnerable, and a new focus on anti-colonialism in international arenas such as the United Nations."[186] Comparably, Cooper also explores decolonisation from multiple lenses. These include how colonial conceptions of the African worker, coupled with the African Trade Union, and political leaders, embarked on social change to fight for equality and power-sharing. Cooper extensively elaborates on several factors including, (i) 'forced labor, strike movements, and the idea of development, 1940-1945'; as well as (ii) how 'family wages and industrial relations in British Africa', all formed part of the causes to pursue decolonisation.[187] Specifically to the Gold Coast, several scholarship have also attributed what led to the fall of the British colony in the country to diverse arguments.

Crook views the reasons for decolonisation in the Gold Coast from the lenses of 'interaction between land law, class formation and the structure of indirect rule.' Crook claims that the demise of Chieftaincy is what led to decolonisation because 'it was an integral part of the reforms which determined the political form of independence – in the so-called Westminster Model.'[188] Dissimilar to Crook, Fage attributes the fall of colonisation in the Gold Coast to

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[185] KV 2/1847 – 'African nationalist and independence movements', Kwame Nkrumah and how he came to the attention of the Security Service
[186] Muffin Batota-Mpeho. *From Political Monolithism to Multiparty Autocracy: The Collapse of the Democratic Dream in Congo-Brazzaville*, (United Kingdom: Lulu Publishing Inc, 2014), p. 119
[187] Frederick Cooper. *Decolonization and African Society: The Labor Question in French and British Africa*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996)
[188] Crook, Richard C. "Decolonization, the Colonial State, and Chieftaincy in the Gold Coast." *African Affairs*, 85:338, (1986), pp 75-105.

British economic policies, which was perceived as a disenfranchisement against the educated elites of the Gold Coast. Therefore, Fage associates this with the 1890s 'Aborigines' Rights Protection Society' (ARPS) concept. Hence draws a correlation between the 'campaign against the exclusion of qualified Africans from the colonial administration', and the ARPS concept. Of which Fage appears to suggest was significant in the fall of colonisation in the Gold Coast.[189]

From the stated arguments, there appears to be a common theme that highlights the native Africans dissatisfaction with their wages and/or living standards during that era. Therefore, wanting to be in control of their own economic affairs and resources. Hence overwhelming colonial powers with their response by advocating for decolonisation through anti-colonial demonstrations, which were often violent and destabilising for the colonies landscapes.

Although this dissertation to some extent aligns with the economic factor mentioned in all the arguments above; it completely disagrees with the context in which it has been argued, especially as far as the Gold Coast was concerned. This is because during the colonial era, "economically the peoples of the Gold Coast had a higher real income than in comparable areas of the colonial and tropical world and a greater degree of economic security."[190] Furthermore, under the British colony, the country's 'education and civil and social services were generally superior to those of other parts of Africa'.[191] Not only that, there has always been economic issues throughout Ghana's history; however, such issues did not always result in destabilising the country's political and security landscape. As a matter of fact since 1981 to date, Ghana's political and security landscape has been stable despite the significant

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[189] Fage, John D. and McCaskie, T.C. "Western Africa", Decolonization And The Regaining Of Independence. *Encyclopedia Britannica*, 2020, [online resource] available from, https://www.britannica.com/place/western-Africa. Accessed on 24/01/2021.
[190] Dalton, John H. "Colony and Metropolis: Some Aspects of British Rule in Gold Coast and Their Implications for an Understanding of Ghana Today." *The Journal of Economic History* 21:4, (1961), pp 552-65
[191] Ibid

economic crises still facing the country; thus, making the economic claim arguably not coherent.

Inasmuch as preceding arguments may have contributed to the fall of colonisation in the Gold Coast, this dissertation takes the stand that those factors rather acted as an accelerant to speed up the decolonisation process. Such a process appeared to have occurred in a certain pattern, which showed that economic issues, triggered nationalist sentiments, which eventually created the rise of the nationalist movement for decolonisation. No wonder Brown's argument appears to amalgamate the preceding views by blaming the decolonisation of the Gold Coast on, multiplication of economic and social grievances among many Gold Casters, especially the educated elites, which then increased nationalist sentiments and subsequently led to the rise of nationalism.[192] This dissertation believes that from the onset, the colonial regime was more focused on Britain's commerce and economic policies, which formed a major part of the regime's strategic agenda for being in the Gold Coast.[193]

Therefore, not only was the regime keen to correct the experiences of the chaotic security landscape during the pre-colonial era, by taking an obverse approach to immediately establish an internal security institution with a centralised command and control structure; the British also designed the security institution to solely help realise its commercial and economic goals. To develop a conducive atmosphere for successful trade, the regime needed to create an internal security institution, with the potential to be 'ruthless to the indigenous citizens', when necessary.[194] For this reason, the regime established and maintained an internal security institution (mainly a police force), purposely for securing (i) 'trade in European goods and as

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[192] Richard Brown. 'European Colonial Rule in Africa', in *Regional Surveys of the World: Africa South of the Sahara 2004*, by Katherine Murison., ed., (London: Europa Publications, 2003), p. 34
[193] Fage, John D. and McCaskie, T.C. "Western Africa", Decolonization And The Regaining Of Independence. *Encyclopedia Britannica*, 2020, [online resource] available from, https://www.britannica.com/place/western-Africa. Accessed on 24/01/2021.
[194] Peter Twumhene. 'Understanding Police Use of Force and its Effect on Individuals Fundamental Rights in Ghana', *International Journal of Research and Innovation in Social Science (IJRISS)*, Volume III, Issue VI, (2019), p. 421

a vanguard for colonial expansion into the hinterland for increased exploitation of agricultural and mineral resources'[195]; and (ii) the protection of ruling and affluent class areas in the Gold Coast, and were not to be stationed where there were no Europeans.[196]

It is therefore this dissertation's assessment that the British embarked on colonisation of the entire Gold Coast from 1900 onwards for only one reason; which was to pursue its strategic objective. Thus, to ensure uninterrupted commerce and flow of mineral resources and other raw materials from the Gold Coast into mainland Britain, until it was satisfied and had decided to leave the Gold Coast in its own accord. For this reason, the regime realigned its internal security institution to suit its strategic objective, for being in the Gold Coast; thus 'to protect and secure their [the colonial regime's] economic exploitation of the country.'[197] This meant that the role of its internal security institution was to exclusively safeguard the regime's commerce and economic activities. Therefore, the British did not see the need to incorporate intelligence work nor encourage intelligence coordination as part of the duties of its internal security institution. Hence, designing the security institution in a manner that it engaged in bare minimum to no politically related incidents in the country.[198] That said, although some part of the internal security institution's role was to 'contain local 'disturbances'; how it was designed meant that it spent more time in addressing urban crime, the policing of licensing, and the growing burden of traffic regulation.'[199]

As far as this chapter is concerned all the factors discussed in different scholarship as causes for decolonisation, rather collectively aroused nationalist sentiments in the country, which matured into a full-blown nationalist movement nationwide over a considerable amount of

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[195] Ibid
[196] Ibid
[197] Paschal Anayenle Badong. 'Security Provision in Ghana: What is the Role and Impact of Non-State Actors?', Brief History and Overview of Ghana's Security System, *The African Leadership Centre*, (2009), p. 12
[198] Richard Rathbone. 'Police Intelligence in Ghana in the Late 1940s and 1950s', *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, 21:3, (1993), pp 107-128
[199] Richard Rathbone. 'Police Intelligence in Ghana in the Late 1940s and 1950s', *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, 21:3, (1993), pp 107-128

years.[200] This movement gradually developed into anti-colonial crusades, subsequently triggering continuous protests and demonstrations; which eventually emerged into nationwide rebellion/resistance.[201] The February 1948 incident at the crossroads of the Christianborg Castle, when security forces opened fire at unarmed protesters, became the ultimate spark; which triggered widespread civil disobedience, looting, and vandalism across the country becoming known as the '1948 Riots'.[202] It is therefore not surprising that Throup, discussing decolonisation in Kenya claims that dramatic increase in urban crime and rapid escalation of political difficulties; coupled with growing militancy of African trade unions; as well as activities of newly formed political parties drew the police into arenas where they lacked experience and training. Therefore, according to Throup, despite the internal security institution's hesitant transition from criminal investigation to effective political policing[203], it was not enough to curb the growing nationalism movement and the cry for decolonisation.

Similar to the Gold Coast, after the 1948 Riots, although relatively peaceful, there was continuous destabilisation in the country for subsequent years, which forced the colonial regime to pursue decolonisation sooner rather than what the British had anticipated. This dissertation is of the view that had the regime incorporated intelligence work and encouraged intelligence coordination into the duties of its internal security institution before 1948, it would have had eyes and ears nationwide. This would have made the colonial regime situationally aware of the changing political mood and growing anti-colonial sentiments in the country at the time. In so doing would have been better placed to address the situation before it got out

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[200] KV 2/1847 – 'African nationalist and independence movements', Kwame Nkrumah and how he came to the attention of the Security Service.

[201] TNA CO537/5946 - Political Intelligence Reports from the West African colonies for 1950 included a claim that Nkrumah had been a member of the CPGB; though WANS had never been "under 11 communist controls…Nkrumah was a much more dangerous character."

[202] J.M Lonsdale. 'East Africa: Towards A New Order 1945-1963', in *Eclipse of Empire*, by D.A. Low., ed., (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp 169-170

[203] David Throup. 'Crime, Politics and the Police in Colonial Kenya, 1939-63', in, *Policing and Decolonisation: Politics, Nationalism, and the Police*, 1917-65, by David Anderson and David Killingray., eds., (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1992), p. 127

of hand; and subsequently, decolonisation would not have been rushed, but rather would have played out according to the regime's strategic schedule.

Looking at the preceding discussion from a different perspective, during this era, there was also the Royal West African Frontier Force (RWAFF), a military outfit[204], which had a unit based in the Gold Coast called the Gold Coast Regiment (GCR).[205] The GCR co-existed with the internal security institution at the Gold Coast. The GCR however, had a mandate to protect the country's territorial borders from external aggression, and therefore financed under the command of the War Office during war times; but its finances were switched to the Colonial Office's budget during peace time. Unlike the internal security institution, the RWAFF's association with the War Office meant that it relied on intelligence work. Hence it was suggested that its intelligence assessment highlighted potential concerns surrounding the upcoming 28th February 1948 demonstration.

However, the disinterest of intelligence work by the Colonial Office's internal security institution appears to suggest that intelligence coordination with the RWAFF was either lacking or was not taken seriously. This adds to the explanation why the colonial regime was situationally unaware of what was emerging from within the country. Therefore, on the day of the protest march, not only did the colonial regime's internal security institution misjudge the outcome of the peaceful demonstration; it was also unprepared with inadequate personnel and resources, hence panicking during the demonstration. This resulted in the 28th February 1948 tragic shooting, which erupted into widespread violence across the country. From this dissertation's assessment, the sheer scale of subsequent civil disobedience and violence overwhelmed the security institution/regime, which took it by surprise; resulting in continuous destabilisation of the country's landscape thereafter.

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[204] C. Nixon. 'A Future for the Colonial Forces' The Colonial Forces Past and Present, *Royal United Services Institution*, 98:590, (2009), pp 261 - 268
[205] Hugh Charles Clifford. *The Gold Coast Regiment in the East African Campaign*, (Frankfurt: Outlook, 2018), p. 183

To reiterate, should the colonial regime have incorporated intelligence work into the duties of its security institution, and appreciated intelligence coordination, such corporation with the RWAFF could have yielded a different outcome. Although the colonial regime responded by significantly incorporating intelligence work and its coordination (second and third pre-conditions) post-1948 Riots; such action came a bit too late, as the nationalism sentiment at the time, had already taken a foothold in the country. Creating destabilisation due to continuous demonstrations, protests, strikes, and politically motivated anti-colonial national movement; which forced the colonial regime to embark on a decolonisation plan sooner than what it had anticipated as part of its strategic schedule for exiting the Gold Coast in its own free will.

Therefore, unlike other scholarship, this chapter argues that although decolonisation of the Gold Coast would have occurred at some point anyway, it would not have been hastily done; and that the regime would have been able to leave in their own accord. That is, had the colonial regime incorporated intelligence work and its coordination into the activities of its internal security institution before February 1948. This would have helped the colonial regime pick up the warning signals of the changing dynamics, which was emerging within the political and security landscape of the Gold Coast at the time. For this reason, blaming the hastily pursued decolonisation of the Gold Coast on the regime's decision to overlook the importance of applying all three pre-conditions collectively together. Rather than only adhering to the need to establish (i) an internal security institution; however, disregarding the importance of (ii) incorporating intelligence work and (iii) encouraging intelligence coordination; as part of the institution's duties. Consequently, when the British eventually decided to incorporate intelligence work and its coordination into the duties of its internal security institution after the 1948 Riots; such a decision in this dissertation's assessment came a bit too late to make any significant impact. Therefore, left the British with no option than to embark on a decolonisation plan sooner than it had anticipated as outlined in the timeline below.

Road to Freedom of the Gold Coast

Immediately after the 1948 Riots, the leaders of the UGCC, including Kwame Nkrumah and J. B. Danquah were blamed by the colonial regime for the violence and were subsequently, arrested on 18th March 1948. On 12th April 1948, Nkrumah was released from jail[206]; and subsequently the colonial regime invited the other leaders of the UGCC to make recommendations towards the path to independence. Although the UGCC sought self-governance, its mandate was described by many as very conservative, because it fell short of seeking revolutionary change. Therefore, on 12th June 1949, Nkrumah broke away from the UGCC to form a new political party called the Convention People's Party (CPP).[207] In contrast to the UGCC who were seeking for independence "in the shortest possible time", the mandate of the CPP was very radical, and it sought "independence now". The CPP's politics resonated significantly with the masses across the country, to the extent that it became extremely difficult to go unnoticed by London.

On 8th January 1950, the CPP started a campaign of "positive action", which was designed to initiate widespread strikes and nonviolent resistance. However, some scuffles and subsequent violence ensued, and a state-of-emergency was declared by the British government on 12th January 1950. Five days later, on 17th January 1950, two government police officers were killed by demonstrators in Accra and the strike eventually ended on 20th January 1950. This resulted in Nkrumah and the leadership of the CPP being arrested on 22nd January 1950 and Nkrumah was subsequently sentenced to three years imprisonment on 22nd February 1950. Getting arrested made Nkrumah's popularity surged and was soon seen by many Gold Coasters as the hero. From 5th to 10th February 1951, elections for the legislative assembly were held under the new constitution and the CPP won 34 out of the 38 elected seats with

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[206] "British Gold Coast/Togoland (1946-1957)." *University of Central Arkansas*, 2019, [online resource] available from, https://uca.edu/politicalscience/dadm-project/sub-saharan-africa-region/british-gold-coasttogoland-1946-1957/. Accessed on 25/04/2020.
[207] Ibid.

Nkrumah still in jail. Therefore, on 12 February 1951, Nkrumah was released from prison and was appointed the Prime Minister on 13th February 1951.[208]

On 29th April 1954, a new constitution, which provided for legislative elections and a cabinet government headed by a prime minister, was approved. Hence on 15th June 1954 elections for the legislative assembly were held and the CPP won 72 out of 104 seats, which resulted in the CPP forming a government on 17th June 1954 with Nkrumah as Prime Minister. In 1955, there was an assassination attempt on Nkrumah's life whereby a bomb planted in Nkrumah's Accra New Town Residence failed to detonate. Such an action created a "very hawkish and vengeful attitude towards his political adversaries as hard-core destructive elements determined to eliminate Nkrumah before independence"[209]. Having said that, from 12th – 17th July 1956, a further legislative election was held and Nkrumah's CPP won 72 out of the 104 seats in the legislative assembly; with the opposition political party, the National Liberation Movement (NLM) won the remaining 32. A resolution demanding independence from Britain was approved by the legislative assembly on 5th September 1956. The British Togoland was integrated with British Gold Coast on 13th December 1956 under the United Nations approval and in January 1957 an Independence Act was approved by the British Parliament. On 6th March 1957, the Gold Coast formally attained independence and was renamed Ghana, with Nkrumah as the Prime Minister.[210]

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[208] "British Gold Coast/Togoland (1946-1957)." *University of Central Arkansas*, 2019.
[209] KB Quantson. *Ghana: National Security*, The Roots of the Problem, (Accra: Bestas Press-NAPASVIL VENTURES, 2003), p. 7
[210] "British Gold Coast/Togoland (1946-1957)." *University of Central Arkansas*, 2019.

Chapter 5: Kwame Nkrumah's Era and Ghana's First National Security Architecture

Table 8: Pre-Conditions for Intelligence-Led National Security

INTELLIGENCE-LED NATIONAL SECURITY ARCHITECTURE		
Pre-condition 1	**Pre-condition 2**	**Pre-condition 3**
Establish National Security Institutions	Embark on Intelligence Activities	Implement Interagency Intelligence Coordination
Protect and defend national interests against known and unknown threats	Offers eyes and ears within and outside country's territorial borders	Makes architecture situationally aware of magnitude and scope of overarching threats

This chapter describes how Ghana's first President, Dr. Kwame Nkrumah's administration set-up its national security institutions, incorporated intelligence activities, but deliberately discouraged interagency intelligence coordination. The chapter explains that in doing so, Nkrumah embraced pre-conditions 1 and 2, but intentionally dismissed pre-condition 3. It therefore argues that the omission of pre-condition 3 created a suspicious, distrustful, toxic, and volatile political and security environment in Ghana[1], which ultimately led to the destabilisation of the country's domestic security. This chapter also demonstrates that although Nkrumah pursued economic development policies, with Ghana being a democracy[2], and religion still being part of the Ghanaian lifestyle[3]; the country's political and security landscape still became unstable.[4] This chapter concludes by attributing the instability in the country at the time to the absence of pre-condition 3, even though pre-conditions 1 and 2 were embraced.

Prepping for a Deep Dive into the Nkrumah Era

Similar to the colonial regime, Kwame Nkrumah, after assuming office as the Prime Minister and later as the President of Ghana, also stayed away from the sort of proliferated security

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[1] Quaidoo Eric. The United States and the Overthrow of Kwame Nkrumah, [MA Thesis] Fort Hayes State University, (2010), p. 25

[2] Esseks, John D. 'Political Independence and Economic Decolonization: The Case of Ghana under Nkrumah.' *The Western Political Quarterly*, 24:1, (1971), pp. 59–64.

[3] David Owusu Ansah. 'The Society and its Environment', by La Verle Berry, ed. *Ghana: A Country Study*, (Washington: GPO for the Library of Congress, 1994), pp 102-108

[4] James McLaughlin. & David Owusu Ansah. 'The Fall of the Nkrumah Regime', by La Verle Berry, ed. *Ghana: A Country Study*, (Washington: GPO for the Library of Congress, 1994), pp 35-36

environment practised in the pre-colonial era; and therefore, continued with the centralised security model. That being said, due to the 1955 assassination attempt on Nkrumah's life, the new administration began its role knowing the magnitude of the threats, which lied ahead.[5] Therefore, unlike the colonial regime, Nkrumah set up the first national security architecture of Ghana by incorporating significant intelligence activities in the architecture's duties right from the onset.[6] Whilst at the same time he deliberately discouraged interagency intelligence coordination, which embodied the organisational structure of the country's first national security architecture.[7] This created an atmosphere of rivalry, distrust, and suspicion within the national security set-up.[8] This destabilised the country's political and security environment, which impacted on the Ghanaian lifestyle. As noted by Irving Markovitz, there was considerable unrest and dissatisfaction, with many assassination attempts against Nkrumah, and relentless rumors of coups. Yet the government had made peace-making gestures toward its opponents both within and outside its ranks and showed every sign of having attained a durable balance of interests.[9]

This chapter, therefore, argues that although the administration's national security architecture had eyes and ears everywhere, thanks to its extensive intelligence activities (pre-condition 2); holistically, the government lacked situational awareness of emerging threats towards its governance. This was due to its decision to omit pre-condition 3 by discouraging interagency intelligence coordination. The administration was unable to foresee how the emerging situation was gradually destabilising Ghana's landscape, which led to the demise of Nkrumah's administration through a military coup d'état. Whilst, on the contrary, had Nkrumah

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[5] Eshun, J. 'Security Under Nkrumah's Administration', Virtual Conversation with Samuel Eduku Cobbold (Educationist / Nkrumahist), Microsoft Teams, 21 June, (2020).

[6] Simon Baynham. 'Quis Custodiet Ipsos CustodesP: The Case of Nkrumah's National Security Service', *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 23:1 (1985), pp 87-103

[7] Eshun, J. 'Security Under Nkrumah's Administration', Virtual Conversation with Samuel Eduku Cobbold (Educationist / Nkrumahist), Microsoft Teams, 21 June, (2020).

[8] Quantson, KB. *Ghana: National Security*, The Roots of the Problem, (Accra: Bestas Press - NAPASVIL VENTURES, 2003), p. 7

[9] Irving Markovitz. "Ghana without Nkrumah-The Winter of Discontent." *Africa Report*, 1966, [online resource] available from, https://home.koranteng.com/writings/ghana-without-nkrumah-discontent.html. Accessed on 15/01/2020

encouraged intelligence coordination within its national security architecture, the changing dynamics of the country's political and security environment could have been spotted. This could have helped to unearth and foil the military coup d'état, which would have prevented the administration's demise.

For this reason, the destabilisation of the country's political and security environment occurred due to the administration's inability to embrace all three pre-conditions. Instead the administration opted to embrace the first two pre-conditions and dismiss the third. This chapter begins with the historical and political narrative of Nkrumah's administration and the outlook of the first national security architecture. This is followed by analysis of the threat landscape that gave Nkrumah a cause to significantly alter the national security architecture. The description of the architecture 's new phase, categorised under the three pre-conditions is analysed to explain the outcome of Nkrumah's administration.

Politicos Historia During Nkrumah's Time in Office

By 1957, Kwame Nkrumah, the nationalist, populist, charismatic leader, who devoted most of his adult life to fighting against colonialism and for the independence of the Gold Coast, is now the Prime Minister of the newly independent Ghana. Prime Minister Nkrumah inherited a country that had a relatively good educational system and a healthy foreign reserve of about US$481 million. At the time, it was estimated that the country's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was at par with those of Malaysia and South Korea; which meant that it could afford to support some of its African neighbours financially and still be comfortable.[10] Ghana at the time was a multi-party system country with Nkrumah's CPP by far the most dominant political party. With such a buoyant atmosphere at the time, Nkrumah assumed the Prime Ministerial role of independent Ghana with optimism; especially knowing that the majority of Ghanaians fully

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[10] Efam Dovi. "Ghana's economy: Hope rekindled." *Africa Renewal*, 2010, [online resource] available from, https://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/august-2010/ghana%E2%80%99s-economy-hope-rekindled. Accessed on 15/01/2020

supported his leadership.[11] In power, Nkrumah actively pursued a policy of national reconstruction and development which was plainly within the logic of anti-colonial nationalism even after independence; of which such a policy was further extended into the rest of Africa.[12]

Nkrumah's Mission Impossible to Set Africa Free from Colonisation

Nkrumah's strategic ambition for Ghana and the African continent was extensive and calculated. In December 1958, as part of his Pan–African ambition, which sought to champion "a global movement to unite Africa and its people against racial oppression and exploitation associated with European hegemony"[13]; Nkrumah organised the "All African People Conference" in Accra, Ghana. Nkrumah's reason for convening such a conference was that Ghana's independence was meaningless unless all other African countries were free from being colonised by European Powers.[14] All the independent states of Africa at the time, such as, Libya, Ethiopia, Liberia, Morocco, Tunisia, Sudan, United Republic of Egypt, and Ghana, attended the conference.[15] This was followed by a historic A.A.P conference also held in Accra, which was the first-ever Pan-African conference held in Africa. In attendance were all the independent and non-independent African states, liberation movements, and public organisations. The slogan for the conference was 'Hands off Africa'[16] and the agenda entailed anti-colonialism, anti-imperialism, anti-racial, African Unity, and non-alignment.[17] As part of

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[11] Haynes, Jeff. 'Sustainable Democracy in Ghana? Problems and Prospects', Preview, *Third World Quarterly* 14, no. 3 (1993): pp 451-467.

[12] MARTIN, Charles. 'Nkrumah's Strategy of Decolonization: Originality and Classicism.', Introduction, *PrÃ©sence Africaine, Nouvelle SÃ©rie*, no. 85 (1973): pp 74-105.

[13] Kah, Henry. 'Kwame Nkrumah and the panafrican vision: Between acceptance and rebuttal', *Austral: Brazilian Journal of Strategy & International Relations*, no. 5, (2016), pp 141-164.

[14] Jesse Weaver Shipley and Jemima Pierre. 'The Intellectual and Pragmatic Legacy of Du Bois' Pan-Africanism in Contemporary Ghana', Du Bois, Pan Africanism, and Nkrumah's Ghana, in *Re-cognizing W.E.B. Du Bois in the Twenty-first Century: Essays on W.E.B. Du Bois* by Mary Keller, Chester J. Fontenot, Jr., eds., (Macon, Georgia: Mercer University Press, 2007)

[15] "All African People Conference is Held in Accra, Ghana." *South African History Online*, 2011, [online resource] available from, https://www.sahistory.org.za/dated-event/all-african-people-conference-held-accra-ghana. Accessed on 16/08/2018

[16] Jan-Bart Gewald. *Hands Off Africa!!*, (New York: American Universities Field Staff, 1959)

[17] "All African People Conference is Held in Accra, Ghana." *South African History Online*, 2011, [online resource] available from, https://www.sahistory.org.za/dated-event/all-african-people-conference-held-accra-ghana. Accessed on 16/08/2018

pressing on his Pan-African agenda, 'Nkrumah and Sekou Toure of Guinea signed a bilateral agreement for socio-politico-economic cooperation.'[18]

In 1960, a new constitution was approved in the country, Ghana was declared a Republic, and Nkrumah was made the President. In his presidential role, Nkrumah pursued a nationalist and socialist agenda, of which he funded national industrial and energy projects. He also embarked on a robust national education project, encouraged a pan-African culture, and led on African international relations during the decolonisation period. During that era, Africa was adversely divided into two opposing camps. These were the moderates led by Nigeria and Liberia, and the radicals who were Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Egypt, Algeria, represented by the GPRA and 'Morocco'.[19]

Once again in January 1961, as part of his Pan-African vision, and also in the capacity as a leader, Nkrumah attended a meeting organised by the so-called 'radicals', to help further his course. During the meeting they adopted an African charter that proposed the creation of an African Consultative Assembly, African Political Committee, and African Economic Committee, an African Cultural Committee and an African High Command. The group was later known as "the Casablanca Powers".[20]

In April 1961, the Ghana - Guinea union was extended by Nkrumah to include Mali, under the authorisation of its leader Modibo Keita; in an attempt to press forward with Nkrumah's Pan-African project.[21] Such a radical Pan-African vision attracted significant controversy in both Ghana and abroad, and it became so divisive that it earned Nkrumah friends and foes alike.[22]

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[18] Etim E. Okon. 'Kwame Nkrumah, The Fallen and Forgotten Hero of African Nationalism', *European Scientific Journal*, 17:10, (2014).
[19] Ibid.
[20] Ibid.
[21] Etim E. Okon. 'Kwame Nkrumah, The Fallen and Forgotten Hero of African Nationalism', *European Scientific Journal*, 17:10, (2014).
[22] Kah, Henry. 'Kwame Nkrumah and the panafrican vision: Between acceptance and rebuttal', *Austral: Brazilian Journal of Strategy & International Relations*, no. 5, (2016): pp 141-164.

Nkrumah's enthusiasm and vision to complete political emancipation and unification of Africa arguably made him unpopular amongst Western leaders and some African leaders. By the early 1960s, President Nkrumah had embraced socialism and had established very cordial diplomatic relations with mostly communist and Eastern European countries. All these occurred during the tense Cold War era between the Western and Eastern Blocs, creating an ideological grudge between Ghana and the liberal democracies of Europe and North America.[23]

Having realised the magnitude of such controversy, it appeared that Nkrumah saw the need to tone down his rhetoric; especially as he was perceived by many in the West as a pro-socialist and anti-imperialist. It was therefore not surprising that Nkrumah declared a non-alignment policy for Ghana. Nkrumah then justified such a stance by highlighting "how dangerous it is for the emergent States of Africa to take sides in the diplomatic maneuvres and political disputes among the Great Powers"[24]. Without a shred of doubt, the statement was made by Nkrumah to position Ghana and his administration as neutral.[25] Despite that, there were still many critics who doubted his intentions especially as Ghana changed its diplomatic tactics from targeting political activists to convincing people through a vociferously anti-colonial propaganda campaign. This was a modification that casted doubt on the sincerity of Ghanaian neutrality at the time when non-alignment began to affect Ghanaian diplomacy on all levels.[26]

However, to appear more convincing about his non-alignment stance, on 3rd September 1961, Nkrumah attended a non-aligned conference in Belgrade and addressed the conferees as a

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[23] Boni Yao Gebe, P. 'Ghana's Foreign Policy at Independence and Implications for the 1966 Coup D'état', Abstract, *The Journal of Pan African Studies*, 2:3, (2008): pp 160-186
[24] "Letter from President Nkrumah to President Johnson." *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIV, Africa - Office of the Historian*. US Department of State, Document 243, 2011, [online resource] available from, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v24/d243. Accessed on 15/01/2020
[25] Eshun, J. 'Security Under Nkrumah's Administration', Virtual Conversation with Samuel Eduku Cobbold (Educationist / Nkrumahist) on Microsoft Teams, 21 June, (2020).
[26] Gerits, Frank. 'When the Bull Elephants Fight': Kwame Nkrumah, Non-Alignment, and Pan-Africanism as an Interventionist Ideology in the Global Cold War (1957–66), *The International History Review*, 37, (2015): pp 1-19

member of the non-aligned nations. Nkrumah and Prime Minister Nehru of India delivered an appeal letter from the Belgrade conference of non-aligned nations to Moscow; urging the Soviets and the US to find common ground and avert the danger of war.[27] Although it appeared that Ghana temporarily achieved its goal, with such a tense political atmosphere, there was confusion as to where Nkrumah's allegiance lied with regards to his foreign policy. This, coupled with previously failed assassination attempts on his life, Nkrumah sensed significant hostility and therefore 'declared Ghana a one-Party state.'[28] Nkrumah subsequently justified his action by stating that a multi-Party system was divisive and was not in Ghana's best interests.[29] Nkrumah further described a multi-Party system as 'cheap imperialist propaganda'. He claimed that it is better to have a people's parliamentary democracy with a one-party system, than a multi-party parliamentary system, which is used to perpetuate and cover up the struggle between the 'haves' and the 'have-nots'[30]

Such a stance combined with Nkrumah's known affiliation with socialist ideology[31] put his administration in a difficult position as far as its domestic and foreign policies were concerned.[32] That said, Nkrumah, was also not naïve to the political and security environment the country was in during that time. Therefore, he was aware of the magnitude of the challenges, which lied ahead in the form of security threats to his administration and all the plans he had installed for the country/continent. Consequently, Nkrumah came to power knowing very well that to consolidate and sustain the gains fought for throughout the struggle

[27] Rakove, Robert. 'The Rise and Fall of Non-Aligned Mediation, 1961–6', *The International History Review*. 37, (2015): pp 1-23.

[28] Kathleen Fallon. 'Using Informal Networks to Seek Formal Political Participation in Ghana', in *The Power of Women's Informal Networks: Lessons in Social Change from South Asia and West Africa,* by Bandana Purkayastha and Mangala Subramaniam., eds., (Oxford: Lexington Books, 2004), p.75

[29] Godfrey Mwakikagile. *Nyerere and Africa: End of an Era*, (Pretoria: New Africa Press, 2010), p.38

[30] "February 1, 1964, Ghana becomes a One Party State under the CPP", Kwame Nkrumah and the One-Party State. *Edward A. Ulzen Memorial Foundation*, 2018, [online resource] available from, https://www.eaumf.org/ejm-blog/2018/1/31/february-1-1964-ghana-becomes-a-one-party-state-under-the-cpp. Accessed on 15/01/2020

[31] Etim E. Okon. 'Kwame Nkrumah, The Fallen and Forgotten Hero of African Nationalism', *European Scientific Journal*, 17:10, (2014), p. 63

[32] Ivan Potekhin, *PAN-AFRICANISM and the struggle of the TWO IDEOLOGIES*, South Africa History, pp 40 – 45 [online resource] available from, https://www.sahistory.org.za/sites/default/files/DC/Acn1964.0001.9976.000.019.Oct1964.7/Acn1964.0001.9976.000.019.Oct1964.7.pdf. Accessed on 15/01/2020

for independence, he needed to have in place an effective security network that would ensure the survival of his administration and the country. For this reason, unlike the colonial regime, Nkrumah set up the country's first centralised national security architecture by incorporating intelligence activities into its duties right from the beginning.

Ghana's First National Security Architecture

After independence, Nkrumah, inherited the Gold Coast Police Force (GCPF) and the Gold Coast Regiment (GCR), which was after Nkrumah decided to pull the GCR out of the Royal West African Frontier Force (RWAFF). Nkrumah subsequently defended his decision by stating that such an action was necessary because the RWAFF was 'one of the trappings of colonialism'.[33] The GCPF became known as the Ghana Police Service[34] and the GCR was renamed the Ghana Armed Forces[35], with the latter believed to have been left in a very poor state. Especially its Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) gathering machinery, which was significantly impacted.[36] This posed a significant challenge for the new administration to reform the colonial regime's internal security architecture into the country's first-ever national security architecture. However, it is stated that through sheer drive and determination to succeed, the administration embarked on intelligence training programmes and reached out to other international partners, which helped make progress towards getting its security apparatus back on track.[37] It is also important to note that at the time, the new administration made the Police the focal point for all national security matters. Besides its regular police functions, it also had control of aspects of national intelligence, through the Special Branch.[38]

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[33] Thomas Ofcansky. 'National Security', by LaVerle Berry. Ed., in *Ghana a Country Study*, National Security, Development of the Modern Army, (Washington DC: U.S Government Printing Office, 1995), p. 268
[34] Francis D Boateng & Isaac Nortey Darko. 'Our past, The effect of colonialism on policing in Ghana', *International Journal of Police Science and Management*, 18:1, (2016): pp 13-20
[35] Simon Baynham. *The Military And Politics In Nkrumah's Ghana*, (New York City: Avalon Publishing, 1988), p. 22
[36] Alhassan, A. R. "Military Intelligence In Ghana." *All Africa*, 2001, [online resource] available from, https://allafrica.com/stories/200107020013.html. Accessed on 15/01/2020
[37] Ibid.
[38] Quantson, KB. *Ghana, National Security*, The Roots of the Problem, (Accra: Bestas Press - NAPASVIL VENTURES, 2003), p. 11

Furthermore, to support his Pan-African strategic vision, Nkrumah also embarked on foreign intelligence and counter-intelligence activities for the first time as part of the country's national security architecture to support its radical Pan-Africanist strategic ambitions.[39] The national security architecture at the time could be grouped under three broad categories, which were the Ghana Police Service (GPS), Ghana Armed Forces (GAF), and the Foreign Service Research Bureau (FSRB). Each of the three categories had sub-units, of which at least one of the sub-units of each category were charged with intelligence functions and capabilities. The GPS had the Criminal Investigations Department (CID) and the Special Branch (SB) as part of its sub-units, with the latter charged with domestic intelligence activities. The GAF consisted of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, all of which had their intelligence collection capabilities. Finally, the FSRB, which later had the African Affairs Secretariat (AAS) derived from it, also performed foreign intelligence work.[40] The sketch on the next page illustrates the outlook of the first national security architecture of independent Ghana.

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[39] Thomas Ofcansky. 'National Security', by LaVerle Berry., ed., in *Ghana a Country Study*, Development of the Modern Army, (Washington DC: U.S Government Printing Office, 1995), pp 265 – 290
[40] Sandy Africa and Johnny Kwadjo. "Changing Intelligence Dynamics in Africa." *GFN-SSR*, 2009, pp 90 – 110, [online resource] available from, www.ssrnetwork.net/publications/gfn_ssr_publications.php. Accessed on 15/01/2020

First National Security Structure of Ghana Under Nkrumah

Figure 3: First National Security Structure of Ghana Under Nkrumah

41

Threat Landscape During Nkrumah's Era

Despite having the above national security architecture in place, Nkrumah soon came to the realisation that the security apparatus was not sufficient and trustworthy to help the administration pursue its ambitions. The political atmosphere in the country during this era was tense and hateful, and such toxicity was evident even before independence, whereby in 1955, there was an assassination attempt on Nkrumah's life. This made the administration reorganise its national security architecture, by creating multi-faceted intelligence agencies to heavily fortify pre-condition 2, as explained later in this chapter. Meanwhile, long before Nkrumah became the Prime Minister, later becoming the President until he was overthrown, several despiteful incidents were aimed at him.[42] This, cumulatively, made Ghana's political

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[41] Author's own Sketch.
[42] Quantson, KB. *Ghana: National Security*, The Roots of the Problem, (Accra: Bestas Press - NAPASVIL VENTURES, 2003), p. 7

and security landscape in that era very dangerous. This assertion is corroborated with an outline of some of the assassination attempts on Nkrumah's life during his tenure in office. One of the first assassination plots was the T-Junction Plot in 1958, whereby the leading figures of the opposition's United Party, including an Army Officer, orchestrated the attack in an attempt to overthrow Nkrumah but failed to materialise.[43] This was then followed by another attempt in August 1962, which was designed by the administration's political adversaries to eliminate Nkrumah at Kulungugu in the Upper Region of Ghana. Perpetrators for this attack planned for it to take place during a welcome ceremony being held for Nkrumah. During that ceremony, a grenade that was thrown at Nkrumah missed him but rather ended up claiming the life of a schoolgirl and injuring forty others with Nkrumah escaping unharmed.[44] Further, in September 1962, there was a third attempt whereby an explosion took place outside Flagstaff House, the office and residence of the President. An eleven year-old girl was reported dead, and sixty others injured as a result. During that incident, there were approximately 2000 guests present at the Flagstaff House celebrating Nkrumah's escape from the previous assassination attempt.

It soon became apparent that the attack was designed to terrorise and frighten people from associating themselves with Nkrumah. This attack was eventually blamed on Anti-Nkrumah organisations and individuals, which resulted in the arrest of many 'militants' throughout the country.[45] It was later alleged that the arrests were designed to crack down on the growing opposition against Nkrumah's government, which had rejected multiparty rule in favour of one-party rule and "scientific socialism".[46] Finally, in January 1964, a fourth assassination attempt on President Nkrumah's life also failed. In this incident, a police constable who was a guard at the Flagstaff House launched an attack on the President by firing a gun at him at close

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[43] Quantson, KB. Ghana: *National Security*, The Roots of the Problem, (Accra: Bestas Press - NAPASVIL VENTURES, 2003), p. 13
[44] Ibid, p. 7
[45] Ibid, p. 8
[46] "Assassination Attempt on Kwame Nkrumah, First Prime and Later President of Ghana." *South African History Online*, 2011, [online resource] available from, https://www.sahistory.org.za/dated-event/assassination-attempt-kwame-nkrumah-first-prime-and-later-president-ghana. Accessed on 15/01/2020

range but missed. In this instance, the Chief Security Officer of the President was killed in the process.[47]

Putting all the said events into context, it was therefore not surprising that despite the earlier optimism, Nkrumah also began his tenure in office knowing full well that he had upset many along the way. These included some fellow educated elites in the country, as well as some Western democracies such as Britain and America.[48] Nkrumah was not naïve about perceived threats posed by potential enemies from both within and abroad to the survival of his newly formed administration and the country. He was not ignorant because in Ghana at the time, there was a clear political divide. This division was between the body of ideas associated with Nkrumah's socialism/imperialism, and the opposing educated elites, associated with Kofi Busia's and J B Danquah's liberalism and pro-West.[49]

As the political tensions in the country continued to heat up, and the pressure on Nkrumah from both home and abroad started to gather pace; coupled with the several assassinations attempts on his life, the administration's response created a 'repressive' and 'suppressive' atmosphere in the country. This created significant security challenges in the form of internal and external threats that became hindrances toward achieving the administration's vision. The threat landscape in Ghana during Nkrumah's era were comprised of internal and external threats.

Internal Threats

Due to the toxic political and security environment in the country during that era, internal threats towards Nkrumah's administration were multifaceted. These included those posed by

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[47] Quantson, KB. Ghana: *National Security*, The Roots of the Problem, (Accra: Bestas Press - NAPASVIL VENTURES, 2003), p. 8

[48] Seymour M. Hersh. "C.I.A. Said to Have Aided Plotters Who Overthrew Nkrumah in Ghana." *The New York Times*, 1978, [online resource] available from, https://www.nytimes.com/1978/05/09/archives/cia-said-to-have-aided-plotters-who-overthrew-nkrumah-in-ghana.html. Accessed on 15/01/2020

[49] Haynes, Jeff. 'Sustainable Democracy in Ghana? Problems and Prospects.' *Third World Quarterly* 14, no. 3 (1993): 451-67

civil servants and university lecturers; members of his political party (CPP); members of the original national security apparatus; and political opponents who were mostly adversaries.[50]

First, were the threats posed by the civil servants and University lecturers. It is believed that there was a significant effort made by some academics to alienate Nkrumah's legacy and destroy his name from Ghana's history. According to Quantson, opposing academics and intellectuals were asked to distort the nation's history and depict Nkrumah as a "thief, "illiterate", "immoral" or even satanic. This, he described as a dangerous strategy to miseducate and mislead future generations about the true stature of Kwame Nkrumah, the founder of the State of Ghana.[51]

Secondly, were the threats which emanated from within the original national security architecture. During Nkrumah's tenure in office, there were groups of senior military and police officers within his national security apparatus who wanted him out.[52] They planned coup plots against his administration; some of which included the discussion of tentative dates, identification of the right occasions to strike, and ideas on how such plans could be carried out.[53] Additionally, it was claimed that Nkrumah's adversaries sought assistance from commissioned and non-commissioned officers of the Ghana Armed Forces. The assistance sort for was to help kidnap and assassinate Nkrumah at Accra International Airport on the 20th December 1958, on the eve of his departure to India for a state visit.[54]

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[50] Roger Gocking. *The History of Ghana*, Independence the Nkrumah Years, (London: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2005), pp 135 - 137

[51] KB Quantson. 'The Centenary Celebration of Dr. Kwame Nkrumah, The Man Nkrumah!', Those who betrayed him, *Kwame Nkrumah Centenary Organisation*, (2009).

[52] Ekow Nelson and Michael Gyamerah. *The Origins and the Case for Introducing Preventive Detention under Nkrumah*, Word Press, 2009, [online resource] available from, https://ekownelson.wordpress.com/2013/01/04/the-origins-and-the-case-for-introducing-preventive-detention-under-nkrumah/. Accessed on 15/01/2020

[53] KB Quantson. *Ghana, National Security*, Foreign Hands Behind Nkrumah's Overthrow, (Accra: Bestas Press - NAPASVIL VENTURES, 2003), p. 42

[54] Ekow Nelson and Michael Gyamerah. "The case for Preventive Detention under Nkrumah." *Ade Sawyerr*, 2009, [online resource] available from, https://adesawyerr.wordpress.com/2009/09/20/the-case-for-preventive-detention-under-nkrumah/. Accessed on 15/01/2020

Furthermore, a report documented by the Special Branch regarding a potential coup d'état being planned against Nkrumah's administration highlighted an alleged conversation overhead by a non-Ghanaian guest at a foreign embassy in Accra. This report sent to the police claimed that J. B. Danquah had been heard assuring a diplomat (known to be Nkrumah's adversary), that Nkrumah will be deposed by the army by Christmas. The information was assessed by Special branch as credible and so they proceeded to investigate.[55]

As subsequent rumours came to light about Nkrumah being targeted by some disaffected military and police officers, who were planning to overthrow his administration; as he travelled for a Commonwealth conference abroad, potential threats from within the national security architecture became even more concerning.[56] Especially, with another allegation alluding to a plot being planned by important military and police officers to kill Nkrumah and take over the government.[57] All of these highlighted the magnitude of the threats, which emanated from within the original national security apparatus but at the same time demonstrated how its multifaceted intelligence network was effective in knowing about such threats.

Thirdly, were the threats posed by some of the members from within Nkrumah's government. It is believed that some of Nkrumah's close associates, loyalists, and protégés secretly embarked on a tele-guided massive propaganda campaign, designed to destroy him, and annihilate his name from history after his death.[58] Additionally, some CPP Stalwarts including 'technocrats and bureaucrats' denounced Nkrumah in pretty harsh terms without

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[55] Ekow Nelson and Michael Gyamerah. "The origin and case for preventive detention under Nkrumah." *Ade Sayerr*, 2013, [online resource] available from, https://www.adesawyerr.com/the-case-for-preventive-detention-under-nkrumah/. Accessed on 15/01/2020

[56] KB Quantson. *Ghana, National Security*, Foreign Hands Behind Nkrumah's Overthrow, (Accra: Bestas Press - NAPASVIL VENTURES, 2003), p 42

[57] KB Quantson. *Ghana, National Security*, Foreign Hands Behind Nkrumah's Overthrow, (Accra: Bestas Press - NAPASVIL VENTURES, 2003), p. 43

[58] KB Quantson, 'The Centenary Celebration of Dr. Kwame Nkrumah, The Man Nkrumah!' Those who betrayed him, *Kwame Nkrumah Centenary*, (2009).

reservation.[59] These individuals were Krobo Edusei a cabinet minister; Ayeh Kumi Nkrumah's economic advisor; Dei Anang, Nkrumah's chief advisor on African affairs; Sir Arku Korsah, the chief justice; and Kwaku Boateng, a senior cabinet minister.[60] In addition were also three of Nkrumah's top members of government who were Tawia Adamafio, the information minister; Dr. Ebenezer Ako Adjei, foreign minister; and H. H. Cofie-Crabbe, the chief of Nkrumah's CPP.[61]

Unlike the threats which emanated from within the original national security architecture, this threat from within Nkrumah's political party and/or his government appeared to have been missed. Such a threat came to light only after Nkrumah's demise; as one of Nkrumah's staunch allies, Krobo Edusei, launched a scathing rebuke at Nkrumah's 'corruption.[62] Furthermore, Nkrumah's former Minister for Science, Kweku Boateng, also complained of ministers having been reduced to gaping sycophants. Others such as Kwesi Amoako-Atta, the former finance minister, condemned Nkrumah's insensitivity to people's hardships, and Alex Quaison-Sackey, the former foreign minister, supported the justification given by Nkrumah's adversaries for embarking on the 1966 coup.[63]

The fourth point to elaborate were the threats posed to the administration by Nkrumah's political opponents. Even before independence, such threats were viable, but these continued to grow in magnitude throughout Nkrumah's tenure in office. Nkrumah's decision to break away from the elitist leadership of the UGCC to form the CPP, was arguably the genesis of this threat, as such action created enemies for him. To add to the confusion, was also the disaffected Ashanti members of Nkrumah's CPP who broke away to form an opposition

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[59] KB Quantson, 'The Centenary Celebration of Dr. Kwame Nkrumah, The Man Nkrumah!' Those who betrayed him, *Kwame Nkrumah Centenary*, (2009).
[60] KB Quantson, 'The Centenary Celebration of Dr. Kwame Nkrumah, The Man Nkrumah!' Those who betrayed him, *Kwame Nkrumah Centenary*, (2009).
[61] Lawrence Lupalo. *Three Africa Visionaries: Nkrumah, Nyerere, Senghor*, (California: Create Space, 2016), p. 90
62 Ryan, Selwyn. "The Theory and Practice of African One Partyism: The CPP Re-Examined." *Canadian Journal of African Studies / Revue Canadienne Des Études Africaines* 4, no. 2 (1970): 145–72.
[63] Robert Pinkney. *File*, Ghana Under Military Rule, 1966-1969, (London: Methuen & Co Ltd, 1972), p. 10

political party called the National Liberation Movement (NLM) before independence. The NLM was joined by Dr. Kofi Abrefa Busia, (an Oxford educated elite) to oppose the process of centralisation whilst supporting a continuing role for traditional leaders.[64] However, regardless of the opposition, Nkrumah's ability to seize political initiative, which led broad masses of people to achieve independence, made the situation even worse for Nkrumah; as far as his political adversaries were concerned.[65] This was because the opposition's "grand ambitions for political power and all the gorgeous enjoyment had been shattered".[66]

Lastly, the stated events coupled with the 'harsh economic conditions' under Nkrumah's administration after independence further escalated the hatred developed for him and his administration beyond repair.[67] Therefore, for those reasons, it is believed that opposition parties were not only disappointed but were very unhappy to the point of vengeful anger.[68] To put such 'vengeful anger' into context, one author describes that as the 'opposition was dangerous, and assassinating Nkrumah seemed the only way to effect change'[69].

It was consequently not surprising that there were several attempts made to assassinate Nkrumah, all of which were unsuccessful[70], thanks to the administration's heavy reliance on intelligence. Nonetheless, the sheer determination of Nkrumah's political opponents to oust the administration meant that they formed a significant bond with foreign powers in the West to help infiltrate Nkrumah's multifaceted intelligence network.[71] All of these developments,

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[64] "On September 19, 1954, The National Liberation Movement was Formed." *Edward A. Ulzen Memorial Foundation*, 2017, [online resource] available from, https://www.eaumf.org/ejm-blog/2017/9/19/54recoyhe1930dp3kbvbq4hx5vy58q. Accessed on 15/01/2020
[65] KB Quantson. 'The Centenary Celebration of Dr. Kwame Nkrumah, The Man Nkrumah!', Those who betrayed him, *Kwame Nkrumah Centenary*, (2009).
[66] Ibid.
[67] Roger Gocking. *The History of Ghana*', Independence the Nkrumah Years, (London: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2005), pp 135 - 137
[68] KB Quantson, 'The Centenary Celebration of Dr. Kwame Nkrumah, The Man Nkrumah!', Those who betrayed him, *Kwame Nkrumah Centenary*, (2009).
[69] Roger Gocking. *The History of Ghana*, Independence the Nkrumah Years, (London: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2005), pp 135 - 137
[70] Ibid.
[71] KB Quantson, 'The Centenary Celebration of Dr. Kwame Nkrumah, The Man Nkrumah!', Those who betrayed him, *Kwame Nkrumah Centenary*, (2009).

including Nkrumah's Pan-African ambition and his suspected affiliation with the Eastern Bloc, brought to bear the magnitude of external threats posed to the administration. Thanks to Nkrumah's multifaceted intelligence network, the administration was aware of most of such threats as outlined.

External Threats

Nkrumah's ideological stance and ambition to unite the African continent placed the administration at loggerheads with the West. Therefore, Nkrumah's administration was deemed as a threat to Western values and civilisation. For this reason, most of the external threats posed to Nkrumah's government were from the United States (US), Britain, and France.[72] Nkrumah was referred to by Western intelligence services as being 'Red', 'East-leaning', 'Communist', 'Socialist' and subsequently regarded as a 'continuing threat.'[73] Whilst at the same time Western powers had also expressed anger at Nkrumah's close ties to the Soviet Union and China during the Cold War.[74] For all these reasons, Nkrumah's administration was held under suspicion due to what the West referred to as 'strident, socialist ideological rhetoric and [that] his African liberation agenda threatened the collective interest of the West'.[75]

All of the elaborated activities coupled with the 1964 review of the anti-American agitation in Ghana, by US Secretary of State Dean Rusk and CIA director, John McCone, which they blamed on Nkrumah, escalated tensions between Nkrumah's administration and the West.[76]

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[72] Eric Quaidoo. The United States and the overthrow of Kwame Nkrumah, The Economic Situation in Ghana During the 60s and the Assassination Attempts on Nkrumah, [MA Thesis], Fort Hays State University, (2010), pp 47 - 52

[73] KB Quantson. *Ghana, National Security*, Foreign Hands Behind Nkrumah's Overthrow, (Accra: Bestas Press - NAPASVIL VENTURES, 2003), p 114

[74] Ismail Akwei, "How CIA planned to wear blackface during Nkrumah's overthrow to attack Chinese Embassy in Ghana." *Face 2 Face Africa*, 2019, [online resource] Available from, https://face2faceafrica.com/article/how-cia-planned-to-wear-blackface-during-nkrumahs-overthrow-to-attack-chinese-embassy-in-ghana. Accessed on 15/07/2018

[75] KB Quantson. *Ghana, National Security*, Foreign Hands Behind Nkrumah's Overthrow, (Accra: Bestas Press - NAPASVIL VENTURES, 2003), p 114

[76] Office of the Historian. *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1964–1968, Discussions with Secretary Rusk, 11 February 1964 3:00 p.m., US Department of State, Vol. XXIV, Document 236, 2011, [online resource] available from, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v24/d236. Accessed on 15/01/2020

It is believed that during the review meeting, the State Department assessed that he was living in a state of constant fear due to several assassination attempts, coupled with an overriding sense of insecurity.[77]

It is also believed that during the meeting mentioned above, an enquiry was made by Rusk, as to whether General Ankrah (Ghana's Deputy Chief of Defence Staff within the original national security set-up), had the ability to take over the government. Rusk subsequently proceeded to propose a future action program for Ghana, outlining US policy options after Nkrumah had been ousted.[78] These plots demonstrated the magnitude of external threats, which confronted Nkrumah and the survival of his administration. Quantson claims that Nkrumah was not betrayed by Colonialists and Imperialists, but rather they hated him for what he stood for and was considered a strategic threat. Therefore, 'they plotted and schemed comprehensively to finish him off. They did not conceal their intentions. That is the honest truth.'[79]

This is a view that is widely shared by many African commentators, historians, and academics alike.[80] This was corroborated later in a declassified CIA and State Department documents, which confirmed the involvement of US, British, and French intelligence services in the struggle to overthrow Nkrumah.[81] Additionally, US State Department's declassified 'memorandum of conversation' (between Director of Central Intelligence, Ambassador to Ghana [William Mahoney] and Deputy Chief, Africa Division), containing a collection of

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[77] KB Quantson. *Ghana, National Security*, Foreign Hands Behind Nkrumah's Overthrow, (Accra: Bestas Press - NAPASVIL VENTURES, 2003), p. 41

[78] Office of the Historian. *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1964–1968, Discussions with Secretary Rusk, 11 February 1964 3:00 p.m., US Department of State*, Vol. XXIV, Document 236, 2011, [online resource] available from, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v24/d236. Accessed on 15/01/2020

[79] KB Quantson. "The Man Nkrumah: Those Who Betrayed Him." *Campus Watch*, 2014, [online resource] available from, http://campuswatchgh.blogspot.com/2014/09/the-man-nrkumah-those-who-betrayed-him.html. Accessed on 15/01/2020

[80] Ismail Akwei, "How CIA planned to wear blackface during Nkrumah's overthrow to attack Chinese Embassy in Ghana." *Face 2 Face Africa*, 2019.

[81] KB Quantson. *Ghana, National Security*, Foreign Hands Behind Nkrumah's Overthrow, (Accra: Bestas Press - NAPASVIL VENTURES, 2003), p. 40

diplomatic and intelligence memos, telegrams, and reports; further highlighted the direct involvement of the US in orchestrating Nkrumah's overthrow.

In the memo, US intelligence assessed that 'one way or another Nkrumah would be out within a year.' This assessment was due to what the US government perceived to be a popular opinion 'running strongly against Nkrumah', which had put the economy of Ghana in a precarious state. Diplomatically and economically, the memo suggested that US diplomats in Ghana continued to sabotage Nkrumah's administration by ensuring that Nkrumah's request for assistance was refused. A move, the diplomats claimed was designed to further weaken Nkrumah's government, whilst anticipating a potential coup d'état to oust Nkrumah.[82]

Relative to the colonial regime, Nkrumah's government, was able to place itself in a much better position to foresee all the warning signals regarding emerging threats geared towards his administration. This was thankfully due in part to the incorporation of significant intelligence activities into the duties of its national security architecture. Therefore, because of Nkrumah's multifaceted intelligence network, he already had an idea that Western governments were embarking on active campaigns to unseat his administration. Whilst at the same time, he was also aware of most of the internal threats emerging from within the country. Nkrumah's assertive response to addressing these threats, resulted in the administration practising autocratic and authoritative regime protection-form of national security architecture.[83] This led to the original outlook of the country's national security setup being significantly impacted. Nkrumah felt the need to create and operate new secret intelligence and security agencies. This took the shape of an alternate national security service, which ran parallel to the country's main national security apparatus.[84] Therefore, Nkrumah ended up operating "a multifaceted

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[82] "1964-1968, Memorandum of Conversation." *US Department of State*, Foreign Relations of the United States, 251:XXIV, (1965).
[83] Biney, Ama. "The legacy of Kwame Nkrumah in retrospect." *Journal of Pan African Studies*, 2:3, (2008): pp. 129+
[84] Simon Baynham. 'Quis Custodiet Ipsos CustodesP', the Case of Nkrumah's National Security Service, *The Journal of Modern African Studies,* 23:1, (1985), pp. 87-103

intelligence apparatus", especially when it became apparent that his adversaries were out to unseat him.[85]

Furthermore, to significantly tame the regular army as an insurance against any military takeover, the administration also introduced the Security Service Act of 1963 to group intelligence and special military bodies into a number of parallel security units. All of these developments significantly contributed to altering the outlook of the country's national security architecture as shown in the diagram and explained under the pre-condition model.

Modified National Security Structure of Ghana Under Nkrumah

Figure 4: Modified National Security Structure of Ghana Under Nkrumah

[86]

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[85] LaVerle Berry. *Ghana a Country Study*, National Security, Development of the Modern Army, (Washington DC: U.S Government Printing Office, 1995), pp 269 – 290
[86] Author's own Sketch.

Pre-Condition 1

To fulfil precondition 1, Nkrumah maintained the Ghana Police Service, Ghana Armed Forces, and their respective subsidiaries as the national security institutions required to defend the administration and the country against internal and external threats.

Ghana Police Service (GPS)

The GPS remained patterned with the British imposed police system, of which it continued to enforce criminal codes inherited from British colonialism. The GPS was further modernised in 1959 by opening the Police Training School in Accra and 'Africanised' by 1960, with 90 percent of its membership being Ghanaians.[87] Apart from the Criminal Investigations Department and Special Branch, the GPS had several departments under its command and control, tasked with maintaining law and order in the country. This served as a form of deterrent against internal threats designed to hinder domestic stability in the country. Alongside the GPS was the Ghana Armed Forces, which also served as a form of deterrent against external aggression to protect domestic stability.

Ghana Armed Forces (GAF)

After independence, the Ghanaian Army had grown in size and as a result, the administration created a separate navy and air force. From 1957 to the early 1960s, there was a combination of Ghanaian and British personnel serving in the GAF. In 1960 the Ghana Military Academy was established near Accra to provide short courses in higher military education for the officers of the three services: the army, navy, and air force. To gain admission into the military, all aspiring candidates were to undertake an entrance examination, which included a military curriculum and other general subjects.[88] Training for all successful candidates who then

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[87] Deflem, Mathieu. (1994). 'Law Enforcement in British Colonial Africa: A Comparative Analysis of Imperial Policing in Nyasaland, the Gold Coast, and Kenya.' *Police Studies*,17:1, (1994), pp 45-68.
[88] Thomas Ofcansky. 'National Security' in LaVerle Berry., ed., *Ghana a Country Study*, Development of the Modern Army, (Washington DC: U.S Government Printing Office, 1995), pp 270 – 290

became army cadets were conducted at the academy for two years. During the training process, few candidates were selected at the end of the initial six months to complete their studies at other institutions abroad, which included the Royal Military Academy at Sandhurst in the United Kingdom. Furthermore, senior officers who excelled were also periodically selected for further studies at the Army Staff College in Camberley, Britain, or one of several other senior service schools in foreign countries.[89]

Other GAF training schools were also established across the country with one in Kumasi in the Ashanti region, which trained army, navy, and air force recruits. This school provided both specialist and basic training courses. The basic training course lasted for nine months and was followed by advanced individual training where recruits were assigned to a unit. A parachute training school was located at Tamale in the Northern region and a jungle warfare school at Achiase in the Eastern region. The army conducted numerous field exercises with a variety of code names; including Hot Foot, Deep Thrust, Operation Swift Sword, Starlight Stretch to test their skills and Full Impact.[90] 'Full Impact 88' marked the first time all units of the Ghana Armed Forces trained together. 'Deep Thrust 89' emphasised on jungle warfare, junior leadership, and physical fitness. 'Starlight Stretch 89' improved low-level operations for the infantry battalion. All of these exercises were held at Daboya in the northern region.[91]

A Joint General Headquarters was also established in 1962 for the army navy and air force to enhance coordination and economise administrative cost.[92] In addition, Nkrumah also embarked on a diversification project for the GAF, upon assuming power and throughout his leadership as the Prime Minister and subsequently the President of Ghana. Beginning from the 1950s to 1966, the following below is how the new administration embarked on a

[89] Thomas Ofcansky. 'National Security' in LaVerle Berry., ed., *Ghana a Country Study*, Development of the Modern Army, (Washington DC: U.S Government Printing Office, 1995), pp 270 – 290
[90] Ibid.
[91] Thomas Ofcansky. 'National Security' in LaVerle Berry., ed., *Ghana a Country Study*, Development of the Modern Army, (Washington DC: U.S Government Printing Office, 1995), pp 270 – 290
[92] Wuyi Omitoogun and Eboe Hutchful. *Budgeting for Military Sector in Africa*, The Processes and Mechanisms of Control, The Military Sector, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), p 75.

diversification programme to help strengthen the capabilities of the GAF and the national security architecture as a whole.[93]

Diversification of Support and Training to Strengthen the Resolve of the GAF

United States

Beginning from 1950, military relations between Ghana and the United States were concentrated on the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program, which included professional military education, management, and technical training. The value of training under the IMET programme between 1950 and 1990 amounted to US$3.5 million. Private companies in the United States also received approximately US$905,000 worth of commercial export licenses for Ghanaian arms purchases from FY 1950 to FY 1990.[94]

Soviet Union

In January 1958, Ghana and the Soviet Union opened diplomatic relations. Seventy-six (76) Ghanaian army officer cadets attended military schools in the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union also deployed an array of military, security, and technical advisers to Ghana. In 1961 Ghana purchased eight Ilyushin-18s on credit, at more than US$1.5 million each.[95] However, due to high operating costs, the Ghanaian government was left with no choice but to return four of these aircrafts back to the Soviet Union with the other four given to Ghana Airways. Ironically, two years later, Moscow presented an Mi-4 helicopter to Nkrumah as a personal gift.[96] Meanwhile, after a period of unrest in the country, coupled with several assassination attempts on Nkrumah's life, in 1965, Nkrumah signed an arms deal with the Soviet Union to purchase weapons for the Presidential Guard. These 'included twenty-four light artillery pieces, twenty-

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[93] John V. Clune. *The Abongo Abroad: Military-Sponsored Travel in Ghana, the United States and the World, 1959-1992*, (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 2017), pp 67-69

[94] Thomas Ofcansky. 'National Security' in LaVerle Berry., ed., *Ghana a Country Study*, Development of the Modern Army, (Washington DC: U.S Government Printing Office, 1995), pp 270 – 290

[95] Thomas Ofcansky. 'National Security' in LaVerle Berry., ed., *Ghana a Country Study*, Development of the Modern Army, (Washington DC: U.S Government Printing Office, 1995), pp 270 – 290

[96] Ibid

one medium mortars, fifteen antiaircraft guns, twenty heavy machine guns, and a large amount of ammunition.'[97] By early 1966, the Soviets had already gained a significant foothold in Ghana and had begun constructing a new airbase near Tamale in the northern region of Ghana. There were also many Soviet instructors working at numerous security and military training facilities across the country, including the Bureau of African Affairs secret camps.[98]

Israel

A year after Nkrumah opened diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, his administration reached out to Israel for support to set up the Ghana Air Force. In April 1959, a team of experts from Israel and India arrived in the country to supervise the establishment of the Ghana Air Force. Upon completion, a handful of the Israeli team were asked to remain and help train Ghanaian aircraft maintenance personnel and radio technicians based at the Air Force Trade Training School in Accra. Eventually, in 1960, pressure from Britain forced the Ghanaian government to withdraw Israeli advisers from the country. Nevertheless, Ghanaian pilots continued to receive training at aviation schools in Israel until military activities between the two countries ended after Nkrumah was ousted.[99]

China

In October 1962, China provided a loan to Ghana for the construction of two arms factories; Ghana, however, never used the funds. It is alleged that a secret agreement was signed between the two countries for the provision of military equipment and advisers. It is believed that in late 1964, a team of Chinese guerrilla warfare experts arrived at the Half Assini Training Camp in Ghana, to inaugurate a twenty-day training course for Ghanaian officers. This included how to manufacture and use explosives, guerrilla tactics, "basic guiding and thinking on armed struggle", strategy and tactics, telecommunications, and battlefield first aid. It was

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[97] Ibid
[98] Thomas Ofcansky. 'National Security' in LaVerle Berry., ed., *Ghana a Country Study*, Development of the Modern Army, (Washington DC: U.S Government Printing Office, 1995), pp 270 – 290
[99] Ibid.

also believed that an unknown number of Ghanaians attended an espionage training course in China. When Dr. Nkrumah was overthrown in 1966, 430 Chinese nationals, including three intelligence officers and thirteen guerrilla warfare specialists, were expelled from Ghana. Diplomatic relations between Ghana and China were resumed in 1972, but Ghana and China never re-initiated significant military ties.[100]

German Democratic Republic

In 1964, Ghana's Bureau of African Affairs opened discussions with the East German Trade Mission in Accra, to request intelligence training for its staff. Such a move is believed to be what kick-started the relationship between the two countries. Based on that request, the East German government helped create an intelligence section in the Bureau of African Affairs. It subsequently assisted the Bureau with an inauguration of a course on "Secret Service and Intelligence Work" for seven of its personnel. An additional training course on "Intelligence Work under Diplomatic Cover" was also delivered to six other personnel of the Bureau of African Affairs. Personnel from the Bureau were subsequently assigned to posts in Zambia, Nigeria, Kenya, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, and Burundi until such practises came to an end after Nkrumah's demise.[101]

Italy

Ghana had already forged a relationship with Italy since independence, as Italy was one of the first countries to supply military aircraft to the Ghana Air Force. A 'jet fighter/ground-attack squadron' was established within the Ghana Air Force in early 1966. It was composed of seven Italian Aermacchi MB—326s and was supervised by a small group of Italian Air Force instructors. This relationship carried on for decades through the 1970s and 1980s. For example, in 1983 and 1984, Italy delivered eight SIAI—Marchetti SF—260TP turboprop

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[100] Ibid.
[101] Thomas Ofcansky. 'National Security' in LaVerle Berry., ed., *Ghana a Country Study*, Development of the Modern Army, (Washington DC: U.S Government Printing Office, 1995), pp 270 – 290

trainers to the Ghana Air Force. In 1987, Ghana also ordered two Aermacchi MB—339 jet trainers from Italy.[102]

Having explained the GAF as a unit, it is now important to provide a brief overview on each of its sub-units (Army, Navy, and Air Force) in order to appreciate its mandate holistically.

GAF: Subunits and their Mandates

Army

The Ghana Army was a combination of Ghanaian and British officers until Nkrumah dismissed all of the British personnel in 1961 for attempting to stand in his way for the decision to use the army to progress his Pan-African agenda. Subsequently, Nkrumah ordered for the army to be Africanised, hence, between 1961 till Nkrumah's demise in 1966, personnel of the army were made up of only Ghanaians. It was their role to defend the territorial borders of the country from all external aggression, with Nkrumah as the commander-in-chief. However, it is believed that by Nkrumah doing so, he exposed the military to political manipulation.[103]

Navy

The Ghana Navy can be traced back to the Gold Coast Naval Volunteers Force that was established in 1936. Their role was to provide seaward defence, carry out sea patrols and keep the coastal waters free of mines. Approximately two years after independence, the Ghana Navy and the Ghana Air Forces were established by an act of Parliament in 1959.[104] It consisted of both Ghanaian and British personnel until 1961 when Nkrumah dismissed all British officers from the Navy. The Ghanaian army brigadier replaced the British commodore

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[102] Ibid.
[103] "Ghana, The Development of the Modern Army." *Photius*, 1994, [online resource] available from, https://photius.com/countries/ghana/national_security/ghana_national_security_the_development_of_t~146.html. Accessed on 15/07/2018
[104] "Ghana Government, Ghana Armed Forces." *Global Security*, 2011, [online resource] available from, https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/africa/gh-navy-history.htm#:~:text=The%20Ghana%20Navy%20took%20its,coastal%20waters%20free%20of%20mines. Accessed on 15/01/2020

to become the first Ghanaian commodore of the Ghana Navy. From 1961 to 1966, when Nkrumah was overthrown, the navy consisted of mainly Ghanaian Officers'[105] and its mandate was to provide coastal defence, fisheries protection, and security on Lake Volta.

Air Force

The Ghana Air Force was established in 1959 under the supervision of Indian and Israeli officers with an Indian Air Commodore as the 1st Commander.[106] As part of Nkrumah's diverse military agenda, the Ghana Air Force acquired training from numerous foreign military forces such as India, Israel, Canada, Britain, and Italy. In 1959, Indian and Israeli officers supervised the formation of Ghana's Air Force and, in the same year, the Indian Air Force Senior Air Commodore established headquarters for the service at Accra. The year 1959 was also when the Israeli Air Force instructors trained the first group of Ghanaian cadet fliers at Accra International Airport.[107]

In 1960 Nkrumah terminated the training agreement with Israel. In the same year, a new agreement was signed with Britain to train the Ghana Air Force. 150 Royal Air Force (RAF) officers and airmen assumed responsibility for the training. The commander of this RAF contingent also replaced the Indian air commodore as chief of staff of the Ghana Air Force.

In 1961, Nkrumah appointed an army brigadier as chief of staff and relieved all RAF officers of their commands. However, as part of the British Joint Services Training Mission, the RAF contingent remained in Ghana to help develop the Ghanaian air.[108] In 1961, a small group from the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) supplemented the British mission. Ten Ghanaians

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[105] "Ghana, The Development of the Modern Army." *Photius*, 1994, [online resource] available from, https://photius.com/countries/ghana/national_security/ghana_national_security_the_development_of_t~146.html. Accessed on 15/07/2018
[106] John V. Clune. *The Abongo Abroad: Military-Sponsored Travel in Ghana, the United States and the World, 1959-1992*, (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 2017), pp 67-69
[107] Thomas Ofcansky. 'National Security', by LaVerle Berry., ed., in *Ghana a Country Study*, Development of the Modern Army, (Washington DC: U.S Government Printing Office, 1995), pp 265 – 290
[108] Ibid.

qualified as pilots in the same year. However, Nkrumah dismissed all British officers and from 1961 to 1966, when Nkrumah was overthrown, the air force constituted mainly of Ghanaian Officers. The Ghana Air Force's primary responsibility was to protect the country's airspace and was mandated to provide offensive air support for the Ghana Armed Forces in the form of offensive air action and air transport support. Just like its sister forces, it is also mandated to assist in the developmental needs of the nation, and to provide air transports for government officials, notably the President.[109]

Evaluating Nkrumah's Strategic Thinking Behind the Ghana Armed Forces' Diversification Process

Unlike all the other agencies, the Ghana Armed Forces (GAF) appeared to have been the central arm of the broader national security architecture. Therefore, the role it played during and after Nkrumah's government proved pivotal in shaping Ghana's national security architecture to what it is today. To assess the relevance, some critics believe that Nkrumah had alternate ideas to use the GAF in pursuance of his foreign policy and Pan - African ambition.[110] This implied that Nkrumah went through all of the effort to diversify the GAF only to benefit his own political vision. For this reason, other commentators have asserted that when the British officers serving in the GAF perceived Nkrumah's intentions, they subsequently pushed back against his plans. In September 1961, Nkrumah, realising the dissatisfaction of the military about his interference, dismissed all 80 British senior officers and replaced them with Ghanaian officers.[111]

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[109] "Brief History of Ghana Air Force." *GAF*, 2011, [online resource] available from, http://airforce.gafonline.mil.gh/. Accessed on 15/05/2019
[110] Simon Baynham. *The Military And Politics In Nkrumah's Ghana*, (New York City: Avalon Publishing, 1988), p. 109
[111] Michael Kweku Addison. Preventing Military Intervention in West Africa, Case Study of Ghana, [MA Thesis] Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California, (2002), p 14

Another school of thought argued that diversifying the GAF did it a disservice, as it was exposed to political manipulation.[112] This assertion could be attributed to what happened in Ghana during the decade after Nkrumah's demise, as the country was plunged into 10 years (1972 – 1982) of turmoil, mostly due to the GAF being consumed by corruption.

This dissertation on the other hand offers a different perspective on the relevance of the GAF's diversification process. It believes that the multinational training received by the GAF, made it formidable to be able to stand against the test of time between 1972 – 1982. A period when Ghana experienced turbulent times in the decade after Nkrumah was ousted. This paper therefore argues that GAF was diversified because of Nkrumah's intention to create a formidable national security architecture, for the betterment of the nation. The diversification process also had negative impacts on how the GAF and the national security architecture operated during the Nkrumah era. This is because the decision to seek assistance from all those countries with competing ideological military doctrines that helped build the GAF, added to the confusion and distrust which emerged within the broader national security architecture. This ultimately besieged the activities of the higher echelon, as well as those of other personnel within the national security setup. Thereby adding to the creation of a toxic and suspicious environment, which offered Nkrumah no other choice than to operate a regime protection national security architecture. In doing so, he deliberately discouraged intelligence coordination between individual agencies to the detriment of his own administration as further argued.

Although other commentators may refer to Nkrumah as a dictator, an autocrat, or even a tyrant from preceding analysis, Nkrumah began his Prime Ministership and subsequently his Presidency with genuine intentions and vision to develop Ghana. However, Nkrumah's

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[112] "Ghana, The Development of the Modern Army." *Photius*, 1994, [online resource] available from, https://photius.com/countries/ghana/national_security/ghana_national_security_the_development_of_t~146.html. Accessed on 15/07/2018

approach towards his Pan-African ambition, coupled with his Socialist and Nationalist agenda for Ghana appeared to have created significant controversies at both home and abroad. The situation created several enemies for Nkrumah, as his adversaries were determined to do whatever necessary to unseat his administration. Unfortunately this meant eliminating Nkrumah, which led to several failed assassination attempts on his life. This scenario forced Nkrumah to embark on an autocratic form of governance during the latter years of his administration, which had a major impact on the country's political and security landscape. That being said, with such an impressive intelligence network at the administration's disposal, Nkrumah had in place a formidable intelligence capability in the form of pre-condition 2.

Pre-Condition 2

Fulfilling this pre-condition offered Nkrumah eyes and ears in the country and across the continent to help counter any internal and external threat, which had the potential to impede its path from pursuing the administration's ambitions. Unlike the colonial regime, fulfilling pre-condition 2 placed Nkrumah's administration in a much better position to understand the gravity of threats confronting its government. Pre-condition 2 comprised of Criminal Investigations Department (CID), Special Branch (SB), and the Foreign Service Research Bureau (FSRB), who were also part of the original national security architecture. Alongside these agencies, Nkrumah created several other agencies to undertake intelligence activities in parallel to the original three, being the CID, SB, and FSRB.

As illustrated on page 143 in the modified national security architecture diagram, the newly created agencies included the Military Intelligence Unit, Special Intelligence Unit, Counter-Intelligence Unit, the Presidential Guard Company, later known as President's Own Guard Regiment (POGR), after the 1962 Kulungugu assassination attempt[113], and the Presidential

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[113] Simon Baynham. 'Quis Custodiet Ipsos CustodesP', the Case of Nkrumah's National Security Service, *The Journal of Modern African Studies,* 23:1 (1985), pp. 87-103

Detail Department (PDD), which was also known as Department 1.[114] Informers were placed everywhere - in factories, banks, offices, shops, public transport, political rallies, and drinking bars. Moreover, members of the intelligence (bodyguard) group preceded Nkrumah on trips, mingled with crowds, and frisked suspicious individuals for weapons. A counter-intelligence system was also employed to check on the loyalty of all PDD members and to prevent the infiltration of elements hostile to the regime.[115] Others include 'Department III Military Intelligence' which was not part of the Ministry of Defence'[116], 'Special Intelligence Unit', 'Bureau for Technical Assistance', and the 'All African Service', which was also known as the 'Technical Unit'.[117]

As indicated in the diagram on page 139, these agencies reported directly to the President; and in some instances, were encouraged by Nkrumah to spy on the individual loyalty of members of the original national security architecture. All of these developments led to duplication in the work of the security forces, creating problems within the command-and-control system[118]; whilst at the same time creating a toxic environment in the country, fuelled by rivalry, distrust, and suspicion. To appreciate the degree of duplications by all the agencies mentioned above, here is the description of the membership, organisational structure, coordination, management, and operational role of each agency.

Criminal Investigations Department (CID)

Members of the CID were elites, mainly Ghanaians who had undergone a series of examinations and excelled with very good grades. They worked in plain clothes and were

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[114] "Kwame Nkrumah's Secret Intelligence Unit." *Kokorokoo*, 2011, [online resource] available from, http://www.kokorokoo.com/SecretIntelligence.aspx. Accessed on 15/07/2018
[115] Simon Baynham. 'Quis Custodiet Ipsos CustodesP', the Case of Nkrumah's National Security Service, *The Journal of Modern African Studies,* 23:1, (1985), pp. 87-103
[116] "Ghana, The Development of the Modern Army." *Photius*, 1994, [online resource] available from, https://photius.com/countries/ghana/national_security/ghana_national_security_the_development_of_t~146.html. Accessed on 15/07/2018
[117] Ibid
[118] Simon Baynham. 'Quis Custodiet Ipsos CustodesP', the Case of Nkrumah's National Security Service, *The Journal of Modern African Studies,* 23:1, (1985), pp. 87-103

employed as specialists in connection with various aspects of crime prevention and detection. The coordination and management of the CID was no different from the broader GPS hence it was organised on a National basis, with a unified command under the Chief of Police. The Chief of Police was responsible for exercising general day-to-day supervision over the operation and administrative duties of the service. The role of the CID was to ensure a proactive and professional approach to the prevention and detection of crime. They were to investigate all issues deemed criminal and also those that posed a threat to the administration. The CID ensured the protection of life and property, apprehended and prosecuted offenders of the law under the Nkrumah's administration, and collected and collated crime figures in the country.[119]

It was also the duty of the CID to compile data on all crimes listed under the Criminal Code, including other crimes found in existing pieces of the legislation. The CID also acted as the media monitoring unit for the GPS by tracking down crimes reported in newspapers across the country. This formed the basis for strategising police operations throughout the country, which enabled them to identify geographical areas with higher crime rates, to put into place appropriate control and preventive measures.[120]

Special Branch (SB)

The SB was on paper described as the intelligence hub of the nation. Its membership was educated elites, mainly Ghanaians who have undergone a series of examinations and had excelled with excellent grades. They were employed as specialists in connection with various aspects of intelligence collection and analysis on national security matters. SB was civilianised with police personnel seconded to it with civilian titles. Civilians were also directly recruited

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[119] Eshun, J. 'Composition of Internal Security Architecture Prior to 1948', Interview with Ghanaian Official, Highgate London, 07 February, (2012).
[120] Ibid

into the Special Branch.[121] Russian Security experts suggested to Dr. Nkrumah that future recruitment into Ghana's security services must go through the ideological institute based at Winneba, a town in Ghana. A number of Special Branch officers were sent to the ideological institute to acquire training.[122] Coordination and management of the Special Branch were supposed to be no different from any other unit in the police service. The Chief of Police had the mandate of overseeing the complete day-to-day operational and administrative duties of all units including SB. After independence, Nkrumah deemed it necessary to separate the Special Branch from the control of Police Chief and placed it directly under his command. This move ensured that political intelligence necessary for the security and governance of the nation did not go through the Chief of Police but came directly to the office of the President.[123]

The roles and duties of the SB broadly consisted of intelligence collection and analysis for national security purposes. They operated with plain-clothes officers, specialised in political and security intelligence activities, and monitored closely political opponents of Nkrumah's administration. The SB also gathered intelligence to support regime protection and as part of that role, SB gathered information on the precise significance of perceived threats in the country; such as groups or individuals planning to overthrow the President.[124] They also drafted procedures for the collection and recording of intelligence through committees at the regional and district levels. Furthermore, they collected intelligence in public meeting places, other social gathering areas, businesses, marketplaces, mainly anywhere locals gathered for one reason or another. It was their duty to disseminate all intelligence to the Office of the President, for the attention of the President. The SB maintained a distribution list which indicated the structure of how intelligence was gained and disseminated. Finally, the SB acted

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[121] Quantson, KB. *Ghana Peace and Stability, Chapters from the Intelligence Sector*, Common Entrance Examination 1966, (Accra: Advent Press - NAPASCOM Ltd, 2000), pp 82 – 83
[122] "Kwame Nkrumah's Ideological Institute, Winneba Ghana." Kokorokoo, 2011, [online resource] available from, http://www.kokorokoo.com/Ideology.aspx. Accessed on 15/07/2018
[123] Michael Kweku Addison. Preventing Military Intervention in West Africa, Case Study of Ghana, Defense Technical Information Center, [MA Thesis], Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California, (2002), p. 25
[124] Quantson, KB. *Ghana Peace and Stability, Chapters from the Intelligence Sector*, Common Entrance Examination 1966, (Accra: Advent Press - NAPASCOM Ltd, 2000), pp 82 – 83

as the focal point for the national security of Ghana and monitored the media regularly for intelligence collection purposes, despite the CID being the main media monitor unit for the Police.[125]

Amidst the roles of SB, its coordination and management did not happen without some controversies. The two most senior members of the GPS (Messrs J.W.K. Harlley and A.K. Deku) who worked tirelessly to develop the new SB, were disappointed when neither one was appointed as the new SB Director. Coincidentally the new SB Director was from the same tribe as Nkrumah and this allegedly "sparked off tribal sentiments that became major security problems over the years".[126] These two senior members, later on played a significant role in the overthrow of Nkrumah's government.[127]

Foreign Service Research Bureau (FSRB)

Regarding his non-alignment policy, Nkrumah saw the need to embark on a "positive neutrality" agenda after the Cold War. He established equal association with the Soviet Union and China on one side, and with Britain and America on the other side. Despite these actions, Nkrumah's continuous rhetoric continued to cast doubts on his "positive neutrality" as far as Britain and America were concerned. For instance it was claimed that Nkrumah recalled ex-Vice President of USA, referring to the Eastern Bloc countries such as "Communist slaves". Nkrumah's reacted to such a comment by stating that 'if slavery consists of what I saw in Hungary, I am prepared to become a Communist slave', for freedom, equality, justice, humanism, and all what goes with it, take true shape only in socialist countries.[128]

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[125] Quantson, KB. *Ghana Peace and Stability, Chapters from the Intelligence Sector*, Common Entrance Examination 1966, (Accra: Advent Press - NAPASCOM Ltd, 2000), pp 82 – 83
[126] Ibid.
[127] Ibid.
[128] Zoltán Ginelli. "Hungarian Experts in Nkrumah's Ghana", Semiperipheral Eastern Europe and decolonization - Nkrumah in Hungary. *Mezosfera*, 2018, [online resource] available from, http://mezosfera.org/hungarian-experts-in-nkrumahs-ghana/. Accessed on 15/07/2020

As Nkrumah was not naïve about the controversies associated with his administration's foreign policy, he realised that to ensure the survival of his administration and Ghana as a whole against the opposing powers, it was pertinent that the country had a more credible intelligence and counter-intelligence capability.[129] The idea of setting up a foreign intelligence collection capability with a global outreach, which could help address such challenges, came into play. In 1950, Nkrumah reached out to one of his close allies, the Prime Minister of India, P.T. Nehru, to help him set up an intelligence agency in Ghana. Prime Minister Nehru sent R.N. Kao (Intelligence Chief of India and founder of RAW) to Ghana and he carried out his job with great professional skill.[130]

It was widely acknowledged that Kao, along with his deputy, K. Sankaran Nair did an excellent job in Ghana, by setting up a foreign intelligence collection capability, even though Ghana did not have the right resources and manpower readily available for such a project.[131] However, when the Foreign Service Research Bureau (FSRB) was founded in 1958 with the assistance of the Indian government[132] and with support from the Soviet government to run it[133], the FSRB was tasked to handle the foreign intelligence capability project. Part of its primary mandate was to support the administration's venture to pursue a broad strategic vision of radical Pan-Africanism.[134] Its coordination and management were put under the administrative control of the Ghana Foreign Ministry and the ministry's officials were posted abroad under the cover of regular diplomats. Furthermore, agents that worked for the FSRB directly, who were all Ghanaians, were also posted out of the country as foreign dignitaries to represent Ghana abroad. Even though the ministry was in charge of the FSRB's coordination and management,

[129] Sandy Africa and Johnny Kwadjo. 'Changing Intelligence Dynamics in Africa', *GFN-SSR and ASSN*, (2009), pp 90 - 110

[130] Rania, P N. "The Legend Called R.N Kao." *Yumpu.* 2007, P.4 [online resource] available from, https://www.yumpu.com/en/document/read/30619833/august-2007-panun-kashmir/6. Accessed on 15/07/2018

[131] Ibid, The Legend called R.N. Kao: p. 6

[132] Rania, P N. "The Legend Called R.N Kao." *Yumpu.* 2007, P.4

[133] LaVerle Berry. *Ghana a Country Study*, National Security, Development of the Modern Army, (Washington DC: U.S Government Printing Office, 1995), pp 270 – 290

[134] Zoltán Ginelli. *Hungarian Experts in Nkrumah's Ghana*, Semiperipheral Eastern Europe and decolonization - Nkrumah in Hungary, Mezosfera, 2018.

its operational control was retained by the Office of the President at Flagstaff House, where

collection tasks were distributed, and agent reports were presented.[135]

As the West became more suspicious of the administration's foreign policy and began to

subvert it, the intelligence collection capabilities of the FSRB became extremely complex and

difficult. Suspicions within the agency and amongst its personal began to crop-up. The

administration responded by carving out an elite corps from within the Foreign Ministry's

Research Bureau to form the African Affairs Secretariat (AAS). The AAS was placed directly

under the Office of the President and its administrative and operational activities were handled

from the same office.[136]

African Affairs Secretariat (AAS)

The AAS was established in 1960[137], at the period when intelligence activities became more

complex, with the pressure from Western powers increasing on Nkrumah's strategic

ambitions.[138] Its members were Ghanaians who worked with Soviet instructors.[139] They were

selected from the elite group of FSRB, and its coordination and management were under the

administrative and operational control of the Office of the President. The role of AAS was to

deal with issues and programs related to the Commonwealth and Eastern bloc countries.[140]

They acted as a driving force to support African nationalists in African territories who were yet

to achieve independence for their respective countries.[141] The AAS provided funds and other

facilities to support individuals or groups (including freedom fighters, refugees, and students

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[135] Sandy Africa and Johnny Kwadjo. 'Changing Intelligence Dynamics in Africa', *GFN-SSR*, (2009), pp 90 – 110
[136] Ibid.
[137] US State Department. 'Confidential US State Department Central Files, 1960 – 1963 (Ghana)', Reel 3, Internal, Political and National Defence Affairs, *Congressional Information Service Inc*, Frame No 0582, (2003), p 10,
[138] Sandy Africa and Johnny Kwadjo. 'Changing Intelligence Dynamics in Africa', *GFN-SSR*, (2009), pp 90 - 110
[139] Thomas Ofcansky. 'National Security', by La Verle Berry, ed. *Ghana: A Country Study*, (Washington: GPO for the Library of Congress, 1994), p. 282
[140] Boni Yao Gebe. 'Ghana's Foreign Policy at Independence and Implications for the 1966 Coup D'état', *The Journal of Pan African Studies*, 2:3, (2008), p. 160+
[141] Boni Yao Gebe. 'Ghana's Foreign Policy at Independence and Implications for the 1966 Coup D'état', *The Journal of Pan African Studies*, 2:3, (2008), p. 160+

from sister African countries) so far as they agreed with Nkrumah's philosophy.[142] They coordinated the Government's African programmes and to assist African liberation movements[143] and also aided other African Colonial territories in their quest for independence.[144]

Presidential Detail Department (PDD)

After Nkrumah dismissed all of the British Officers from the Ghana Armed Forces, most of the British-trained Ghanaian officer corps also resisted his attempts to use them to pursue his political ideology. They eschewed the political commissars whom Nkrumah had introduced into all units. In response, Nkrumah created his own private army called the Presidential Guard. The Soviet Union supported Nkrumah with military advisers and weaponry. After an unsuccessful attempt on his life, Nkrumah ordered the expansion of the private army to regimental strength. The Soviet security advisers recommended that civilian elements be added to his private army. The military and the civilian wing then became the Presidential Guard Department. In 1963 Nkrumah changed the name from the Presidential Guard Department to the Presidential Detail Department.[145]

Membership constituted of mainly Ghanaians who were loyal to and trusted by the President. Its members were largely ex-service men. Membership grew rapidly and by February 1966, the unit's First Guard Regiment included a 1,500-member battalion. The Second Guard Regiment was also in the process of being formed and trained under Soviet advisers[146] when Nkrumah was overthrown. Civilian members of the PDD were housed in flats directly across

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[142] Ibid.

[143] Sam Sower., Honors Capstone., & Stephen Taylor. *Kwame Nkrumah and Julius Nyerere, Independence, Leadership and Legacy*, Early Life/Education, Washington Research Library Consortium, (2011), p. 10

[144] Meredith Terretta. 'Cameroonian Nationalists Go Global', From Forest Maquis to a Pan-African Accra, *Journal of African History*, 51:2, (2010), pp 189 - 212

[145] "Ghana, The Development of the Modern Army." *Photius*, 1994, [online resource] available from, https://photius.com/countries/ghana/national_security/ghana_national_security_the_development_of_t~146.html. Accessed on 15/07/2018

[146] Ibid

the road of the Flagstaff House.[147] Its organisational structure was organised along military lines of command and control. They were trained by Russians, with emphasis on weapon handling, hand–to–hand combat, and physical fitness.[148] Personnel of the PDD were personal bodyguards for the President, who accompanied him on both local and foreign trips, mingled with the crowd, and were prepared to remove troublemakers or those that posed a threat to the President. This department ensured the personal safety of the president and guarded the Flagstaff House, the Office of the President.

The department also supervised secret storage depots and training for Nkrumah's constantly expanding private army, and advised the President mostly on security issues, with regards to his life and regime. Its counter-intelligence unit spied on all the other members of the PDD. They maintained secret camps that were the storage depot and training grounds for Nkrumah's expanding private military. The existence of these secret military camps was not supposed to be known to the command of the Ghana Armed Forces.[149] The formation of Nkrumah's personal agencies further undermined the authority and independence of the original national security architecture. They operated in parallel and reported directly to Office of the President. The agencies were better paid and resourced whilst the already existing ones were deprived and under-resourced.[150]

Department III Military Intelligence Unit (D3 MIU)

Attached to the PDD was the D3 MIU which was set up privately by the President and was not part of the Ministry of Defence. Membership consisted of mainly Ghanaians who were trained by Soviet intelligence agencies. The D3 MIU was tasked to check independently on the loyalty of regular armed forces to the president and his administration. They were also to maintain an

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[147] "Kwame Nkrumah's Secret Intelligence Unit." *Kokorokoo*, 2011.
[148] Ibid.
[149] "Kwame Nkrumah's Secret Intelligence Unit." *Kokorokoo*, 2011.
[150] Michael Kweku Addison. Preventing Military Intervention in West Africa, Case Study of Ghana, Defense Technical Information Center, [MA Thesis], Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California, (2002), p. 14

interrogation centre at the Burma Camp (military camp) in Accra and collect intelligence to ensure the safety of the President and the protection of his administration.[151] It is claimed that the D3 MIU acted as 'Big Brother', by eavesdropping on activities of all elements within the regular armed forces and those with sinister motives and capabilities.[152]

Special Intelligence Unit (SIU)

As part of Nkrumah's 'multifaceted intelligence apparatus', the SIU was established in 1963 by Nkrumah's closest ally, who was known as Ambrose Yankey.[153] Yankey was from the same tribe as Nkrumah and was described by many as a 'peddler of smoked fish'. He was originally attached to the President's Office to perform personalised presidential household functions however, due to his closest affiliation with Nkrumah, Yankey rose to a powerful status. He was perceived as someone who possessed supernatural powers and whenever Nkrumah was worried about his safety, Yankey became handy. For those reasons, there was no national security discussion without the role of Ambrose Yankey.[154] Membership was made up of mainly Ghanaians and three years after its establishment in 1963, its membership had grown to 281 people, all of whom reportedly received training from Soviet and other Communist Advisers.[155] Yankey attained the position of the SIU director and recruited his son as the Deputy Director[156], reporting directly to the President. The primary role of this unit was to monitor the activities of anti-government individuals and groups.[157]

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[151] "Ghana Army History – Nkrumah." *Global Security Organisation*, 2016, [online resource] available from, https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/africa/gh-army-nkrumah.htm. Accessed on 06/07/2019

[152] Eshun, J. 'Composition of Internal Security Architecture Prior to 1948', Interview with Ghanaian Official, Highgate London, 07 February, (2012).

[153] "Ghana, The Development of the Modern Army." *Photius*, 1994, [online resource] available from, https://photius.com/countries/ghana/national_security/ghana_national_security_the_development_of_t~146.html. Accessed on 15/07/2018

[154] KB Quantson. *Ghana: National Security*, Preventive Detention & Protective Custody, (Accra: Bestas Press - NAPASVIL VENTURES, 2003), p. 25

[155] "Ghana, The Development of the Modern Army." *Photius*, 1994, [online resource] available from, https://photius.com/countries/ghana/national_security/ghana_national_security_the_development_of_t~146.html. Accessed on 15/07/2018

[156] "Ghana under Kwame Nkrumah, Social and Economic Developments." *Ghana District*, 2006, [online resource] available from, www.ghanadistricts.com. Accessed on 15/06/2019

[157] Thomas Ofcansky. 'National Security', by La Verle Berry, ed. *Ghana: A Country Study*, (Washington: GPO for the Library of Congress, 1994), pp 270 – 290

Bureau for Technical Assistance (BTA)

The BTA was also established as part of Nkrumah's 'multifaceted intelligence apparatus' and its agents were tasked to conduct espionage activities in other African countries. Such activities were designed to support Nkrumah's Pan-African agenda, and also to help gather intelligence for the survival of his administration. Out of the BTA, came the formation of an all African intelligence service called the 'Special African Service', which was also known as the 'Technical Unit'.[158] The BTA was coordinated and managed directly by the office of the President at the Flagstaff House and were answerable to Nkrumah directly.

Special African Service / Technical Unit (SAS / TU)

The SAS, which was also known as the TU was carved out of the BTA in October 1965[159] as a special unit equipped with Communist arms and eavesdropping equipment.[160] It was designed to penetrate the intelligence services of other African countries[161] and by 1966 the SAS had grown from 40 to 67 personnel.[162, 163] Its membership consisted of mostly Ghanaians, with some members also from other African countries. Members of the SAS lived in secret camps located at Brekum, Wa, Navrongo, Yendi, Obenemasi, Okponglo, and at least thirty other locations in the country. They were under the supervision of Soviet, Chinese, and Cuban instructors, and were used for espionage and other subversive activities throughout the continent.[164] It was also part of their role to train fellow Africans from many states; notably Niger, Upper Volta (Burkina Faso), Nigeria, Cameroon, Sierra Leone, and Burundi in guerrilla warfare.

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[158] Ibid.

[159] "Kwame Nkrumah's Secret Intelligence Unit." *Kokorokoo*, 2011.

[160] F.R. Metrowich. *Africa and Communism*, Nurseries for Subversion (West Africa), RHODESIA, (2005), pp 82 – 114, [online resource] available from, http://www.rhodesia.nl/Africa%20and%20Communism.pdf. Accessed on 15/01/2020

[161] Peter Antwi Boasiako. "The Fall of Nkrumah and the Corruption he Supervised." *Modern Ghana*, 2010, [online resource] available from, https://www.modernghana.com/news/303873/the-fall-of-nkrumah-and-the-corruption-he-supervis.html. Accessed on 15/07/2018

[162] Thomas Ofcansky. 'National Security', by La Verle Berry, ed. *Ghana: A Country Study*, (Washington: GPO for the Library of Congress, 1994), pp 270 – 290

[163] "Kwame Nkrumah's Secret Intelligence Unit." *Kokorokoo*, 2011.

[164] Peter Antwi. "The Fall of Nkrumah and the Corruption he Supervised." *Modern Ghana*, 2010 [online resource] available from, https://www.modernghana.com/news/303873/the-fall-of-nkrumah-and-the-corruption-he-supervis.html. Accessed on 15/01/2020

It was believed that Nkrumah's ambition of United Africa made him create the Bureau of African Affairs, which was secretly known as the Special African Service. This agency was also part of the 'Die national security apparatus' to train Africans from many states, including Niger, Upper Volta (Burkina Faso), Nigeria, Cameroon, Sierra Leone and Burundi, in guerrilla warfare. Agents lived in secret camps located at Brekum, Wa, Navrongo, Yendi, Obenemasi, Okponglo and at least thirty other locations. They were supervised by Soviet, Chinese and Cuban instructors, and were used for espionage and other subversive activities throughout Africa.[165]

The Young Pioneer Movement (YPM)

Nkrumah also setup the Young Pioneer Movement which had branches all over the country with a total membership of approximately 500,000. Members were all Ghanaians between the ages of 4 and 25 years who were grouped under three broad categories. The first of the groups were made up of young people ranging between 17 and 25 who received technical and ideological training. The second group consisted of children from age 9 to 16 and were specialised in drama, driving and craft. Finally, the third group comprised of children from age four to eight years. Most of these people were to receive training in Israel and the Soviet Union. One of their "Pioneer Code and Pledge" was to be in the first ranks of men fighting for the total liberation and unity of Africa. These were believed to be the noble aims guiding the Ghana Young Pioneers.[166] It is alleged that Nkrumah used these young people as agents who spied in every primary school and every home in the country. They spied on their teachers and parents respectively and reported any negative comment passed about the administration to Nkrumah.[167]

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[165] "Ghana under Kwame Nkrumah, Social and Economic Developments." *Ghana District*, 2006.
[166] Ebenezer Obiri Addo. *Kwame Nkrumah*, A Case Study of Religion and Politics in Ghana, Christian Church and Nkrumah's Leadership, (Oxford: University Press of America, 1997), pp 143 - 146
[167] Charles Sanders. 'Kwame Nkrumah the Fall of a Messiah', Deposed President Indicated by his People as Tyrant-Thief who nearly Ruined Ghana', *Ebony*, Vol XXI, No. 11 (1966) p. 138 - 40

Nkrumah had an enormous amount of intelligence coming in to help protect the administration and the country from internal and external threats, with all of these agencies in place. The issue at the time was that the intelligence being received came in unilaterally in scattered format from the numerous intelligence agencies without any interagency intelligence coordination. This inhibited the administration's ability to effectively counter internal and external threats, aimed at destroying domestic stability, as explained in pre-condition 3.

Pre-Condition 3

This pre-condition was not fulfilled by this administration, as Nkrumah deliberately discouraged interagency intelligence coordination within the modified national security architecture. Such a decision meant that it was impossible for Nkrumah's administration to be able to piece together the jigsaw puzzle from the scattered intelligence it had been receiving, to holistically build an overarching picture of such threats. The assessment below demonstrates the extent to which the lack of pre-condition 3 impacted domestic stability and subsequently the administration and its vision.

Consequences for Deliberately Dismissing Pre-Condition 3

Kwame Nkrumah, unlike the colonial regime, knew right from the onset the scale of the political and security challenges which lied ahead for his administration to deal with. Hence, at no stage during that era did the administration mistakenly underestimate the abilities of its potential adversaries. For these reasons, the administration relied heavily on pre-condition 2 as one of the major tools, if not the only tool to help counter such perceived threats. It is therefore not surprising that even before independence, Nkrumah invited the Indian authorities to come and help set up a foreign intelligence collection capability. After independence such capability was incorporated into the first national security architecture of the country, making it intelligence-led. This, coupled with Nkrumah also embarking on a diversification programme for the army, was a testament to how he understood the significant threats facing his administration.

Nonetheless, for Nkrumah to separately operate a 'multifaceted intelligence apparatus' to ensure the survival of his administration and his Pan-African agenda, was further proof of how the administration took its perceived adversaries seriously. These factors demonstrated how ready it was to counter any such hostility head-on.

Although the work of intelligence was at the forefront of everything that Nkrumah's administration did, the lack of intelligence sharing and coordination within its security apparatus was a disservice to achieving its vision. Unlike the colonial era whereby the colonial office and JIC were hardly talking, under Nkrumah's administration, it was Nkrumah's plan to purposely discourage intelligence sharing and coordination between these agencies. For this reason, he deliberately created a parallel security architecture and intentionally encouraged rivalry among all the agencies to help ensure the survival of his administration and its Pan-African agenda. Therefore, in doing so this created an atmosphere of 'distrust and suspicion' among the numerous agencies who spied on each other and subsequently suspected everybody of eavesdropping. Nkrumah thus succeeded in pushing these agencies miles apart from collaborating, curtailing interagency intelligence sharing and coordination.

Furthermore, Nkrumah's creation of a private security machinery, which operated parallel to the original national security architecture, did not only violate the country's constitution but also undermined the authority of the agencies within the original architecture. Consequently, unlike his private machinery, the lack of funding for the original architecture, especially the regular army was significant, as it was under-resourced and obtained inadequate training for its personnel. This also resulted in a complete deterioration of its credibility. The formation of Nkrumah's multifaceted intelligence agencies was a duplication of the existing national security architecture and usurped its function. Members of the new function were better equipped and enjoyed more appealing conditions of service than the personnel of the original

architecture. Because the new agencies reported directly to the President, it created a 'problem with regards to established norms of hierarchy and discipline.'[168]

Moreover, respect within the ranks of the regular army also immensely diminished due to Nkrumah indirectly empowering the junior army personnel by encouraging them to report any suspicious activities within the higher echelon of the army directly to him.[169] It was not surprising that the build-up of alternative security services, and the militarisation of civilian organisations, were perceived by senior officers as counterweights to neutralise the influence of the regular forces.[170]

It is therefore not surprising that after the demise of Nkrumah's administration, A.A. Afrifa (one of the army generals who deposed Nkrumah from office and later became the President of Ghana); described Nkrumah's private machinery as an 'instrument of Kwame Nkrumah's growing desire to turn [Ghana] into his private domain.'[171] In an interview he stated that it:

> "Took a man with no training as an officer, Mr. Hassan, appointed him a brigadier general and put him in charge of military intelligence. Hence we had a situation in which mess corporals were watching commanding officers and reporting them. What greater insult to our intelligence and patriotism."[172]

The above statement depicted how toxic the political and security environment was at the time. This created elements of distrust and suspicion even within the original national security architecture, and also between the original architecture and Nkrumah's private machinery. This highlights the extent to which there was lack of interagency intelligence coordination within the overarching national security architecture.

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[168] "Ghana under Kwame Nkrumah, Social and Economic Developments." *Ghana District*, 2006.
[169] Michael Kweku Addison. Preventing Military Intervention in West Africa, Case Study of Ghana, Defense Technical Information Center, [MA Thesis], Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California, (2002), p 14
[170] Simon Baynham. 'Quis Custodiet Ipsos CustodesP', the Case of Nkrumah's National Security Service, *The Journal of Modern African Studies,* 23:1 (1985), pp 97 - 100
[171] Ibid.
[172] Michael Kweku Addison. Preventing Military Intervention in West Africa, Case Study of Ghana, Defense Technical Information Center, [MA Thesis], Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California, (2002), p 14

Additionally, the Special Branch (previously part of the Police Service), which was one of the arms of the original national security architecture, with a mandate to perform political and security intelligence work[173]; had its directorship position offered to Nkrumah's fellow tribesman. By sidelining the Chief of Police and his deputy with an offer to a fellow tribesman, started tribal sentiments within the national security apparatus.[174]. Altogether, this deepened the issue of distrust and suspicion, which added to the toxic environment at the time. These actions subsequently damaged any hopes of interagency intelligence sharing and coordination among the national security agencies.[175]

Finally, it is claimed that the son of Director of Nkrumah's Special Intelligence Unit (SIU) was at some point arrested on the grounds of national security by SB. Whilst being interrogated, it was alleged that the Director of SIU disregarded all protocols, walked into SB premises, and got his son out. As graphically described by KB Quantson, the director stormed into the SB premises disrespecting everyone from the lowest-ranked to the director to release his son from custody. He allegedly promised the Director of SB that he would hear from him, and the SB Director soon lost his job.[176] Once again, this highlights the hostility which existed between the original national security architecture and Nkrumah's private security machinery. It also appeared to have played out and escalated in the open to inflame the deep wedge of rivalry, distrust, and suspicious environment, which had engulfed the country at the time. This demonstrated a clear lack of professionalism and cooperation among agencies, which made any hope of sharing and coordinating intelligence, far from reality.

In light of prior discussion, it appears that Nkrumah by deliberately creating a distrustful atmosphere the intelligence agencies spent most of their time gathering intelligence on each

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[173] Michael Kweku Addison. Preventing Military Intervention in West Africa, Case Study of Ghana, Defense Technical Information Center, MA Thesis, (Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California, 2002), p 25
[174] KB Quantson. '*Ghana Peace and Stability: Chapters from the Intelligence Sector*', Common Entrance Examination, 1966, (Accra: Advent Press - NAPASCOM Ltd, 2000), pp 82-83
[175] Sandy Africa and Johnny Kwadjo. 'Changing Intelligence Dynamics in Africa', *GFN-SSR*, (2009), pp 90 - 110
[176] KB Quantson. '*Ghana: National Security*', Preventive Detention & Protective Custody, (Accra: Bestas Press - NAPASVIL VENTURES 2003), p. 25

other's activities. Therefore, this might have invested very little effort, if any at all, in performing the primary mandate upon which most of them were created to fulfil. Which was to protect the administration's survival and/or its Pan-African vision from perceived threats and their perpetrators. All of these made interagency intelligence coordination impossible, impacting the administration's ability to cohesively respond to perceived threats.[177]

Detrimental Result for Deliberately Dismissing Pre-Condition 3 Response

Lack of intelligence coordination meant that the way the administration responded to perceived threats was more of a kneejerk reaction, rather than embarking on comprehensive and proactive control strategies, which were needed to counter such threats at the time. From a reactive standpoint, Nkrumah used measures such as the introduction of the Preventive Detention Acts of 1958, 1959, and 1962 to target opposing political elites and traditional chiefs. These included those flagged by his numerous intelligence networks as potential threats to his one-party state system and/or his socialist economic vision.[178] Additionally, the administration also embarked on what it touted as measures put in place to preserve the security of the state. Such measures were used to target political opponents, who were identified through intelligence collection as helping the opposition political party, the NLM, to orchestrate violence in the Ashanti region.

The individuals referred to above were deported in line with colonial precedence of sending 'such unsavoury characters back to their countries of origin.'[179] Whilst at the same time investigated the Kumasi State Council and the Asanteman Council for using public resources

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[177] Sandy Africa and Johnny Kwadjo. 'Changing Intelligence Dynamics in Africa', *GFN-SSR*, (2009), pp 90 - 110
[178] Michael Kweku Addison. Preventing Military Intervention in West Africa, Case Study of Ghana, Defense Technical Information Center, [MA Thesis], Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California, (2002), p. 25
[179] Ekow Nelson and Michael Gyamerah. "The origins and the case for preventive detention in Ghana." *Patriotic Vanguard*, 2009, [online resource] available from, http://www.thepatrioticvanguard.com/the-origins-and-the-case-for-preventive-detention-in-ghana. Accessed on 01/15/2020

towards political activities, and for recruiting non-Ghanaians to carry out acts of terrorism.[180] Another move made by Nkrumah's administration was to introduce the Avoidance of Discrimination Act, designed to prohibit the establishment of political parties based solely on ethnic, racial, or religious grounds.[181] It also introduced the Prevention Detention Bill, which was aimed at targeting individuals identified through intelligence for purchasing military hardware and setting up violent secret organisations with the intention to overthrow the government.[182] The Detention Bill was introduced after the so-called 'Amponsah and Apaloo conspiracy'; of which the two individuals were accused of purchasing military hardware and setting up a violent secret organisation to overthrow the government.[183] Once again corroborating the assertion that the administration's response in countering threats was reactive rather than proactive, aided by effective intelligence coordination.

As part of the administration's knee-jerk reaction in dealing with internal threats, in some instances, Nkrumah unleashed SB officers to search government offices and frisked members of Parliament for arms outside the Assembly building. Even the troops he had called in to guard the city were also suspected. Nkrumah also instructed his security officers to travel from house to house in search of arms and explosives, and during the day army helicopters whirled at treetop level.[184] Amid all of the chaos, it was also alleged that part of Nkrumah's private security network uncovered that some of the explosives used in previous attacks against him were part of the arsenal stockpiled by the Ghanaian army.[185] Therefore, similarly the administration once again hastily reacted by ensuring that Accra, the capital city of Ghana was ringed with troops of armoured cars. This was coupled with 7000 army personnel and armed

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[180] Ibid.
[181] Ibid.
[182] Ibid.
[183] Ibid.
[184] "Ghana: Evil Spirits for Nkrumah." *Time Magazine US*, 1962, [online resource] available from, http://content.time.com/time/subscriber/article/0,33009,829182,00.html. Accessed on 15/01/2020
[185] "Ghana: Evil Spirit for Nkrumah." *Time Magazine US*, 1962, [online resource] Available from, http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,829182,00.html. Accessed on 15/07/2018

police who were placed on 24/7 security duty at the Parliament House and across the country.[186]

Not only did Nkrumah's knee-jerk reactions and repressive activities significantly impact the mood in the country, the actions of Nkrumah's security apparatus also made the situation worse. Nkrumah's security agencies infiltrated every corner of the country and operated unilaterally with no centralised coordination. Therefore cumulatively, all the mentioned events ended up having a pervasive impact on life in Ghana and the economy at the time. This created a suspicious environment across Ghana, whereby Nkrumah's political opponents, adversaries, or even people with different policy views to those of Nkrumah, were always looking over their shoulders as to who was monitoring what they were saying or doing. Nkrumah was heavy-handed at the time towards his political opponents, using the Prevention Detention and others to imprison several of his opponent without trial.[187]

From this dissertation's assessment, these series of events created a tense, volatile, and arguably unstable atmosphere in Ghana, which significantly destabilised the political and security landscape of the country. It also impacted the internal structures of the broader national security architecture and how individual agencies operated with distrust toward each other. These factors contributed to Nkrumah's demise, which was plotted from both internal and international fronts as further elaborated.

On the international front, thanks to such an extensive intelligence network, the administration was able to pick up on several external threats. Different agencies identified different threats, however, because of the decision made to discourage intelligence sharing and coordination, understanding the bigger picture was a challenge. Therefore, external threats were also

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[186] Wilmington Morning Star. 'Ghana's President Reported Killed News Censored', *Wilmington Morning Star*, (1962).
[187] Eshun, J. 'Security Under Nkrumah's Administration', Virtual Conversation with Samuel Eduku Cobbold (Educationist / Nkrumahist), Microsoft Teams, 21 June, (2020).

countered reactively rather than proactively engaging such challenges. For instance, it is believed that as Nkrumah also became aware of Western intelligence agencies meddling in the country's affairs; the administration's immediate reaction was to devote significant resources on counter-intelligence measures to tackle such threats at both home and abroad.[188] Although some of Nkrumah's security network became aware of some internal coup plotters within the original national security architecture, the countermeasure was once again based on a knee-jerk reaction.

Nkrumah suddenly retired the Defence Chief and deputy, who apparently had been involved in coup plotting for several months, and openly made this known to the US ambassador in Ghana that he was convinced more than ever that the US was out to get him. Additionally, Nkrumah also reiterated his concern by citing previous assassination attempts on his life as examples of possible US handwork.[189]

In summary, although to some degree Nkrumah's counter-measures worked effectively well in spotting threats; because it decided to discourage effective intelligence coordination within its multifaceted intelligence apparatus, the network was unable to connect the dots. This coupled with the rivalry, distrust, and suspicious atmosphere brewing amongst the various agencies at the time meant that a disagreement ensued. This resulted in the overarching national security architecture not being able to comprehensively convince Nkrumah to abandon a trip to Vietnam in 1966, where he was supposedly going to be 'mediating' peace talks between the US and Vietnam. Special Branch had assessed the trip as a plot. However, the SIU, which was also an intelligence outfit under Nkrumah's private security machinery had an alternate narrative that assessed the trip to be genuine. Such a disconnect between the agencies came at a cost for the administration and ultimately, to the detriment of national

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[188] KB Quantson. *Ghana, National Security*, Foreign Hands Behind Nkrumah's Overthrow, (Accra: Bestas Press - NAPASVIL VENTURES, 2003), p. 115

[189] "Memorandum for the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (Helms)." *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, Africa - Office of the Historian*. US Department of State, Point 3, Volume XXIV, Document 257, (1964).

development. As Nkrumah proceeded with the trip based on the assessment of the SIU, the outcome was his demise, as elaborated further.

Outcome

Prior to Nkrumah's trip to Hanoi, several correspondences took place between him and his US counterpart Johnson, as well as between Nkrumah's foreign minister, Alex Quayson Sackey, and President Johnson in Washington.[190] Due to the lack of intelligence sharing and coordination within the overarching architecture, two opposing and most importantly, conflicting intelligence assessments were presented to Nkrumah from SB and SIU.

Upon closer look at the correspondence, SB assessed the trip as something sinister, which was deliberately designed as part of a military coup plot to lure Nkrumah out of the country.[191] Whilst the SIU on the other hand assessed the trip as genuine and an opportunity for Nkrumah to excel on the international stage. Since the Director of SIU was Nkrumah's personal friend, this meant that the administration's loyalty lied with the SIU. Therefore, on 21st February 1966, Nkrumah left Accra for Hanoi with the belief that he was going to mediate the Vietnam War, leaving three presidential commissions in charge of the country.[192] When he transited in China on-route to Vietnam, for consultations with Premier Chou En-lai, Nkrumah was informed that his administration had been overthrown[193] and Nkrumah's initial reaction was disbelief as shown in the image on the next page.

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[190] Eric Quaidoo. The United States and the overthrow of Kwame Nkrumah, Nkrumah's Ouster and the United States' Involvement, [MA Thesis], Fort Hays State University, (2010), p. 59
[191] Ibid.
[192] "February 21, 1966, Nkrumah departs for peace mission in Hanoi." Edward A. Ulzen Memorial Foundation, 2018, [online resource] available from, https://www.eaumf.org/ejm-blog/2018/2/21/february-21-1966-nkrumah-departs-for-peace-mission-in-hanoi. Accessed on 15/01/2020
[193] Abayomi Azikiwe. "Ghana and the 1966 Coup Against Kwame Nkrumah", The Role of African Americans in the African Revolution. *Global Research*, 2016, [online resource] available from, https://www.globalresearch.ca/ghana-and-the-1966-coup-against-kwame-nkrumah-the-role-of-african-americans-in-the-african-revolution/5508043. Accessed on 15/07/2018

Figure 5: Image of Nkrumah's Initial Reaction to News about the 1966 Coup in Ghana

Image[194]

How Kwame Nkrumah received the news of the Coup d'etat on 24th Feb. 1966, at Peking on his Hanoi Trip.

Nkrumah was informed that the military coup was orchestrated by a group of lower-ranking military and police officials who called themselves the "National Liberation Council" (NLC); with direct assistance and coordination by the CIA and the US State Department.[195] It is

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[194] Ismail Akwei, "How CIA Planned to Wear Blackface During Nkrumah's Overthrow to Attack Chinese Embassy in Ghana." *Face 2 Face Africa*, 2019.

[195] Abayomi Azikiwe. "Ghana and the 1966 Coup Against Kwame Nkrumah", The Role of African Americans in the African Revolution. *Centre for Research and Globalisation*, 2016, [online resource] available from, https://l-

believed the NLC emerged from the previous opposition political party called the NLM and its members are shown in the image below.

Figure 6: Image of the National Liberation Council Members

Image[196]

Members of the National Liberation Council. From left: Brigadier A. A. Afrifa; Mr. B. A. Yakubu, Deputy Commissioner of Police; Major-General A. K. Ocran; Mr. J. W. K. Harlley, Inspector-General of Police and Vice-Chairman of the N.L.C.; Lt.-General J. A. Ankrah, Chairman of the N.L.C.; Lt.-General E. K. Kotoka; Mr. A. K. Deku, Commissioner of Police, C.I.D.; Mr. J. E. O. Nunoo, Commissioner of Police, Administration.

Nkrumah was further informed that leading members of the CPP were driven into exile, arrested, or executed, while the party press was seized along with the national radio and television stations. It was also alleged that counter-revolutionary mobs inspired by the CIA and the military-police clique that had seized power, attacked CPP offices.[197]

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hora.org/en/ghana-and-the-1966-coup-against-kwame-nkrumah-abayomi-azikiwe-global-research-02-16-2016/. Accessed on 15/01/2020

[196] Ismail Akwei, "How CIA Planned to Wear Blackface During Nkrumah's Overthrow to Attack Chinese Embassy in Ghana." *Face 2 Face Africa*, 2019, [online resource] available from, https://face2faceafrica.com/article/how-cia-planned-to-wear-blackface-during-nkrumahs-overthrow-to-attack-chinese-embassy-in-ghana. Accessed on 15/01/2020

[197] Abayomi Azikiwe. "Ghana and the 1966 Coup Against Kwame Nkrumah." 2016.

On 12th March 1966 at 10:30 am, suspicions raised by some of Nkrumah's 'multifaceted intelligence networks were proven to be true. The US overtly showed its hands as being behind the military coup. A memo to President Johnson from Robert W Komer, US Special Assistant to President Johnson, stated that the overthrow of Nkrumah's government was 'another example of Fortuitous Windfall'.[198] He emphasised that 'Nkrumah was doing more to undermine our interests than any other black African' and that the 'new military regime is almost pathetically pro-Western.' Komer then stressed that the US should 'follow through skilfully and consolidate such successes.' Komer stated that;

> "A few thousand tons of surplus wheat or rice, given now when the new regimes are quite uncertain as to their future relations with us, could have a psychological significance out of all proportion to the cost of the gesture. I am not arguing for lavish gifts to these regimes—indeed, giving them a little only whets their appetites, and enables us to use the prospect of more as leverage."[199]

On 25th February 1966 at 6:18 pm, a telegram from the Department of State to the embassy in Ghana further highlighted the involvement of the US in the military coup d'état.

> "1. Embassy's prompt, comprehensive and perceptive reporting of coup events much appreciated by Dept.
>
> 2. Dept. fully cognizant that pressures for early recognition of new regime will mount. Before deciding how best to cope with this question, would prefer first have reaction of some other African countries. We wish avoid appearing overzealous by acting too quickly, thus lending credence to inevitable charges that U.S. masterminded coup. At same time, we wish move as quickly as feasible into position of mutually beneficial relations with new regime. Would hope be able take positive action soon. While you should make no commitment of any kind, you authorized maintain discreet normal contacts with NLC as necessary, but to extent possible leave initiatives to them at this early stage.
> 3. FYI: Dept. believes composition of NLC, particularly its Economic Committee, is encouraging3 and gives grounds for hope that new regime recognizes immense problems it faces. While our public posture influenced by para. 2 above, our attention already being directed toward question of how we might best assist Ghana in regaining its feet. Your comment para. 7 reftel relevant this connection. While speed important, however, technical and other considerations also necessitate certain amount of caution. Much will depend on performance NLC. First move in seeking US assistance, of course, must be initiation by NLC of specific requests for our consideration and that of other countries and with agencies such as IMF, IBRD. End FYI.
> 4. We also encouraged by absence of bloodbath and generally moderate approach taken by NLC thus far toward Nkrumah's cohorts. Retention of judiciary and public service particularly welcome, as is apparent desire for rapid return to civilian government.

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[198] "Memorandum from the President's Acting Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Komer) to President Johnson." *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, 260 - Office of the Historian*. US Department of State, Vol. XXIV, Document 260, (1966), [online resource] available from, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v24/d260. Accessed on 15/07/2018
[199] Ibid

5. Nkrumah's hopes of returning to power and his subsequent statements and movements will of course continue be relevant."[200]

Key Takeaways During Kwame Nkrumah's Time in Office

Nkrumah truly appreciated the importance of pre-condition 2 and the vital role it could play within his national security institutions in stabilising the country's landscape. Unlike the colonial regime who at the beginning disregarded pre-conditions 2 and 3, Nkrumah's appreciation for intelligence underscores why he zealously incorporated pre-condition 2, to the extent of creating a multifaceted intelligence network. Even though other commentators may argue that Nkrumah creating a parallel security apparatus, duplicated the work of the original national security architecture, this dissertation has a different perspective. This dissertation believes that creating the parallel network (although it might play a bare minimum part) was not the reason for Nkrumah's demise. Notably, such an extensive intelligence network rather gave Nkrumah's administration a relatively wider coverage of intelligence collection.

The multifaceted intelligence agencies enabled Nkrumah's government to have eyes and ears everywhere across the country and the continent, not forgetting the FSRB's role in collecting intelligence outside the shores of the African continent. However, where Nkrumah missed the point was that he misjudged the power of having in place pre-condition 3 to ensure interagency intelligence coordination. So, although his administration did not necessarily lack understanding of what was happening; it was situationally unaware as it was unable to separate the facts from the noise, which led to Nkrumah's demise. Meanwhile, on the other hand, had Nkrumah not discouraged intelligence coordination and established a mechanism or a centre that ensured effective coordination and sharing of intelligence (third pre-condition); there would have been some element of unity within the broader architecture. The division,

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[200] "Memorandum for the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (Helms)." *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, Africa - Office of the Historian*, US Department of State, Point 3, Volume XXIV, Document 257, (1964).

rivalry, and suspicious environment created within the architecture, which negatively impacted the country's political and security landscape, would have arguably been curtailed.

Not only that, with some degree of cooperation within the architecture, the military coup d'état would have been foiled, and Nkrumah's trip to Vietnam would have been cancelled. This would have produced a different outcome rather than Nkrumah ending up in exile in Guinea Conakry, from where he blamed the United States' CIA for masterminding the coup d'état.[201] On the flip side, Nkrumah's allies from the Eastern Bloc coupled with loyalists in exile and their sympathizers in Ghana did not go down without a fight. In 1968, there was an attempted counter-coup in Ghana to re-instate Nkrumah into power, of which the Warsaw Pact countries especially the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia played significant roles. Most importantly was "Operation ALEX", which was an attempt by the Czechoslovakian intelligence service to support Nkrumah loyalists in their attempts to launch a left-wing counter-coup in Ghana.[202] All of these plots collectively made the country's political and security landscape, chaotic, fragile, and unstable, posing imminent challenges for the interim NLC military regime to deal with.[203]

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[201]James Hilty. *The Education of a University President Marvin Wachman*, (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2005), p. 82

[202] Natalia Telepneva. 'Saving Ghana's Revolution, The Demise of Kwame Nkrumah and the Evolution of Soviet Policy in Africa, 1966-1972', *Journal of Cold War Studies*, 20:4, (2018), pp. 4-25

[203] Eshun, J. 'Security Under Nkrumah's Administration', Virtual Conversation with Samuel Eduku Cobbold (Educationist / Nkrumahist) on Microsoft Teams, 21 June, (2020).

Chapter 6: The National Liberation Council (NLC) Era and the Intelligence-Led National Security Architecture from 1966 to 1969

Table 9: Pre-Conditions for Intelligence-Led National Security

INTELLIGENCE-LED NATIONAL SECURITY ARCHITECTURE		
Pre-condition 1	**Pre-condition 2**	**Pre-condition 3**
Establish National Security Institutions	Embark on Intelligence Activities	Implement Interagency Intelligence Coordination
Protect and defend national interests against known and unknown threats	Offers eyes and ears within and outside country's territorial borders	Makes architecture situationally aware of magnitude and scope of overarching threats

This chapter describes the restructuring of the country's national security architecture in the immediate aftermath of the coup which overthrew Kwame Nkrumah. It continues Ghana's historical journey and the evolution of the state's intelligence-led national security architecture. It explains how the National Liberation Council (NLC) set up its pre-condition 1 to incorporate pre-condition 2 and encouraged pre-condition 3, during the reformation process. Therefore, embracing all three pre-conditions by creating an intelligence-led national security architecture and projecting its importance. This chapter demonstrates that although the NLC was a military dictatorship unlike Nkrumah's democratic government; it still managed to create domestic stability in the country due to having the three pre-conditions at play.

Prepping for the NLC's Reign

The manner in which Nkrumah's administration was unseated further escalated the division in Ghana, which was already polarised, creating a very fragile, volatile, and turbulent landscape in the country. Further, there was also the war of ideals and ideologies being fought in Ghana between the Western and Eastern bloc countries in that era. Collectively, these created the situation whereby the slightest mistake could have thrown the country into turmoil. The NLC military regime came to power knowing very well the magnitude of the political and security challenges which lied ahead for it to tackle. The NLC, right from the onset, appreciating the enormity of the task ahead, placed its regime in a much better position than its predecessors in dealing with threats confronting its government.

The NLC enhanced its approach towards national security activities, by distancing itself from practices of preceding administrations. Unlike the colonial regime that only embraced pre-condition 1, and the Nkrumah administration that put in place pre-conditions 1 and 2, the NLC refrained from the preceding governments' mistakes as it embarked on pre-conditions 1, 2, and 3; creating an intelligence-led national security architecture. By having all the three pre-conditions, the regime placed its intelligence-led national security architecture in a relatively advantageous position, whereby it had eyes and ears everywhere. This was thanks to its intelligence activities and inter-agency intelligence coordination, which made it situationally aware of what was occurring and emerging. Hence, the NLC was ultimately able to counter threats facing the regime to stabilise Ghana's landscape until it handed over power to a democratically elected government.

This chapter demonstrates that, unlike previous administrations, the NLC was successful in stabilising the country's landscape because the security architecture had three pre-conditions in place, which were; (i) created national security institutions, (ii) embarked on intelligence activities, and (iii) implemented inter-agency intelligence coordination. This chapter begins with the historical background and political narrative surrounding the NLC's governance, alongside an assessment of the internal and external threats to Ghana. This is followed by an analysis of the architecture's intelligence activities and its inter-agency intelligence coordination, which is interspersed with how all three pre-conditions impacted the regime's effectiveness in addressing perceived threats. Finally, this chapter explores how these activities influenced the outcome of the NLC's term in office, as the regime peacefully handed over power to a democratically elected government by reinstating the country's democracy.

Politicos Historia During the NLC Era

A new era orchestrated by Western intelligence services and executed by the NLC begun in Ghana, after the 24th of February 1966 military coup, which ousted Nkrumah's government.

This new regime known as the National Liberation Council was led by Joseph Ankrah, 'whom Nkrumah had fired on suspicion of disloyalty'.[1] The council was made up of a small number of army and police officers as shown below.[2]

Figure 7: Names of Members of the National Liberation Council

Approved For Release 2006/12/19 : CIA-RDP79-00927A006400010003-0

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Members of the National Liberation Council (NLC)

Joseph A. ANKRAH Lt. Gen.; Commander in Chief, Ghana Armed Forces	Chairman of NLC since coup; blunt, forceful, impatient with delays; installed by leaders of 24 February coup who needed a senior moderator; has gradually asserted actual leadership	Age 52; Member of Ga Tribe
John W. K. HARLLEY Inspector General of Police	Deputy Chairman of NLC since coup; played key role in overthrow of Nkrumah; his continuing leadership, based on his firm command of the police and his subtly strong personality, has kept the junta unified	Age 49; Member of Ewe Tribe
Akwasi A. AFRIFA Brig.; Commandant Ghana Military Academy	Youngest NLC member; colorful, brash, mercurial; often takes independent position on controversial issues; inclusion in NLC due primarily to decisive role of his unit in the coup; his impetuosity has at times caused tensions in the NLC	Age 33; Member of Chiefly Family of Ashanti Tribe
Anthony K. DEKU Commissioner of Police	NLC member responsible for intelligence and security; trusted deputy to fellow Ewe tribesman Harlley; their longtime professional collaboration has extended to political solidarity	Age 45; Member of Ewe Tribe
Emmanuel K. KOTOKA Maj. Gen.; deceased 17 April 1967	A prime mover in the overthrow of Nkrumah, he was a key member of the NLC until killed in the April 1967 mutiny of an army unit	Age 41 at Death; Member of Ewe Tribe
John E. O. NUNOO Commissioner of Police	Pleasant, ineffectual, and largely without influence in the NLC; included in junta because of seniority in police; has gained some influence with fellow Ga tribesman Ankrah	Age 51; Member of Ga Tribe
Albert K. OCRAN Maj. Gen.; Commander of Army	Stabilizing factor in NLC; has shown little taste for political power and has given primary attention to military duties; usually supports Harlley and Deku on major issues	Age 38; Member of Fanti Tribe
Bawa A. YAKUBU Deputy Commissioner of Police	Sole northerner on the NLC; professional policeman with few political ambitions; has maintained bland relations with all NLC colleagues	Date of Birth Unknown; Member of Dagomba Tribe

[3]

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[1] CIA-RDP79T00826A000400010049-8. 'The New Regime in Ghana', Intelligence Memorandum, (1966), Approved for Release 2004/07/16. P.6
[2] "Ghana Department of State Background", Ghana - Post-Nkrumah Politics. *Infoplease*, U.S. Department of State, 2007, [online resource] available from, https://www.infoplease.com/world/countries/state-department-profiles/ghana-department-of-state-background. Accessed on 15/01/2020
[3] CIA-RDP79-00927A006400010003-0. 'Ghana's Complex Road Toward Civilian Rule', Weekly Summary: Special Report, (1968), Approved for Release 2006/12/19.

Holistically, the NLC consisted of four army officers and four police officers[4] who assumed the role of the executive branch of the new regime in Ghana.[5] This new regime justified its action regarding the military coup by citing what it claimed to be Nkrumah's abuse of power, widespread political repression, sharp economic decline, and rampant corruption.[6] For those reasons, immediately after the military coup, all of Nkrumah's ministers were dismissed, the CPP and National Assembly were dissolved, and the constitution was suspended. In contrast, members of the judiciary and civil service were kept in their posts by the NLC regime.[7] Consequently, after establishing its first cabinet, the NLC appointed civil servants as cabinet members. The new regime subsequently announced in public that it would return the country back to a democratic rule as soon as possible;[8] however, in private, General Ankrah was indicating 'that the country must first undergo a period of re-education for 18 months to two years.' The NLC also opened up the country's borders and its prisons to allow the return of Nkrumah's opponents in exile and the release of those who were jailed, back into the Ghanaian society.[9]

The NLC still kept in place a ban on the formation of political parties for about two years. In late 1968, the ban was lifted and the appointment of a succession of committees (composed of civil servants and politicians) erupted in the country as part of the steps towards democratic rule. Political party activity was eventually allowed and in August 1969, the first competitive nationwide political contest begun in the country.[10] As a pro-West regime, the NLC sought economic, financial, administrative, and security aid and advice from the United States. They

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[4] CIA-RDP79T00826A003200100001-9. 'Ghana', Current Intelligence Country Handbook, (1966), Approved for Release 2002/01/03.

[5] KB Quantson. *Ghana, National Security*, Foreign Hands behind Nkrumah's Overthrow, (Accra: Bestas Press-NAPASVIL VENTURES, 2003), p. 40

[6] CIA-RDP80B01676R000400130013-2. 'The New Regime in Ghana', Intelligence Memorandum, (1966), Approved for Release 2006/11/08, pp 1 - 6

[7] "Ghana Department of State Background." *Infoplease*, U.S. Department of State. 2007.

[8] Joanne Maher. Philip McIntyre., ed., *The Europa World Year Book*, Ghana: Introductory Survey, (London: Europa Publication, 2004), p. 1874

[9] CIA-RDP79T00827A000300110001-2. 'Ghana', (1966), Approved for Release 2004/08/31. pp 28-31

[10] Tapan Prasad Biswal. *Ghana, Political and Constitutional Developments*, (New Delhi: Northern Book Centre, 1992), p. 105

embarked on a drastic shift from anti-East policies to pursue a strong pro-West agenda.[11] Such a move contributed to helping the NLC to acquire enormous intelligence support from Western Intelligence Services, which helped them counter numerous threats from both internal and external actors.[12]

Threat Landscape During the NLC Era

It is believed that from their first day in office, the NLC "assessed its security threats on assumptions which were too broad and too subjective".[13] Despite the national security setup put in place by the NLC, the regime was also aware of threats emerging from both home and abroad, which posed significant challenges to the survival of its government.[14] The NLC came to power with very broad defined threats which they perceived as dangerous to the stability of their regime. Therefore, they pursued what is described as "robust anti-Nkrumah, anti-African, anti-Socialists and anti-East foreign policy".[15] Nkrumah and his entire CPP and anyone believed to have had affiliation or supported him were collectively perceived as a threat to national security. These also included individuals who worked under Nkrumah's government, anyone with Socialist orientation, all tribesmen (Nzemah tribe) of Nkrumah, and even anyone with Nkrumah's portrait displayed in their home.[16] Externally, all the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc nations, Cuba, Guinea (where Nkrumah had settled in exile and was made Co-President), Mali, and some other African nations were all perceived as threats to national security.[17] These threats can be grouped under two broad categories, internal and external.

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[11] CIA-RDP79T00827A000300110001-2. 'Ghana', (1966), Approved for Release 2004/08/31. pp 28-31
[12] Sherman Kent. "Ghana's Political and Economic Malaise." *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIV, Africa*, (1967), pp 2 – 3 [online resource] available from, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v24/d268. Accessed on 15/01/2020
[13] K.B Quantson. *Ghana: National Security*, The Tribal Problem and National Security, (Accra: Bestas Press-NAPASVIL Ventures, 2003), p. 37
[14] Eshun, J. 'Security Under Nkrumah's Administration', Virtual Conversation with Samuel Eduku Cobbold (Educationist / Nkrumahist), Microsoft Teams, 21 June, (2020).
[15] K.B Quantson. *Ghana: National Security*, Foreign Hands Behind Nkrumah's Overthrow, (Accra: Bestas Press-NAPASVIL Ventures, 2003), pp 37 – 46,
[16] Eshun, J. 'Security Under Nkrumah's Administration', Virtual Conversation with Samuel Eduku Cobbold (Educationist / Nkrumahist), Microsoft Teams, 21 June, (2020).
[17] K.B Quantson. *Ghana: National Security*, The Tribal Problem and National Security, (Accra: Bestas Press-NAPASVIL Ventures, 2003), pp 37 – 38

Internal Threats

Internal challenges perceived as threats by the NLC regime emerged from 'multifaceted angles, including Nkrumah sympathisers within the national security setup, tribalism, some media outlets, and NLC political opponents. However, this dissertation will mainly focus on threats within the national security set-up and tribalism.

Threats Within the National Security Set-up

Firstly, were the threats posed by Nkrumah sympathisers within the national security setup. Approximately a year after the NLC regime was in office, on 17th April 1967, a group of junior officers of the army reconnaissance squadron based at the Volta region of Ghana, launched a counter-coup to return Nkrumah into power. However, due to the support from Western intelligence agencies, the NLC had a strong intelligence base at their disposal and was able to foil the plot.[18] The leadership of the regime announced that a coup plot with plans to assassinate all senior officers had been crushed. They further stated that about 120 members of the Army Reconnaissance Regiment on training manoeuvres attacked the presidential castle, government offices and even succeeded in occupying the radio station. However, they were met by resistance from the loyal troops who eventually over-powered the coup plotters. The NLC leaders also announced that some military officers were killed including General Kotoka, however, General Ankrah, the Head of State was unharmed. The perpetrators were arrested with their leaders, jailed, and 20 mutineers disarmed. Rumours linked the coup plotters to ex-President Nkrumah.[19]

Furthermore, in late 1968, there was another military coup attempt by Air Marshal M.A. Otu, the General Officer commanding the Ghana Armed Forces and his aide, a Naval Lieutenant

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[18] Robert Pinkney. *Ghana Under Military Rule 1966-1969*, Putting Down Roots, Threats to NLC's Survival, (London: Methuen & Co Ltd, 1972), pp 37 - 45
[19] "Analysis of the Causes of Military Coup D'état in Sub-Saharan Africa 1960 to 1982." *Defense Technical Information Center*, US Department of Defense, 1983 [online resource] available from, https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a151943.pdf. Accessed on 15/01/2020

as well as other pro-Nkrumah supporters which also failed.[20] The conventional wisdom is that most of the senior army officers were unhappy about the 1966 coup and how it had interrupted the promotion cycle. They maintained that some colleagues were favoured over others, receiving quicker promotions, while others were held back.[21] Most of the officers believed promotions were influenced by tribal affiliation with the government in power. Therefore, officers from certain tribes were favoured by the ruling government over others from different tribes.[22] They were convinced that a change of government would be the solution to restore an equitable ethnic balance in promotions within the armed forces.[23]

Tribalism as a Threat

Although the threat of tribalism re-surfaced for the first time after independence under Nkrumah's administration, it was not distinctively obvious. Despite there being some glimpses of the threat posed by tribalism to national security under Nkrumah's administration, it became more apparent during the NLC rule.[24] It is claimed that after Nkrumah was overthrown, the new military regime allowed "emotional, vindictive and whimsical factors" to dominate their immediate activities, especially concerning the country's national security set-up.[25] As the "NLC consisted of four police and three military officers" who were made up of "Ewe" and "Akan" tribes, it is also important to highlight that it was these same officers that felt alienated by Nkrumah for appointing his fellow "Nzemah" tribesmen as SB director. Hence when the NLC attained office after the military coup, most of "Nzemah" operatives within the inherited national security architecture were dismissed. The director of SB, Ben Forjoe, an "Nzemah"

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[20] Robert Pinkney. *Ghana Under Military Rule 1966-1969*, Putting Down Roots, Threats to NLC's Survival, (London: Methuen & Co Ltd, 1972), pp 37 – 45

[21] Chuka Onwumechili. *African Democratisation and Military Coup*, Reasons for and History of Military Coups, (Westport: Greenwood Publishing Group, 1998), p. 41

[22] CIA-RDP79T00826A001800010060-0. 'Situation in Ghana', Intelligence Memorandum, (1967), Approved for Release 2007/06/05. pp 1-2

[23] IBP USA. 'Ghana Country Study Guide', The Acheampong Regime 1972-1978, *International Business Publications*, (2012), pp 140 - 148

[24] CIA-RDP79-00927A007300060003-5. 'Ghana's Second Republic', Weekly Summary: Special Report, (1969), Approved for Release 2006/05/24. p. 3

[25] K.B Quantson. *Ghana: National Security*, The Tribal Problem and National Security, (Accra: Bestas Press-NAPASVIL Ventures, 2003), pp 47 – 56

who was appointed by Nkrumah, was one of the victims, including other competent intelligence professionals, such as KB Quantson who initially also lost his job (although Quantson successfully appealed to be reinstated in his role).[26] Furthermore, a good number of trained, competent, and experienced national security and intelligence professionals were dismissed due to their tribal affiliation with Nkrumah.

Others were also sacked because of their political and personal connections with Nkrumah. For those reasons, tribalism became deep-rooted into the nation's politics resulting in such an issue being deemed 'as a major national security threat.'[27] The actions by the NLC appeared to have created a 'big loyalty problem for the chunk of trained, humiliated, aggrieved and traumatized operatives'[28]. This cultivated what was termed as a 'rich base' for recruitment by 'politically displaced people for rebellious purposes'[29]. A dangerous precedence for the country was set, as intelligence professionals were appointed and/or replaced based on tribal affiliation rather than on a competency basis.[30] Consequently, creating the perception that all Nzemah people were threat to national security threat and the regime's survival.[31] Although, the NLC, initially seemed united against a 'common' adversary, including those from the Nzemah tribe who were perceived to be affiliated with Nkrumah; internally the NLC had its problems with tribalism. The issue of tribalism became clear on May 1969, at the period when the country was preparing for a general election.

The NLC was divided between 'Akan' and 'Ewe', with police bosses Harlley and Deku supporting their 'Ewe' tribesman presidential candidate, Gbedema, and military General A.A Afrifa openly supporting his 'Akan' tribesman presidential candidate, K.A Busia, who

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[26] K.B. Quantson. *Ghana Peace and Stability: Chapters from the Intelligence Sector* Oh Acheampong: 1972, (Accra: Advent Press - NAPASCOM Ltd, 2000), p. 83

[27] K.B Quantson. *Ghana: National Security*, The Tribal Problem and National Security, (Accra: Bestas Press-NAPASVIL Ventures, 2003), pp 47 – 56

[28] Ibid

[29] Ibid.

[30] Ibid.

[31] K.B Quantson. *Ghana: National Security*, Foreign Hands Behind Nkrumah's Overthrow, (Accra: Bestas Press-NAPASVIL Ventures, 2003), pp 37 – 46

eventually won the election.[32] During the transitional period from the NLC's military regime to Busia's democratically elected Progress Party (PP) in 1969, the threat of tribalism hit the NLC's intelligence-led national security architecture extremely hard. SB, the national intelligence agency, lost several competent operatives due to tribal affiliation. Many of those affected were Ewe, who assumed their positions when NLC took office in 1966. Although tribalism was perceived as a national security threat by the NLC military regime, it was not until during the governance of subsequent regimes that it manifested itself as a real concern. In addition to tribalism being a national security threat as explained above, "there were several other plots and counter-plots in Nkrumah's name, some of them fake, but as a result of varying levels of betrayals, none were successful."[33] Not all of these coup plots emerged from within the country however, there were some external plots as well.

External Threats

External threats, on the other hand, were posed by Guinea Conakry, Mali, some other African nations that shared Nkrumah's vision, and Eastern bloc countries; especially the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia as explained next.[34]

Perceived Threats from Guinea and Mali

To begin with, the governments of Guinea and Mali were perceived as potential threats to the NLC regime as they were known to be Pro-Nkrumah. There was an allegation that the Guinean government for instance put in place an effective strategy, (described as convincing machinery) which was to ensure Nkrumah's second coming to Ghana. It is believed that the Guinean government and its entire political committee provided facilities, passports and also made embassies readily available to help transmit messages and move weapons during that

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[32] K.B. Quantson. *Ghana Peace and Stability: Chapters from the Intelligence Sector*, Oh Acheampong: 1972, (Accra: Advent Press - NAPASCOM Ltd, 2000), pp 97 – 98
[33] Linus Tongwo Asong. *Osagyefo, The Great Betrayal*, A Historical Novel, (Cameroon: Langaa RPCIG, 2010), p. 137
[34] CIA-RDP79T00827A000300110001-2. 'Ghana', (1966), Approved for Release 2004/08/31. pp 28-31

operation. As part of the operation, Nkrumah was invited to spend the night before the operation (26th November 1968) at Sekou Toure's (President of Guinea) residence. This was to enable him to make a swift broadcast to the Ghanaian nation about his return to power, once the operation was a success.[35] Additionally, Kwame Nkrumah and President Toure of Guinea planned for Nkrumah's return. Ahead of this plan, Toure arranged for 20,000 French-trained Guinean ex-servicemen, and 50,000 locally-trained personnel to be sent into Ghana in a military convoy. Their task was to help free Ghanaians from the military dictatorship ahead of Nkrumah's grand return. The Ghana Trades Union Congress warned President Toure that the workers and all the people of Ghana did not want Kwame Nkrumah; and that Ghanaians would firmly stand by the new progressive Government.[36]

Despite the warning, Nkrumah, Sekou Toure, and the entire planning group were very convinced and positive about their planned operation, to the extent that Nkrumah began planning where he was going to live in Ghana. It was reported that Nkrumah sketched a plan of his intended underground headquarters which was to be based on the mountains of Aburi, a town in Ghana.[37] It is evident that the NLC at the time was facing multiple security challenges. This was because Nkrumah sympathisers, both internally and externally, were trying to wrestle power away from the regime. As part of those external threats were those also emerging from the Eastern bloc countries.

Perceived Threats from Soviets, China, and Cuba

With immediate effect from being in power, the NLC military regime ceased diplomatic relations with the Soviets, China, and Cuba. It subsequently, closed down its embassies in

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[35] Linus Tongwo Asong. *Osagyefo, The Great Betrayal*, A Historical Novel, (Cameroon: Langaa RPCIG, 2010), pp 140 – 144

[36] "Keesing's Contemporary Archives 21275." Stanford, 1966, [online resource] available from, http://web.stanford.edu/group/tomzgroup/pmwiki/uploads/1408-1966-Keesings-a-EYJ.pdf. Accessed on 15/01/2020

[37] Linus Tongwo Asong. *Osagyefo, The Great Betrayal*, A Historical Novel, (Cameroon: Langaa RPCIG, 2010), pp 140 – 144

these countries and withdrew its technicians.[38] Five other embassies in the Eastern bloc countries were also closed down, including Hanoi in North Vietnam.[39] It is believed that the new administration referred to the Communist ideology as an imminent threat and vowed to "remove all traces of alien ideological influence" from the country.[40] The new regime ousted 620 Soviet technicians and advisers who worked in schools, state farms, research and government ministries.[41]

The ousting of Nkrumah coupled with the said action taken by the Pro-West NLC regime, rekindled debate within the Warsaw Pact surrounding the prospects for revolution in Africa. Hence, the roles of the Warsaw Pact countries, especially the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia were perceived by the new pro-West military regime of Ghana as a threat.[42] Especially as the Warsaw Pact initiated, "a series of unsuccessful attempts on behalf of the Soviet and Czechoslovak intelligence services to restore Nkrumah to power."[43]

'Operation ALEX', which was an attempt by the Czechoslovakian intelligence service to support Nkrumah loyalists in their attempts to launch a left-wing counter-coup in Ghana was evidence of such a threat.[44] There were even attempts made by the Czechoslovak rezidentura in Accra to assist members of Ghana's internal opposition to launch a countercoup, as part of Operation ALEX. Moscow increased training and equipment supply for the military and security services of some African nations that it considered as being friends.[45] The KGB, continued attempts to undermine the Western security services in Ghana, with some success but not enough to successfully reinstate Nkrumah back into power.[46] Thanks to an effective

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[38] CIA-RDP79T00827A000300110001-2. 'Ghana', (1966), Approved for Release 2004/08/31. pp 28-31

[39] Hutchful, E. Military Rule and the Politics of Demilitarization, [PhD Thesis] University of Toronto, (1973), p. 148–149.

[40] Telepneva, Natalia. 'Saving Ghana's Revolution: The Demise of Kwame Nkrumah and the Evolution of Soviet Policy in Africa 1966-1972', *Journal of Cold War Studies*, 20:4, (2018), pp. 4-25

[41] Ibid.

[42] Ibid.

[43] Ibid.

[44] Telepneva, Natalia. 'Saving Ghana's Revolution: The Demise of Kwame Nkrumah and the Evolution of Soviet Policy in Africa 1966-1972', *Journal of Cold War Studies*, 20:4, (2018), pp. 4-25

[45] Ibid.

[46] Ibid.

intelligence-led national security architecture, spearheaded by Western intelligence services, that had all the three pre-conditions in place.

The NLC's Intelligence-led National Security Architecture Encompassing Pre-Conditions 1, 2, and 3

Upon assuming power, the NLC dissolved most of Nkrumah's 'multifaceted' intelligence apparatus. Within the inherited national security architecture, the new regime abolished the African Affairs Secretariat (AAS) and renamed the Foreign Service Research Bureau (FSRB) to Research Bureau (RB). Its members were also reshuffled to actively embark on foreign intelligence collection for regime protection against the Eastern bloc and Nkrumah's allies abroad.[47] Besides this, the NLC also initially abolished the Military Intelligence Unit (MIU) and reintroduced it later into its national security setup to help boost regime protection and to make it very difficult to be overthrown from power. As the NLC consisted of personnel from the military and the police, its intelligence activities within the inherited national security architecture were divided equally between the Army and the Police.[48] The outlook of the intelligence-led national security architecture under NLC rule is shown in the diagram on the next page.

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[47] Sandy Africa and Johnny Kwadjo. "Changing Intelligence Dynamics in Africa." *GFN-SSR* (2009), pp 90 - 110
[48] Ibid.

Pre-Condition 1: NLC Established National Security Institutions

The NLC fulfilled pre-condition 1 by putting in place national security institutions upon assuming office. These institutions included the Ghana Police Service, Ghana Armed Forces, and the Research Bureau. From these institutions, the regime carved out other agencies to form its national security structure as shown in the diagram below.

Diagram
1966 - 1969 National Security Structure of Ghana

Figure 8: 1966 - 1969 National Security Structure of Ghana

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Pre-Condition 2: NLC Incorporated Agencies that Embarked on Intelligence Activities

Having fulfilled pre-condition 1, the regime recognised the importance in incorporating pre-condition 2. The NLC carved out the Military Intelligence Unit from the Ghana Armed Forces and created the Research Bureau. The regime also formed the Special Branch and Criminal Investigations Department from the Ghana Police Service. Successful candidates had to

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49 Diagram Sketched by Author

undergo a series of examinations, and the decision to be recruited into SB or CID was dependent on grades obtained. These agencies were then charged with intelligence activities to be the eyes and ears on the ground for the regime.

Special Branch (SB)

To fully appreciate the composition of Special Branch under the NLC, there is the need to contrast it to the makeup of SB under Nkrumah's government. During Nkrumah's administration, SB was on paper, the intelligence hub of the nation. Its members were skilled personnel, mainly Ghanaians who have undergone a series of examinations and had excelled with excellent grades. Nkrumah made SB autonomous from the Ghana Police Service (GPS). It was a separate arm of the National security architecture, which reported directly to him. The Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner of the GPS, J.W.K. Harlley and A.K. Deku respectively, who contributed significantly to develop SB after independence, were unhappy with that decision. To make matters worse, Nkrumah appointed Mr. Ben Forjoe, a civilian and fellow tribesman but competent intelligence professional as its first director. Harlley and Deku were ordered to return to the headquarters of the GPS, which caused lots of irritation within the service.[50]

However, soon after the demise of Nkrumah's administration, commissioner Harlley who was one of the main architects of the 1966 military coup and also the vice chairman of the NLC, was made the Inspector General of Police (IGP). The new IGP ordered Special Branch back into the Ghana Police Service and also ensured that Police officers who were transferred from SB and those who had their positions taken up by civilian intelligence professionals returned into SB. These officers returned with 'vim, venom and vengeance'[51] attitude targeting the civilian intelligence personnel, of which most of them were dismissed. The civilian intelligence

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[50] K.B. Quantson. *Ghana Peace and Stability, Chapters from the Intelligence Sector,* Oh Acheampong, (Accra: Advent Press - NAPASCOM, 2000), pp 81 – 92
[51] K.B. Quantson. *Ghana Peace and Stability, Chapters from the Intelligence Sector,* Oh Acheampong, (Accra: Advent Press - NAPASCOM, 2000), p. 83

personnel with the same tribal affiliation as Nkrumah were sacked, as were those with political and personal association with Nkrumah.[52] KB Quantson, a civilian, and competent intelligence professional, who was of the same tribe (Nzemah) as Nkrumah, and worked for SB during Nkrumah's administration also lost his job. However, Quantson was able to plead his case, stating that he held no tribal allegiance nor political association and successfully retained his job. Quantson moved on to serve under almost every successive regime in different capacities, until the year 2000, when Jerry Rawlings' democratically elected government handed over power to another successive democratically elected administration. Quantson, became arguably the most successful senior intelligence officer in Ghana's national security history.

During the NLC era, although still maintaining its internal intelligence agency status, coordination and management of SB was brought back under the command and control of the GPS. A director and deputy director were appointed and given the mandate to oversee the day-to-day operational and administrative duties of SB, whilst the director reported to the IGP.[53] Roles and duties of the SB under the NLC 's regime broadly consisted of intelligence collection and analysis within Ghana's borders for regime protection purposes. SB operated with plain-clothes officers, who specialised in political and security intelligence activities. They monitored closely all political opponents of the regime and gathered information through its divisions and sub-divisions, as well as through its agents across the country to support regime protection. Information was collected in public meeting places, other social gathering areas, businesses, marketplaces, and mainly anywhere that locals gathered for one reason or another.

Under Special Branch, intelligence analysts used the collected information to provide estimates of perceived threats across the country. In doing so, SB was able to identify groups

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[52] Ibid
[53] Ibid

or individuals perceived as planning to overthrow the regime in power. As part of its duties, SB was also charged with drafting procedures for the collection and recording of intelligence through committees at the regional, district, and local levels. It disseminated all intelligence to the top echelon of the regime, and also maintained a distribution list that indicated the structure of intelligence gained and disseminated. Finally, SB acted as the focal point for the national security of Ghana and monitored the media regularly for intelligence collection purposes.

Criminal Investigations Department (CID)

CID members were elites, mainly Ghanaians who have undergone a series of examinations and had very good grades, but not necessarily excellent. They worked in plain clothes and were employed as specialists in connection with various aspects of crime prevention and detection. Coordination and management of the entire GPS were organised on a national basis, with unified control and command under IGP whose direct report was the director of CID, responsible for exercising general day-to-day supervision over the operation and administrative duties of the CID.

The role of the CID under the NLC was not necessarily different from the previous administration. However, in addition to its duties, the CID was specifically tasked with investigating drugs-related incidents with national security implications. Hence the CID acted on both external and internal intelligence to apprehend perpetrators of drug offences and ensured that such cases were successfully detected in Ghana. One of the CID's successful operations in that era, which was related to a specific case, highlighted the significance of intelligence sharing and coordination to the regime's achievement. Through intelligence activities and inter-agency intelligence coordination, authorities became aware that harvested cannabis was usually being carried from farms in cocoa bags and empty cartons which were concealed in bushes along certain major roads in Ghana. Intelligence highlighted that transportation of these drugs occurred during the night and were concealed in cartons of soap

and soft drink and were tied together with a string. Being intelligence-led, authorities were able to organise roadblocks to and from specific major towns and cities. Searches of vehicles, which uncovered significant concealment were conducted and suspected passengers were arrested. This operation, associated with the country's intelligence-led national security architecture back then, was described as arguably one of the major successes in the war against drugs in sub-Saharan Africa.[54]

The CID had a laboratory which was adequately equipped and manned by a forensic scientist staff member, whilst at the same time the CID possessed a government analytical laboratory, which undertook an analysis for the department. Its personnel embarked on night patrols with police jeeps as part of its operational duties at the outskirts of the cities and major towns where people illegally consumed cannabis. These patrols were termed as one of the most successful methods of detecting cannabis in Ghana during that period. Due to an intelligence-led approach, most of its successes emerged from being able to investigate and detect various crimes including the identification of cannabis through forensic activities undertaken in their own laboratory.[55]

Military Intelligence Unit (MIU)

After the 1966 successful military coup d'état, the MIU was disbanded by the new regime. However, after the foiled coup in 1968, the regime saw the need to re-establish the MIU to help ensure its survival. Such a decision was taken to capitalise on the MIU's function of monitoring political activities of service personnel, with the aim to prevent the armed forces from being exploited for subversive purposes.[56] Its employees consisted of intelligence personnel from the military, navy, and air force.

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[54] T.E.C. Sagoe. "Narcotics Control in Ghana", A United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime publication. *UNODC*, 1966, [online resource] available from, https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/bulletin/bulletin_1966-01-01_2_page003.html. Accessed on 15/01/2020

[55] T.E.C. Sagoe. 'Narcotics Control in Ghana', A United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime publication, *UNODC*, (1966).

[56] Simon Baynham. *The Military and Politics in Nkrumah's Ghana*, (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1988), p. 131

Research Bureau (RB)

Although the FSRB was founded with the support of the Soviets under the previous administration, this new pro-West regime kept the agency. As part of its maintenance, the AAS was dissolved, and its members were integrated into the FSRB and renamed it the Research Bureau (RB). Coordination and management of the bureau were under the administrative control of the Ghana Foreign Ministry. They posted officials abroad under the cover of regular Ghanaian diplomats. Operational control was handled by the Office of the President at the Flagstaff House.[57] It was business as usual as agents of the RB were still Ghanaians who were posted out of the country as foreign dignitaries that represented Ghana abroad. Its members were also reshuffled to actively embark on foreign intelligence collection for regime protection against the Eastern bloc and Nkrumah's allies abroad.[58] RB agents were "posted to embassies in West Africa to monitor the activities of Nkrumah and his numerous agents"[59].

Pre-Condition 3: Implementation of Inter-Agency Intelligence Coordination

Having established pre-conditions 1 and 2, the NLC recognised the importance of inter-agency collaboration and cooperation as a part of the jigsaw puzzle to help maintain domestic stability. One of the regime's initial actions was to create the Special Executive for Counter Espionage.

Special Executive for Counter Espionage (SECE)

Thanks to Western intelligence services, the NLC also had a relatively effective intelligence coordinating body (pre-condition 3) incorporated into its national security architecture called the SECE, which was able to operate across the African continent effectively. This was used to help bolster its intelligence-gathering capabilities, to clamp down activities by Nkrumah

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[57] Sandy Africa and Johnny Kwadjo. "Changing Intelligence Dynamics in Africa." *GFN-SSR* (2009), pp 90 - 110
[58] Ibid.
[59] Norman Otis Richmond. 'Remembering Ahmed Sekou Toure as Guinea Turns 50', *Foundation Panafricaine Sekou Toure*, (2011)

loyalists operating across the African continent. [60] Personnel for the SECE were skilfully trained to penetrate the African continent with ease, hence its personnel operated with fluidity across the continent, were able to naturally mix in with natives and were very effective in intelligence-gathering. It was also their duty to ensure that all other intelligence obtained by other agencies within the architecture was effectively coordinated and presented to the higher echelon within the regime's hierarchy.

Analysis of Pre-Condition 3: Inter-Agency Intelligence Coordination and Response

The highlighted successes would not have been made possible if not for the immense contribution of Western intelligence services, which supported the NLC's intelligence-led national security architecture to be able to foil such threats. How the national security apparatus coordinated and shared intelligence to help respond to such threats are explained as follows. To begin with, the NLC purposely set up its national security institutions (pre-condition 1) by placing intelligence activities (pre-condition 2) and inter-agency coordination (pre-condition 3) at its core. The NLC, based on its composition of senior army and police officers, divided intelligence activities within its national security architecture equally between the army and the police to reflect the outlook of its membership. Additionally, the regime also deliberately created an intelligence coordinating body called the SECE as mentioned above.[61] The SECE was used to help bolster its intelligence-gathering capabilities, to clamp down activities by Nkrumah loyalists operating across the African continent. Its personnel operated with fluidity across the African continent and were very effective in gathering intelligence, whilst at the same time sharing and coordinating with the other agencies within the architecture (CID, SB, MIU, RB), to protect the regime and maintain domestic stability in the country.

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[60] Linus Tongwo Asong. *Osagyefo: The Great Betrayal*, A Historical Novel, (Cameroon: Langaa RPCIG, 2010), pp 140 - 144
[61] Linus Tongwo Asong. *Osagyefo: The Great Betrayal*, A Historical Novel, (Cameroon: Langaa RPCIG, 2010), p. 142

The NLC had all the tools to counter threats from both home and abroad due to relatively effective intelligence-led national security architecture. For this reason, they were able to foil the April 1967 coup attempt, which resulted in high-ranking Ghanaian officials seeking refuge or assistance in US official residences.[62] However, unfortunately the same coup attempt resulted in the killing of the Ghana Armed Forces Commanding Officer, Kotoka, also a member of the NLC.[63] As part of their response, the regime ordered an investigation into the incident, which led to the "imprisonment of over six hundred civilians and over three hundred soldiers".[64] The two Lieutenants believed to be the main architects of the unsuccessful coup d'état were tried by a military court, convicted, and executed.[65] Other perpetrators were also arrested, with their leaders jailed and 20 mutineers disarmed.[66] Lengthy prison sentences were given to some reconnaissance squadron's non-commissioned officers who supported the coup attempt.[67], The squadron regiment was disbanded with its leaders who were part of the coup plot trialled, found guilty, and hanged. The findings of the investigations linked the coup plotters with Nkrumah.[68]

Additionally, to deal with future perceived threats, the NLC regime also enacted the Protective Custody Law in 1967.[69] This law enabled the administration to arrest and detain many people with no coherent evidence.[70] They "pursued a robust anti – Nkrumah, anti – African, anti –

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[62] CIA-RDP79T00826A001800010060-0. 'Situation in Ghana', Intelligence Memorandum, (1967), Approved for Release 2007/06/05. pp 1-2
[63] Asamoah Obed. *The Political History of Ghana (1950 – 2013), The Experience of a Non- Conformist*, (Bloomington: Author House, 2014), p. 154
[64] Robert Pinkney. *Ghana Under Military Rule 1966-1969*, Putting Down Roots, Threats to NLC's Survival, (London: Methuen & Co Ltd, 1972), pp 37 – 45
[65] Kwame Afadzi Insaidoo. *Ghana: A Time to Heal & Renew the Nation*, Did Dr Busia and his Progress Party Heal Ghana, (Bloomington: Author House, 2007), p. 46
[66] "Analysis of the Causes of Military Coup D'état in Sub-Saharan Africa 1960 to 1982." *Defense Technical Information Center*, US Department of Defense, 1983.
[67] CIA-RDP79-00927A006400010003-0. 'Ghana's Complex Road Toward Civilian Rule', Weekly Summary: Special Report, (1968), Approved for Release 2006/12/19.
[68] US Department of Defense. *Analysis of the Causes of Military Coup D'état in Sub-Saharan Africa 1960 to 1982*, Defense Technical Information Center, (1983)
[69] Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im. *African Constitutionalism and the Role of Islam*, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006), p. 68
[70] KB Quantson. *Ghana, National Security*, Preventive Detention and Protective Custody, (Accra: Bestas Press-NAPASVIL VENTURES, 2003), p 21

Socialists and anti – East foreign policy"[71] during their regime. The NLC was described as "wicked, untrue and a dangerous"[72] regime. They made widespread arrests and sacked the editors of newspapers which had propagated such allegations against them"[73]. Loyal members of Nkrumah's government were arrested and questioned. After many hours of interrogation his supporters were imprisoned or expelled from the country.[74]

Furthermore, after the 1968 alleged coup attempt by pro-Nkrumah elements, which was also foiled by the NLC's intelligence-led national security architecture, Air Marshal M.A. Otu (who became the General Officer commanding the Ghana armed forces), and his aide, a Naval Lieutenant were arrested for alleged subversive activity. Otu was not a member of the NLC but assumed his role by succeeding Kotoka. A military court charged both men with plans to overthrow the government and return Nkrumah to power and were eventually acquitted of their roles.[75] Finally, "the military cum police administration of the NLC, which toppled the Nkrumah regime, used the police to shoot striking mine workers in 1969"[76], who were possibly perceived as pro-Nkrumah supporters.

Meanwhile, on the external front, the NLC had no doubt about Nkrumah's ability to mobilise and move people in his favour effortlessly across the continent. For this reason, they concluded that their regime would be under continuous threat as long as Nkrumah was in Africa and alive. Therefore, with such a national security capability, with the skill to coordinate intelligence effectively at their disposal, the NLC had a very good intelligence community,

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[71] KB Quantson. *Ghana, National Security*, Foreign Hands behind Nkrumah's Overthrow, (Accra: Bestas Press-NAPASVIL VENTURES, 2003), p. 44
[72] David, BROWN. 'Who are the Tribalists?' Social Pluralism and Political Ideology in Ghana, *African Affairs*, 81:322, (1982), p.57
[73] Ibid.
[74] Autumn Anne Lawson. Kwame Nkrumah's Quest for Pan-Africanism, From Independence Leader to Deposed Despot, [MA Thesis], Acadia University, (2004), p. 159
[75] Robert Pinkney. *Ghana Under Military Rule 1966-1969*, Putting Down Roots, Threats to NLC's Survival, (London: Methuen & Co Ltd, 1972), pp 37 – 45
[76] Akua Britwun and Pim Marten. 'The Challenge of Globalisation', Labor Market Restructuring and Union Democracy in Ghana, Union/State Relations, *Journal for African Studies*, 10:2&3, (2008).

thanks to Western intelligence services.[77] This, in addition to its SECE, which was able to operate across the African continent effectively, the NLC's intelligence network was able to infiltrate the inner circle of Nkrumah's former cabinet members, intelligence services in Guinea, Mali, and most African nations perceived as pro-Nkrumah to foil external threats. For instance, it is believed that two days after Sekou Touré and his political committee had planned for a counter-coup that would ensure Nkrumah's return from exile in Guinea Conakry, the NLC had in its possession in Accra, Ghana, verbatim minutes of the political committee's meeting.[78]

With this intelligence in hand, the NLC employed every tactic and strategy at their disposal to help counter the threat of Nkrumah's second coming, which was emerging from Guinea. The regime embarked on activities such as sabotage, blackmail and outright murder or elimination of Nkrumah's former cabinet ministers and all those affiliated to Nkrumah in any shape or form.[79] Blackmail tactic was used to lure Nkrumah's CPP supporters and ex-ministers to agree to their course. The NLC threatened to evict their families from government owned bungalows. The NLC was able to turn many of them into 'traitors'. These CPP leaders on whom Nkrumah counted for return to power, became informants and assisted the NLC to thwart Nkrumah's efforts.[80]

Furthermore, the NLC also posted emissaries into most West African countries to monitor the activities of Nkrumah and his agents. The pro-NLC diplomatic mission in Guinea was also used as an intelligence post to monitor Nkrumah's agents coming in and out of Guinea. An emergency meeting was held by the SECE, which was chaired by one of the highest echelons within the RB (Ghana's foreign intelligence agency) called Hilla Limann, who later became the President of Ghana in the late 1970s to early 1980s. Hilla Limann was serving as the Head of

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[77] Linus Tongwo Asong. *Osagyefo: The Great Betrayal*, A Historical Novel, (Cameroon: Langaa RPCIG, 2010), pp 140 - 144
[78] Ibid.
[79] Linus Tongwo Asong. *Osagyefo, The Great Betrayal*, A Historical Novel, (Cameroon: Langaa RPCIG, 2010), pp 140 - 144
[80] Ibid.

Chancery in the Ghana embassy in Togo and was responsible for intelligence activities and the monitoring of pro-Nkrumah activities in Togo. It is alleged that Limann once boasted to some arrested ex-CPP members who arrived from Guinea that "even when Nkrumah coughs in Guinea, we know it".[81]

NLC's Ultimate Success for Establishing Pre-Conditions 1, 2, and 3

As indicated above, Nkrumah's planned second coming was unsuccessful as his network was successfully infiltrated by the NLC's counterintelligence team, with the help of Western intelligence agencies. On 19th November 1968, three days after the political committee meeting in Guinea, the President of Mali, Modibo Keita, who was also actively involved in planning for Nkrumah's second coming, was overthrown in a coup d'état; an event which was described by pro-Nkrumah camp as a CIA sponsored coup. Therefore, due to the important role Mali had to play in the operation for Nkrumah's second coming, the NLC acted swiftly the day after the coup to get the new Malian regime to change course. The NLC's intelligence-led national security architecture unearthed Mali's plan to support Nkrumah. This obtained intelligence helped Ghana's new military regime to warn the new regime in Mali to order their embassy in Ghana to immediately halt their pro-Nkrumah activities in Accra. The same intelligence helped the NLC regime to identify and round up several pro-Nkrumah agents in Ghana, who were either 'neutralised' or 'murdered'.[82]

Nonetheless, on 23rd November 1968, one of Nkrumah's intelligence team members arrived at Dahomey (West African country now known as Benin) as part of their operation for Nkrumah's second coming. However, due to inside information, which was passed on to the NLC from within Nkrumah's network in Guinea by so-called NLC's 'double agents', upon arrival, he was apprehended, flown to Ghana and paraded through the streets of Accra in a

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[81] Ibid.
[82] Linus Tongwo Asong. *Osagyefo: The Great Betrayal*: A Historical Novel, (Cameroon: Langaa RPCIG, 2010), pp 140 - 144

cage on national television. Another Nkrumah agent, Ekow Eshun was also arrested and immediately taken to Ghana and humiliated publicly. He was spectacled on national television 'virtually naked', with his hands tied behind him, and being dragged from one side to the other.[83]

On 25th November 1968, the political committee in Guinea received the news that all their intelligence operatives and emissaries were captured. On 27th November 1968, the day Nkrumah was supposed to have been addressing Ghanaians, an emergency meeting was held by Nkrumah's former intelligence chief, Ambrose Yankey. This meeting was aimed at identifying the double agents within their mist and deal with them to enable the Nkrumah camp to pursue their mission. As it turned out, the attempt of identifying the so called 'double-agents' was unsuccessful. Their operation for Nkrumah's second coming was foiled by the NLC's intelligence network[84] and Dr. Nkrumah remained in Guinea until he died of cancer in exile at Bucharest, Romania on 27th April 1972. Once again demonstrating how the NLC, through having pre-conditions 1, 2, and 3, was able to rely on its intelligence-led national security architecture to keep the regime's governance in place and stabilise the country's landscape.

Key Takeaways from the NLC Era

On paper, with such a relatively less impressive intelligence network compared to Nkrumah's multifaceted network, arguably, the NLC's national security institutions from this dissertation's point of view, should not have been able to stand the test of time in tackling the enormous threats it encountered. However, because it decided to incorporate all three pre-conditions, thus put intelligence activities and inter-agency intelligence coordination at the core of the national security institutions, the regime had in place a more formidable intelligence capability (an intelligence-led national security architecture) to prove equal to the challenges. It had eyes

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[83] Ibid.
[84] Ibid

and ears everywhere in the country in the form of SB and CID personnel who worked in subdivisions across the country, as well as well-trained spies who operated inside Ghana and across the continent. Not only that, all intelligence obtained, both from within Ghana or outside the country, unlike under Nkrumah's administration, were coordinated to make the regime situationally aware of what was occurring and/or emerging.

For this reason, the regime was able to counter such internal and external threats head-on for its survival. Therefore, dissimilar to preceding eras (from pre-colonial to Nkrumah's administration), the NLC military regime was in the loop of the perceived threats which threatened its survival. This made the regime effective in foiling all of the military coup d'états to successfully protect the NLC in power. A stark contrast to Nkrumah's administration that despite its multifaceted intelligence network, failed to stop the plot which unseated his administration. It is this dissertation's assessment that the only difference between Nkrumah's failure and the NLC's success, was that the NLC embraced interagency intelligence coordination (pre-condition 3), whilst Nkrumah discouraged it.

This dissertation also acknowledges the notion that the NLC had a relatively shorter duration in power compared to the pre-colonial, the colonial as well as the Nkrumah era. Therefore, casting doubts as to whether the NLC would have been able to sustain the stability of Ghana's political and security landscape for a much longer duration, than its three years in office. Although this point highlights the likelihood of this being true, the evidence does not support this conclusion. This dissertation asserts that the NLC would have still succeeded regardless of the duration. The reason is, the NLC, although had a much shorter duration in government than preceding administrations, its length in office was also relatively longer than some of the subsequent governments after the NLC regime. For instance, Akuffo's regime was for just one year, and Limann's government ended after two years; whilst Busia's administration was three years, a similar duration as the NLC.

What makes the difference is that the governments before and those that came within a decade after the NLC regime, regardless of their duration in power, all were unable to stabilise the country's landscape; making the argument that the NLC succeeded because it was not in office for long, a weak one. Akuffo and Limann even had a much shorter period in power than the NLC, however they both failed to stabilise the country's landscape. Whilst Busia had a similar number of years in power to the NLC's but also failed to do so. What is even more important is that Rawlings' government which was in power for almost two decades; as well as subsequent administrations who governed the country after Rawlings, all managed to sustain the stability of Ghana's political and security landscape. This dissertation assesses that the NLC regime, unlike preceding governments, and just like Rawlings' administration and the governments after, prioritised intelligence activities and interagency intelligence coordination into the duties of their respective national security institutions. Therefore, justifying this dissertation's argument that the NLC was successful because its national security institutions attached importance to intelligence activities and inter-agency intelligence coordination. Thus, embracing all three pre-conditions to operate an intelligence-led national security architecture, which ensured and maintained domestic stability.

Despite the successes, the NLC also had its own internal challenges to contend with, which became apparent towards the end of its governance. Such challenges especially came to the fore when the NLC lifted the ban on political parties on 1st May 1969, to pave the way for a general election, after three and a half years of being in office.[85] This brought to light issues of tribalism, which resulted in creating division in the country. This division became apparent during the 1969 election between Dr. KA Busia (Akan tribe) and Mr. Gbedemah (Ewe tribe). This issue of tribalism still continued after the general election, which was won by Busia. This resulted in the architecture losing a good number of trained, competent, and experienced national security and intelligence professionals. All of whom were dismissed because of their

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[85] Dennis Austin. *Ghana Observed*, Essays on the Politics of a West African Republic, The 1969 Election, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1976), pp 129 - 140

ethnicity, especially those from the Nzemah and Ewe tribes, which appeared to have had an adverse effect on the architecture under subsequent regimes. That being said, because of its ability to effectively coordinate its foreign and domestic intelligence agencies, coupled with their inhumane practices, as well as the enormous support obtained from Western intelligence services, the NLC was still successful in defending its regime and stabilising the country.

Finally, thanks to the regime having all the three pre-conditions in place, the NLC was able to stay in power, ensuring a new constitution was in place, overseeing a successful general election, and peacefully handing over power to a democratically elected government, Dr. Busia in 1969.[86] This new constitution re-established the position of Prime Minister as executive head of government, while the role of President as head of state was more ceremonial. To conclude, this dissertation asserts that the very act of the NLC embarking on a military coup to overthrow Nkrumah's democratically elected government, set a very dangerous precedent for the future. As such action made it acceptable that the power of the state could be usurped on the decision of a few, regardless of how high-minded those few might be.[87]

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[86] CIA-RDP79R00967A000300010009-9. 'The Doldrums in Ghana', Memorandum, (1970), Approved for Release 2006/09/25
[87] J. Clark Leith and Ludvig Söderling. *Ghana, Long Term Growth, Atrophy, and Recovery*, The NLC Legacy, A report for the OECD Development Centre project on Emerging Africa, OECD, (2000), p. 26 [online resource] available from, https://www.oecd.org/countries/ghana/2674846.pdf. Accessed on 15/01/2020

Chapter 7: Decade of Destabilisation from 1969 to 1981

Table 10: Pre-Conditions for Intelligence-Led National Security

INTELLIGENCE-LED NATIONAL SECURITY ARCHITECTURE		
Pre-condition 1	**Pre-condition 2**	**Pre-condition 3**
Establish National Security Institutions	Embark on Intelligence Activities	Implement Interagency Intelligence Coordination
Protect and defend national interests against known and unknown threats	Offers eyes and ears within and outside country's territorial borders	Makes architecture situationally aware of magnitude and scope of overarching threats

This chapter covers six consecutive governments made up of two democratic administrations and four military regimes, between 1969 and 1981.[1] Throughout this decade, each one of these governments put in place national security institutions, and in their unique way disregarded the importance of intelligence activities and interagency intelligence coordination. They embraced only pre-condition 1 but dismissed the relevance of pre-conditions 2 and 3 throughout that decade. This made their respective national security architecture not intelligence-led. Not only that, they prioritised economic policies coupled with either democratic/traditional policies or military dictatorship, in order to pursue domestic stability in Ghana.[2] Subsequently, this chapter draws a direct correlation between the deteriorated state of the architecture's professional integrity, and the practice of nepotism, tribal affiliation[3], as well as inadequate funding of the architecture by respective governments. Thereby, justifying how such events, coupled with the omission of the second and third pre-conditions, affected the architecture's response capabilities, which impaired its ability to counter security challenges. Thus, making the country dangerous by destabilising its political and security landscape to the verge of becoming a failed state.

Prepping for a Dive into the Dark Era of Ghana

This era in Ghana's journey (1969 to 1981), can be described as the dark years in the country's history. It was a period characterised by a series of military coup d'états, which significantly

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[1] Peace Corps. *Peace Corps Times*, (United States: Peace Corps, 1989), p. 9
[2] Schneider, Hartmut, et al. *Adjustment and equity in Ghana*, (Washington: Development Centre of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 1992), pp 15-16
[3] École des hautes études en sciences sociales. *Cahiers D'études Africaines*, (France: Mouton, 1985), p. 266

destabilised its political and security landscape. During this period, the country witnessed several changes of governments, with most of them through military coup d'états.[4] Such practices had adverse effects on the country's national security architecture, as this resulted in continuous changes of its higher echelon. There were six administrations/regimes in total which governed the country in that era. These were: Dr. Busia's democratically elected Progress Party (PP), the National Redemption Council (NRC) military regime, Acheampong's Supreme Military Council 1 (SMC I) regime, Akuffo's SMC II regime, Rawlings' Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) military regime and Dr. Hilla Limann's democratically elected People's National Party (PNP).[5]

Throughout this period, all of the different governments that came to power placed diverse factors at the top of their priority list to help create and sustain stability of the country's political and security landscape. Under each of the named governments, the country's national security architecture was either of low importance on their priority list or was not on it at all; let alone placing emphasis on incorporating intelligence activities and interagency intelligence coordination. In so doing, the governments of this era exhibited complete disregard for pre-conditions 2 and 3 as a prerequisite for the effectiveness of pre-condition 1. Meanwhile, it is impossible to maintain domestic stability without having all three pre-conditions in place.

To begin with, Busia's administration allowed tribalism to gain a significant foothold within its national security architecture. Favouritism through tribal affiliation took precedence over professional merits when it came to recruitment, promotion, and how the architecture performed its duties. Such practices were also being replicated across all sectors in the country, including the civil service, the business community, the broader private sector, and even in academia; where promotions and contracts were awarded based on tribal affiliations.

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[4] Addae, S. Kojo. *General history of Ghana Armed Forces*, (Ghana: Ministry of Defence of Ghana Armed Forces, 2005), p.411

[5] U.S. Department of State. *Background Notes, Ghana*, (US: Bureau of Public Affairs - Office of Public Communication, 1998), p. 4

Depending on ethnic backgrounds, such practices created a sense of belonging or not belonging to the privileged within society, making certain ethnic groups feel superior over other cultures. These created rivalries, tensions, hatred, and ultimately ethnic division in the country; impacting domestic stability, and resulting in the ousting of the Busia administration.

The Acheampong regime became the successor, when the Busia administration lost power. The Acheampong regime attached importance to the Ghana Armed Forces (GAF) and marginally improved its authority in society compared to the previous Busia administration. However, Acheampong also barely attributed relevance and value to all three pre-conditions. Moreover, the regime also placed an emphasis on economic development, however, with ill-equipped policies, the acts of corruption engulfed the higher echelon of the GAF and across all sectors in the entire country. This gave rise to significant hardship in Ghana, and destabilised its landscape, which resulted in the demise of the Acheampong regime. Subsequent events and priorities embarked on by the Akuffo regime, which was the next government, were no different from the preceding Acheampong regime. This government further deteriorated and destabilised the country's political and security landscape, making it extremely volatile and dangerous, which resulted in its demise and the beginning of the Rawlings' brief regime.

Few months after being in power, Rawlings handed over to the Limann administration. Upon assuming office, Limann placed significant emphasis on traditions/traditional rulers, democratic systems, and extensive economic policies to help stabilise the country's political and security landscape. Although the administration relied on some elements of pre-conditions 2 and 3, its interagency intelligence coordination was mainly implemented for its survival. Its complete disregard for establishing an intelligence-led national security architecture, and attaching importance to its preparedness, made it ineffective in addressing emerging challenges. This led to the demise of Limann's administration through a military coup. These stated events, coupled with ineffective intelligence work and its coordination within the national

security architecture under all the mentioned governments, resulted in prolonged destabilisation of the country's political and security landscape for over a decade.[6]

Therefore, the complete neglect of the country's national security architecture coupled with the absence of the second and third pre-conditions meant that, respective regimes had no idea what threats were emerging. For this reason, the successive administrations were not situationally aware, resulting in continuous military coup d'états, which destabilised the country's political and security landscape to almost becoming a failed state. Had these governments taken the architecture seriously by embracing the second and third pre-conditions, rather than over-relying on just one branch of the architecture (the military); this would have made their respective governments situationally aware. Further, it would have placed the mentioned administrations into a much better position to address threats and challenges in order to protect their respective governments and stabilise the country's landscape. All these important points have been explained and assessed below in subsequent sub-sections; beginning with the historical and political background of each administration.

K.A. Busia's 'Tribalism' Infused Administration from 1969 - 1972
Who is Busia and the Politicos Historia of this Period

Dr. K.A Busia, who was born in 1914, was a member of the royal family of Wenchi, a sub-group of the Ashanti tribe in Ghana, which was then the Gold Coast.[7] He was educated at church missions and proceeded to have his secondary education at Mfantsipim school in the Gold Coast. He later taught at the Achimota secondary school, also in the Gold Coast, and

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[6] Kwaku Gyening Owusu. 'Military Coups in Ghana, 1969-1985', A By-Product of Global Economic Injustices? *Diva-Portal*, (2008), pp 36-38

[7] Sara Fretheim. "K A Busia on Ethnicity, Religion and Nationality." *Methodist Heritage*, 2011, p. 2, [online resource] http://www.methodistheritage.org.uk/missionary-history-fretheim-busia-on-ethnicity-2011.pdf. Accessed on 13/09/2020

from there, gained a scholarship to study at Oxford in the United Kingdom (UK).[8] He returned to the Gold Coast in 1941, to begin researching on the Ashanti system. Busia subsequently became one of the first two African administrative officers to work within the colonial service in 1942. He later returned to Oxford where he obtained his doctorate degree and eventually became the first African professor at the University College in the Gold Coast in 1952.[9] Busia became a vehement and outspoken critic of Nkrumah's CPP even before independence. After independence, Busia became the leader of the United Party (UP), which was the main opposition political party to Nkrumah's CPP.[10]

Nkrumah's determination to go after UP leaders, threatened Busia's detention. This made him flee the country into exile back to Oxford, UK for seven years, where Busia devoted most of his effort on anti – Nkrumah struggle. Busia at the time was very well viewed and favoured by the West as a possible successor to Nkrumah, should Nkrumah be ousted. However, some clash of vision between Busia and the West made a handful of Western nations, especially the US, UK, and France, write him off as a possible successor to Nkrumah.[11] After Nkrumah was toppled, Busia returned to Ghana following careful negotiations with the NLC.[12] Whilst in Ghana, Busia was appointed as a chairman of a new council of higher education after he was nominated for the Chancellorship of the University of Ghana. Meanwhile on the political scene in Ghana at the time was also another seasoned politician known as Komla Gbedemah, who was highly thought of and was from the Ewe tribe. However, Gbedemah's previous affiliation with Nkrumah at the time impacted his credibility as far as those who did not align with Nkrumah's policies were concerned.[13]

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[8] Alex Kwaku Danso-Boafo. *The Political Biography of Dr. Kofi Abrefa Busia*, (Accra: Ghana Universities Press, 1996), p. 13

[9] F. M. Bourret. *Ghana, the Road to Independence, 1919-1957*, (California: Stanford University Press, 1960), p. 193

[10] Muriel E. Chamberlain. *Longman Companion to European Decolonisation in the Twentieth Century*, (Abingdon: Routledge, 2013), p. 216

[11] "Kofi Abrefa Busia." *Encyclopaedia*, 2019 [online resource] available from https://www.encyclopedia.com/people/history/african-history-biographies/ka-busia. Accessed on 15/01/2020

[12] David Apter. 'Ghana', in *Political Parties and National Integration in Tropical Africa*, by James S. Coleman, Carl G. Rosberg., eds., (London: Cambridge University Press, 1964), p.292

[13] Joseph G. Amamoo. *The Ghanaian Revolution*, (Lincoln: Authors Choice Press, 2000), pp 70-82

In addition, to the determination of the Ashanti tribe to regain control of the country since the demise of its empire in 1900, made them recognise Busia as the key to regaining control of Ghana.[14] Therefore, after the NLC regime lifted the ban on political parties in Ghana on 1st May 1969, the issue of tribalism ensued within the regime, as the country was preparing for a general election. The NLC leadership, which comprised of Akan (Fanti and Ashanti tribes) and the Ewe tribe found itself split in half along tribal lines. Those from the Akan tribe explicitly supported Busia, whilst those from the Ewe tribe openly backed Gbedemah. The Police Chief Harlley and his deputy Deku, (both from the Ewe tribe) overtly participated in campaigns in support of Gbedemah's National Alliance Liberals (NAL) for Gbedemah's Prime Ministerial bid.[15] Military General A.A Afrifa and Lieutenant Colonel Yeboah, who were both from the Akan tribe also openly rooted for Busia's Progressive Party (PP) in support of Busia's Prime Ministerial bid.[16] It was also claimed that Afrifa used his office to pursue partisan campaigns to favour the Busia's PP and to discredit Gbedamah's NAL. Ewe police officers were removed from areas where it was thought they might endanger PP campaign. Ewe army officers were transferred from strategic command posts and were replaced by Akan officers.[17]

A general election was finally held on 1st October 1969, and K.A Busia and his Akan PP-dominated political party won a landslide victory, to begin the second Republic in Ghana. The military regime in turn handed over power to the newly democratically elected government and reverted to their traditional military duties.[18] All of these events set the tone for the future political and security environment in the country; and from this dissertation's assessment, it was a very dangerous path. The significant tribal divisions leading to the election ended up

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[14] "Kofi Abrefa Busia." *Encyclopaedia*, 2019, [online resource] available from, https://www.encyclopedia.com/people/history/african-history-biographies/ka-busia. Accessed on 20/01/2020
[15] K.B. Quantson. *Ghana Peace and Stability, Chapters from the Intelligence Sector*, Oh Acheampong 1972, (Accra: Advent Press - NAPASCOM Ltd, 2000), pp 97 – 98
[16] Symon Baynham. 'Civilian Rule and the Coup 'Etat: The Case of Busia's Ghana', *The RUSI Journal*, 123:3, (2000), pp 27-33
[17] Symon Baynham. 'Civilian Rule and the Coup 'Etat: The Case of Busia's Ghana', *The RUSI Journal*, 123:3, (2000), pp 27-33
[18] Tapan Prasad Biswal. *Ghana Political and Constitutional Developments*, (New Delhi: Northern Book Centre, 1992), pp 116 - 117

having a profound impact on the country's national security architecture and how it operated.[19]

Instead of the new administration focussing on the issues within the national security architecture and ensuring that the second and third pre-conditions were at the centre of the architecture's duties, the Busia government completely did the opposite. The new administration paid less attention to the country's national security architecture, and to some extent deliberately weakened its influence, especially the Ghana Armed Forces, by gradually wearying out the structures it inherited from the NLC.

Additionally, instead of discouraging the tribalism which had engulfed the architecture at the time, Busia rather encouraged tribal affiliation and/or nepotism, which became criteria for promotions within the national security apparatus. Hence, doing a complete disservice to the requirement of competence and professional standards as a necessary criterion for promotion. Unfortunately, Busia also prioritised economic security and democratic stability over national security, putting its economic policies and democratic structures as a priority. These included removing Nkrumah's CPP "dictatorship" and establishing political democracy, eliminating bribery and corruption in public life, and addressing the rise of economic deprivation in the country.[20] It is therefore not surprising that the administration's 1969 Constitution, happened to be mostly based on 'liberal market economic doctrines.' All of these coupled with the introduction of the Ghana Business Act of 1970, offered an earlier insight into the new administration's 'preparedness to rely on the market and private sector for economic development'.[21]

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[19] K.B. Quantson. *Ghana Peace and Stability, Chapters from the Intelligence Sector*, Oh Acheampong 1972, (Accra: Advent Press - NAPASCOM Ltd, 2000), pp 97 – 98

[20] Owusu, Maxwell. "The Search for Solvency: Background to the Fall of Ghana's Second Republic, 1969-1972." *JSTOR*, 19:1, (1972), pp 52-60

[21] Charles Ackah, Ernest Aryeetey, Joseph Ayee & Ezekiel Clottey. "State-Business Relations and Economic Performance in Ghana." *Research Programme Consortium for Improving Institutions for Pro-Poor Growth (IPPG)*, 2010, [online resource], available from, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/57a08b1be5274a31e0000990/dp35a.pdf. Accessed on 21/11/2020

Additionally, the decision made by the administration to depend on developed countries and multinational corporations to help boost foreign investment in the country, was also an indication of where its priorities lied.[22] To add to the list, the Busia government also undertook severe monetary measures, by devaluing the national currency and encouraging foreign investment in Ghana's industrial sector.[23] Further, Busia embarked on two early measures, which were the expulsion of large numbers of non-Ghanaian citizens from Ghana and limit foreign involvement in small businesses in the country. This was designed to drive out foreigners, especially Lebanese, Asians, and Nigerians, who were perceived as unfairly monopolising trade to the disadvantage of Ghanaians and to relieve the unemployment in the country.[24]

In summary, the said actions and policies, coupled with other economic measures, as well as the significant investment embarked on by Busia's administration to establish democratic structures, were placed at the forefront of its strategy above anything else. The new administration naively misjudged the aforementioned factors to be the most vital antidotes required to help secure its government and stabilise Ghana's political and security landscape. At the same time the Busia Administration overlooked the necessary steps needed to immediately prioritise the reformation of the country's national security architecture, by placing intelligence work and its coordination at the core of its duties. Failing to do so, did an enormous disservice to the Busia government, as it could only implement its economic policies and democratic structures from a position of weakness.

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[22] Charles Ackah, Ernest Aryeetey, Joseph Ayee & Ezekiel Clottey. "State-Business Relations and Economic Performance in Ghana." *Research Programme Consortium for Improving Institutions for Pro-Poor Growth (IPPG)*, 2010, [online resource], available from, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/57a08b1be5274a31e0000990/dp35a.pdf. Accessed on 21/11/2020

[23] "The National Liberation Council and the Busia Years, 1966-71." [online resource] available from, http://countrystudies.us/ghana/18.htm. Accessed on 21/11/2020

[24] "The National Liberation Council and the Busia Years, 1966-71." [online resource] available from, http://countrystudies.us/ghana/18.htm. Accessed on 21/11/2020

The reason for making the prior assertion is that whenever a new government assumes office anywhere; proposing, enacting, and implementing policies, especially those aimed at reducing poverty and hardship, always require significant time and patience to yield results. Therefore, without having effective law enforcement as well as a broader national security architecture in place to help enforce such policies, the administration in question becomes vulnerable to civil disobedience, unrest, or even a government takeover. This highlights a vital concern that cannot be underestimated. For example, when Busia's economic policies failed to have an instant impact, it had no intelligence-led national security architecture in place, to fall back on for the protection of his administration's constitutional right to maintain power. For this reason, having a national security architecture that attached importance to intelligence work and its coordination, would have significantly solidified and stabilised Busia's government. This would have helped the administration to implement its policies from a position of strength rather than from a position of weakness, due to the type of security challenges it encountered at the time.

Analysis of the Threat Landscape During Busia's Era

Perceived threats to Busia's administration and its national security architecture were mostly internal rather than external. First, was the threat posed by Busia's political opponents during that period. After assuming office, Prime Minister Busia's PP banned Nkrumah's CPP from participating in the politics of the nation. It subsequently alienated Nkrumah's supporters from participating in other affairs of the country, which made it impossible for most of them to go about their daily business normally without having the feeling of being watched or suspected.[25] Such actions led to significant resentments being developed and directed towards Busia's administration as well as the Ashanti tribe in general. This created a very dangerous political and security terrain in Ghana, as it became ethnically polarised, with a certain tribal segment in the country feeling superior over others. Moreover, the same scenario was also being

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[25] K.B. Quantson. *Ghana Peace and Stability, Chapters from the Intelligence Sector*, Oh Acheampong 1972, (Accra: Advent Press - NAPASCOM Ltd, 2000), pp 99 - 100

played out within the country's national security architecture. This posed significant national security threats internally within the country and made subversion and coup plotting inevitable.[26]

Second, was the threat that emerged from within the national security architecture, with specific reference to the armed forces. Immediately after Busia assumed office, his administration "started taking from the armed forces the few amenities and the facilities they enjoyed even under the Nkrumah regime".[27] Most of the senior army officers were also unhappy about the 1966 coup and how it had interrupted the promotion cycle. These senior officers maintained that some colleagues were favoured over others, having received quicker promotions, whilst others were held back.[28] Most of the officers formed the opinion that promotions were being influenced by tribal affiliation with the government in power. This made disgruntled officers convinced that a change in government would be the only solution to restore an equitable ethnic balance in promotions within the armed forces.[29]

Additionally, the army also had a problem with the new administration's decision to broaden the army's duties to include non-military functions. Such as, engaging in anti-smuggling patrols, supporting anticholera drives, facilitating flood relief work, and participating in reconstruction projects, which they rejected. The preceding discussion of tribal favouritism being witnessed within the ranks of the military and also across civil service institutions in the country, made the political and security landscape extremely vulnerable.[30]

[26] K.B. Quantson. *Ghana Peace and Stability, Chapters from the Intelligence Sector*, Oh Acheampong 1972, (Accra: Advent Press - NAPASCOM Ltd, 2000), pp 99 - 100
[27] Ibid.
[28] Chuka Onwumechili. *African Democratisation and Military Coup*, Reasons for and History of Military Coups, (Westport: Greenwood Publishing Group, 1998), p. 41
[29] IBP USA. *Ghana Country Study Guide*, The Acheampong Regime 1972-1978, (USA: International Business Publications, 2012), pp 140 - 145
[30] Ibid.

Finally, was the threat of tribalism, which had infiltrated the country's national security architecture; and Prime Minister Busia was not naïve about the heightened tribalism within the national security institutions. Busia, after attaining power as the new Prime Minister of Ghana appointed Lieutenant Colonel Acheampong, his fellow Akan tribesman as the Army Brigade Commander and the Head of MIU.[31] Such action escalated the hostilities, tensions, suspicions, and confrontations between Ewe and Akan officers within the security setup under Busia's administration. Hence the ethnic division which seemed to have penetrated the army in the barracks continued to destabilise the administration, its national security architecture, and the country's landscape as a whole.[32] Although there were several other factors perceived by the new administration as threats, including Busia's political opponents and members of the armed forces; tribalism was the most significant.

All Busia's administration needed to do was to reform the architecture by uniting its personnel and continuing with the NLC's intelligence-led approach. The administration could have achieved this by ensuring that pre-conditions 2 served as a pre-requisite for pre-condition 1 and ensured the existence of pre-condition 3. This would have placed the architecture in a much better position to pick up on emerging threats geared towards the administration from within and outside of the broader national security architecture. This would have enabled Busia's government to effectively work towards long-term stabilisation of the country's landscape. What was different relative to the preceding regime's architecture was that the Busia administration took the issue of tribalism within the national security apparatus to another level. Busia embraced tribalism and tribal affiliations as a form of protection for the survival of his administration, which affected the professionalism of the national security setup.[33]

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[31] K.B. Quantson. *Ghana Peace and Stability, Chapters from the Intelligence Sector*, Oh Acheampong 1972, (Accra: Advent Press - NAPASCOM Ltd, 2000), pp 96 - 106
[32] Symon Baynham. 'Civilian Rule and the Coup 'Etat: The Case of Busia's Ghana', *The RUSI Journal*, 123:3, (2000), pp 27-33
[33] K.B. Quantson. *Ghana Peace and Stability, Chapters from the Intelligence Sector*, Oh Acheampong 1972, (Accra: Advent Press - NAPASCOM Ltd, 2000), pp 96 - 106

Busia was well assured and confident that his administration was safe because he had a fellow Akan tribesman in place as the Head of MIU. Busia had so much confidence in his MIU Chief to the extent that he became over-reliant on Acheampong, who became very influential within the national security apparatus. For this reason, despite also having three other agencies (CID, SB, and RB) as part of his national security architecture, the Prime Minister had the ears for the MIU because of its Head of Intelligence who was a fellow tribesman. This significantly impacted the duties of the national security institutions, their intelligence activities, and its interagency intelligence coordination. The result created a vulnerability which was exploited to unseat Busia's administration from power as explained later.

National Security Outlook Under Busia's Administration

Pre-Condition 1

The fundamental core and outlook of the national security architecture under Busia's administration remained unchanged from the NLC regime's. The primary national security institutions at the time during Busia's administration were the Ghana Police Service (GPS) and Ghana Armed Forces (GAF), which comprised of the army, navy, and air force. There were also other institutions mandated to undertake some national security-related duties, be it directly or indirectly.

Relevance of Pre-Condition 2 Overlooked

The NLC handed over to the Busia administration a national security architecture incorporated with agencies that were tasked to undertake intelligence activities. Busia maintained these agencies except the SECE, which was purposely set up by the NLC to coordinate intelligence to specifically counter threats emanating from Nkrumah's camp abroad. Apart from that, the remaining agencies, Criminal Investigations Department (CID), Special Branch (SB), Research Bureau (RB), and Military Intelligence Unit (MIU) remained unchanged. They remained unchanged although tribalism had infiltrated the ranks of these agencies and how

they operated during the end of the NLC regime. Busia, upon assuming office had the opportunity to address the once formidable intelligence-led national security architecture of the NLC regime, which had been infiltrated by tribalism towards the end of the regime's rule. This would have gone a long way to address the deteriorated state of the architecture, repair its internal tribal division and restore the broader polarisation within the political and security environment of the country.

No Meaningful Pre-Condition 3

There was no meaningful interagency intelligence coordination due to Prime Minister Busia's preferential treatment for the MIU based on tribal affiliation. Tribal affiliation took precedence within the architecture and also clouded Busia's judgement. It is claimed that SB, which was another arm of the architecture, once picked up a specific but significant intelligence. This specific intelligence, which was subsequently assessed highlighted a potential threat to depose Busia's administration through a military coup d'état. The SB assessment concluded that the Head of MIU, Acheampong, who was a close confidant of the Prime Minister was the master architect behind the coup which was being planned. Being aware of the Prime Minister's loyalty to Acheampong and the MIU, SB reported its assessment and findings directly to the Prime Minister. As Busia genuinely believed that his fellow tribesman would not undertake such a subversive activity against him, the intelligence submitted by SB was downplayed by the Prime Minister.[34] Dismissing the rumours of a coup d'état in Ghana, in 1979, Busia arrogantly said that 'even if the government were to step down there would not be alternative men of calibre readily available to rule the country.' He added that he would offer no resistance in the event of a coup, but he would rather return to 'closet' at Oxford. But there was no reason for a coup since his administration was prepared to demonstrate to Africa and the world that an African government 'can be removed through the ballot box.'[35]

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[34] K.B. Quantson. *Ghana Peace and Stability, Chapters from the Intelligence Sector*, Oh Acheampong 1972, (Accra: Advent Press - NAPASCOM Ltd, 2000), pp 93 - 106
[35] Owusu, Maxwell. 'The Search for Solvency: Background to the Fall of Ghana's Second Republic, 1969-1972.' *Africa Today*, 19:1 (1972).

Furthermore, it was also claimed that SB obtained subsequent intelligence through surveillance work. Special Branch's surveillance observed Lt Col. Acheampong, the Commander of the First Infantry Brigade, meeting contacts under surreptitious conditions. The surveillance report noted that Acheampong often parked his car a good distance away and walked to the target hotel, checking every now and then to see if he was being watched. The occupant of the hotel room was a male with political leanings but was registered in the name of a woman. It was also ascertained that Acheampong had promised a demanding girlfriend of his 'not to worry because soon everything would be okay.' However, all of these intelligence were also downplayed by Busia.[36]

Once again, with tribal affiliation being preferred over the appreciation of intelligence activities and interagency intelligence coordination, such strong ethnic allegiance clouded his judgment. Upon receiving the intelligence report produced by SB, the Prime Minister downplayed its content.[37] Busia, in a bizarre moment, called on his Head of MIU, Acheampong and bluntly told him that;

> 'They said he [Acheampong] was plotting a coup. He [Acheampong] should not mind them. They were envious of his [Acheampong's] status'.[38]

Therefore, demonstrating how intelligence work and its coordination was of no significance to the Busia administration and for this reason, allowed his tribal prejudice to take precedence over real intelligence appreciation.[39] This ended up costing Busia the Prime Ministerial role, as his national security architecture was unable to prevent the very threat the architecture was created to counter.

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[36] K.B Quantson. *Ghana: National Security*, The Tribal Problem and National Security, (Accra: Bestas Press - NAPASVIL Ventures, 2003), pp 47 – 56

[37] K.B. Quantson. *Ghana Peace and Stability: Chapters from the Intelligence Sector*, Oh Acheampong: 1972, (Accra: Advent Press - NAPASCOM Ltd, 2000), pp 93 - 106

[38] K.B Quantson. *Ghana: National Security*, The Tribal Problem and National Security, (Accra: Bestas Press - NAPASVIL Ventures, 2003), pp 47 – 56

[39] K.B Quantson. *Ghana: National Security*, The Tribal Problem and National Security, (Accra: Bestas Press - NAPASVIL Ventures, 2003), pp 47 – 56

Despite Busia's optimism in the MIU, it was reported that in the early hours of 13th January 1972, two arms of the architecture (SB and MIU) received pieces of fragmented information, which indicated an imminent military coup. It is believed that those pieces of information posed significant challenges for both SB and MIU, who were tasked to solve the jigsaw puzzle to help identify exactly where the threat would be emanating from. Despite the lack of intelligence coordination within the broader national security architecture, on this occasion, SB and MIU appeared to have demonstrated some degree of coordination, which was reactionary. It is believed that both agencies were in constant liaison with each other early that morning, trying to unearth the imminent threat.[40] The Director of SB was continuously in touch with his counterpart, the Head of MIU, Acheampong, who was also the confidant and a fellow Akan tribesman of the Prime Minister.

However, because Busia did not prioritise the second and third pre-conditions within the broader national security architecture right at the beginning of his administration, such a missed opportunity eventually ended up making the difference between failure and success. Acheampong, in addition to being the Head of MIU, was also in charge of all the military troops in the southern sector of the country, which also included of all the strategic points of the country. Therefore, to convincingly demonstrate that he was committed to this reactionary intelligence coordination (between the MIU and SB) to help foil the threat at hand, Acheampong, informed his opposite number in SB that he had positioned troops at all the military coup take over strategic points of the country. These included the country's 'international airport', 'external communication centre' and most importantly the 'broadcasting house', which was a sensitive target for all military takeovers.[41]

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[40] K.B. Quantson. *Ghana Peace and Stability, Chapters from the Intelligence Sector Oh Acheampong*, 1972, (Accra: Advent Press - NAPASCOM Ltd, 2000), pp 93 - 106
[41] K.B. Quantson. *Ghana Peace and Stability, Chapters from the Intelligence Sector Oh Acheampong*, 1972, (Accra: Advent Press - NAPASCOM Ltd, 2000), pp 93 - 106

Furthermore, as part of the effort to address that imminent threat, it is believed that two military intelligence officers who were part of the SB and MIU coalition were allegedly sent to undertake some surveillance work. The surveillance work was to help intelligence personnel figure out exactly what was wrong; however, it was claimed that none of the two officers returned. An operation called 'Operation Contamination' was subsequently activated to act as a structured counter-measure to help address the situation at hand.[42]

As part of the operation, it was reported that SB intelligence officers worked flat-out throughout the night through to the early morning until 05:00 hours with no success of being able to uncover the supposed threat.[43] This led the Director of SB to conclude that this might have been an 'expensive joke', thus dismissing all personnel to go take some rest at home. However, failing to initially take into consideration that past military coups had occurred mostly at 06:00 hours at the 'Broadcasting House', it was claimed that due to quick thinking of some intelligence personnel, the members of the operation insisted that they wait until 06:00 hours.[44] Although this demonstrated good analytical thinking, such a suggestion came a bit too late. This is because the disregard for the second and third pre-conditions from the start of the administration, exposed significant lapses within the broader national security architecture as a unit.

At 06:00 hours on 13th January 1972, all hopes of the threat being an 'expensive joke' were dashed, as it became obvious that the threat of a military coup was real; and that Acheampong, the Head of MIU, whom the government was relying on to address the threat, was the actual person in charge of the plot.[45] The democratically elected civilian government of Ghana, which was being headed by Prime Minister Busia was ousted through a successful military coup.[46]

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[42] K.B. Quantson. *Ghana Peace and Stability, Chapters from the Intelligence Sector Oh Acheampong*, 1972, (Accra: Advent Press - NAPASCOM Ltd, 2000), pp 93 - 106
[43] Ibid.
[44] K.B. Quantson. *Ghana Peace and Stability, Chapters from the Intelligence Sector Oh Acheampong*, 1972, (Accra: Advent Press - NAPASCOM Ltd, 2000), pp 93 - 106
[45] Ibid.
[46] Sandy Africa and Johnny Kwadjo. 'Changing Intelligence Dynamics in Africa', *GFN-SSR* (2009), pp 90 - 110

As a matter of urgent precaution, the SB director was evacuated from the premises of SB to a safe place.[47] It further came to light that one of the two military intelligence officers deployed on an earlier surveillance mission, had been detained by Acheampong and was unable to report back their findings.[48]

Busia, who had arrived in London earlier that week for a medical check-up, lived in denial, and this caused dismay and confusion at the Ghanaian diplomatic missions. Prime Minister Busia eventually issued a statement condemning the coup, declaring it might not succeed and subsequently stated that:

> "I believe the people of Ghana will resist this selfish and senseless coup, and overthrow it. The people of Ghana know how sincerely we are trying to establish democracy and human dignity, as well as coping with our grave economic problems in order to raise our standard of living."

He continued to live in denial that his administration had been ousted by a military coup d'état until later reports emerged from other countries in the sub-region to corroborate that Colonel Mike Acheampong had seized power in Ghana.[49]

Key Takeaways from Busia's Time in Office

Unlike the NLC who immediately transformed the national security architecture it had inherited from the Nkrumah administration to incorporate intelligence activities and interagency intelligence coordination, Busia, on the other hand, did nothing to improve it. Even though Busia's government had an opportunity to address the tribal imbalance within the architecture, it decided to do the contrary, which made the already polarised national security set-up worse. Busia's administration raised the stakes even higher to make favouritism by ethnic affiliation and tribalism the new normal on the national security agenda.[50] Busia appointed Lieutenant

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[47] K.B. Quantson. *Ghana Peace and Stability, Chapters from the Intelligence Sector Oh Acheampong*, 1972, (Accra: Advent Press - NAPASCOM Ltd, 2000), pp 93 - 106

[48] Ibid.

[49] Patrick Keatley. "The archive, Colonel takes charge after coup in Ghana." *The Guardian*, 2011, [online resource] available from, https://www.theguardian.com/theguardian/2011/jan/14/archive-colonel-takes-charge-after-coup-in-ghana-1972. Accessed on 15/01/2020

[50] K.B Quantson. *Ghana: National Security*, The Tribal Problem and National Security, (Accra: Bestas Press - NAPASVIL Ventures, 2003), pp 47 – 56

Colonel Acheampong, his fellow Ashanti tribesman as the Brigade Commander and the Head of Military Intelligence Unit (MIU). It was an appointment which was disapproved by most senior military officers, as they questioned Colonel Acheampong's competency for the new role. This decision taken by Busia took the threat of tribalism within the country's national security apparatus to a whole new level.

Furthermore, not only did Busia do nothing to improve and strengthen the deteriorated architecture which was inherited; upon assuming office, his administration also immediately "started taking from the armed forces the few amenities and the facilities they enjoyed even under the Nkrumah regime". Additionally, the promotion cycle within the rest of the agencies (CID, SB, and RB), which made up the architecture, were all also influenced by tribal affiliation rather than professional merit. Professional training of the personnel within the architecture, as well as encouraging intelligence activities and interagency intelligence coordination as part of the architecture's duties to help stabilise the country was a distant reality. Therefore, from this dissertation's assessment, all the highlighted activities collectively contributed toward the already depleted state of the national security architecture, to make it worse. This made rivalries, tensions, and suspicions engulf the national security environment, which affected the architecture's ability to operate effectively.

The effect of such rivalry and tribal division subsequently harmed the Ghanaian community as a whole and the day-to-day lifestyle within the wider society in the country. The practice of tribal favouritism ended up having a foothold on the broader political and security spectrum in the country, setting a very dangerous precedent moving forward. All of these problems, coupled with not having an intelligence-led national security architecture in place, made it impossible for the administration to complete its term in office as mandated by the constitution and stabilise the country's landscape. It is therefore not surprising that despite being democratically elected and bounded by the constitution, Busia's administration was ultimately ousted from office through a military coup. To conclude, this sub-section argues that Busia's

administration destabilised the country's landscape because of its neglect towards the architecture, and its disinterest in encouraging intelligence work and its coordination. For this reason, the architecture had its eye off the ball for a significantly long period, and even when it had credible intelligence, tribal affiliation helped one branch of the agency to play the other. Hence the architecture was misled, making it situationally unaware, which resulted in the demise of the Busia administration, to begin the Acheampong regime.

Acheampong's Militarisation of Ghana from 1972 - 1978

Who is Acheampong

Colonel Ignatius Kutu Acheampong was one of the army officers who participated in the NLC military coup that ousted Nkrumah's government in 1966. Under the NLC regime led by Ankrah, Acheampong served as an administrator of the Western Region of Ghana. After the NLC handed over power to Busia's democratically elected government, Acheampong, who was a fellow tribesman and a personal friend of Busia, was given the position of the Head of MIU by the Busia administration. Acheampong was able to capitalise on his friendship with Busia and his position as the Head of MIU to successfully plan and execute a military coup which ousted Busia's government. Unlike Busia who prioritised economic security and the establishment of democratic structures over national security upon assuming office, Acheampong, also embarked on economic security but targeted the democratic institutions already in place.

Politicos Historia of the Acheampong Era

As part of targeting the country's democratic systems, the new military regime known as the National Redemption Council (NRC), led by Acheampong, replaced Ghana's parliamentary government, exactly a day after the successful bloodless coup, on 14th January 1972.[1] The NRC, initially comprised of six army officers and one civilian. Later, it broadened its membership to include officers from all of the services, including the Navy and Air Force Commanders, as well as the Inspector General of Police. Not long after, the NRC in an unprecedented move expelled the two lower-ranking army officers and its civilian member (the Attorney-General) from the membership of the regime. The NRC then appointed nine military officers who were ranked from Major to Colonel to serve as Regional Commissioners. The

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[1] Patrick Keatley. "From the archive, 14 January 1972: Colonel takes charge after coup in Ghana." *The Guardian*, 2011, [online resource] available from, https://www.theguardian.com/theguardian/2011/jan/14/archive-colonel-takes-charge-after-coup-in-ghana-1972. Accessed on 20/02/2020

regime strategically placed these Commissioners in regions attributed to their ethnic traditional homelands; and from this dissertation's perspective, appears to have been a possible attempt to address the issue of tribalism in the country at the time.

Further to its dismantling of the democratic institutions already in place, the NRC dismissed all of the ministers of states, disbanded the national assembly, suspended the 1969 constitution, and introduced a copycat of the constitutional structure of the NLC. However, the powers, duties, functions, and composition of the courts remained the same with no initial alterations. In addition to the changes made by the new regime, the NRC banned public meetings from being held anywhere in the country, proscribed political parties and imprisoned political leaders. Furthermore, the regime enacted a 'retroactive subversion decree' which empowered military courts 'to impose the death penalty for offenses such as subversive political activity, robbery, theft, and damaging public property'[2]; and for the spreading of rumours and profiteering.[3] The NRC and the Regional Commissioners, which included about thirty senior military officers, assumed the duties of the Executive Council, and were responsible for ruling the country.

Acheampong, who was the chairman of the NRC declared himself as the Commander-in-Chief and Head of State. He was responsible for all NRC appointments and removals based on the advice of no less than two-thirds of its membership; whilst the NRC chairman could also be removed by a unanimous decision.[4] Not only did the NRC embark on campaigns to dismantle existing democratic institutions as part of its strategy, to secure its survival and ensure the

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[2] Abdulai Kuyini Mohammed. 'Executive Dominance of Policy Making Under the Acheampong's Regime', in *Politics, Governance, and Development in Ghana*, by Joseph Aryee., ed., (London: Lexington Books, 2019), p.198

[3] "Ghana, Independence, Nkrumah's Administration, the 1966 Coup, and the Return to Civilian Rule." *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, 2019, [online resource] available from, https://www.britannica.com/place/Ghana/Independence. Accessed on 20/01/2020

[4] "January 13, 1972, Lt. Col. Ignatius Kutu Acheampong Overthrows Prof. Kofi Busia's Government." *Edward Ulzen Memorial Foundation*, 2018, [online resource] available from, https://www.eaumf.org/ejm-blog/2018/1/11/january-13-1972-lt-col-ignatius-kutu-acheampong-overthrows-prof-kofi-busias-government. Accessed on 15/01/2020

stability of the country's landscape, it also focussed on economic security to help achieve such objectives. The Head of State inaugurated a 36 member Consultative Advisory Committee in early 1974, to advise the NRC on matters affecting the national interest. This was made up of civilians, members of professions, farmers, chiefs, servicemen and ordinary citizens. Further, a 33 member National Economic Planning Council was formed. The Head of State was the Chairman, and the Commissioner for Economic Planning was made Vice-Chairman. The council was charged with drawing up the NRC's five-year development plan. Additionally, 22 million cedis was allocated to the agricultural sector in the 1974-75 budget. This was to develop food crops and to increase meat and poultry production. It was also to produce industrial raw materials and other exportable crops. All of these were operated under the famous "Operation Feed Yourself" programme. There were also measures put in place to address the rising inflation problems at the time.[5]

In addition, the NRC just like the Busia administration, also barely attributed any attention and/or value to the relevance of the broader national security architecture, its intelligence work, and its intelligence coordination. Where the NRC distanced itself from its predecessor was that the regime upon assuming office; singled out one arm of the national security architecture, the Ghana armed forces (GAF). The NRC repaired some of the damage done to the status of the GAF under the previous administration and raised its profile to re-establish its authority in the country. As far as stabilising the country's political and security landscape was concerned, the NRC's effort to restore the credibility of the GAF was excessively done. The Ghanaian society became militarised by appointing senior military officers to positions in all major departments, regional bodies, state corporations, and public boards. Attempts were also made by the regime to end party politics and to create a unified government composed of civilians,

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[5] Owusu, Maxwell. "Economic Nationalism, Pan-Africanism and the Military: Ghana's National Redemption Council."
Africa Today, 22:1, (1975), pp 31-50

military personnel, and police; with the belief that it would create national unity, end tribalism, and facilitate economic development.[6]

The said measures coupled with the lack of viable economic policies and vision, eventually resulted in making the regime's inability to stabilise the country's economy become obvious. The country's gross domestic product, export earnings, and living standards began to rapidly deteriorate. Meanwhile, in a desperate attempt to improve the country's economy, in 1975 the NRC was reorganised to include some civilians and changed its name to the Supreme Military Council 1 (SMC I), with the SMC I having the ultimate power and Acheampong still being the leader.[7] The Acheampong regime clearly missed the point that the GAF alone could not protect its government and stabilise the country's political and security landscape. The government needed broader national security institutions (pre-condition 1), which prioritised intelligence activities (pre-condition 2) and encouraged interagency intelligence coordination. However, the NRC's failure to do so made it operate a military-focused national security architecture.

National Security Architecture

Pre-Conditions 1, 2, and 3

Throughout Acheampong's rule, there was no significant difference in the state of pre-conditions 1, 2, and 3, from Busia's administration. The core structure of the national security architecture remained the same as that of his predecessor's administration. The Ghana Police Service (GPS) and Ghana Armed Forces (GAF) remained the primary national security institutions, with no significant alteration made to pre-condition 1. The only difference was that this regime treated the GAF with respect and dignity. Pre-condition 2 still consisted of the CID, charged with criminal intelligence work; SB, tasked with the political and security intelligence

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[6] "January 13, 1972: Lt. Col. Ignatius Kutu Acheampong Overthrows Prof. Kofi Busia's Government." *Edward Ulzen Memorial Foundation*, 2018, [online resource] available from, https://www.eaumf.org/ejm-blog/2018/1/11/january-13-1972-lt-col-ignatius-kutu-acheampong-overthrows-prof-kofi-busias-government. Accessed on 20/02/2020

[7] IBP. *Ghana Land Ownership and Agricultural Laws Handbook: Strategic Information, Policies, Regulations*, (Washington DC: International Business Publications, 2018), p. 25

role; MIU, for defence intelligence work; and RB, responsible for foreign intelligence work. Under pre-condition 3, there was no agency put in place and tasked with the responsibility of ensuring interagency intelligence coordination. That said, there were changes made to personnel that headed up the agencies. Almost all the agencies including other government departments were led by uniformed officers, who were in-charge of areas where they had no relevant expertise. Over time, growing corruption, significant economic problems, frequent nationwide protests, demonstrations, and quite often violent disturbances, all took hold of the country's landscape, making the regime unpopular. The situation created substantial security challenges for the regime, with the most significant being 'the risk of overthrow by a counter-coup.'[8]

Eventually realising the magnitude of issues at hand, and in an attempt to counter such challenges, plans were made by the regime in 1976 to return to civilian government. On 1st July 1977, Acheampong announced a time - schedule for the return to civilian government. Details of the proposal were still unclear and was based on 'no party politics' and political parties were excluded. However, it included a formal role of the military, which would be part of the Council of State, the Military Advisory Council, and the National Security and Defence Council. It was also made clear that, on 1st July 1979, the new civilian government would assume power. Subsequently, a proposal was put forward by the SMC I in 1977 to form a 'union government to which everybody will belong'[9], which was also referred to as the "UNIGOV".[10] As part of this proposal, there would be no political parties, with government duties being shared between the military and civilians. However, results of a national

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[8] Obed Yao Asamoah. *The Political History of Ghana (1950-2013): The Experience of a Non-Conformist*, (Bloomington: Author House, 2014), p. 227
[9] Obed Yao Asamoah. *The Political History of Ghana (1950-2013): The Experience of a Non-Conformist*, (Bloomington: Author House, 2014), pp 235-238
[10] "Ghana – Country Assessment: Country Information & Policy Unit." *Refworld*, 2001, p. 4, [online resource] available from, https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/3c2b4e0f7.pdf. Accessed on 20/02/2020

referendum held to either support or dismiss this proposal highlighted the disapproval of Ghanaians for the act.[11]

Acheampong Underestimating the Relevance of Pre-Conditions 1, 2, and 3

The said events, alongside the severe economic and political hardship in the country at the time, not forgetting the emergence of the violent disturbances during the 1978 referendum on UNIGOV, collectively contributed to Acheampong losing his leadership.[12] In July 1978, a military coup orchestrated within the confinement of the palace, deposed Acheampong and forced him to resign. Acheampong's Chief of Defence Staff, Lieutenant General Frederick William Kwasi (F.W.K) Akuffo who led the military coup became his successor, with the new regime calling itself SMC II.[13] Akuffo dismissed all but three members of the SMC I and several leading officials of state agencies.[14] Acheampong was charged with economic and other offences against the state and was imprisoned but eventually released in May 1979 under the 'indemnification' agenda of the SMC II. He was stripped of all retirement benefits and honours acquired during his tenure of office. He was only to be addressed as Mr. Acheampong and no longer with the military title General Acheampong. He was also ordered not to ever step foot on any military base or risk imprisonment.

The NRC's failure to reform the first pre-condition by incorporating the second and third placed the regime at a disadvantage. This is because, when its economic policies began to crumble, the NRC was unable to protect its regime and subsequently address the collateral damage to domestic stability in the country. Meanwhile, on the contrary, had the broader national security

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[11] "Ghana: Independence, Nkrumah's Administration, the 1966 Coup, and the Return to Civilian Rule." *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, 2019, [online resource] available from, https://www.britannica.com/place/Ghana/Independence. Accessed on 15/01/2020

[12] "January 13, 1972, Lt. Col. Ignatius Kutu Acheampong Overthrows Prof. Kofi Busia's Government." *Edward Ulzen Memorial Foundation*, 2018, [online resource] available from, https://www.eaumf.org/ejm-blog/2018/1/11/january-13-1972-lt-col-ignatius-kutu-acheampong-overthrows-prof-kofi-busias-government. Accessed on 15/01/2020

[13] George Tagoe. *Genesis Four*, (Victoria, Canada: Trafford Publishing, 2003), pp 115-128

[14] "Ghana – Country Assessment: Country Information & Policy Unit." *Refworld*, 2001, pp 4 - 5

architecture been reformed by the NRC right from the onset, and had the regime embraced intelligence work and implemented intelligence coordination throughout the architecture, this might have yielded a different outcome. This is because the NRC attaching relevance to every single agency, by making its duties intelligence-led, and well-coordinated, would not have only served as eyes and ears for the regime on the ground nationwide; it would have also created unity within the broader national security architecture.

At the time when Acheampong's economic policies were falling apart, having an intelligence-led national security architecture would have ensured the regime was better-placed to be situationally aware of related emerging threats from within and outside the architecture. This would have improved its preparations and served as a deterrent for anyone who had ideas in embarking on any form of malign activities, aimed at undermining and subsequently unseating the regime. Henceforth, this section argues that having in place an intelligence-led national security architecture would have protected Acheampong's regime with a firm grip on power; which would have helped the regime stabilise the country's landscape, and embark on its economic policies from a position of strength. It is therefore not surprising that Quantson stated that in retrospect, if Ghana's past leaders had appreciated the importance of security/intelligence work, the nation's history would have been otherwise; and probably would not be wallowing in the political and economic mess, which Ghanaians have been 'struggling to extricate ourselves over the years.'[15]

This is an assertion completely shared by this dissertation, as in Acheampong's case, its regime's ill-equipped national security architecture (as assessed below), made the difference in not being able to stabilise the country and protect its government.

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[15] Kofi Betum Quantson. *Bogus Informants: Nation Wreckers*, (Accra: NAPASVIL VENTURES, 2004), p. 82

Key Takeaways from the Acheampong Era

The Acheampong regime, just like the Busia administration, also prioritised economic security to help stabilise the country's landscape over national security. Furthermore, despite knowing very well that the most serious threat to the regime was a potential counter-coup, Acheampong, upon inheriting Busia's national security architecture also did nothing to improve it. This was despite the architecture at the time being so unprofessional and extremely polarised due to internal tribalism. Such inaction from this dissertation's point of view placed the Acheampong regime at a disadvantage, to begin with. Even though Acheampong, unlike Busia, attempted to address the ethnic imbalance within the broader Ghanaian society, by appointing nine military officers and strategically placing them in regions attributed to their ethnic traditional homelands; the regime only succeeded in militarising the Ghanaian society. Furthermore, what made it worse for the Acheampong regime was that it also attempted to model its governance structure on the military regime of the NLC by introducing a copycat of the NLC's constitutional structure. Unfortunately, similar to the NLC, the Acheampong regime also embarked on some inhumane practices to serve as a deterrent for anyone with subversive ideas to depose its government.

However, where the Acheampong regime missed the point was that unlike Acheampong, the NLC immediately after assuming office reformed the national security architecture it inherited from Nkrumah, by placing intelligence activities and interagency coordination at its core. This made the government effective and able to stabilise the country's landscape because the decisions it made were all intelligence-led. Under Acheampong's regime, this was not the case, as the outlook of the national security architecture it inherited from the Busia administration was not altered. The Acheampong regime left the architecture as it was, however, contrary to the past Busia administration, the new regime was pro-GAF. Acheampong focussed on re-instating the GAF's authority in the country and heavily relied on

the GAF to govern; whilst barely paying any attention to the rest of the agencies which constituted the broader architecture.

So, instead of Acheampong having a national security architecture, which was intelligence-led to protect its regime and help stabilise the country's volatile landscape, its over-reliance on the GAF ended up militarising Ghana. This made the fragile landscape extremely volatile and dangerous. Therefore, with no intelligence-led national security architecture to fall on, Acheampong's SMC I had no eyes and ears, and subsequently was situationally unaware of where the threat to the regime might be emerging from. It is therefore not surprising that Acheampong's own Chief of Defence Staff, F.W.K Akuffo, was the one who orchestrated an internal military coup, which ultimately resulted in SMC I's demise to establish the new Supreme Military Council 2 (SMC II) regime.

Akuffo's Military Regime from 1978 - 1979

Politicos Historia of the Akuffo Era

The SMC II, upon assuming power inherited about 300% inflation and to tackle this issue put into motion a demonetization program. This program was to help get rid of large hordes of illegal cedi (monetary currency) holdings both within and outside the country. Such a decision was aimed at strengthening Ghana's monetary currency by reducing the excess liquidity in the system.[16] By October 1978, Ghanaians were being significantly affected by the aforesaid measures, which had made prices of consumer goods double and even quadruple in some cases. The hardships were immense and there was widespread discontent among Ghanaians in every society. Within the space of three months between August and November 1978, the country had recorded eight strikes involving over 70,000 workers, which were to secure pay rises to meet living costs. Due to the situation getting out of control, the new regime declared a state of emergency. An emergency decree was subsequently passed in November 1978 to prohibit strikes and all forms of protest. The regime declared that damage to property was a criminal act and was against the security of the state. The 1978 decree also granted the regime the right to detain people without trial, restrict the movement of citizens, control property and dismiss all civil servants on strike by replacing them with new recruits.[17] By April 1979, inflation in the country began to rise excessively.[18]

Threat Landscape During Akuffo Era

On 15th May 1979, five weeks before the planned elections for the return to civilian rule, there was an attempted military coup d'état orchestrated against the SMC II. This attempted coup was led by a Flight Lieutenant of the Ghana Air Force called Jerry John Rawlings. He was

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[16] "November 6, 1978, Lt. Gen. FWK Akuffo, Chairman of the Supreme Military Council (II) Declares a State of Emergency." *Edward Ulzen Memorial Foundation*, 2017, [online resource] available from, https://www.eaumf.org/ejm-blog/2017/11/6/november-6-1978-gen-fwk-akuffo-chairman-of-the-supreme-military-council-ii-declares-a-state-of-emergency. Accessed on 15/01/2020
[17] Ibid
[18] Ibid

'part of an underground movement of military officers' who had plans to 'unify Africa through a series of coups', and therefore called themselves, the Free Africa Movement (FAM). Rawlings alleged that there was widespread corruption across the country and that it needed a 'house-cleaning operation'. However, due to inadequate planning coupled with ill-equipped tools, the attempted coup failed.[19]

Rawlings, together with six other soldiers were arrested and imprisoned. Rawlings was charged with leading a squad of soldiers to depose Akuffo's regime and was put in front of a publicly held court-martial. According to Rawlings, during the trial, several legal terminologies were used that made no sense to him. Therefore, he got up and interrupted the proceedings by grabbing the microphone.[20] He then stated that;

> "I don't understand these terms and all that's going on…." "I am just here and I am taking responsibility for everything that's happened and to leave my men alone but I wanted to make sure that they hear what I wanted to say first."[21]

Rawlings subsequently made a passionate speech by stating that:

> "I am not an expert in economics, and I am not an expert in law. But I am an expert in working on an empty stomach while wondering when and where the next meal will come from. I know what it feels like going to bed with a headache, for want of food in the stomach."[22]

Although the trial proceeded to find Rawlings guilty and sentenced him to death, the speech resonated with the majority of ordinary Ghanaians and non-commissioned soldiers.[23] Assessing these developments from afar was Afrifa, a former Head of State during the NLC regime. Rawlings' failed military coup attempt, coupled with the rapid deterioration of the country's economy, made Afrifa very worried. It was alleged that Afrifa wrote a letter to Acheampong expressing concerns about corruption and indiscipline in the military. In the letter

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[19] W Ofuatey-Kodjoe. 'Ideology, Politics and Public Policy in Ghana: 1982 – 1996', in *Globalization and the Dilemmas of the State in the South*, by F. Adams, S. Gupta, K. Mengisteab, Timothy M. Shaw., eds., (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1999), p. 170

[20] CGTN. (2019, January 29). *Faces of Africa- The Jerry Rawlings story* [Video]. YouTube. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9NqrehaPOrA

[21] CGTN (2019)

[22] CGTN (2019)

[23] CGTN (2019)

Afrifa echoed his fears about the future consequence of soldiers being executed to serve as a deterrent against the staging of military coups in Ghana.[24] In the letter, Afrifa stated that;

> "I feel greatly disturbed about the future after the government…. In order to discourage the military from staging coups in the future, how about if they line all of us up and shot us one by one? I do not certainly want to be arrested, given some sort of trial and shot. But I would be a stupid General if I sit in the comfort of my farm and await the VENGEANCE that is about to be unleashed on us…. I will pray to take away the fear and confusion weighing on my mind now."[25]

National Security Architecture

Pre-Conditions 1, 2, and 3

Throughout Akuffo's rule, there was no significant difference in the state of pre-conditions 1, 2, and 3, from Acheampong's administration. The core structure of the national security architecture remained the same as that of his predecessor's administration. The Ghana Police Service (GPS) and Ghana Armed Forces (GAF) remained the primary national security institutions, with no significant alteration made to pre-condition 1. The only difference was that this regime treated the GAF with respect and dignity. Pre-condition 2 still consisted of the CID, charged with criminal intelligence work; SB, tasked with political and security intelligence role; MIU, for defence intelligence work; and RB, responsible for foreign intelligence work. Under pre-condition 3, there was no agency put in place and tasked with the responsibility of ensuring interagency intelligence coordination. There were however changes made to personnel that headed up the agencies.

Akuffo Underestimating the Relevance of Pre-Conditions 1, 2, and 3

As the Ghanaian economy continued to flounder, on 4th June 1979, a month before the July elections for the return to civilian rule, Rawlings escaped from the military cell to launch a successful coup in the second attempt. To date, it is still a mystery how Rawlings managed to

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[24] Former president John Agyekum Kufuor. "Rawlings: "killing" an Elected Man; the Gravest Disrespect to Our Electoral Process." *The Independent Ghana*, 2020, [online resource] available from, https://theindependentghana.com/2020/06/rawlings-killing-an-elected-man-the-gravest-disrespect-to-our-electoral-process/. Accessed on 14/09/2020
[25] Ibid.

escape.[26] However, what is known is that he had support from some junior officers and lower army ranks who wanted to restore the reputation of the military.[27] Ultimately, Akuffo's SMC II regime was deposed, and Akuffo in addition to other senior members of the regime was arrested by Rawlings' Armed Forces Revolutionary Council's (AFRC) military regime.

Key Takeaways from the Akuffo Era

Once again, similar to Acheampong's regime, Akuffo's SMC II also appears to have leaned heavily towards prioritising economic security over national security to help stabilise the political and security landscape of the country. For this reason, the SMC II also upon assuming office did nothing to improve the state of the national security architecture it inherited. The regime operated the same architecture, which was militarised, with less attention given to the other agencies and therefore, lacked professionalism in the form of incorporating intelligence work and its coordination (pre-conditions 2 and 3) in its duties. Furthermore, just like its predecessor, the SMC II also militarised the country, undertook inhumane acts, coupled with extreme hardship in living standards, as well as the non-existence of an intelligence-led national security architecture to rely on. There is no doubt that the Akuffo regime plunged the country into further chaos, creating severe destabilisation in its political and security landscape. As there were no eyes and ears across the country, this made the regime lack focus, and became situationally unaware of emerging challenges. This became more apparent because although through sheer luck the regime was able to foil Rawlings' first coup attempt; the absence of an intelligence-led national security architecture meant that the SMC II was ousted from office in Rawlings' second attempt of a military coup d'état. Rawlings and his fellow officers who perpetrated the successful military coup referred to themselves as the AFRC.

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[26] Kwamina Panford. 'Elections and Democratic Transition in Ghana: 1991 - 196', Ghana's Post-Colonial History: The Rawlings Factor, in *Democratization in Late Twentieth-Century Africa: Coping with Uncertainty*, by Jean-Germa Gros., ed., (London: Greenwood Press, 1998), p. 114

[27] "Firing Squad Executes Former Ghana Leader on Corruption Charge." *New York Times*, 2004, [online resource] available from, https://www.nytimes.com/1979/06/17/archives/firing-squad-executes-former-ghana-leader-on-corruption-charge.html. Accessed on 20/02/2020

Rawlings' Armed Forces Revolutionary Council's (AFRC) Military Regime from June 1979 - September 1979

Flight Lieutenant Jerry John Rawlings and his team indicated that its assumption of power was temporary[28] as the main purpose for the coup was to embark on a 'housecleaning operation'. Hence the new military junta immediately set up the AFRC consisting of 14 members, which included lower army commanders as well as some retained SMC commissioners and was headed by Rawlings. The handover to a civilian government was postponed from July 1979 to October 1979 by the AFRC. A week after assuming power, the AFRC began the 'housecleaning operation'.[29] This resulted in setting up a military tribunal to put all those who had contributed to the deterioration of the country on trial. Anyone found guilty was to be shot by a firing squad.[30]

On 26th June 1979, Acheampong, Afrifa, Akuffo, and five other senior military officers (Amedume, Boakye, Felli, Kotei, and Utuka) were found guilty of embezzlement and corruption of public funds and were all executed by the firing squad.[31] Furthermore, some civilians including many Lebanese and Indian traders were also executed to make an example of those perceived to be engaged in economic corruption.[32] Some of this 'housecleaning operation' was done in public and had popular support from the Ghanaian public who were chanting out loud 'let the blood flow'. There was immediate condemnation by Britain, who urged the United States, Canada, and Western European nations to make a joint protest to the new Ghanaian

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[28] "Ghana – Country Assessment: Country Information & Policy Unit." *Refworld*, 2001, p. 5
[29] CIA-RDP84B00049R000200400078-6. 'A Retrospective Look at Rawlings, The Armed Forces Revolutionary Council in Power', Approved for Release 2007/07/16
[30] Joseph G. Amamoo. *The Ghanaian Revolution*, (Lincoln: Authors Choice Press, 2000), pp 193-203
[31] "Brief Profile, Ignatius Kutu Acheampong." *Justice Ghana*, 2019, [online resource] available from, http://justiceghana.com/blog/our-services/research-information-and-advisory-advocacy/brief-profile-ignatius-kutu-acheampong/. Accessed on 15/06/2020
[32] "2 Former Heads of State Are Executed in Ghana, Democracy Dies in Darkness." *Washington Post*, [online resource] available from, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1979/06/27/2-former-heads-of-state-are-executed-in-ghana/277f17f6-69ef-48aa-bbb4-8d71b02004f3/. Accessed on 15/01/2020

authorities. The West German government expressed 'deep dismay' over the executions.[33]

Answering the condemnation from the international community, Rawlings stated that;

> "I don't believe in taking a man's life because I can't make one, but if shedding blood is the only thing that will make the Ghanaian change his greedy character, then I will do it".[34]

Not forgetting that, as the 'housecleaning operation' was still taking place, the presidential and parliamentary election had already been completed. The winner, Dr. Hilla Limann, whose People's National Party (PNP) had then formed a governing coalition with the United National Convention (UNC) was patiently waiting to take power as part of returning to civilian rule.[35] On 24th September 1979, Limann assumed power and was inaugurated as the President of the Third Republic of Ghana[36], hence becoming the third civilian government since independence. That said, at the time of handing over power, Rawlings openly warned the new administration to put the interest of Ghanaians first, and that it was on probation and was being watched.[37] This period of Rawlings' era was a short transitional period (three months) and therefore no significant changes were made to the national security architecture.

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[33] Ibid.

[34] Jimmy D. Kandeh. "Coups from Below", This page intentionally left blank Coups from Below Armed Subalterns and State Power in West Africa, Coup from Below, *EPDF PUB*, 2004, p. 72 [online resource] available from https://epdf.pub/coups-from-below-armed-subalterns-and-state-power-in-west-africa.html. Accessed on 15/01/2020

[35] "Ghana – Country Assessment: Country Information & Policy Unit." *Refworld*, 2001, p. 5

[36] Tapan Prasad Biswal. *Ghana, Political and Constitutional Developments*, (New Delhi: Northern Book Centre, 1992), p. 167

[37] IBP. *Ghana Land Ownership and Agricultural Laws Handbook Volume 1 Strategic, Information, Policies and Regulations*, (Washington DC: International Business Publication, 2018), p. 55

Hilla Limann's Administration from September 1979 to 1981

Who is Limann

Dr. Hilla Limann was an academic who had been educated at the University of Ghana, London School of Economics, Sorbonne University, France and attained his PhD in Political Science & Constitutional Law at the University of Paris.[38] He served as a counsellor for Ghana's Permanent Mission, in Geneva, Switzerland from 1971 to 1975 and returned to Ghana in the capacity of the Head of Europe, the Americans Southeast Asia Desk in 1975.[39]

Politicos Historia of the Limann Era

When the ban on political parties was lifted in 1979, Limann's PNP and his coalition partners the UNC came into power with Hilla Limann as the leader.[40] At the time, Ghana's economy had ground almost to a halt due to Acheampong's economic mismanagement coupled with the AFRC's reckless and erratic economic measures. The level of stocks of goods in the country was extremely low, and the state coffers were almost empty. The Limann government also had to contend with Rawlings' ominous threat issued in his handing-over address that it was on probation; and he was still visibly around to stir up anti-establishment sentiments among the populace with his populist rhetoric. Additionally, this new government found its leadership being torn apart due to issues of power brokerage, distribution of patronage, and accusations and counter-accusations of corrupt deals.[41]

Responding to the hardship in the country, upon assuming office as the President of Ghana, one of Limann's first acts was to replenish food stock, which according to the new

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[38] Roger Gocking. *The History of Ghana*, (West Port: Greenwood Press,2005), p. 292

[39] Agape Kanyiri Damwah. Dr Hilla Limann 1934 – 1998: His Life and Times, [PhD Thesis] University of Cape Coast, (2011), p.62

[40] "Ghana – Country Assessment: Country Information & Policy Unit." *Refworld*, 2001, p. 5

[41] FK Drah. 'Civil Society and the Transition to Pluralist Democracy', in *Political Parties and Democracy in Ghana's Fourth Republic*, by Kwame A. Ninsin and FK Drah, eds., (Accra: Woeli Publishing Services, 1993), P. 98

administration had been depleted by the AFRC's three-month rule.[42] The new administration also launched the Gold Endowment Fund as a means of getting investors to Ghana[43], while also introducing a 'trade liberalization programme.'[44] Furthermore, using local governments and traditional institutions, Limann's administration embarked on economic policies which supported farmers by offering them fair producer prices, expertise, machinery, and equipment to help boost food production in the country. Limann's economic policies yielded positive results as within a year in office, Ghanaians witnessed improvement in the market and a sharp decline in long queues for food.[45] Not only that, the administration also "initiated an investment code to attract foreign capital, and eventually succeeded in lifting the international economic blockade slapped on Ghana during the AFRC period."[46]

Threat Landscape During Limann Era

During that period, the country's political and security landscape had become so volatile that it needed more than just economic security and democratic institutions to help address the dire consequences it faced. Ghana, at the time, needed strong leadership to help address the various crises which had plagued its landscape head-on. Despite Limann's personal qualities and his universally recognised honesty, the administration was arguably unable to prove equal to the task at hand. This became evident as gradually Limann's government was undermined with political infighting and accusations of corruption by his coalition partners, the UNC. Furthermore, efforts to tackle economic decline failed, food prices escalated and there were continuous strikes and riots across the streets of Ghana. Inevitably, the relationship between

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[42] Agape Kanyiri Damwah. Dr Hilla Limann 1934 – 1998: His Life and Times, [PhD Thesis] University of Cape Coast, (2011), p.115

[43] Ibid.

[44] FK Drah. 'Civil Society and the Transition to Pluralist Democracy', in *Political Parties and Democracy in Ghana's Fourth Republic*, by Kwame A. Ninsin and FK Drah, eds., (Accra: Woeli Publishing Services, 1993), P. 98

[45] Kwasi Dartey Baah. 'Political Leadership in Ghana: 1957 to 2010', *African Journal of Political Science and International Relations*, 9:2, (2015), pp 49-61

[46] FK Drah. 'Civil Society and the Transition to Pluralist Democracy', in *Political Parties and Democracy in Ghana's Fourth Republic*, by Kwame A. Ninsin and FK Drah, eds., (Accra: Woeli Publishing Services, 1993), P. 98

Limann and Rawlings also deteriorated.[47] The UNC also ended its alliance with the PNP in October 1980 following heightened disagreements. This led to amalgamation of other parties (including the UNC) to form the All People's Party with the aim to improve the economy. However, all attempts made to stimulate the economy failed, creating further discontent, and several unsuccessful attempts were made by members of the armed forces to seize power.[48]

National Security Architecture

Pre-Conditions 1, 2, and 3

Similar to the preceding government's the Limann administration also ensured that the core of the national security architecture remained unchanged. The core structure of the national security architecture remained the same as that of his predecessor's administration. The Ghana Police Service (GPS) and Ghana Armed Forces (GAF) remained the primary national security institutions, with no significant alteration made to pre-condition 1. The only difference was that this regime treated the GAF with respect and dignity. Pre-condition 2 still consisted of the CID, charged with criminal intelligence work; SB, tasked with political and security intelligence role; MIU, for defence intelligence work; and RB, responsible for foreign intelligence work.

Just like his predecessors, prioritising intelligence activities and interagency intelligence coordination was not of importance to the Limann administration. However, in contrast to previous governments, Limann even went further to significantly diminish the influence of the military and the police, where the CID and MIU emerged from respectively. The membership of the Chief–of–Defence Staff and the Inspector-General of Police for the national security council and council of state was abolished. No significant improvement was made to the broader national security architecture, with regards to its intelligence work and how it operated.

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[47] Tom Porteous. *Obituary, Hilla Limann*, Independent, (1998), [online resource] available from, https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/obituary-hilla-limann-1141990.html. Accessed on 15/01/2020
[48] "Ghana – Country Assessment: Country Information & Policy Unit." *Refworld*, 2001, p. 5

That said, the new government still relied on the depleted and outdated SB and MIU to embark on 24/7 intelligence surveillance and hostile campaigns against groups and individuals perceived to be a threat to the government in power. The MIU and SB mounted targeted surveillance to monitor movements of Rawlings and his followers.

Limann Underestimating the Relevance of Pre-Conditions 1, 2, and 3

However, just like the preceding regimes, because of this new administration's complete disregard to prioritise and invest in the national security architecture, the landscape was still unstable, and being able to perform its duties effectively was significantly hampered. The administration had no eyes and ears across the country, and similar to its predecessor was also situationally unaware of the magnitude of emerging threats. On the 31st December 1981, Rawlings and a small group of enlisted and former soldiers were able to effectively operate under the architecture's radar, to launch another successful military coup, which toppled the Limann administration. Subsequently, the 1979 constitution was suspended, and the president and his cabinet members were dismissed. All political parties were banned indefinitely. Rawlings and his colleagues established the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC), which was composed of seven members including Rawlings who exercised both executive and legislative powers and was also the Chairman.[49]

Key Takeaways from the Limann Era

Limann's government relied heavily on the principles of traditions and traditional rulers, coupled with economic security as the antidote to help stabilise the country's political and security landscape. Improving and/or reforming the national security architecture it inherited, and incorporating the second and third pre-conditions, appeared not to be a priority. Meanwhile, what Ghana needed in that era was strong leadership with the tenacity to face the

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[49] "President Jerry John Rawlings, Former President of Ghana, Biography." *Word Press*, 2013, [online resource] available from, https://jjrawlings.files.wordpress.com/2009/04/jerry-rawlings-bio-v1-03.pdf. Accessed on 15/01/2020

various crises which had engulfed the country head-on. As the Limann administration chose not to prioritise the architecture, it was unable to understand the magnitude of the challenges facing the country; due to not having eyes and ears on the ground to collect, assess and coordinate intelligence to that effect.

Despite Limann being fully aware that one of the main threats to his administration could well emanate from the camp of Rawlings and his associates, Limann's government was still unable to counter such a threat. Even though at the time, Limann sought the need to rely on the SB and MIU of his national security architecture to help protect his administration by addressing such concerns; Limann, just like preceding regimes also missed the point. Comparable to previous governments in this decade, the Limann administration also failed to recognise the importance of reforming the national security institutions to incorporate intelligence work and its coordination (three pre-conditions) right at the start of his government. Rather, Limann's administration began its governance by targeting the architecture through diminishing some of its influence by attacking a certain segment within the national security set-up. Meanwhile on the contrary the administration was over-reliant on its economic policies and its desire to put in place traditional structures as the possible key to help stabilise Ghana's deteriorated landscape.

However, as it became clear that despite Limann's personal qualities and his universally recognised honesty, he was arguably unable to prove equal to the task at hand. The administration became vulnerable, as the country was thrown into further chaos. Limann's failure to attach importance to the national security institutions immediately after assuming office, by incorporating the second and third pre-conditions to their duties, rendered the country's national security architecture ineffective in accomplishing its core duties. This underscores the reason why even though the administration knew who the threat was, its architecture was still unable to prevent the demise of Limann's democratically elected government. The demise occurred despite the country's constitutional mandate requiring

246

Limann to be in office at the time, and it signified a failure of democracy. Below is a recap of this chapter covering the entire decade of destabilisation in Ghana.

Consequences for Disregarding the Relevance of Pre-Conditions 1, 2, and 3

During this period of instability in Ghana, every successive administration and/or regime placed economic policies at the top of their respective priority list to help attain domestic stability. The civilian administrations were overly reliant on their respective economic policies and democratic institutions; whilst the military regimes were heavily dependent on their economic policies and the GAF. Therefore, while some pursued such policies in addition to putting in place democratic structures, others relied on the military to pursue such goals. That said, none of these governments succeeded in stabilising the country's political and security landscape. Rather, the landscape kept deteriorating under each government from one after the other, until it became extremely volatile like a tinderbox ready to ignite in flames. Failure to recognise the significance of the second and third pre-conditions as critical to their respective national security architecture's duties, created an inviting environment for military coups, rather than stabilising the country.

These governments missed the crucial point that what was required to make their respective architecture effective in protecting and stabilising their governments and the country respectively, was to have all three pre-conditions in play. Rather, they mostly relied on economic policies, and/or democratic institutions, and/or the GAF to attain domestic stability. By missing the crucial point of engaging the second and third pre-conditions meant, their respective architecture failed to prevent the military coup d'états, which significantly destabilised the country's landscape. It is therefore the assertion of this thesis that incorporating the second and third pre-conditions into the overarching national security architecture's duties to include every agency, could have stabilised the country's landscape

during this decade. As it was demonstrated during the NLC era and will be comprehensively proven in subsequent administrations to follow.

Therefore, had the architecture during this period not been neglected and operated unprofessionally based on tribal affiliation rather than professional merit, the sense of entitlement, which created division could have been avoided. The rivalries, suspicions, and hatred within the architecture, which impacted the wider society and made the country's landscape volatile and vulnerable to extreme violence, could have also been prevented. That being said, even if it were not prevented, having all three pre-conditions collectively working together would have placed respective regimes and/or administrations in a relatively better position to address such instabilities; as demonstrated during the NLC era. However, because the situation in the country during this decade played out to the contrary, whereby respective governments disregarded the importance of intelligence activities and interagency intelligence coordination, this resulted in destabilising Ghana's landscape. Further, the destabilised landscape also created the perfect environment for the 31st December 1981 military coup to take place from within the architecture, which saw Rawlings and his PNDC military regime come to power.

Chapter 8: Rawlings' Era and the Intelligence-Led National Security Architecture from 31 Dec 1981 to 2000

Table 11: Pre-Conditions for Intelligence-Led National Security

INTELLIGENCE-LED NATIONAL SECURITY ARCHITECTURE		
Pre-condition 1	**Pre-condition 2**	**Pre-condition 3**
Establish National Security Institutions	Embark on Intelligence Activities	Implement Interagency Intelligence Coordination
Protect and defend national interests against known and unknown threats	Offers eyes and ears within and outside country's territorial borders	Makes architecture situationally aware of magnitude and scope of overarching threats

Despite the fact that Rawlings' PNDC government was a military dictatorship, and initially pursued flawed economic policies, it still managed to bring about domestic stability in Ghana. By reforming Ghana's national security institutions, the regime was able to stabilise the country's security landscape. Rawlings' government incorporated intelligence work and interagency intelligence coordination into the architecture's duties; embracing all three pre-conditions. Such stability offered the regime breathing space to eventually implement effective economic policies, secure freedom of religious practice in the country, and most importantly, ensure Ghana's transition to true sustained democracy.

Recap of Preceding Events

Key	
X	Existence
X*	Existence but disregarded
-	Non-Existence

Table 12: Recap of Preceding Events

Era	Government Type	Precondition 1	Precondition 2	Precondition 3	Result
Precolonial	N/A	-	-	-	▪ Destabilised landscape ▪ Unable to defend country ▪ Conquered and colonised by Britain
Colonial Rule	Colonial Dictatorship	X	-	-	▪ Unable to perceive changing political and security environment ▪ Dangerous and unstable landscape ▪ Resulted in decolonisation
Nkrumah's Government	Democracy	X	X	-	▪ Unable to perceive changing political and security environment ▪ Dangerous and unstable landscape ▪ Resulted in demise through military coup
NLC Regime	Military Dictatorship	X	X	X	▪ Stabilised country's domestic landscape ▪ Averted internal and external threats (military coups) ▪ Successfully handed over power to a democratic government
▪ Busia Government	Democracy	X*	X*	-	▪ Over a decade of violence, dangerous and destabilised domestic landscape ▪ Resulted in the demise of every government through military coup (except AFRC)
▪ Acheampong NRC Regime	Military Dictatorship	X	X*	-	
▪ Acheampong SMC1	Military Dictatorship	X	X*	-	
▪ Akuffo SMC2	Military Dictatorship	X	X*	-	
▪ Rawlings AFRC	Military Dictatorship	X	X*	-	
▪ Limann Government	Democracy	X	X*	-	

To recap stability in Ghana (or anywhere) rests on a combination of three security pre-conditions; (i) establish national security institutions; (ii) incorporate intelligence activities; and (iii) implement interagency intelligence coordination. During the pre-colonial era, none of these three pre-conditions existed. The country's landscape became unstable, hence making it easier for the Europeans to exploit such vulnerabilities, resulting in the colonisation of the Gold Coast. During the colonial era through to the 1948 Riots, only one pre-condition existed. The Gold Coast only had an internal security institution with no intelligence activity and/or interagency intelligence coordination. This made the colonial regime situationally unaware of the changing dynamics of the country's political and security landscape, as it had no eyes and ears nationwide.

After the 1948 Riots when the colonial regime incorporated intelligence activities and interagency intelligence coordination into the internal security institution's duties, it was already too late. The continuous rioting and push for independence destabilised the country's landscape. This forced the regime to embark on a decolonisation plan sooner than it had anticipated, which ultimately resulted in the independence of the Gold Coast, to be renamed Ghana. The Nkrumah government put in pre-conditions 1 and 2 but left out pre-condition 3. The administration had in place national security institutions; incorporated intelligence work into the institutions' duties; but discouraged intelligence coordination. Unlike preceding administrations, Nkrumah's government was relatively aware of the changing dynamics within the political and security landscape in the country. However, its decision to discourage intelligence coordination meant that it was unable to connect the dots to foil the military coup d'état which deposed the administration.

The subsequent NLC Military regime, immediately after attaining power, transformed the national security institutions to incorporate intelligence work and its coordination; engaging all three pre-conditions. This provided the regime with eyes and ears everywhere in the country and also outside its borders into the rest of the African continent. Due to such an intelligence

capability, the regime was situationally aware, which helped them foil several military coup d'états, held on to power, and stabilised the country's landscape until it successfully handed over power to a democratically elected government in 1969. From 1969 to 1981, there were six administrations/regimes in total which governed the country. These were, Busia's democratically elected Progress Party (PP); Acheampong's military regime under the National Redemption Council (NRC); Acheampong's regime under the Supreme Military Council 1 (SMC I); Akuffo's regime under the SMC II; Rawlings' military regime under the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC); and Limann's democratically elected People's National Party (PNP). All of these regimes demonstrated a complete disregard for intelligence work and its centralised coordination within their respective national security institutions. Therefore, they only had one out of the three pre-conditions in place throughout this decade, leading to a major destabilisation of the country's political and security landscape, to the extent of almost becoming a failed state. With this recap in mind, here is a brief overview of this chapter.

Prepping for the Era of Rawlings

During the immediate decade prior to this administration, the entire sub-region alongside Ghana, was also heading in a downward trajectory and therefore leaning toward a destructive path. Ghana's political and security landscape at the time was described by Rawlings as a 'highly charged', environment which was ready to explode into flames, and all it needed was for someone to ignite a matchstick.[50] However, upon assuming office, Rawlings' PNDC military regime completely reformed the national security institutions, to significantly incorporate intelligence activities and encouraged interagency intelligence coordination, signifying all three pre-conditions. As part of the reformation, Special Branch (SB), which had since been one of the armed uniformed agencies used to perpetrate military coup d'états throughout preceding years was instantly disbanded by the PNDC regime.

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[50] UONGOZI Institute. (2015, October 30). *Meet the Leader - President Jerry Rawlings* [Video]. YouTube. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pcDfAZ0fby8

After disbanding SB, the Bureau for National Investigations (BNI) was formed as a replacement. The BNI reintroduced some former SB personnel, but the bureau was civilianised and the majority of its personnel disarmed. Subsequently, the PNDC government completely changed how the BNI operated, especially, how intelligence activities, and interagency coordination were undertaken professionally. As part of its intelligence collection and coordination capabilities, the MIU was disbanded to form the Defence Intelligence (DI).[51] In addition, to enhance the intelligence capabilities of the architecture, the regime created the People's Defence Committees (PDC) throughout the country.[52] Whilst alterations within the Research Bureau (RB) later down the years also led to its name being changed to the Research Department (RD).[53]

These changes, alongside creating a national security coordinating body, made the regime situationally aware of emerging threats internally and externally. This placed the PNDC in a firm position to counter every threat against its government. With such an intelligence-led national security architecture in place, Rawlings' regime was able to stabilise Ghana's political and security landscape from 1982 to 1992. The architecture also helped transition the country into real democracy in 1992, when Rawlings' National Democratic Congress (NDC) political party won the general election to begin Ghana's Fourth Republic. With all the three pre-conditions in place, the NDC administration was able to sustain and maintain Ghana's stabilised landscape. The NDC peacefully handed over power after an opposing party won the general election in 2000.

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[51] KB Quantson, *Ghana: National Security*, Security Problems of the June 4 Revolt, (Accra: Bestas Press-NAPASVIL VENTURES, 2003), p 69 onwards.

[52] CIA-RDP83S00855R000100040004-7, 'Ghana: Outlook for the Rawlings Regime', Approved for Release 2008/07/30

[53] "Security Sector Reform in Ghana", Intelligence Services, the introduction of Security and Intelligence Act 526. *The Bonn International Center for Conversion*, 2013, [online resource] available from, https://www.bicc.de/ssr_gtz/pdf/ghana.pdf. Accessed on 15/01/2020

Who is Jerry John Rawlings

Jerry John Rawlings was born in Accra on 22nd June 1947, to a Ghanaian mother from the Ewe tribe in the Volta Region and a Scottish father. As a child, when asked what he would like to be when he grew up, he answered, 'I wanted to be a pilot', which significantly angered his mother who wanted him to become a doctor.[54] He had his secondary education at Achimota Secondary School where he obtained his General Certificate of Education 'O' Level (GCE 'O' Levels) in 1966.[55] Whilst in school, the first President of Ghana, Dr. Kwame Nkrumah was ousted from office and as a schoolboy, Rawlings wondered about how people around Nkrumah "conducted or misconducted themselves" to develop such hatred for the founding father of the nation.[56] Upon completing Achimota Secondary School, he enlisted as a flight cadet in the Ghana Air Force in 1967 and was selected for officer cadet training at the Ghana Military Academy and Training School at Teshie, in Accra.[57]

After graduating as a commissioned pilot officer in January 1969, Rawlings won the "Speed Bird Trophy" as the best cadet in flying and airmanship. In 1978, he was promoted to the rank of Flight-Lieutenant in the Ghana Air Force.[58] Rawlings had a particular interest in socio-political affairs and broadened his horizons in this subject-area by reading, discussing, and sharing ideas with like-minded friends and colleagues. As personnel of the Ghana Air Force, he watched with keen interest the rapid deterioration of morale and discipline within the GAF, as corruption became second nature for the Supreme Military Council (SMC) I. On 4th June 1979, Rawlings and some junior ranked personnel launched a successful military coup, which ousted the SMC II out of office. He arrested military officers, government officials, and private sector individuals for corruption and after being put on trial and found guilty, had their

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[54] CGTN. (2019, January 29). *Faces of Africa- The Jerry Rawlings story* [Video]. YouTube. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9NqrehaPOrA

[55] "President Jerry John Rawlings, Former President of Ghana" Biography. *Word Press*, 2013, [online resource] available from, https://jjrawlings.files.wordpress.com/2009/04/jerry-rawlings-bio-v1-03.pdf. Accessed on 15/01/2020

[56] CGTN (2019)

[57] "President Jerry John Rawlings, former President of Ghana", Biography. *Word Press*, 2013.

[58] "President Jerry John Rawlings, former President of Ghana", Biography. *Word Press*, 2013.

properties confiscated and were sentenced to long-term imprisonment. Others were also executed, with some of them being senior military officers from previous regimes, including three former heads of state.[59] This was an action believed to have been deliberately taken as a deterrent for anyone who had irresponsible dreams of amassing national wealth through political power, to the detriment of Ghana's economy.[60]

Rawlings eventually handed over power to Limann's civilian government in 1979.[61] Due to corruption and other poor economic and security governance from the Limann administration, on 31st December 1981, Rawlings launched a second successful military coup. He regained power and formed the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) government.[62] Rawlings "imprisoned Limann and some 200 other politicians."[63]

Politicos Historia of Rawlings' Time in Office

Unlike any of his predecessors, when Rawlings took over the country, the Ghanaian economy was significantly depleted with most of its citizens experiencing extreme famine and hunger. As a hands-on leader, Rawlings ensured that the rebuilding of Ghana was done by all, including civilians and soldiers alike with 'no task too small'.[64] Rawlings, unlike many of his predecessors led Ghana 'through the difficult years of economic recovery and succeeded in giving back to Ghanaians their national pride.'[65]

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[59] Brenya E, Adu-Gyamfi S*, Afful I, Darkwa B, Richmond MB, Korkor SO, Boakye ES and Turkson GK. 'The Rawlings' Factor in Ghana's Politics: An Appraisal of Some Secondary and Primary Data', *Journal of Political Sciences & Public Affairs*, 1:4, (2015), pp 1-14

[60] KB Quantson. *Ghana: National Security*, Security Problems of the June 4 Revolt, (Accra: Bestas Press-NAPASVIL VENTURES, 2003), p. 69 onwards,

[61] 'Ghana – Heads of States', in *Heads of States and Governments Since 1945*, by Harris M. Lentz., ed., (Abingdon: Routledge, 2013), p. 319

[62] John L. Adedeji. 'The Legacy of J.J. Rawlings in Ghanaian Politics, 1979-2000', Abstract, *African Studies Quarterly*, 5:2, (2001).

[63] "Jerry J. Rawlings, The Head of State of Ghana." *Britannica*, 2019, [online resource] available from, https://www.britannica.com/biography/Jerry-J-Rawlings. Accessed on 15/06/2020

[64] CGTN. (2019, January 29). *Faces of Africa- The Jerry Rawlings story* [Video]. YouTube. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9NqrehaPOrA

[65] John L. Adedeji. 'The Legacy of J.J. Rawlings in Ghanaian Politics, 1979-2000', *African Studies Quarterly*, 5:2, (2001).

Harruna Yakubu, a Ghanaian professor, stated that Rawlings symbolises an awareness brought to Ghanaians that there was no divide between the people and the government, and that it is the people that made the government. For that reason, it was time for the people to stand up for their rights.[66] Rawlings promised to restore democracy and told members of the PNDC to see their appointment only as 'a chance to serve the people sacrificially.'[67]

However, the decline of Ghana's economy at the time was so significant that the economic hardship in the country was getting worse; and for that reason, not every Ghanaian shared Rawlings' approach. This scenario coupled with an attempted military coup in 1982 made the security and political landscape of the country very volatile. Rawlings at the time had two opposing powers of influence advising him. One of them was his fellow tribesman and intelligence chief, Captain Kojo Tsikata, who was a Pro-East idealist[68]; and the other was his chief economic adviser, Dr. Kwesi Botchway, a pro-West idealist.[69] Rawlings, who was perceived by the West as closely aligned to Marxism, listened to his chief economic adviser to realign economically toward the West.[70] Based on Bothway's advice, Rawlings had no choice than to turn to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank for support. As part of the economic package provided to Ghana, the government was subsequently required to implement a four-year Western-style economic recovery programme (ERP).[71] This led to the devaluation of the Ghanaian currency (Cedi) from 2.75 Cedis per the $1 to 29 Cedis per the $1.[72] This made the hardship in the country significantly unbearable for Ghanaians[73], which further infuriated his opposition in Ghana and abroad.[74]

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[66] CGTN (2019)
[67] Guy Arnold. *Africa, A Modern History from 1945 – 2015*, Ghana, (London: Atlantic Books, 2005), pp 673 - 676
[68] Joe Pichirallo and John Mintz. "Routine Polygraph Opened Ghanaian Espionage Probe, Ghanaian Intelligence and a Leader of the Government's Pro-Marxist Faction", *Washington Post*, 1985, [online resource] available from, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1985/07/13/routine-polygraph-opened-ghanaian-espionage-probe/0984d8f8-cb5f-4dbd-84bd-2227e71d1835/. Accessed on 15/01/2020
[69] Guy Arnold. *Africa, A Modern History from 1945 – 2015*, Ghana, (London: Atlantic Books, 2005), pp 673 - 676
[70] Ibid.
[71] Ibid
[72] CGTN (2019)
[73] Ibid.
[74] Guy Arnold. *Africa, A Modern History from 1945 – 2015*, Ghana, (London: Atlantic Books, 2005), pp 673 - 676

Despite the intense opposition, the economy gradually began to improve. By 1985, as the ERP was going quite well with the country experiencing some significant economic improvement, Botchway advised Rawlings to embark on ERP Mark II. Rawlings' PNDC government proceeded to launch ERP Mark II against powerful opposition within his government[75], with one of them being his Pro-East idealist intelligence chief, Captain Kojo Tsikata.[76] That said, proceeding with such a project led to an impressive economic recovery in the country, especially by the end of the 1980s.[77] Furthermore, as part of getting the Ghanaian economy back on track, Rawlings also empowered Local Defence Committees (LDCs) to root out corruption at the community level.[78] Rawlings' regime subsequently decentralised government from Accra to the regions, districts, and local communities; with overall national level control being maintained in Accra. These changes were also reflected in the administration's rebuilding of the country's national security apparatus into a cohesive, efficient, trustworthy, reliable, and professional apparatus, which arguably helped Ghana turn a significant corner.[79] Due to Rawlings significant effort, it has been claimed that "besides its first President, Dr. Kwame Nkrumah, no political leader has had as much of an impact on Ghana as Jerry John Rawlings."[80]

Threats Landscape in Rawlings' Era

Several threats were perceived as having the potential to destabilise or in the worst-case scenario oust Rawlings' military regime, and subsequently his civilian administration from office. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) at the time estimated that Rawlings' military coup

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[75] Guy Arnold. *Africa, A Modern History from 1945 – 2015*, Ghana, (London: Atlantic Books, 2005), pp 673 - 676
[76] Joe Pichirallo and John Mintz. "Routine Polygraph Opened Ghanaian Espionage Probe, Ghanaian Intelligence and a Leader of the Government's Pro-Marxist Faction." *Washington Post*, 1985, [online resource] available from, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1985/07/13/routine-polygraph-opened-ghanaian-espionage-probe/0984d8f8-cb5f-4dbd-84bd-2227e71d1835/. Accessed on 15/01/2020
[77] Guy Arnold. *Africa, A Modern History from 1945 – 2015*, Ghana, (London: Atlantic Books, 2005), pp 673 - 676
[78] Tapan Prasad Biswal. *Ghana, Political and Constitutional Developments*, (New Delhi: Northern Book Centre, 1992), p. 192
[79] KB Quantson, *Ghana: National Security*, Security Problems of the June 4 Revolt, (Accra: Bestas Press-NAPASVIL VENTURES, 2003), p 69 onwards.
[80] Brenya E, Adu-Gyamfi S*, Afful I, Darkwa B, Richmond MB, Korkor SO, Boakye ES and Turkson GK. 'The Rawlings' Factor in Ghana's Politics: An Appraisal of Some Secondary and Primary Data', *Journal of Political Sciences & Public Affairs*, 1:4, (2015), p. 3

had begun what was a potential prolonged period of political and economic instability in Ghana. The CIA assessed that internally, ideological, and personal tensions within the regime was intensifying rather than abating.[81] The CIA concluded that "with no meaningful reform in sight, the serious economic malaise grippling Ghana could well topple the regime which is already in serious disarray."[82] Additionally, although Rawlings came to power with the help of the Ghanaian Air Force in which he served, the loyalty of the military was also questionable; as there was widespread scepticism among the ranks of the armed forces. Not only that there were also splits along regional, ethnic, and ideological lines within the regime, the armed forces, and in the country as a whole.[83] Unlike preceding administrations, the magnitude of internal and external threats inherited by the PNDC regime was extensive.

Internal Threats

Politically Enabled Threats

Firstly, was the threat that emanated from within the intelligence-led national security architecture, the military arm to be precise and/or political adversaries. Several coup plots by Rawlings' adversaries from within and also by exiles were planned to oust Rawlings' regime and subsequently assassinate Rawlings and his inner circles. One of the attempted coups occurred during the first political disturbance in Ghana due to the influx of about one million Ghanaian expelled from Nigeria. The abrupt return of these Ghanaians added new pressure to an already foundering economy. This, coupled with the significant distractions created in the country by the influx, was seen as an opportunity for a coup attempt. According to Rawlings, the expulsion of Ghanaians from Nigeria was a well-coordinated attempt by some foreign governments to destabilise the PNDC regime and ultimately overthrow it.[84]

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[81] CIA-RDP86T00303R000300420015-9. 'Ghana: The Rawlings Regime One Year Later', Interagency Intelligence Assessment, (1983), p. 8, Approved for release 2008/ 05/19
[82] CIA-RDP86T00303R000300420015-9. 'Ghana: The Rawlings Regime One Year Later', Interagency Intelligence Assessment, (1983), p. 8, Approved for release 2008/ 05/19
[83] CIA-RDP86T00303R000300420015-9. 'Ghana: The Rawlings Regime One Year Later', Interagency Intelligence Assessment, (1983), p. 5, Approved for release 2008/ 05/19
[84] UONGOZI Institute. (2015, October 30). *Meet the Leader - President Jerry Rawlings* [Video]. YouTube. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pcDfAZ0fby8. Accessed on 10/092020

However, with sub-divisions of the national security institutions operating at the national, regional, district and local levels, the architecture had eyes and ears across the country. Alongside its NSC, intelligence gathered was coordinated to undertake nationwide intelligence-led operations that foiled the anticipated coup attempt before it got off the ground.[85] Later, it was announced on radio that an attempted coup had been foiled by the regime's intelligence and security network. This and other later military coup attempts, which had the potential to destabilise the country were all foiled by the regime.[86]

Series of Military Coup Attempts

During the PNDC era, the regime encountered several military coups attempts to execute and/or oust Rawlings and the regime from office.[87] One such attempt occurred on 23 November 1982, whereby through effective intelligence coordination, the PNDC's intelligence-led national security architecture "picked up warning signals".[88] The signals suggested that a group of military officers from the Gondar Barracks in Accra, were planning to overthrow the regime. Hence with an intelligence-led national security architecture to rely on, the perpetrators were out-smarted by government forces who arrested more than twenty of them.[89] Furthermore, during the 1983 famine and significant hardship season in Ghana, there was lot of anger, impatience, and rebellion against the PNDC regime. This resulted in another military coup attempt on 27 February 1983.[90] Once again, with the regime's intelligence-led national security architecture having eyes and ears on the ground across the country, perpetrators were taken by surprise, nine soldiers and two civilians were arrested at Achimota

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[85] Eshun, J. 'Security and National Development During Rawlings' Era', Virtual Conversation with a Retired Naval Officer & Former Senior PDC Operative, Microsoft Teams, 21 June, (2020).

[86] "Coup Attempt Said Foiled." *UPI Archives*, 1983, [online resource] available from, https://www.upi.com/Archives/1983/03/03/Coup-attempt-said-foiled/3159415515600/. Accessed on 15/01/2020

[87] Baffour Agyeman-Duah. 'Ghana 1982-6: The Politics of the P.N.D.C.', *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 25:4 (1987), pp 613-642

[88] Eshun, J. 'Security and National Development During Rawlings' Era', Virtual Conversation with a Retired Naval Officer & Former Senior PDC Operative, Microsoft Teams, 21 June, (2020).

[89] "Ghana The 1981 Coup and the Second Rawlings Government." *Photius*, [online resource] available from, https://photius.com/countries/ghana/national_security/ghana_national_security_the_1981_coup_and_th~152.html. Accessed on 15/12/2020

[90] "Ghanaian Army Rebels Stage Fourth Coup Attempt in a Year." *UPI Archives*, 1983, [online resource] available from, https://www.upi.com/Archives/1983/06/19/Ghanaian-army-rebels-stage-fourth-coup-attempt-in-a-year/2575424843200/. Accessed on 06/12/2020

in Accra. It was reported that heavy machine guns, rockets, ammunition, coupled with a hit list were seized during the process.[91]

Between 1985 and 1986, there were several military coup attempts aimed at unseating the PNDC regime out of office, which were all also foiled.[92] There was another military coup attempt to oust the Rawlings' military regime on 24 September 1989. This attempted coup was headed by a military Major called Courage Quashigah, Commandant of the Ghana Military Academy, and a close associate of Rawlings. It was alleged that the attempt included an assassination plot to take out Rawlings. However, once again with such an impressive intelligence-led national security architecture, the plot was unravelled, and Quashigah, including the other five military officers, were arrested.[93]

State of the Economy

Furthermore, the same challenges that confronted preceding leaders of the country such as 'the poor state of the economy, unemployment, poor administrative reforms, human rights issues, and unfavourable international economic order, which descended Ghana's landscape into political and security chaos, was no different under Rawlings' PNDC regime. In 1983, just over a year after the PNDC assumed office, there was severe famine, hardship, and hunger in the country. Whilst such hardship triggered continuous demonstrations, civil disobedience, civil unrests, and other violent scenes under previous governments, which often resulted in their demise, such occurrences yielded a different outcome under the PNDC regime. Unlike its predecessors, Rawlings' military regime was able to contain such protests and/or unrests, and at the same time defended against the threat of military coups and stabilise the country's political and security landscape.

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[91] Ghana: A Country Study, p.274
[92] Ibrahim Hardi. "Honour The Revolution!. Lets Join Hands With The Hero!, His Excellency Jerry John Rawlings." *Modern Ghana*, 2017, [online resource] available from, https://www.modernghana.com/news/824312/honour-the-revolution-lets-join-hands-with-the.html. Accessed on 06/12/2020
[93] Taylor & Francis Group. *The Europa World Year Book*, (London: Europa Publications, 2004), p. 1874

From this dissertation's assessment, because the PNDC prioritised the country's national security institutions immediately after assuming office, by incorporating significant intelligence work and encouraging effective intelligence coordination; the regime was better-positioned to have eyes and ears across the country. This made it situationally aware of the magnitude of threats that faced the PNDC government. From a position of strength, it was able to maintain a firm grip on power, which bought the regime some time until its economic policies started to yield results. In doing so, the PNDC was also able to stabilise the country's chaotic political and security landscape and most importantly was able to eventually put in place democratic structures to return Ghana back to real democracy in 1992.

Tribalism as a Threat

Last but not least was the threat of tribalism which comprised of tribal politics and some tribal conflicts during Rawlings' tenure in office. Rawlings' vision to democratise the Ghana Armed Forces was unpopular, which inevitably provoked conflict and tribal concerns. Ethnic divisions in the country became very visible, and Rawlings with an Ewe mother, came to often rely on the Ewe tribe for support. He was also unable to escape the tribal politics in Ghana as PNDC leaders from non-Ewe groups were forced out, sometimes accused of plotting, and a number of coup attempts were reported."[94]

At the same time, there were also conflicts between different tribal groups engulfing the country. This included the conflict between the Konkomba and Nanumba tribes, which also posed a significant challenge towards the stability of the political and security landscape in the country. With most of the political and security instabilities in sub-Saharan Africa occurring as a result of tribal conflicts getting out of control, the challenges that were associated with the Konkomba and Nanumba conflict in Ghana were no different. In In 1994, a minor trade issue

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[94] Guy Arnold. *Africa, A Modern History from 1945 – 2015*, Ghana, (London: Atlantic Books, 2005), pp 673 - 676

started violence, which escalated into full-fledged violence. This left approximately 2000 people dead and 150,000 displaced, with several hundred villages and farms destroyed.[95]

However, with national security institutions, which embraced intelligence activities and interagency intelligence coordination (constituting the three pre-conditions), the situation was handled effectively, and abuses by the armed forces were rarely reported. The conflict was brought under control if not fully resolved; and although it emerged again in 1997, the situation was quelled before it got out of hand in June 1999.[96] Once again, each of the preceding incidents had the potential to destabilise the country's landscape, had it not been the timely intervention of the intelligence-led national security architecture. Besides the domestic security issues, there were also external challenges that pose significant threat to domestic stability as elaborated below.

External Threats

Ghana-Togo Border Tensions

Hostility between Ghana and Togo which existed since the 1970s, posed a significant external threat. The relationship between the two countries deteriorated during the mid-70s after Togo demanded a readjustment of their shared border in Togo's favour. During the mid-70s, under Ghana NLM rule, they rebuffed this demand outright and subsequently cited the 1956 United Nations (UN) referendum to justify their actions. The 1956 UN referendum gave the population of western Togoland the choice to be part of Togo or Ghana. In addition, the NLM government banned the National Liberation Movement for Western Togoland (NLMWT). Furthermore, Ghanaian security forces arrested ten people near Togo's border and charged them with subversion for contacting Ghanaian dissidents in Togo. The NLMWT threatened to use force

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[95] UNHCR. 'Ghana, Conflict between the Konkomba and Nanumba tribes and the government response to the conflict (1994-September 2000)', Research Directorate, Immigration and Refugee Board, Canada, *Refworld,* (2000).
[96] Ibid

and even attempted to use guerrilla warfare but failed.[97] Tensions appeared to have calmed down in the early 1980s until Rawlings took office and closed Ghana's border with Togo in 1982. He sent a strong warning to the Togolese government to stop allowing Ghanaian dissidents to use Togo's territory as a base from which to launch attacks against Ghana. Togolese government reacted by threatening to arrest any Ghanaian exile found to be holding meetings in Togo, which resulted in Ghana reopening its borders with Togo in early 1984.[98]

In 1986 a blame game ensued between the two countries which further deteriorated their relations. Ghana's secretary for foreign affairs warned against the use of neighbouring countries as bases for subversive activities against the Rawlings' regime. Furthermore, Ghanaian security forces captured a group of armed dissidents who had crossed the border from Togo. On the other hand, the Togolese government also warned against Togolese dissidents operating subversively from Ghana in an attempt to oust Togo's President, Gnassingbe Eyadema. Togo subsequently closed its borders with Ghana and deported two hundred and thirty-three Ghanaian nationals. In early 1989 Togo further removed one hundred and twenty Ghanaians from its country, however during the late 1990s Togo reopened all its borders with Ghana which gradually improved relations.[99] Political conflict ensued in Togo on 30th January 1993 whereby Togolese security forces loyal to President Eyadema clashed with opposition groups.

Ghana placed its security forces on full alert and at the same time aided approximately fifty-five thousand refugees to flee into Ghana. Rawlings subsequently recalled all Ghanaian troops serving on UN missions abroad to return to Ghana. On 25th March 1993 Togolese attackers raided President Eyadema's home and Togo closed its borders with Ghana. Lomé accused

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[97] "Ghana International Security Concerns." *Photius*, 1994, [online resource] available from, https://photius.com/countries/ghana/national_security/ghana_national_security_international_securi~8325.html. Accessed on 15/04/2020
[98] Ibid
[99] Ibid

Rawlings' government of providing a safe haven for the raiders.[100] The two countries were on the brink of war in early 1994 after Lomé accused Accra of an assassination attempt on President Eyadema. The government of Togo alleged that over 100 Togolese expatriates, supposedly armed by the Ghanaians crossed the border from Ghana in an attempt to eliminate Eyadema and to take control of the government. Togo immediately closed its border with Ghana, and both countries blamed each other's armed forces for launching cross-border raids. Relations between the two countries improved in late 1994.[101]

Ghana-Liberia Tensions

Secondly, were the threats that emanated from Liberia between the late 1980s and late 1990s during the First Liberian Civil War. This took the lives of about 250,000 people,[102] and tens of thousands of Liberians sought refuge in Ghana with about 40,000 remaining at the end of the war in 2003. During the civil war period, Monrovia accused Accra of deporting four hundred of its citizens from Ghana in 1989. Intelligence out of Liberia suggested that the country was planning to retaliate by forcefully removing Ghanaians from its country, which was followed by 350 Ghanaians expelled from Liberia in 1989. This was followed by approximately 2,000 Ghanaians being held hostage by a rebel group called the National Patriotic Front of Liberia. Such an action infuriated Ghanaians and in response, Liberian refugees in the Budumburam Refugee Camp in Ghana also became a target for some Ghanaians. Furthermore, Ghanaians also called on their security forces to halt the continuous influx of Liberian refugees at the border by detaining them.[103]

In response to such pressures, in the mid-1990s authorities in Ghana deployed three battalions of troops to Liberia as part of the Economic Community of West African States

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[100] Ibid
[101] Ibid
[102] Lyle. Kane. 'Linking TVET to Economic in Post-Conflict Liberia' in *International Handbook of Education for the Changing World of Work: Bridging Academic and Vocational Learning*, by Rupert Maclean, David Wilson., eds., (Toronto: Springer, 2009), p. 788
[103] "Organisation. Ghana - Liberia Relations." Global Security, 2019, [online resource] available from https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/africa/gh-forrel-liberia.htm. Accessed on 15/01/2020

Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) peacekeeping force.[104] Reports that emerged from Liberia suggested that Ghanaian aircraft from the peacekeeping forces dropped bombs on rebel artillery posts.[105] All these appeared to have created some level of concern for authorities in Ghana as well as the country's political and security landscape. As the situation had implications for stability and peace for countries in the sub-region. Once again, the significant contribution and professionalism of the Ghana navy, an arm of the architecture, were relied upon, with the help of effective intelligence coordination within the architecture, to help bring the war to an end.[106]

Tensions with Western Nations

Lastly, were the threats posed to the administration from Western countries. Rawlings came into power announcing to campaign against mismanagement, corruption, and black 'marketeering' in the country. The new regime announced plans to reverse 25 years of social, economic, and political decline in the country, and publicly criticised the West, especially the United States and Britain for contributing to the situation in Ghana. Therefore, making it logical to infer that Rawlings' new regime viewed the West as a threat. This was especially true, because Rawlings had a revolutionary goal that leaned more towards the East than the West. It is therefore not surprising the Central Intelligence Agency's (CIA's) assessed that the new regime offered a greater opportunity for Communist countries and Libya to nurture a radical, anti-Western regime in Ghana' than ever existed since Nkrumah's overthrow in the mid-1960s.[107]

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[104] Ibid
[105] Mark Huband. Peace Proposals Rejected As Fighting Continues, *UPI Archives*, 1990, [online resources] available from, https://www.upi.com/Archives/1990/09/16/Peace-proposals-rejected-as-fighting-continues/5562653457600/. Accessed on 15/01/2020
[106] Maxwell Owusu. 'Reluctant Refugees, Liberians in Ghana', *The Journal of the International Institute*, 7:3, (2000).
[107] CIA-RDP83S00855R000100040004-7. 'Ghana: Outlook for the Rawlings Regime', An Intelligence Assessment, Approved for Release 2008/07/30

The CIA assessment further zooming in on one of Rawlings' inner-circle members, Captain Kojo Tsikata (security and counter-intelligence chief). The assessment noted how Tsikata had been able to consolidate control over the security apparatus with Soviet bloc assistance, and how this assistance helped Tsikata to establish an effective counter-intelligence organisation. Therefore, this made the US view Tsikata as the greatest challenge to overcome if the West was to stand any chance with Rawlings' regime.[108] It was then only logical that the regime also viewed the US as a threat to the regime.[109] It was claimed that in early 1983, Rawlings' Counter-Intelligence Chief, Capt. Kojo Tsikata, obtained documents, which associated the CIA with dissident Ghanaians trying to destabilize and overthrow the PNDC regime. The document also linked the abortive coup attempts against the PNDC in 1983 and 1984, with the CIA's activities in , 'providing weapons, money or contracts through their offices at the US embassy in Accra and Lomé.'[110]

However, due to the regime's competent national security architecture in place and its effective intelligence coordinating capabilities, it was able to prove more than equal to the task by successfully responding to all the threats from within Ghana or abroad. For example, as part of the architecture's effort to counter threats against the government, in 1985, Mike Soussoudis, a cousin of Rawlings, who was also alleged to be an 'intelligence operative' within the PNDC regime's intelligence-led national security architecture, was arrested in Washington on charges for using a dissident African-American CIA Clerk (Sharon Scranage) to solicit information within the CIA.[111]

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[108] CIA-RDP83S00855R000100040004-7. 'Ghana: Outlook for the Rawlings Regime', An Intelligence Assessment, Approved for Release 2008/07/30

[109] CIA-RDP85T01058R000100190001-5. 'Ghana: Threat from the Extreme Left', Directorate of Intelligence, (1985), Approved for Release 2012/01/17

[110] Guy Arnold. *Africa, A Modern History from 1945 – 2015*, Ghana, (London: Atlantic Books, 2005), p. 675

[111] CIA-RDP90-00965R000504040004-8. Love Story Ends in Woe for a Lonely CIA Clerk', (1985), Approved for Release 2012/01/20 [online resource] available from, https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP90-00965R000504040004-8.pdf. Accessed on 01/15/2020

Meanwhile, at the same time, the intelligence machinery within Ghana's national security architecture, headed by Tsikata, had also obtained named US CIA agents and Ghanaians working for the CIA.[112] Rawlings' government arrested those Ghanaians who were then working at the US embassy in Accra, Ghana. They subsequently admitted to passing on information and were tried and sentenced to prison. A deal was reached between the Ghana and the US governments and Soussoudis was swapped for the convicted Ghanaians who were all stripped of their citizenship.[113]

National Security Rebuild and Outlook

The gradual process that formed the foundation of the country's current intelligence-led national security architecture began with the PNDC regime. As part of the national security rebuild, Rawlings' administration gradually started a national security architecture that had a purpose to protect the country, its citizens, and national interest.[114]

As Rawlings had the awareness that preceding military coup d'états were perpetrated by armed personnel from MIU and SB, upon assuming office, he immediately disbanded the MIU for good, and dismantled SB to create the BNI. The BNI then became the arm of the new intelligence-led national security architecture that was charged with internal intelligence duties. Members of the former SB were reshuffled and recruited into either the BNI or the Criminal Investigations Department (CID). The BNI recruited 'A' level leavers and university graduates with specialised skills. These recruits were professionally trained to perform intelligence production processes aimed at protecting the country, its citizens, and its interest. The BNI was created as a civilian intelligence agency that operated on domestic intelligence activities only. For that reason, intelligence activities of both disbanded MIU and SB were transferred to

[112] Guy Arnold. *Africa, A Modern History from 1945 – 2015*, Ghana, (London: Atlantic Books, 2005), pp 673 - 676
[113] Screen Ocean. "Ghana: Ghanaian Leader's Nephew, Michael Soussoudis, Arrives Home After being Released from the USA in a Spy Swap Deal." *Reuters*, 1985, [online resource] available from, https://reuters.screenocean.com/record/1040892. Accessed on 15/01/2020
[114] Eshun, J. 'Security and National Development During Rawlings' Era', Virtual Conversation with a Retired Naval Officer & Former Senior PDC Operative, Microsoft Teams, 21 June, (2020).

the BNI. Its agents carried no arms and were independent of the police and the military. It was, however, answerable to the President through the office of the newly created National Security Adviser (NSA) role.[115]

The NSA role was occupied by Captain Kojo Tsikata, who was a fellow Ewe tribesman of Rawlings. An independent national security agency answerable directly to the Head of State was also created. It was based at the National Security Secretariat (NSS) in Accra, which was also the office for the National Security Advisor (NSA).[116] Furthermore, a new military intelligence was also created called the Defence Intelligence (DI), which was operated by the Ghana Armed Forces (GAF) and was answerable to the NSA. It is also important to note that before the creation of the NSS and National Security Advisory role, all national intelligence and security matters were handled by the Special Services Division (SSD) of the President's office. All the duties of the SSD were also transferred to the office of the NSA. The NSS which was the office of the NSA became the centre for all the country's intelligence and security activities and Tsikata was at the helm of it. KB Quantson described him as the "most powerful man in the country" during that period.[117]

The NSS became the collation centre for both internal and external intelligence and security matters. The national security institutions submitted their independent analysis on national security matters to the NSS. These analysed products were collated, assessed, and turned into national intelligence estimates by the NSS, to help protect the national interest.[118] Rawlings' government also created a Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), which had permanent and non-permanent members. The NSS hosted and coordinated regular meetings

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[115] KB Quantson, *Ghana: National Security*, Security Problems of the June 4 Revolt, (Accra: Bestas Press-NAPASVIL VENTURES, 2003), p 69 onwards.
[116] KB Quantson, *Ghana: National Security*, Security Problems of the June 4 Revolt, (Accra: Bestas Press-NAPASVIL VENTURES, 2003), p 69 onwards.
[117] KB Quantson, *Ghana: National Security*, Security Problems of the June 4 Revolt, (Accra: Bestas Press-NAPASVIL VENTURES, 2003), p 69 onwards.
[118] KB Quantson, *Ghana: National Security*, Security Problems of the June 4 Revolt, (Accra: Bestas Press-NAPASVIL VENTURES, 2003), p 69 onwards.

with the JIC. Permanent members included the heads of the internal and external intelligence agencies, commissioners of the police CID and operations, and senior analysts of the NSA. These members attended regular meetings, but non-permanent members were invited to meetings when necessary. The non-permanent members included heads of Customs, Prisons, and Immigration.[119]

In addition to its effective intelligence activities, Tsikata (Rawlings' intelligence Chief) sent 100-200 Ghanaian intelligence officers to Bulgaria, East Germany, and Cuba to undertake intelligence and security training.[120] Thereafter, about 600 Ghanaians were also enrolled into Cuban schools on scholarships with most of them being trained in intelligence work, in what was termed as clear defiance of Western ideals.[121] In terms of bolstering military security, the regime also established a 500-man force reserve unit, who were all Cuban-trained to act as the first line of defence against any coup attempts by the regular armed forces and/or Ghanaian exiles based in Togo, Ivory Coast, and Nigeria.[122] Furthermore, upon assuming power, Rawlings' government also maintained the existing judicial system. The new government subsequently created the National Investigation Committee (NIC), the Citizens' Vetting Committee (CVC), and the Public Tribunals (PT) which operated parallel to the judiciary.[123] The NIC's primary duty was to tackle all forms of economic crimes and corruption in the country. The CVC dealt with tax evaders and the PT was used to try all those charged with criminal activities.[124]

After a decade of military rule under Rawlings' PNDC regime, Ghana's political and security landscape became significantly stabilised. There were no successful military coups, economic

[119] KB Quantson, *Ghana: National Security*, Security Problems of the June 4 Revolt, (Accra: Bestas Press-NAPASVIL VENTURES, 2003), p 69 onwards.
[120] CIA-RDP85T01058R000100190001-5. 'Ghana: Threat from the Extreme Left', Directorate of Intelligence, (1985), Approved for Release 2012/01/17
[121] Ibid.
[122] Ibid.
[123] "President Jerry John Rawlings, former President of Ghana", Biography. *Word Press*, 2013.
[124] Gyimah-Boadi, E., and Donald Rothchild. 'Rawlings, Populism, and the Civil Liberties Tradition in Ghana.' *Issue: A Journal of Opinion* 12:3/4 (1982): 64-69.

recovery was relatively improved, protests and riots were limited, and gradual progression in judicial practices occurred. Therefore, in the early 1990s, Rawlings' government lifted the ban on political parties in preparation for the return to democracy.[125] To ensure that the political and security stability in the country was sustained, Rawlings gave up his military career to become a civilian. He formed a political party called the National Democratic Congress (NDC), of which he was the leader and its presidential candidate. In 1992, the NDC won the country's general election in a landslide victory for a four-year term of office.[126] Rawlings and his NDC also won a second term in office in 1996. So, from 1992 to 2000, the intelligence-led national security architecture of the country was significantly improved. During that period, Ghana's intelligence-led national security architecture was decentralised into the regional, district, and local levels, which was aimed at helping to pass on threats identified within the communities to the national level.[127]

Especially, when a new constitution was formed in 1992, Article 83 formally recognised the existence of the country's foreign intelligence agency called the Research Bureau (RB) under the foreign ministry for the first time. Directors of external intelligence, internal intelligence, and defence intelligence became members of the newly created National Security Council (NSC) and were rendered subject to the law. Chapters 15, 16, and 17 made provisions for the armed forces, police, and prison services of Ghana. The NSC was officially given the legal mandate to manage the overall framework of the country's intelligence and security issues.[128] Article 85 also came into effect to buttress the changes and clearly stated that no organisation

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[125] Christopher McCarty. *Public Opinion in Ghana, 1997*, (Washington DC: International Foundation for Election Systems, 1997), p. 7

[126] E. Gyimah-Boadi. 'Ghana: The Political Economy of 'Successful' Ethno-Regional Conflict Management' in *Can Democracy be Designed?: The Politics of Institutional Choice in Conflict-Torn Societies*, by Sunil Bastian, Robin Luckham., ed., (London: Zed Books, 2003), pp 131-132

[127] "Security and Intelligence Agencies Act", 1996 (Act 526), Arrangement of Sections. *NDPC*, 2001, [online resource] available from, https://new-ndpc-static1.s3.amazonaws.com/CACHES/PUBLICATIONS/2016/09/04/SECURITY+AND+INTELLIGENCE+AGENCIES+ACT,1996+(ACT+526).pdf. Accessed on 15/01/2020

[128] "Ghana's Constitution of 1992 with Amendments through 1996", The National Security Council, Establishment of Security Services. *Constitute Project*, 1996, [online resource] available from, http://www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/docs/ELECTRONIC/31976/101268/F-1229887249/GHA31976.pdf. Accessed on 15/01/2020

or agency concern with national security shall be established except as enshrined in the constitution.[129]

By 1996, Rawlings' administration had been able to build a significant level of trust and confidence in the country's national security apparatus. Rawlings' approach built a great deal of mutual respect and confidence between intelligence agencies and the government, which eventually led to the introduction of the Security and Intelligence Act in 1996 called the Act 526. The Act regulated activities of agencies, provided them with legal backing, and also held them accountable to the people of Ghana.[130]

Jerry Rawlings Introduces the Security and Intelligence Act 526 of 1996

From early 1990s to mid-1990s, there was significant outcry by the public, pressure groups, and other activists' demanding accountability from the intelligence and security agencies in the country.[131] As a result, the Security and Intelligence Agencies Act 526 was passed in Parliament in 1996. The Act 526 was passed to ensure effective coordination, management, and control of all agencies under the intelligence-led national security architecture of Ghana. It is aimed at bringing all the security and intelligence agencies under one big umbrella (NSC) with legal backing. It ensured that the intelligence and security activities of the nation were not only focussed on the national level but also decentralised into the regional, district, and local council levels. Act 526 established the Regional Security Councils (REGSEC), District Security Councils (DISEC) and Local Security Councils. Their primary responsibilities were to

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[129] Ibid.
[130] "Security Sector Reform in Ghana", Intelligence Services, the introduction of Security and Intelligence Act 526. *Bonn International Center for Conversion*, 2013 [online resource] available from, http://www.bicc.de. Accessed on 15/01/2020
[131] "Security and Intelligence Agencies Act", 1996 (Act 526), Arrangement of Sections. *New-NDPC*, 2001, [online resource] available from, https://new-ndpc-static1.s3.amazonaws.com/CACHES/PUBLICATIONS/2016/09/04/SECURITY+AND+INTELLIGENCE+AGENCIES+ACT,1996+(ACT+526).pdf. Accessed on 15/01/2020

identify threats within the regions, districts, and local communities and also feed them up the chain to the national level.[132]

The Act formalised the institutions of Ghana's intelligence and security architecture, and defined the reporting structure, including roles of intelligence and security agencies. It also established priorities with regards to intelligence and security oversight, by clearly defining the roles of other arms of government in keeping agencies in check. It clearly laid out the process of respecting activities that may constitute threats to the security of the state and the government of Ghana. Furthermore, it stated that intelligence and security agencies are to safeguard the economic well-being of the state against threats posed by the acts or omissions of persons or organisations both inside and outside the country. Additionally, these agencies are to protect the state against threats of espionage, sabotage, terrorism, hijacking, piracy, drug trafficking, and similar offence. Finally, they are to perform other functions as directed by the President or the NSC.[133] Before Rawlings handed over power to a new democratically elected government in 2001, the outlook of the country's intelligence-led national security architecture had been significantly transformed to look like what is in the diagram shown on the next page.

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[132] "Security and Intelligence Agencies Act", 1996 (Act 526), Arrangement of Sections. *New-NDPC*, 2001, [online resource] available from, https://new-ndpc-static1.s3.amazonaws.com/CACHES/PUBLICATIONS/2016/09/04/SECURITY+AND+INTELLIGENCE+AGENCIES+ACT,1996+(ACT+526).pdf. Accessed on 15/01/2020
[133] "Security and Intelligence Agencies Act, 1996 (Act 526)", *New-NDPC*, 2001.

Intelligence-led National Security Architecture Outlook

Figure 9: Intelligence-led National Security Architecture Outlook

Pre-Condition 1 (Establishing National Security Institutions)

The national security institutions put in place to protect and defend the country during the entire Rawlings government included the Ghana Police Service (GPS) and Ghana Armed Forces (GAF). The GPS was responsible for maintaining law and order and internal security, while the GAF was responsible for protecting the country's land, sea, and air borders. The Ghana Air Force defended Ghana's airspace, the Navy protected its seas, and the Army its land borders. There were other agencies that were charged with supporting the GPS to maintain internal security, and these include the following.

Narcotics Board

This agency was charged with the formulation and enforcement of narcotics laws in the country. This was achieved through "effective local and international collaboration to fight the

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drug menace in Ghana efficiently." It was also part of the mandate of the agency to implement provisions of legislation and international conventions on narcotics, psychotropic substances and precursor chemicals; using enforcement and control, education and preventive measures, as well as treatment and rehabilitation of drug addicts.[135]

Its role and responsibilities included arresting and prosecuting cultivators, traffickers, peddlers, and users of narcotic drugs. It further ensured that the general public was educated on the harmful effects of drug abuse and the dangers inherent in drug abuse through youth workers, parents, and law enforcement personnel. As part of its coordination responsibilities with the broader intelligence-led national security architecture, as well as international cooperation, it embarked on a multi-disciplinary approach to combating the drug problem. These included liaising with governmental and non-governmental organisations by encouraging them to direct their efforts towards a common objective of fighting the drug war in line with the United Nations Comprehensive Multi-Disciplinary Outline (CMO). Locally, the agency collaborated with other stakeholders through Inter-Agency Committees. This helped to facilitate exchange of information to assist intelligence gathering among various agencies in the country. Internationally, it collaborated with foreign agencies and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) on drug-related cases.[136]

Prison Service of Ghana (PSG)

The PSG was charged with ensuring that individuals considered to be dangerous to society, national security, and domestic stability were kept behind bars. During Rawlings' administration, especially in the early 1990s, the PSG consisted of twenty-seven institutions. These were six central prisons for men at Accra (Ussher Fort and James Fort), Sekondi, Kumasi, Tamale, and Nsawam; and two for women at Ekuasi near Sekondi and at Ho. A

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[135] "Narcotics Control Mission." *Ministry of Interior - Republic of Ghana*, 2019, [online resource] available from, https://www.mint.gov.gh/agencies/narcotic-control-board/. Accessed on 15/04/2020
[136] Ibid.

further fifteen local prisons were situated throughout the country, with two open prisons at James Camp near Accra, and Ankaful near Cape Coast. Probation homes were established for girls in Accra (Jakobu Ashanti for boys) and Kumasi, as well as detention centres for juveniles in Accra, Sekondi, Cape Coast, and Kumasi. In that era, those on parole were subjected to a licensing arrangement. Violations of license terms were punishable by one-year imprisonment. After serving a year in prison, a court may release the individual on probation for six months to three years. Failure to comply with the terms of the probation can result in the probationer's having to serve the sentence for the original offence. Coordination and management of the PSG was the responsibility of the director of the PSG.[137]

Ghana Immigration Service (GIS)

The GIS acted as the first line of defence at Ghana's entry points, including the air ports, land borders, and sea ports, to keep out anyone or anything deemed a threat to domestic stability from entering the country. It also collected intelligence for national security on who and what was coming in and leaving the country. The GIS monitored the entry, residence, employment, and exit of all foreign nationals; and also monitored the movement of Ghanaians into and out of the country. It played a significant role within the intelligence-led national security architecture by assisting with criminal intelligence work and some criminal investigations which had national security implications. It was headed by the director of immigration who acted as the chief advisor to the service board and the minister of interior. The director was responsible for the day-to-day administration of the service.[138]

Customs, Excise and Preventive Service (CEPS)

As part of its roles and duties, CEPS was at the forefront and was classified as one of the first lines of defence for Ghana. One of their duties was to collect intelligence to contribute towards

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[137] "Ghana Prisons System, *Photius*, 1994, [online resource] available from, https://photius.com/countries/ghana/economy/ghana_economy_prison_system.html. Accessed 0n 15/04/2020
[138] Eshun, J. 'Composition of Internal Security Architecture Prior to 1948', Interview with Ghanaian Official, Highgate London, 07 February, (2012).

national intelligence estimates while undertaking their daily business. It was their role to physically patrol the borders and other strategic points of the country; prevent goods smuggling; examine goods; and search premises; as well as documents relating to the goods in question. The organisation was responsible to watch Ghana's borders and was to alert authorities of external aggression and maintain the territorial integrity of the country. Furthermore, CEPS had the task to regularly liaise with several external agencies from other countries for intelligence sharing purposes. CEPS was to perform agency duties on behalf of other government organisations and ministries by seeing to the enforcement of laws on import and export restrictions and prohibitions.[139]

Other duties of the organisation were to collect all excise duties in Ghana, enhance the management and administration of taxes and improve the professionalism of tax collection in Ghana. It was their responsibility to improve the conditions of work and employment for institutions in Ghana. They were to ensure that the sales tax and excise functions were combined and administered as a separate department from the customs and preventive units. Officials who were responsible for collecting tariffs and sales tax at every entry point into the country were also responsible for collecting import excise. Every CEPS official was also trained to be able to undertake both customs responsibilities as well as excise duties. Officials could be easily transferred to perform their functions across tax types.[140]

The collection of excise taxes in Ghana goes back in history and has been a practice in the past. However, under the Customs and Excise Decree, 1972 (NRCD 114), a major re-structuring of excise taxes took place in the 1970s. In the mid-1980s a second major review also took place under Jerry Rawlings' regime. Customs Excise and Preventive Service (CEPS)

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[139] "Customs, Excise and Preventive Service (Management) Law 1993." *WIPO*, Republic of Ghana, 2007, [online resource] available from, https://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/gh/gh007en.pdf. Accessed on 15/01/2020
[140] Seth E Terkper. "The Role of Excise Taxes in Revenue Generation in Ghana", African Economic Policy, *FPR 2 Organisation*, No 74, 2001, [online resource] available from, https://www.yumpu.com/en/document/read/20929263/the-role-of-excise-taxes-in-revenue-generation-in-ghana-frp2org. Accessed on 15/01/2020

was created in 1986 together with the IRS. The Service was removed from the core of the civil service administration and granted autonomy.[141] [142] Under its organisational structure was the commissioner at the top of the echelon, followed by a deputy commissioner, departmental heads, officers, and staff.

The commissioner was vested with powers to issue regulations regarding sanctions, maintenance, and supervision of warehouse businesses in Ghana, and revocation of the license to operate a bonded warehouse. The commissioner was also in-charge of various departments under CEPS, which included the operations department, field audit unit, investigation unit, and others more. The operations department examined all filled returns and maintained a physical presence in large factories. Its 'zonal officers' undertook close surveillance on some taxpayers, monitored input, production and ultimately saw to the release of final goods from factory premises. The investigation unit conducted targeted investigations into the affairs of importers and manufacturers. At the same time officers were able to enter and inspect business premises or the residence of any manufacturer, producer, retailer, or wholesaler if an on-going investigation required doing so. The field audit unit conducted an audit and verification checks as and when required.[143]

Rawlings Attaches Importance to Pre-Condition 2 (Agencies charged with intelligence activities)

In addition to establishing pre-condition 1 (national security institutions), Rawlings' government also ensured that undertaking intelligence activities within the duties of the national security institutions, were paramount. The following agencies were then charged to perform intelligence work by being the eyes and ears of the government.

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[141] Seth E Terkper. "The Role of Excise Taxes in Revenue Generation in Ghana", African Economic Policy, *FPR 2 Organisation*, No 74, 2001, [online resource] available from, https://www.yumpu.com/en/document/read/20929263/the-role-of-excise-taxes-in-revenue-generation-in-ghana-frp2org. Accessed on 15/01/2020
[142] "Customs, Excise and Preventive Service (Management) Law 1993." *WIPO*, Republic of Ghana, 2007, [online resource] available from, https://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/gh/gh007en.pdf. Accessed on 15/01/2020
[143] Seth E Terkper. 2001.

Bureau for National Investigations (BNI)

The BNI under Rawlings' time in office comprised of career civilian intelligence professionals, some uniformed officers who were drafted in from previously disbanded SB and MIU. In addition to them were 'A' levels and university graduates who were recruited and trained to perform intelligence research and analysis.[144] To be recruited into the BNI, a candidate had to undertake an 'Examination. Preliminary interview. Positive Vetting. Comprehensive Interview.'[145] The BNI was mainly a civilian intelligence agency, restricted from carrying arms, and was independent of the police and the military. It was answerable to the President through the office of the National Security Adviser (NSA). Its primary role was to undertake internal intelligence work to safeguard the government in power and the country as a whole from all perceived threats within the country.[146]

Defence Intelligence (DI)

During Rawlings' duration in office, the DI operated under the ministry of defence and also functioned as one of the intelligence agencies under the national security architecture. The DI consisted of the intelligence directorates of the army, navy, and air force. The Director-General of Defence Intelligence (DGDI) acted as the authority that oversaw the coordination of functions of the intelligence directorates of the army, navy, and air force.[147] The DGDI advised the chief of defence staff and defence minister on internal and external threats to the country's security and offered appropriate recommendations to counter such threats. The DGDI acted as the Single Point of Contact (SPOC) for the DI within the JIC and the NSC. The primary role of the DI was to provide intelligence to the ministry of defence (MoD) and the NSC, therefore making the two outfit their primary customers. This technically brought the DI closer to

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[144] KB Quantson, *Ghana: National Security*, Security Problems of the June 4 Revolt, (Accra: Bestas Press-NAPASVIL VENTURES, 2003), p 69 onwards.

[145] K.B. Quantson. *Ghana Peace and Stability: Chapters from the Intelligence Sector*, Hard Times: 1986, (Accra: Advent Press - NAPASCOM Ltd, 2000), p. 239

[146] KB Quantson, *Ghana: National Security*, Security Problems of the June 4 Revolt, (Accra: Bestas Press-NAPASVIL VENTURES, 2003), p 69 onwards.

[147] Michael Kweku Addison. Preventing Military Intervention in West Africa, Case Study of Ghana, Defense Technical Information Center, [MA Thesis] Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California, (2002), pp 14 - 25

performing some amount of domestic intelligence work, as its products were used to feed the higher echelon of the executive branch.[148]

Research Department (RD)

This used to be known as the Research Bureau (RB). The RB apart from during Nkrumah's era had always been one of the branches of the country's national security architecture, with very little known about its operational activities; and this was no different under Rawlings' rule. However, the little known about RB during that era was that it performed its duties outside the borders of Ghana to help safeguard the government and the country from all external hostilities. It also monitored and helped safeguard Ghana's economic, political, and security interests abroad. It is also important to note that as part of the changes made in 1996, the name RB was changed to Research Department (RD).

Criminal Investigations Department (CID)

The Police Service Act of 1970 (Act 350) is a piece of legislation that governs the Ghana Police Service (GPS). It outlines in detail the organisational and administrative control of the Police Service. The Inspector-General of Police (IGP) was responsible for exercising general day-to-day supervision over the operation and administrative duties of the service.[149] During Rawlings' tenure in office, the CID, which was a department within the GPS comprised mostly of Ghanaian elites who had undergone a series of examinations and had excelled with very good grades. It was overseen by the Commissioner/CID, who at the direction of Rawlings ensured that there was a rigorous process in place for recruitment, to ensure that only the best was recruited. The recruitment process entailed an initial screening exercise to select candidates who met the criteria. Selected candidates were then put through Police Training Depots for regular police training to become policemen and policewomen upon completion.

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[148] Ibid.
[149] "Criminal Investigation Department – CID." *Ghana Police Service*, 2019, [online resource] available from, https://police.gov.gh/en/index.php/criminal-investigation-department-cid/. Accessed on 15/04/2020

This was followed by a standard Detective Training Course and then attached to various police stations for practical experience. After completing all the processes, the candidates were then assigned as CID officers to begin detective work.[150] They worked in plain clothes and were employed as specialists in connection with various aspects of crime prevention and detection. Coordination and management of the CID was the responsibility of the director of CID with the GPS as a whole organised on a national basis. The roles and duties of the CID included developing intelligence to support operations by uniformed officers and prioritised criminal investigations. Officers worked closely with partners of the broader national security architecture for crime prevention purposes, asset recovery, and disruption.[151]

Other Intelligence Collection Capabilities

Firstly, the regime also created the People's Defence Committee (PDC), as part of its intelligence collection and coordination capabilities. Branches of the PDC were located at every region, municipality, district, and local towns and cities across the country, to serve as eyes and ears for the regime.[152] Inasmuch as the PDC also played a significant role in supporting the regime distribute food stored in government warehouses to help feed Ghanaian families across the country in 1983; it was also being used as an extra arm of the regime's machinery to collect intelligence across every corner of the country for national security purposes. The PDC was in a unique position because its members relationship with the ordinary Ghanaian was cordial and for this reason, ordinary citizens were often relaxed around the PDC members. This offered the PDC the opportunity to know first-hand, what was occurring and/or emerging within local communities. All of these points coupled with the fact

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[150] K.B. Quantson. *Ghana Peace and Stability: Chapters from the Intelligence Sector*, Hard Times: 1986, (Accra: Advent Press - NAPASCOM Ltd, 2000), p. 240
[151] "Criminal Investigation Department – CID, Ghana Police Service." 2019, [online resource] available from, https://police.gov.gh/en/index.php/criminal-investigation-department-cid/. Accessed on 15/04/2020
[152] CIA-RDP83S00855R000100040004-7, Ghana: Outlook for the Rawlings Regime, Approved for Release 2008/07/30

that liaison between the PDC and law enforcement agencies was being championed by the regime, that made the PDC an effective tool in collecting intelligence.[153]

Lastly, corruption and financial embezzlement was a major part of the reasons why the country was plunged into significant chaos, to the extent of destabilising its political and security landscape before the PNDC took office. The regime also utilised University, 'A' Level leavers and National Service postings to collect intelligence in fighting such issues. For instance, attractive single young females were posted to serve in organisations whereby there was intelligence to suggest that the senior management team were corrupt. Tackling corruption was one of Rawlings' main goals, and for this reason he made it the regime's priority to go after such offenders. The regime relied on such National Service postings to collect evidence to corroborate already obtained intelligence in helping to dismiss such offenders from their posts by prosecuting them in the court of law. Accomplishing such practices helped curb some of the corruption in the country.[154] Embarking on pre-condition 2 significantly enhanced the government's intelligence collection capabilities. To effectively utilise collected intelligence for national security purposes, the government also implemented pre-condition 3, by ensuring interagency intelligence coordination as assessed below.

Achievement for Implementing Pre-Condition 3

Unlike most previous regimes, Rawlings' government recognised the importance of both pre-conditions 2 and 3. Hence Rawlings' PNDC regime was able to establish a national security architecture that was intelligence-led, with effective sharing and coordinating capabilities, which made a significant difference to the country's political and security landscape. Rawlings' intelligence-led national security architecture was designed in a way that it had its member-agencies performing activities at the local, district, regional and national levels through inter-

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[153] Eshun, J. 'Security Under Rawlings' PNDC Regime, Virtual Conversation with a PDC Member, Microsoft Teams, 10 June, (2020).
[154] Eshun, J. 'Security Under Rawlings' PNDC Regime, Virtual Conversation with a PDC Member, Microsoft Teams, 15 May, (2020).

agency coordination and sharing if required. The machinery was operated from top-down and bottom-up, with all agencies talking to each other and a national security council at the helm of coordinating intelligence flow.

National Security Council (NSC)

Membership comprised of Ghanaians who had been vetted at various levels and cleared with no associated risk to national security. These included ministers holding the portfolios of Foreign Affairs, Defence, Interior, and Finance; as well as other ministers that may be determined by the President. Other members included the Chief of Defence Staff and two other members of the Armed Forces, Inspector-General of Police and two other members of the police service: Commissioner in-Charge of CID and Commissioner in-Charge of operations. Membership also included the Director-General of Prisons; Director of Defence Intelligence; Director of External Intelligence; Director of Internal Intelligence; Commissioner of Customs, Excise and Preventive Service; and three persons appointed by the President. The main function of the NSC was to consider and take appropriate measures to safeguard all internal and external security issues of Ghana.

The NSC's other responsibilities were to ensure the collection, collation, and management of information relating to the security and safety of citizens and assets of Ghana both at home and abroad. It was also part of their duties to integrate domestic, foreign, and security policies relating to national affairs; and to enable security services, government agencies, and other departments to co-operate more effectively in matters relating to national security. Furthermore, the NSC was to assess and appraise the objectives, commitments, and risks of Ghana in relation to actual and potential military power in the interest of national security. Finally, the NSC was to take appropriate measures regarding the consideration of policies on

matters of common interest to the departments and agencies of government concerned with national security.[155]

Practical Application of Pre-Condition 3

Under Rawlings' national security set-up, tasks were created at the national level by the NSC, which were disseminated to the regional levels, and further cascaded to the district and local levels if required. Alternatively, intelligence obtained at the local levels, were passed on to the district levels, then to the regional levels, and finally to the national level where the NSC sits, in order for it to perform its national intelligence oversight duties. This resulted in a well-structured process to perform intelligence work within Ghana. Rawlings introduced an effective coordinating body that could monitor and manage intelligence with eyes and ears from within and beyond the nation's borders. This effectively made the effort of Rawlings' government to control its intelligence activities work well to help protect the country. As a result, during Rawlings' military regime as well as throughout his presidency, his government was able to successfully fend off 'multifaceted' threats that emerged from both foreign and domestic actors. Rawlings was able to create and sustain political and security stability in the country throughout his term of office as discussed earlier under the threat landscape sub-section.

Significance in Attaching Importance to Pre-Conditions 1, 2, and 3

When Rawlings came into power, the uncertainties surrounding Ghana's political and security landscape were extremely severe. The volatility of the country's landscape had been stemmed from prolonged periods of successful and failed military coups; which were sometimes financed by foreign powers and orchestrated by Ghanaians within the national security apparatus. Unlike preceding governments, especially from Busia to the Limann era, (who only

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[155] Constitute Project. *Ghana's Constitution of 1992 with Amendments through 1996*, The National Security Council, Establishment of Security Services, (1996).

had to deal with home threats, but still failed to address such challenges), when Rawlings'

regime seized power, it inherited multifaceted security threats from both domestic and foreign

actors. The home threats at the time had escalated during the preceding decade into an

extremely dangerous political and security environment at the beginning of Rawlings' regime.

For this reason, making it an extremely challenging terrain to deal with relative to the

environment in the decade before.

Whilst internationally, the external threats sometimes had foreign powers behind such

subversive activities. These added to the magnitude of challenges faced by the PNDC regime

in that era, which were much greater than the era of its predecessors. It, therefore, came as

no surprise as the international community had significant doubt as to whether the new regime

was going to survive. However, because Rawlings' military regime learned from mistakes

made by previous governments, its immediate decision upon assuming office to focus on the

country's national security architecture was key to the survival of the government and the

country. The regime's quick thinking in ascertaining that most of the coup plotters during the

preceding decade emerged from within the higher echelon of the MIU and SB, made all the

difference.

Soon after assuming power, Rawlings' regime proceeded to restructure the national security

architecture in terms of its personnel and outlook; ensuring that both the MIU and SB were

disbanded to create DI and BNI respectively. Furthermore, as part of neutralising any potential

future threat of military coup d'état, the regime civilianised the BNI and limited gun access to

its agents. Amid all the changes, this dissertation asserts that having all three pre-conditions

collectively working together changed everything. What ultimately made a difference was the

PNDC regime's decision to transform its national security institutions to become intelligence

focussed, by putting in place a competent intelligence coordinating body. Once established, it

made the architecture able to coordinate and share intelligence among all of its intelligence

and security agencies in an effective manner. This enabled Rawlings' government (during the PNDC regime and NDC administration) to have eyes and ears in every corner of the country.

Therefore, with a very competent intelligence and counter-intelligence capability in place, the regime's intelligence-led national security architecture was able to infiltrate the ranks of Ghanaians in exile. These included officers and enlisted men who at the time had been divided by differences between rivalry tribes and ideological outlook. From this dissertation's point of view, this made the architecture gain significant intelligence to help foil both external and internal threats perpetrated towards the country during Rawlings' duration in office. The 1985 Mike Soussoudis and Scranage case, which demonstrated the counter-intelligence capabilities of the intelligence-led national security architecture put in place by Rawlings' government, spearheaded by its Intelligence Chief, Captain Kojo Tsikata, was an example. Once again this highlighted the effectiveness of the architecture by having all three pre-conditions in place, as it averted multifaceted threats, which had the potential to destabilise the country's landscape. It is therefore not surprising that further years down the line, the vital role of the architecture towards political stability in the country was acknowledged by Kwadjo, a former Deputy National Security Coordinator of Ghana.[156]

During all the heated exchanges between Ghana and US authorities, there were also diplomatic attempts being made to improve relations between Ghana and the West. Especially, when the Soviets failed to meet the expectations of the Rawlings government, the regime in sharp contrast gradually lent towards Western-backed policies.[157] Arguably, such a move helped neutralise the stands of the Ghanaian authorities to some degree as far as the West and East ideals were concerned.

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[156] Johnny Kwadjo. 'Changing the Intelligence Dynamics in Africa: The Ghana Experience', Conclusion, *GFN-SSR and ASSN*, (2009), p. 121
[157] CIA-RDP83S00855R000100040004-7. 'Ghana: Outlook for the Rawlings Regime', An Intelligence Assessment, Approved for Release 2008/07/30

Key Takeaways from the Rawlings Era

In conclusion, meeting all three pre-conditions provided Rawlings and his administration with a strong intelligence and security foundation. This helped Rawlings to firmly cement its government's foothold in running the country; even though other commentators have described Rawlings' military regime as characterised by a culture of impunity and brutality. Meanwhile, Rawlings' predecessors were also brutal and similar accusations could also be made about them. However, the difference between the preceding governments and Rawlings' PNDC regime was that the PNDC later used such tactics to ensure that it had an effective and efficient intelligence-led national security architecture in place, which was more cohesive, purposeful, trustworthy, and professional. Therefore, with such an architecture in place, the regime was able to have eyes and ears across the country. This made the regime situationally aware and was able to avert potential threats to stabilise the country's landscape; unlike his predecessors (except for the NLC regime), who significantly destabilised the country.

Additionally, despite Rawlings' government being faced by national and international 'multifaceted' challenges, including numerous military coup attempts, its intelligence-led national security architecture rose to the challenge. It was able to counter such threats to help put the country on a more sustainable path towards future political and security stability. To conclude, the move made by Rawlings' PNDC regime to put in place the three pre-conditions by significantly reforming the national security institutions, embracing intelligence activities and implementing interagency intelligence coordination, proved pivotal. It made the difference between the failures during the previous governments (except for the NLC regime), and the successes attained by the Rawlings' government. Rawlings was able to transition Ghana into a true democracy, with a formidable intelligence-led national security architecture to help enforce policies. This was after Rawlings changed his status from a military officer to a civilian, to form the National Democratic Congress (NDC) political party.

The NDC subsequently won two (four-year) terms in office with Rawlings as the President. Such a move offered the NDC administration an eight-year period to further improve on the architecture's outlook to improve on the abilities, maturity, and professionalism of the national security architecture. Most importantly, the longevity helped the administration to implement and sustain an architecture that would support the stability of Ghana's political and security landscape. At the end of his second term in office, Rawlings, peacefully handed power to the democratically elected New Patriotic Party (NPP). He left behind a stabilised landscape and an intelligence-led national security architecture, backed by the 1996 Act 526.

Chapter 9: 21st Century Era and the Intelligence-Led National Security Architecture from 2001 to Present

Table 13: Pre-Conditions for Intelligence-Led National Security

INTELLIGENCE-LED NATIONAL SECURITY ARCHITECTURE		
Pre-condition 1	**Pre-condition 2**	**Pre-condition 3**
Establish National Security Institutions	Embark on Intelligence Activities	Implement Interagency Intelligence Coordination
Protect and defend national interests against known and unknown threats	Offers eyes and ears within and outside country's territorial borders	Makes architecture situationally aware of magnitude and scope of overarching threats

Since Rawlings' military intervention on 31st December 1981, the country's political and security landscape has gradually improved, despite the magnitude of security threats facing the country in the 21st century. Ghana has still managed to stabilise its landscape for over four decades even though it is situated in a violent sub-region plagued with civil unrest, political violence, military coups, and civil wars. This chapter attributes the positive achievement of maintaining domestic stability, to the role of Ghana's intelligence-led national security architecture.

Politicos Historia of the 21st Century

After over a decade of destabilisation in the country due to the military coup d'états, the emergence of Rawlings on 31st December 1981, helped set Ghana on a path for long-term stability. The 1981 successful military coup d'état by Rawlings' PNDC military regime, followed by two successful victories of his NDC administration through the ballot box in 1992 and 1996, helped stabilise the country's political and security landscape. Unlike some leaders, Rawlings stepped aside without attempting to change the constitution to enable him to stay longer in power.[158] Since then, free uncontested elections and a peaceful transfer of power have become the standard practice in Ghana; and there have been four stable but different administrations.[159] Every successive administration since 2002 has kept in place the

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[158] "Africa's Top 5 Most Politically-Stable Countries", Related Matters, IOA Position Papers Illustrate Our Thought Leadership on Africa, *IOA*, 2018, [online resource] available from, https://www.inonafrica.com/2018/02/08/africas-top-5-politically-stable-countries/. Accessed on 15/01/2020

[159] Benjamin Elisha Sawe. "Presidents of Ghana Since Independence." *World Atlas*, 2019, [online resource] available from, https://www.worldatlas.com/articles/presidents-of-ghana-since-independence.html. Accessed on 26/09/2020

intelligence-led national security architecture, creating the peaceful environment in Ghana today. This stability has been made possible as a result of ensuring that the three pre-conditions are upheld through their respective administration.

That being said, from 2001 to the present, general elections held in the country have not passed without some degree of political and security tensions building up across the country. These have been further elaborated and demonstrate the volatility of this period. Interestingly, potential threats to Ghana and its political and security landscape from 2001 to the present day, have been far more expansive than in previous years. The bulk of the security challenges Ghana had to contend with emanated from a range of internal and external threats. Despite these concerns, the country's political and security landscape remains stable as a result of having all three pre-conditions in place.

Assessment of Threat Landscape for the Past Four Decades and Over

A broad range of security threats that have been confronting the country for decades and how the intelligence-led national security architecture addressed such challenges are discussed further under internal and external threats.

Internal Threats

Politically Motivated Youth and Elections Violence

Throughout the history of the African continent, and in sub-Saharan Africa to be specific, politically motivated and/or election-related violence/conflicts have quite often contributed to the destabilisation of most countries' political and security landscape.[160] Statistics indicate that "more than 50 African elections from 2011 to 2017, showed that almost all these elections had

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[160] L. Snodgrass and A.O. Achieng. 'Mediating Post Electoral Violence in Kenya, 2007-2008', in *Infrastructures for Peace in Sub-Saharan Africa*, by Mediel Hove, Geoff Harris., eds., (Cham – Switzerland: Springer, 2019), p.186

cases of electoral violence at some stage of the poll"[161], and in Ghana's case, this is no different. However, unlike the widespread violence which occurred during the, (i) post-2007 general elections in Kenya[162], (ii) post-2010 elections in Ivory Coast[163], and (iii) post-2019 elections 'widespread political violence' in Nigeria, which was blamed on the failure of its security forces 'to respond effectively to threats to people's lives and security'[164]; Ghana, on the other hand, has always managed to rise above such challenges, without impacting domestic stability nation-wide.

In Ghana's case, from 2001 to the present, general elections held in the country have not passed without some isolated cases of violence or some degree of politically motivated tensions building up across the country, creating a tense and dangerous environment. Factors that contribute to generating such an environment in the country include dangerous utterances by some politicians and irresponsible activities by some hard-line political supporters. Another example is a fiercely contested campaign towards Ghana's 2012 general elections. In this instance, the then flagbearer of the opposing NPP, Nana Akufo-Addo (currently the President of Ghana), said to his supporters not to allow themselves to be perceived as cowards by the incumbent NDC. Akufo-Addo urged his supporters to do whatever was necessary to win power by telling them not to be afraid for 'all die be die'. This created a tense and volatile environment leading up to the 2012 general elections[165], however, the tense environment was no different from any other election year.

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[161] "Violence in African Elections", Beyond the headlines, *Relief Web*, 2018, [online resource] available from, https://reliefweb.int/report/world/violence-african-elections. Accessed on 27/09/2020
[162] "Elections in Kenya in 2007." *DFID and UK Aid*, 2007, [online resource] available from, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/67654/elections-ke-2007.pdf. Accessed on 27/09/2020.
[163] "ICC to Investigate Ivory Coast Post-Election Violence." 2011, [online resource] available from, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-15148801. Accessed on 27/09/2020
[164] "Nigeria: Widespread Violence Ushers in President's New Term." *Human Rights Watch*, 2019, [online resource] available from, https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/06/10/nigeria-widespread-violence-ushers-presidents-new-term. Accessed on 27/09/2020
[165] Ghana News Network. (2011, February 25). *All Die Be Die Saga - Nana Addo Akuffo - NPP Presidential* [Video]. YouTube. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uHSHsmtyNVw. Accessed on 27/09/2020

The dangerous utterances, coupled with other election-related activities such as political vigilantism, which covers a broad range of violent acts, and quite often used to serve the political interest of both an incumbent government and opposition parties, contribute to the tense atmosphere in the country before, during and after elections. In most cases, both the incumbent and opposition parties mobilise their vigilante groups in a way that, knowingly or unknowingly, such groups end up taking the law into their own hands to ensure victory at all cost without any compromise.[166] For this reason, often ending up using brute force to protect their interest, which quite regularly leads to some elements of violence in the country. Additionally, there is also the principle of 'winner takes all' (first-past-the-post system) associated with general elections in Ghana. This legitimately allows the winning political party 'the right to appoint ministers, presidential staffers, managers and board members of all parastatals, and more importantly, the right to award contracts.'[167]

Although, the first-past-the-post system is no different from what is practised in most developing and also advanced countries; for an African country, this system adds to the dangerously heated environment. Therefore, in Ghana's case, such a process does not also help in making the situation any less tense before, during, and after general elections. Bearing this in mind, collectively, political vigilantism ranging from dissident violence to legal exercise of physical coercion by a ruling government[168]; coupled with the 'winner takes all' process, enhances the uncertainties that build up in a major way in the country. Hence from this dissertation's point of view, such degree of volatility has always had the tendency of becoming a recipe for widespread political and security violence, and subsequent disaster in Ghana. For example, in the lead up to one of Ghana's past general elections, the environment was so

[166] Emmanuel Graham, Ransford E V Gyampo & Bossman Asare. 'Political Vigilantism and Democratic Governance in Ghana's Fourth Republic', Political Vigilantism in Ghana's Fourth Republic, *African Review*, 44:2, (2017), pp 113 - 115

[167] Cadman Atta Mills. "Politics, policy, and implementation, The Ghanaian Paradox." *Africa in Focus*, 2018, [online resource] available from, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2018/07/18/politics-policy-and-implementation-the-ghanaian-paradox/. Accessed on 15/04/2020

[168] Emmanuel Graham, Ransford E V Gyampo & Bossman Asare. 'Political Vigilantism and Democratic Governance in Ghana's Fourth Republic', Political Vigilantism in Ghana's Fourth Republic, *African Review*, 44:2, (2017), pp 113 - 115

tense that after the elections, the post-election commentary by one commentator summarised what created such anxieties as;

> "The tense situation during the election campaign, the expectation of a close outcome and, not least, the events surrounding the elections in Kenya inculcated a keen awareness of the potential threat among civil society actors and religious leaders and even, to some extent, in the political parties."[169]

The preceding quote is an example of the degree of concerns shared nationwide before, during, and after every general election in the country. Unlike some of its neighbours in the sub-region, where Ghana's case has been different is that its intelligence-led national security architecture has been able to prevent such tensions from getting out of control. For decades now, the architecture, as part of its constitutional responsibilities, has been able to ensure that the transition of power from one administration to another occurs peacefully; "by swiftly countering potential election-related violence before they get out of hand."[170] Since 2002, before, during, and after general elections, the intelligence-led national security architecture of Ghana has always been confronted with multifaceted security challenges from both internal and external fronts. Examples include the 2004 and 2008 eruption of violence in DAGBON, the Northern region of Ghana[171]; as well as in YENDI, and in BAWKU in the Upper East region[172], whereby the architecture had since 2002 made the difference by containing violence in those areas from spreading across the country.[173]

Before the 2004 presidential elections, it was reported that a combination of serving and retired military personnel who were planning a military coup d'état; had their plans timely intercepted by the architecture, with perpetrators subsequently arrested before such a plan was

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[169] Kathrin Meissner. "Elections and Conflict in Ghana", Context Analysis, Social, Religious and Ethnic Groupings and the Security Forces, International Policy Analysis. *Friedrich Ebert Stiftung*, 2010, p. 7 [online resource] available from, http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez//07676.pdf. Accessed on 15/04/2020

[170] Eshun, J. 'The Role of the National Security Architecture During the 2020 General Elections in Ghana', Virtual Conversation with a Ghanaian National Security Official on Microsoft Teams, 21 December, (2020).

[171] Ovadia, Jesse Salah. "Stepping Back from the Brink: A Review of the 2008 Ghanaian Election from the Capital of the Northern Region." *Canadian Journal of African Studies / Revue Canadienne Des Études Africaines*, 45:2, (2011): 310-40.

[172] Clementina Amankwaah. *Election-Related Violence: The Case of Ghana*, (Nordiska Afrikainstitutet: UPPSALA, 2013), p. 13

[173] Infoletrre Gratuite. "IRIN Focus on the Yendi Crisis." *The New Humanitarian*, 2002, [online resource] available from, https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/fr/node/202203. Accessed on 27/09/2020

enacted.[174] According to a former Ghanaian government official, "had this incident been successful, it would have plunged the country into utter chaos."[175]

In the lead up to the 2012 elections, a national discussion about the creation of an Electoral Commission of Ghana before the general elections created a very heated debate between the political parties. This resulted in members and leaders of political parties resorting to the use of abusive, intimidatory, aggressive, and violent words across the political spectrum; creating a relatively tense and volatile atmosphere nationwide.[176] During that same period, there were also rumours that 'secret tapes' obtained by the architecture indicated a potential plot to undermine the process by sowing chaos in the country. Whilst at the same time there were grassroots political party-loyalists, youth vigilante groups, and the so-called 'Macho men' (private guards) across the country, intimidating and harassing political opponents.[177] In the midst of all these were external security threats, which emerged from across Ghana's border with Cote D'Ivoire.

In the Cote D'Ivoire case, reports indicated that the national security architecture had to deal with mercenaries and rebel groups who sneaked into the country with arms to support non-state actors for subversion of Ghana's established democratic system. In summary, these tapes were linked to both internal (Grassroot political party-loyalists, youth vigilante groups and the so-called 'Macho men'); and external threats (mercenaries and rebel groups sneaked into Ghana from Cote D'Ivoire with arms to support non-state actors for subversion purposes). All of these election-related incidents cumulatively carried the potential of destabilising Ghana's stable political and security landscape. That said, as part of being able to proactively

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[174] The Ghanaian Times. 'Coup Plot Foiled…. 7 Suspects Detained', Newspaper Front Page, 8 November 2004. Also reported by the BBC Africa News Broadcast on 6 November 2004.
[175] Eshun, J. 'Security Under Kufuor Administration', Virtual Conversation with A Former Government Official, Microsoft Teams, 21 August, (2020).
[176] Festus Aubyn and Mustapha Abdallah. 'Sustaining Peace and Stability in Ghana: Appraising the Role of the National Election Security Task Force in the 2012 Elections', *Journal of African Election*, 12:2, (2012), p. 134
[177] Festus Aubyn and Mustapha Abdallah. 'Sustaining Peace and Stability in Ghana: Appraising the Role of the National Election Security Task Force in the 2012 Elections', *Journal of African Election*, 12:2, (2012), p. 134

respond to possible election-related violence, a few months before the 2012 elections, a task force was carved out of the architecture. This was called the National Elections Security Task Force (NESTF) and comprised of selected members from the intelligence and security agencies in the country. The NESTF operated in every region, municipal, district, and locality in the country.[178]

Additionally, some personnel of the intelligence-led national security architecture were also deployed across the country for intelligence collection purposes. Intelligence personnel sometimes blended in with locals at drinking bars, political gathering meetings, political rallies, as well as other public gathering events nationwide, as part of the intelligence work. Having an intelligence-led national security architecture in place meant that there were eyes and ears in every corner of the country gathering intelligence.[179] As part of the architecture's coordination capabilities, every intelligence collected was sent to the National Assessment Centre (NAC) at the National Security Council Secretariat (NSCS). An overarching assessment was conducted by the NAC, making the architecture situationally aware. The NAC, in addition to the office of the National Security Coordinator, ensured that finished (actionable) intelligence was coordinated and disseminated to direct operations at the regional, municipal, district, and local levels. Due to the architecture's well-coordinated intelligence capabilities with eyes and ears across the country; this resulted in foiling potential wide-spread conflict nationwide, that could have destabilised Ghana's landscape. Alleged perpetrators linked to the highlighted security concerns were identified and rounded up.[180] A preliminary statement published by the Carter Center regarding the credibility of Ghana's

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[178] Festus Aubyn and Mustapha Abdallah. 'Sustaining Peace and Stability in Ghana: Appraising the Role of the National Election Security Task Force in the 2012 Elections', *Journal of African Election*, 12:2, (2012), p. 134
[179] Eshun, J. 'Security Under Atta-Mills / Mahama Administration', Virtual Conversation with A Former Government Official, Microsoft Teams, 21 August, (2020).
[180] Eshun, J. 'Security Under Atta-Mills / Mahama Administration', Virtual Conversation with A Former Government Official, Microsoft Teams, 21 August, (2020).

presidential run-off elections acknowledged that; 'security forces played a positive role in the election and the Carter Center noted no major instances of intimidation.'[181]

Additionally, as part of the architecture's counter-espionage and counter-subversion duties to ensure stability in the country, in March 2016, the BNI arrested and deported three ex-South African police officers suspected of undertaking illegal training activities in the country.[182]

In 2019, as part of a well-coordinated nationwide intelligence-led operation by the national security architecture, an 'elaborate plot to destabilise the country' was halted. A statement by the Ghana government claimed that the plot had "the ultimate aim of destabilising the country". It subsequently stated that "the group were aiming to recruit and radicalise a base of young people."[183] That said, the timely intervention of the architecture through its REGSEC, MUSEC, DISEC and local-level intelligence work, assessed by the NAC and coordinated by the NSC "stopped the perpetrators in their tracks."[184] The successful operation was based on 15 months of surveillance. A stash of weapons and ammunitions including pistols, smoke grenades, IEDs, AK47 magazines and one long knife were confiscated, alongside computer equipment, a voice recorder, and a Ghanaian passport. [185]

Another example is the December 2020 general elections in Ghana, which ended with a significant dispute between the incumbent National Patriotic Party (NPP) and the opposing National Democratic Congress (NDC) concerning the election results. The results announced by Ghana's Electoral Commission, which declared the NPP as winners was vehemently

[181] "Carter Center Finds Ghana's Presidential Run-off Elections Credible and Peaceful." *The Cater Center*, 2008, [online resource] available from, https://www.cartercenter.org/news/pr/ghana_123008.html. Accessed on 15/04/2020
[182] Moses.Y Jatuat. "Role of Intelligence, Institutions and Legal Framework in Ghana, National Security." *Academia*, 2020
[183] "Ghana Halts Elaborate Plot to Destabilise Country." *BBC News*, 2019, [online resource] available from, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-49808879. Accessed on 29/04/2021.
[184] Eshun, J. 'The Role of the National Security Architecture During the 2020 General Elections in Ghana', Virtual Conversation with a Ghanaian National Security Official on Microsoft Teams, 21 December, (2020).
[185] "Ghana Halts Elaborate Plot to Destabilise Country." *BBC News*, 2019, [online resource] available from, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-49808879. Accessed on 29/04/2021.

rebuked by the opposing NDC. This resulted in nationwide protests and demonstrations associated with scuffles and violence in some areas, some of which carried the hallmarks of potential emerging disturbances. The swift intervention by the country's security forces aided by intelligence helped put a lid on such concerns, especially in the capital, Accra. Attempts made by protesters to bring the capital to a halt with roadblocks were swiftly intervened. Whilst an intelligence-led operation also ensured that security forces were positioned in Parliament based on intelligence obtained, which alluded to plans made by rioters to disrupt Parliamentary proceedings. All of these interventions collectively brought the situation under control to maintain law, order, and peace in the country. Such actions by the security forces helped create a stable environment for Ghana's democratic process to play out and for both political parties to pursue their differences in the Supreme Court, as the constitution demands, preventing destabilisation of the country's landscape.[186]

In view of the preceding examples and discussion, this dissertation assesses that through an intelligence-led approach, security forces were able to curtail the mentioned security challenges. All of the stated examples are a clear indication that it is the pivotal role played by the intelligence-led national security architecture, which is promoting and upholding domestic stability in Ghana and not its democratic system. This is because, without the architecture, which ensures the enforcement and maintenance of the rule of law and the constitution respectively, whilst ensuring that they are adhered to, successful democracy would not be possible.

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[186] Eshun, J. 'The Role of the National Security Architecture During the 2020 General Elections in Ghana', Virtual Conversation with a Ghanaian National Security Official on Microsoft Teams, 21 December, (2020).

Tribalism as a Threat

Ethnic/tribal conflict has been one of the main causes for civil wars in many countries in sub-Saharan Africa and has quite often been a catalyst to the destabilisation of the political and security landscape in many countries in the sub-region.[187] For example, the Darfur crisis in Sudan had a significant impact on Africa and its ripple effect led to arms proliferation across the continent. This resulted in the breeding of rebels, terrorists, and other forms of insecurities in Africa.[188]

Other cases including the Rwanda genocide[189], and the conflict between the Tutsi and Hutu tribes in Burundi[190], are testaments to the earlier assertion. Tribal divisions, and the contributory role they have played towards civil wars in Chad, Angola, and the 'devastating Biafran war in Nigeria in the 1960s'[191]; all highlight the extent to which ethnic and tribal conflicts add to the destabilisation in the sub-region.

As a country, Ghana has also not been immune to ethnic and tribal violence within its territorial boundaries. This can be seen between the Ashanti Empire against the Fanti Empire during the pre-colonial era or the 1980s Konkomba and Nanumba conflict in Northern Ghana.[192] Further, since 1981 the region around the Oti river, on the Ghana and Togo border, has witnessed five of the bloodiest clashes since Ghana's founding.[193]

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[187] Mohamed Suliman. *Ecology, Politics and Violent Conflict*, (United Kingdom, Zed Books, 1999), p. 33

[188] Ifeoma, Ezeabasili E. 'The Nature of Conflict in Africa And Its Impact on African International Relations: The Case of Darfur.' *World Affairs: The Journal of International Issues*,15:3 (2011): 88-112

[189] Zoe Lowery. Frank Spalding. *The Rwandan Genocide*, (New York: ROSEN Publishing, 2017)

[190] Rene Lemarchand. *Burundi: Ethnic Conflict and Genocide*, (Cambridge: Woodrow Wilson Center Press and Cambridge University Press, 1994)

[191] David Crary. *African Continent Tormented by Tribal Conflicts: Problem Has Triggered Wars, Toppled Governments and Wrecked Courtships*, Los Angeles Times, (1986), [online resource] available from, https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1986-03-23-mn-5583-story.html. Accessed on 27/09/2020

[192] Artur Bogner. 'The Peace Process in the Wake of Ghana's Northern Conflict: Its Course and Conditions for Success', in *Ethnicity, Belonging and Biography: Ethnographical and Biographical Perspectives*, by Gabriele Rosenthal, Artur Bogner., eds., (London: Transaction Publishers, 2009), p. 46

[193] Bogner, Artur. 'The 1994 civil war in northern Ghana: the genesis and escalation of a 'tribal' conflict', in *Ethnicity in Ghana*, by C. Lentz and P. Nugent., ed., (Basingstoke: Macmillan Press Ltd, 2000), p. 183

In addition, there have also been clashes between sedentary farmers and nomadic Fulani herdsmen in Ghana.[194] However, apart from the example cited for the pre-colonial era, none of these ethnic and tribal conflicts in recent years have managed to impact domestic stability nationwide. A specific example was during the Konkomba and Nanumba conflict in the northern region of Ghana. During this incident, it was reported that at least 423 villages were destroyed and/or burnt to the ground; displacing over 135,000 people, out of the estimated 700,000 population in the entire region.[195] Just like the majority of the tribal conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa, which often begins from a section of a country, spreading to the rest; the incident in Ghana also began to spread into immediate towns and villages.[196]

However, with an intelligence-led national security architecture that operated at the regional, municipal, district, and local levels, understanding the dynamics of the threat as it was playing out through intelligence work, came in handy. Although details of intelligence work done behind the scenes was not shared due to its sensitivity, it was ascertained that there was a significant amount of intelligence work and coordination undertaken to direct operations designed to resolve the conflict.[197] Therefore, with a well-coordinated capability, the dissemination of actionable intelligence helped direct security operations, which resulted in an intervention by security forces (army-cum-police) who ended the conflict.[198] During the process, several weapons including guns and machetes were confiscated with some arrests being made.[199] Once again, as far as this dissertation is concerned, the country's intelligence-

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[194] "Farmers, nomadic herdsmen clash in Ghana." *DW*, 2020, [online resource] available from, https://www.dw.com/en/farmers-nomadic-herdsmen-clash-in-ghana/a-19028767. Accessed on 27/09/2020

[195] Julia Jönsson. "The Overwhelming Minority: Traditional Leadership and Ethnic Conflict in Ghana's Northern Region." *Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity*, 30, (2007), [online resource] available from, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/57a08c0840f0b64974000f52/wp30.pdf. Accessed on 07/12/2020

[196] Kwabena O. Akurang-Parry and Catherine Clay. 'Postcolonial Localized Politics and Wars in Africa: A Case Study of the 1994 Small Ethic War in Northern Region Ghana and Its Effect on Women', in *Intellectual Agent, Mediator and Interlocutor*, by Toyin Falola and Emmanuel M. Mbah., eds., (New Castle Upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2014), pp 66-70

[197] Eshun, J. 'Security Under Rawlings' Administration', Virtual Conversation with A Former Government Official, 21 August, Microsoft Teams, (2020).

[198] Peter Skalnik. 'Outwitting Ghana: Pluralism of Political Culture in Nanun', in *Outwitting the State*, by Peter Skalnik., ed.,(London: Transaction Publishers, 1989), p. 162

[199] Ibrahim Mahama. *Ethnic Conflicts in Northern Ghana*, (Tamale: Cyber Systems, 2003), p. 56

led national security architecture foiled a violent tribal conflict, which had the potential to destabilise the rest of Ghana's landscape.

Chieftaincy Dispute and [Ethnically Motivated] Related Violence

Chieftaincy disputes and its related violence have also contributed to several widespread conflicts in many countries in sub-Saharan Africa.[200] Thus, be it the OWO crisis in Nigeria to the DAGBON dispute in Ghana[201], the related violence is no stranger in Ghana than it is anywhere else in the sub-region. For example, in Ghana, this issue has often been associated with several challenges. These include communal violence, as well as heightened tensions between pastoralists and farmers; coupled with increasing frustration from communities whose livelihoods are being affected by illegal mining activities. These have often led to 'a host of bitter ethnic and chieftaincy conflicts, especially in its three northern regions.'[202] The BIMBILLA case, whereby there has been an ongoing conflict between two princes for the highest traditional office in the northern part of the country since the death of BIMBILLA Naa Abarika Attah II in 2001'[203]; is a typical example. What makes such a conflict even more complicated is that it is also a contest for power between two of the most powerful kingmakers in NANIM, (the KPATIHI Naa and the JUO Naa), which has also been ongoing since 1999 in Northern Ghana. Such activities, only to name a few, have for some time now made the northern region of Ghana, become synonymous with clashes emanating from violent ethnic, land, and chieftaincy conflicts.[204] Statistically, it is claimed that there have been approximately

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[200] "Effects of The Wa Chieftaincy Conflict Politics Essay." *UK Essays*, 2003, [online resource] available from, https://www.ukessays.com/essays/politics/effects-of-the-wa-chieftaincy-conflict-politics-essay.php. Accessed on 27/09/2020

[201] Isaac Olawale Albert. 'From Owo Crisis' to Dagbon Dispute: Lessons in the Politicization of Chieftaincy Disputes in Modern Nigeria and Ghana', The Round Table, *The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs*, 97:394, (2008), pp 47-60

[202] "Why is the north blighted by chieftaincy disputes?" *The New Humanitarian*, 2006, [online resource] available from, https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/report/58007/ghana-why-north-blighted-chieftaincy-disputes. Accessed on 27/09/2020

[203] Canada: Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Ghana: Information on the chieftaincy dispute in Bimbilla, including the process for choosing a chief (1999-April 2017), 27 April 2017, GHA105791.E, available at: https://www.refworld.org/docid/59c8e13c4.html [accessed 27 September 2020

[204] Alhassan Sulemana Anamzoya and Steve Tonah. 'Chieftaincy Succession Dispute in Nanun, Northern Ghana: Interrogating the Narratives of the Contestants', *Ghana Journal of Geography*, 4, (2012), pp 83-102

23 violent conflicts fought in northern Ghana between 1980 and 2002.[205] However, once again the country's security apparatus has managed to contain such conflicts in that part of Ghana, by preventing such issues from impacting the entire country[206], as it had done and as well as dealing with external threats.

External Threats

Cross-Border Threats

In recent years, sub-Saharan Africa has witnessed several episodes of violence spilling over from one neighbouring country to another, posing significant threats to the respective political and security landscapes of related countries. A few examples of such incidents include the violence in northern Nigeria spilling into Cameroon[207]; and the violence in Somalia impacting on Kenya[208]; as well as the violence at the Mali – Niger border.[209] Once again, Ghana as a country is not immune to threats posed by cross-border violence. In fact, Ghana is bordered by Ivory Coast and Burkina Faso, both of whom have witnessed significant violence in recent years. However, hardly did any such violence manage to spill over into Ghana's territorial borders to significantly impact its political and security landscape. As part of its constitutional responsibilities to ensure that cross-border threats do not impact on Ghana's domestic stability, its intelligence-led national security architecture embarks on a programme called the 'Accra Initiative'. In accordance with this initiative, the architecture in collaboration with other

[205] "Effects of The WA Chieftaincy Conflict Politics Essay." *UK Essays*, 2003, [online resource] available from, https://www.ukessays.com/essays/politics/effects-of-the-wa-chieftaincy-conflict-politics-essay.php. Accessed on 27/09/2020

[206] Eshun, J. 'Security Under Rawlings' Administration', Virtual Conversation with A Former Government Official, 21 August, Microsoft Teams, (2020).

[207] "Nigerian Troops Cross Border after Boko Haram Clashes." *BBC News*, 2014, [online resource] available from, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-28927898. Accessed on 27/09/2020

[208] Salem Solomon. "Kenya Looks to Secure Border as Al-Shabab Launches Deadly Attacks." *VOA*, 2020, [online resource] available from, https://www.voanews.com/africa/kenya-looks-secure-border-al-shabab-launches-deadly-attacks. Accessed on 27/09/2020

[209] "The Niger-Mali Border: Subordinating Military Action to a Political Strategy'." *International Crisis Group*, no. 261, 2018, [online resource] available from, https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/mali/261-frontiere-niger-mali-mettre-loutil-militaire-au-service-dune-approche-politique. Accessed on 27/09/2020

agencies from Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, and Togo, prevents spill-over of security threats in neighbouring countries from destabilising Ghana's landscape.[210]

For example, recently, a nationwide intelligence-led operation, with collaboration from external partners ended up uncovering plans, ammunitions, and training camps belonging to a politically motivated secessionist group called the 'Western Togoland' in Ghana.[211] The group were planning to subvert the country's constitution and its democracy through destabilising its landscape.[212] However, through the architecture's work, several members of the group were arrested and are currently awaiting trial.[213] Therefore, from this dissertation's assessment, the vital role manifested by the country's intelligence-led national security architecture, has managed to counter unwanted security threats from impacting its landscape.

Transnational Organised Crime

Transnational organised criminal activities in the sub-region have been characterised by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 'as an issue of growing concern.'[214] Organised criminal activities such as 'drug trafficking, advanced fee, and Internet fraud, human trafficking, diamond smuggling, forgery, cigarette smuggling, illegal manufacture of firearms, trafficking in firearms, armed robbery and the theft and smuggling of oil'; are associated with many countries in the sub-region including Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Nigeria, Senegal, and Sierra Leone.[215] Although, 'Ghana remains a transit and destination point for illicit drugs trafficked

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[210] Sampson Kwarkye, Ella Jeannine Abatan and Michaël Matongbada. "Can the Accra Initiative Prevent Terrorism in West African Coastal States?" *Institute for Security Studies*, 2020, [online resource] available from, https://issafrica.org/iss-today/can-the-accra-initiative-prevent-terrorism-in-west-african-coastal-states. Accessed on 15/12/2020

[211] Eshun, J. 'The Role of the National Security Architecture During the 2020 General Elections in Ghana', Virtual Conversation with a Ghanaian National Security Official on Microsoft Teams, 21 December, (2020).

[212] "Latest on "Western Togoland" Secessionist Arrest for Independence", Map, Funding and Ghana Government Military Response. *BBC News*, 2020, [online resource] available from, https://www.bbc.com/pidgin/tori-54321507. Accessed on 15/12/2020

[213] "Western Togoland Case: Six New Suspects Arrested." *Ghanaweb*, 2020, [online resource] available from, https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/Western-Togoland-case-Six-new-suspects-arrested-1199821. Accessed on 13/03/2021

[214] "Transnational Organized Crime in the West African Region." *UNODC*, 2005, p. iii [online resource] available from, https://www.unodc.org/pdf/transnational_crime_west-africa-05.pdf. Accessed on 15/04/2020

[215] Ibid.

from Asia and South America to other African nations, Europe, and the United States'[216], it has managed to control this from destabilising its landscape, unlike some its neighbours. The continuous joint operation exercise between the Ghana Armed Forces and the Ghana Police Force (branches of the intelligence-led national security architecture), as part of addressing armed robbery and other forms of violent or organised crimes in the country, is an example of the architecture maintaining domestic stability.[217] It is therefore not surprising that the significant contribution by the country's intelligence-led national security architecture in helping stabilise Ghana's landscape, has been recognised by the United States (US). The US stated that it maintains a strong partnership with Ghana and hailed Ghana for its multiple peaceful inter party political transitions. The US commended Ghana for its solid record on its apolitical military, in addition to its strong record on human rights, fast-growing economy, and its free and independent media.[218]

No wonder in 2017-2018, the US partnered with Ghana and since then has sometimes relied on Ghana's national security architecture to help counter such threats in the sub-region and the wider continent as a whole.[219] This is in part due to one of the architecture's core responsibilities to "promote political tolerance, stability, security, and peace in Ghana and the sub-region."[220] Furthermore, the Ghana Navy, which is an arm of the country's intelligence-led national security architecture, has also in recent years been described by the US Naval Institute as 'a rising star in the maritime domain.'[221] The US has cordially characterised Ghana as a nation which 'has become a model as its security initiatives make inroads in the battle

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[216] "Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs: Ghana Summary." *US Department of State*, [online resource] available from, https://www.state.gov/bureau-of-international-narcotics-and-law-enforcement-affairs-work-by-country/ghana-summary/. Accessed on 27/09/2020

[217] "Ministry of Defense." *Republic of Ghana*, 2005.

[218] "Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs: Ghana Summary." *US Department of State*.

[219] "Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs: Ghana Summary", Accomplishments, *US Department of State*, [online resource] available from, https://www.state.gov/bureau-of-international-narcotics-and-law-enforcement-affairs-work-by-country/ghana-summary/. Accessed on 27/09/2020

[220] "Ministry of National Security", PART A: Strategic Overview of the Ministry of National Security, Core Functions. *Republic of Ghana*, 2017, p. 2 [online resource] available from, https://www.mofep.gov.gh/sites/default/files/pbb-estimates/2017/2017-PBB-MNS.pdf. Accessed on 01/05/2020

[221] "Ghana: A Rising Star in the Maritime Domain." *US Naval Institute*, 2016, [online resource] available from, https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2016/march/ghana-rising-star-maritime-domain. Accessed on 30/09/2020

against pirates in the Gulf of Guinea.'[222] Whilst other commentators have described the Ghana Armed Forces, a branch of the intelligence-led national security architecture as "one of the better-run armed forces in sub-Sahara Africa."[223]

Replacement of Security and Intelligence Act 526 of 1996 with ACT 1030 of 2020

Ghana's success in maintaining long-term domestic stability was not without the role played by its intelligence-led national security architecture. Activities of the architecture are enshrined in the Security and Intelligence Act 526 of 1996, which has now been replaced with the introduction of Section 12 of the Security and Intelligence Agencies Act 1030 of 2020. Act 1030 expands the duties of the national security institutions and increase the remit of the agencies charged with undertaking intelligence activities. This widens their scope of having eyes and ears within and outside Ghana's borders to effectively counter emerging threats including, counterintelligence, cybercrime, and new forms of terrorism. Under Act 1030, the Bureau of National Investigations (BNI), the domestic intelligence agency, is renamed the National Intelligence Bureau (NIB). Act 1030 also increases the NIB's capabilities to counter threats such as organised crimes and financial crimes, sabotage, terrorism, hijacking, piracy, drug, and trafficking; whilst having the jurisdiction to arrest, detain and interrogate people associated with criminal offenses. The introduction of Act 1030 bolsters the effectiveness of Ghana's intelligence-led national security architecture.

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[222] Ibid.
[223] "Security Sector Reform in Ghana", Introduction and Context of Reform, *Bonn International Center for Conversion*, 2005, [online resource] available from, https://www.bicc.de/ssr_gtz/pdf/ghana.pdf. Accessed on 15/01/2020

Ghana's Intelligence-Led National Security Architecture from 2002 – 2021

The primary outlook of Ghana's current intelligence-led national security architecture is shown in the diagram below.

Figure 10: Diagram of Ghana's Current Intelligence-Led National Security Architecture

224

There are also other national security-related institutions that do not appear on the diagram above. The current intelligence-led national security architecture of Ghana can be grouped under two broad categories, (i) those charged with undertaking intelligence work for national security purposes; and (ii) security agencies that rely on intelligence work to support investigations for national security purposes. See table below for further details.

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224 Author's Own Sketch

Table 14: Distinguishing between Ghana's Intelligence Agencies and Security Agencies

Intelligence Agencies Charged with Undertaking Intelligence Work for National Security Purposes	Security Agencies Rely on Intelligence to Support Investigations & Operations for National Security Purposes
• **National Security Council** – Overall Strategic Threat Intelligence Work & Coordination • **Research Department** – Foreign Intelligence Work • **Bureau of National Investigations.** Now known as **National Intelligence Bureau (**Technically a Security Agency not an Intelligence Agency**)** – Domestic Intelligence Work • **Defence Intelligence (**Army, Navy & Air Force**)** – Military Intelligence Work • **Criminal Investigations Department (**Technically not an Intelligence Agency**)** – Criminal Intelligence Work • **Financial Intelligence Centre** – Financial Crime Intelligence Work • **National Analysis Centre** – Based at the National Security Secretariat. Responsible for Overarching National Security–Related Assessments • **Joint Intelligence Committee** – Subsidiary of the National Security Council & Made up of the Directors of all the Intelligence & Security Agencies. It is Headed by the National Security Coordinator	• **Military Service (**Army, Navy & Air Force**)** – Charged with Defending and Protecting the Country against External Aggression and sometimes internal • **Police Service** – Enforcing Law & Order and Keeping Citizens Safe within Ghana's Territorial Borders • **Prisons Service** - Tasked with the safe custody of convicted persons from the courts • **Customs, Excise & Preventive Service** - Acts as the Country's Watchdog when it comes to Frontier & Border Security Work. • **Immigration Service** – Acts as the Country's Watchdog when it comes to Border Security Work. • **Economic and Organised Crime Office** – Organised Economic Crime Work with National Security Implications • **Narcotics Control Board (NACOB)** – Combats Drug Smuggling from Trans – National Organised Gangs with National Security Implications • **Fire Service** – From Low – Level Emergencies to those of National Security Implications [225]

There are also other national security-related institutions that do not appear on the diagram The agencies that do not show on the diagram but appear on the table above, offer supportive roles for the primary intelligence-led national security architecture. These agencies perform their supportive roles through the coordination process put in place by the National Security Council to ensure that Ghana's long-term domestic stability is not jeopardised. This is how the broader architecture fits into the context of the three pre-conditions.

Existence of Pre-Condition 1: Projection of Readiness to Defend Country

Pre-condition 1 consists of the security agencies that rely on intelligence work. Like Rawlings' two decades in office, every successive government from 2002 to date upon assuming office ensures that there are national security institutions in place to project the country's readiness to defend its citizenry, and institutions from potential threats. Such institutions are put in place to serve as a deterrent towards potential perpetrators with hostile intent to destabilise Ghana's political and security landscape. The Ghana Armed Forces, Police Service, Customs Excise

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[225] Image created by the author

and Preventive Service (CEPS), Immigration Service, Prison Service, including other agencies play a pivotal role in projecting the country's readiness to secure its land borders, seas, airspace, and cyberspace.[226]

Ghana Armed Forces (GAF) - Army, Navy and Air Force

The GAF comprises of the Ghana army, navy, and air force. It is charged with protecting the country's land borders, seas, and airspace from hostile activities. The army defends Ghana against external aggression. It ensures the development of Ghana and contributes to the fight for global peace.[227] The navy enhances its lead status in maritime security by establishing and maintaining a highly skilled specialised force for various maritime security operations. It performs surveillance of coverage of the exclusive economic zone of Ghana; and undertakes maintenance of ships to ensure that they are at a high operational readiness state. It protects the maritime boundaries of Ghana and acts as a deterrent against any aggression from sea, whilst protecting Ghana's lines of communication and the resources of the sea.[228] The air force provides air transport and offensive air support to the GAF to protect the territorial air space of Ghana. It maintains fighter ground attack capability and provides close air support during GAF operations. It also provides surveillance over the air space of Ghana and over its Exclusive Economic Zone. Lastly, it is responsible for the coordination and direction of search and rescue within the Accra Flight Information Region.[229] Refer to the table in appendix 4 for further details regarding its functions, schedule, structure, management, apparatus, jurisdiction, coordination, and references.

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[226] Government of Ghana. *Freedom & Justice: 1992 Constitution of The Republic of Ghana*, (Accra: Ministry of Justice / Allshore Co, 2005), pp 60-63
[227] 'Professionalism and Loyalty', Ghana Army, A*rmy.Gafonline*, 2019.
[228] 'Ghana, Gender-related Human Resources Policies in Armed Forces', Overview of the Ghana Armed Forces, *GSS Training. Ch*, 2019.
[229] 'Military, Ghana Air Force', *Global Security.Org*, 2019.

Ghana Police Service (GPS)

The GPS is tasked to identify and arrest the perpetrator(s) of the crime, whilst preventing them and their accomplices from absconding. It detects and secures the clues to the crime and articles which might serve as evidence. It gathers all information that might be of use for the effective conduct of investigations and prosecution; and takes all necessary steps and actions to assist national security-related investigations.[230] It collaborates with the Office of Public Prosecution, Economic and Organized Crime Office, Ghana Prisons Service, and refers cases involving family tribunal to the Legal Aid Scheme where the parties agree to an out of court settlement. Lastly, it liaises with the Department of Social Welfare on child custody cases to reduce national burden with potential future national security implications.[231] Refer to the table in appendix 4 for further details regarding its functions, schedule, structure, management, apparatus, jurisdiction, coordination, and references.

Prisons Service (PS)

The Prisons Service (PS) contributes to the maintenance of internal security by maintaining an efficient, humane, and safe reformatory penal system operated within the laws of Ghana. It reintegrates ex-convicts into society and provides reformation and rehabilitation programmes for successful reintegration. It works in close partnership with others in the Criminal Justice System to achieve a common objective by offering opportunities to prisoners to develop their skills through vocational training, moral and formal education. It encourages public and private participation in the provision of skills training. It is tasked with the safe custody of convicted persons with the potential to pose a threat to Ghana's domestic stability.[232] Refer to the table in appendix 4 for further details regarding its functions, schedule, structure, management, apparatus, jurisdiction, coordination, and references.

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[230] 'Police Handbook', General Aspects on Police Role in Preliminary Investigations, The Police Duty - Necessary Steps to take when Crimes are Committed, Ghana Police Service, *Institute for International and Comparative Law in Africa*, (2019).

[231] 'Ghana Police Service, Legal & Prosecutions Directorates', Standard Operating Procedures, Collaboration, *mojagd.gov.gh*, NUMBER: GPS - SP001-15.

[232] 'Vigilance, Humanity and Fortitude, Ghana Prisons Service', *ghanaprisons.gov.gh*, 2019.

Customs Excise and Preventive Service (CEPS)

The CEPS protects Ghana's boundaries by preventing external aggressions imposed by militia activities.[233] It also acts as the country's watchdog when it comes to border revenue collections to prevent entry of smuggled goods into the country.[234] It collects and accounts for all duties, taxes, revenue, and penalties payable under this Law. The CEPS collects export and import duty tax on behalf of the government; and imposes and supervises imports and exports restrictions and prohibitions put in place. It monitors, regulates, and inspects imported goods into Ghana, whilst maintaining a compliance office that undertakes risk assessments to identify medium to high-risk consignments at port of entry, to protect national integrity.[235] The CEPS officials, alongside the Police Service, Immigration Service, BNI and other national security personnel undertake border security duties by manning the sea and land frontiers of Ghana. It undertakes border security intelligence collection on threats to the country such as armed robbery, arms trafficking, vehicle theft, human trafficking, drug trafficking and money laundering.[236] Refer to the table in appendix 4 for further details regarding its functions, schedule, structure, management, apparatus, jurisdiction, coordination, and references.

Ghana Immigration Service (GIS)

The Ghana Immigration Service (GIS) acts as the first line of defence at the country's borders by guarding against infiltration to Ghana of unscrupulous foreigners who aim at destabilising the country's domestic stability.[237] It operates fair but firm immigration controls that regulate and facilitate the movement of people through Ghana's borders. It ensures that people who do not qualify for entry under the various Immigration Laws and Regulations do not gain entry

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[233] 'Republic of Ghana, Customs, Excise and Preventive Service (Management) Law, 1993 (P.N.D.C.L. 330)', Object and function of the Service, *World Intellectual Property Organisation*, (1993).
[234] 'Ghana CEPS Ranks and Their Symbols', The Roles of CEPS, *YEN*, (2019).
[235] 'Workshop on the Compilation of International Merchandise Trade Statistics (Addis Ababa, 8-11 November 2004)', Statistics Division International Trade Statistics Branch, Ghana Customs Excise and Preventive Service, Declaration validated and selected by Risk Assessment Module, *United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs*, (2004).
[236] Francis Azure Junior. Francis Azure Junior. Organogram, MBA Thesis, Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology, (2009).
[237] 'The Border Patrol Unit', Introduction, *Ghana Immigration Service*, 2019.

into the country.[238] It ensures that people with no leave to remain in the country are removed expeditiously. It clamps down on people who facilitate or harbour illegal migrants and conducts court prosecution of foreign nationals in Ghana without permits. It investigates breaches of the Immigration laws and regulations, and vets passport applications.[239] It cooperates fully with other agencies that have a legitimate interest in the movement of people in and out of Ghana, and of their presence in the country.[240] It liaises with other agencies with responsibilities for security, combating of crime and other issues relating to the public good. It collaborates with CEPS, Police, Narcotic Control Board, BNI and other security agencies at Ghana's borders and within the country, to check drug trafficking, human trafficking, smuggling, and subversive activities. These may include activities that threaten the economy of Ghana and create a bad image for Ghana in international circles.[241] Lastly, it keeps a laser-focussed eye by examining travellers entering or leaving Ghana from a national security perspective.[242] Refer to the table in appendix 4 for further details regarding its functions, schedule, structure, management, apparatus, jurisdiction, coordination, and references.

Existence of Pre-Condition 2: Provide Eyes and Ears In and Out of Ghana

In addition to the national security institutions are also the multifaceted agencies integrated within the architecture to undertake intelligence activities. These include the National Intelligence Bureau/Bureau of National Investigations, Research Department, Defence Intelligence, Criminal Investigations Department, Financial Intelligence Centre, and Economic and Organised Crime Office. As part of embarking on intelligence activities, all individual agencies are also uniquely positioned to help counter specific challenges as and when they pose a threat to the country's domestic stability. The functions, schedule, structure,

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[238] Ibid. Corporate Information, Aims and Objectives
[239] Ibid. Corporate Information, Functions and Services to the People
[240] 'Corporate, Information, Aims and Objectives', *Ghana Immigration Service*, 2019.
[241] The Border Patrol Unit, Introduction, *Ghana Immigration Service*, 2019.
[242] 'Corporate, Information, Aims and Objectives', *Ghana Immigration Service*, 2019.

management, apparatus, jurisdiction, and coordination of these agencies cumulatively signifies their role of being the eyes and ears within and outside Ghana's territorial boundaries. Collectively, the roles of these intelligence agencies help to ensure the sustenance and maintenance of the country's long-term domestic stability. Refer to the table in appendix 4 for further details regarding its functions, schedule, structure, management, apparatus, jurisdiction, coordination, and references.

National Intelligence Bureau (NIB) / Bureau of National Investigations (BNI)

The NIB/BNI is Ghana's domestic intelligence agency that operates from within its territorial borders. It is responsible for the collection, and analysis of information to support decision making within the broader national security set-up and provides predictive intelligence for national security protection. It ensures that threats to the country's security and territorial integrity are put in check and where necessary are thwarted with the support of the broader national security architecture. It is responsible for monitoring and securing interior security in Ghana, including counter-terrorism, counter-espionage, and counter proliferation.[243] The NIB also investigates and prosecutes crimes relating to terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, threats against national security and government, and espionage.[244] As part of its broader responsibilities, it provides intelligence to sister agencies to help prevent identified internal threats from escaping outside of Ghana's territorial borders. It liaises and supports the Ghana Armed Forces, Immigration, and CEPS with intelligence to help protect the country's borders from external threats. It liaises and supports the Financial Intelligence Centre (FIC) and Economic and Organised Crime Office (EOCO) information and sometimes intelligence to help safeguard the economic well-being of Ghana. It offers support by cooperating and assisting the Criminal Investigations Department (CID) of the Ghana Police Service to

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[243] "Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorist Financing Measures: Ghana", Key Functions, *FATF-GIBA*, 2017, p. 8, [online resource] available from, https://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/mer-fsrb/GIABA-Ghana-MER-2018.pdf. Accessed on 15/01/2020
[244] 'Bureau for National Investigations', Purpose, *IPFS.IO*

investigate criminal issues of major national security concerns.[245] Refer to the table in appendix 4 for further details regarding its functions, schedule, structure, management, apparatus, jurisdiction, coordination, and references.

Research Department (RD)

The RD undertakes external intelligence work by monitoring the political, economic, social, technological, environmental, legal, and organisational changes globally, and their potential implications on Ghana's national security and its homeland. It also works in collaboration with the broader national security setup to receive and provide intelligence to help protect Ghana's interests abroad.[246] The RD is tasked by the National Security Council, and in return uses its findings to play an advisory role by providing intelligence to support government policy. It informs, alerts, cautions and/or warns government about emerging threats posed by hostile foreign entities, international organisations, terrorism, espionage, and sabotage activities.[247] Refer to the table in appendix 4 for further details regarding its functions, schedule, structure, management, apparatus, jurisdiction, coordination, and references.

Defence Intelligence (DI)

DI provides strategic intelligence capability to support policy at the national level. It collects and analyses information to provide intelligence assessments to support military operations and feed into the national intelligence estimates via NSC. It offers intelligence on intentions, plans, military strength, and capability of other armed forces; and preserves and protects military secrets from unauthorised disclosures.[248] The DI offers intelligence on events

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[245] GIABA. 'Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorist Financing Measures: Ghana', *FATF-GIBA*, 2017, pp 54-55, [online resource] available from, https://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/mer-fsrb/GIABA-Ghana-MER-2018.pdf. Accessed on 15/01/2020

[246] Joshua Addo, Raphael Apoeta, Bernard Tawiah, Eselali Dogue & Kelvin Brooks. 'The Constitution of the Republic of Ghana, In the Name of the Almighty God', National Security Council, *Academia*, 2020

[247] Interview with a Ghanaian Official (2012), 'Composition of Internal Security Architecture Prior to 1948', Interview with a Ghanaian Official, by Joe Eshun, *Doctoral Dissertation: Understanding the National Security Architecture of Ghana*, 07 February.

[248] Patrick Peprah Obuobi. 'Defence Intelligence, Evaluating Ghana's Intelligence Oversight Regime', *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence*, Vol 31, Issue 2, (2018), pp 312 - 341

associated with armed militant, illegal military activities of other armies, insurgency, movements of troops, weapons et cetera, to enable the Ghana armed forces to tackle the threat with military force.[249] It collaborates and trains with foreign agencies. An example is training with the German Armed Forces Technical Assistance Group (GAFTAG) at the defence Intelligence Training Centre and Office Complex to help enhance the Military Intelligence Unit of Ghana.[250] Refer to the table in appendix 4 for further details regarding its functions, schedule, structure, management, apparatus, jurisdiction, coordination, and references.

Criminal Investigations Department (CID)

The CID is the arm of the architecture tasked with undertaking intelligence work to support national security-related criminal investigations. It ensures a proactive and professional approach to the prevention and detection of crime, protection of life and property and the apprehension and prosecution of offenders.[251] The CID works closely with and supports the broader national security architecture on criminal cases that have national security implications. Refer to the table in appendix 4 for further details regarding its functions, schedule, structure, management, apparatus, jurisdiction, coordination, and references.

Financial Intelligence Centre (FIC)

The FIC was set up to tackle "the twin-menace of money laundering and terrorist financing" to protect Ghana's economy and its financial integrity on the global stage.[252] It performs its functions under section 6 of the Anti-Money Laundering Act, 2008, (Act 749), as amended. It requests, and receives, financial records of interest from partner organisations in both Ghana and abroad. It analyses such financial records and disseminates in the form of intelligence to

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[249] Jatuat, Moses.Y. "Role of Intelligence, Institutions and Legal Framework in Ghana, National Security." *Academia,* 2020, [online resource] available from, https://www.academia.edu/40038957/NATIONAL_SECURITY_Role_of_Intelligence_Institutions_and_Legal_Framework_in_Ghana. Accessed on 01 May 2020.
[250] Juliet Akyaa Safo. "Defence Intelligence Training Centre inaugurated in Accra." *Graphic Online*, 2017.
[251] "Criminal Investigation Department – CID, Mission Statement", *Ghana Police Service*, 2019, [online resource] available from, http://police.gov.gh/criminal-investigation-department---cid.html. Accessed on 15/01/2020
[252] "Financial Intelligence Centre", Republic of Ghana, *Ghana Government*, 2019, [online resource] available from, https://fic.gov.gh/. Accessed on 15/01/2020

address issues concerning proceeds of crime and terrorist property. The FIC also cooperates with the Ghana Revenue Authority to ensure compliance of the Act by Designated Non-Financial Businesses and Professions (DNFBPs).[253] Whilst at the same time, it Informs, advises, and co-operates with investigating authorities, supervisory bodies, the revenue agencies, the intelligence agencies, and foreign counterparts on national security matters. It monitors and gives guidance to accountable institutions, supervisory bodies, and other persons on the discharge of their duties and in compliance with the Act. Lastly, it works in collaboration with the broader national security set-up as well as the with the international community to combat financial crimes. These include Ghana Police Service; Ghana Immigration Service (GIS); Bureau for National Investigations (BNI); Economic and Organized Crime Office (EOCO), Narcotic Control Board (NACOB) and Internationally are FATF, UNODC, GIABA and EGMONT.[254] [255] Refer to the table in appendix 4 for further details regarding its functions, schedule, structure, management, apparatus, jurisdiction, coordination, and references.

Economic and Organised Crime Office (EOCO)

The Economic and Organised Crime Office (EOCO) monitors and investigates economic and organised crime that result in financial or economic loss to Ghana or any State entity or institution in which the State has financial interests. These include, money laundering, human trafficking, prohibited cyber activity, tax fraud, and other serious offences. It recovers proceeds of crime and help alleviates related criminal activities with the potential of causing significant financial loss to the State. It works in collaboration with the broader national security set-up to combat financial crimes. These include Ghana Police Service; Ghana Immigration Service (GIS); Bureau for National Investigations (BNI); Financial Crime Centre (FIC) and Narcotic

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[253] Ibid, FAQ
[254] "Financial Intelligence Centre: Annual Report 2016", Core Values, 2016.
[255] "Inter-Agency Collaboration", *FIC Government of Ghana*, 2019, [online resource] available from, https://fic.gov.gh/index.php/component/content/article/18-posts/67-inter-agency-collaboration?Itemid=101. Accessed 0n 30/09/2020

Control Board (NACOB).[256] Refer to the table in appendix 4 for further details regarding its functions, schedule, structure, management, apparatus, jurisdiction, coordination, and references.

Existence of Pre-Condition 3: Provides Overarching Situational Awareness

Not only do the national security institutions attach importance to the activities undertaken by the intelligence agencies by incorporating that into their operations, they also place intelligence coordination at the core of their activities. Just like Rawlings' era, since 2002 there has been a coordinating body in place, which ensures that gathered intelligence is holistically managed, shared, and well-coordinated to help ascertain what is going on within and outside the country's territorial borders. The National Security Council plays the role of the coordinating body, which ensures that there is situational awareness and understanding of the magnitude and scope of overarching threats to Ghana's domestic stability, as explained below.

National Security Council Secretariat (NSCS)

The NSCS maintains 'eyes and ears' in every corner of the country through its decentralised structure. These include operating through its Regional Security (REGSEC), Municipal Security (MUSEC), District Security (DISEC), and Local Levels Security setups. These are made up of intelligence and security personnel at subsidiary levels; and are headed by Regional Ministers, Municipal Chief Executives, District Chief Executives and Locally Appointed Leaders respectively; who are also decision makers. Operating through such a system ensures that there is a 'bottom – up and top – down intelligence flow for the protection of the country. The NSCS is responsible for producing strategic threat intelligence and acts as a policy-making decision body for national security matters; however not without some degree

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[256] "Economic and Organised Crime Office", Functions of the Office, *Office of the Attorney General and Ministry of Justice*, 2019, [online resource] available from, http://www.mojagd.gov.gh/economic-and-organised-crime-office. Accessed on 15/01/2020

of oversight from the other arms of government. [257] The NSCS considers and takes appropriate measures to safeguard the internal and external security of Ghana. It oversees the collection of information relating to the security of Ghana and ensures the integration of domestic, foreign and security policies.[258] This enables the security services and other departments and agencies of the government to co-operate more effectively in matters relating to national security. It assesses and appraises the objectives, commitments, and risks of Ghana in relation to the actual and potential military power in the interest of national security. Lastly, it takes appropriate measures to consider policies on matters of common interest to government departments and agencies so far as national security is concerned.[259] Refer to the table in appendix 4 for further details regarding its functions, schedule, structure, management, apparatus, jurisdiction, coordination, and references.

Practical Application of Pre-Conditions 1, 2, and 3

The Office of the President, which is the ultimate customer, sits at the apex of the country's national security hierarchy. There is then the National Security Secretariat (NSS), which houses the National Assessment Centre (NAC); as well as the Coordinator of the National Security Council (NSC). The NSC comprises of the President of the Republic of Ghana, who is the head. It is also made up of the Vice President of the Republic of Ghana and four other senior ministers with portfolios. These are the Defence Minister, Interior Minister, Foreign Affairs Minister, and Finance Minister. In addition to the NSC set-ups are the (i) Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS), and two members of the armed forces, (ii) the Inspector-General of Police (IGP), and two members of the police with one of them being the Director CID, (iii) the Director-General of the Prison Service, (iv) Director-General of the Defence Intelligence

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[257] "Ministry of National Security", Budget Programme Description, *MOFEP*, Republic of Ghana, 2017, [online resource] available from https://www.mofep.gov.gh/sites/default/files/pbb-estimates/2017/2017-PBB-MNS.pdf. Accessed on 15/01/2020

[258] Joshua Addo, Raphael Apoeta, Bernard Tawiah, Eselali Dogue & Kelvin Brooks. "The Constitution of the Republic of Ghana, In the Name of the Almighty God", National Security Council, *Academia*, 2020, [online resource] available from, https://www.academia.edu/33539326/THE_CONSTITUTION_OF_THE_REPUBLIC_OF_GHANA_IN_THE_NAME_OF_THE_ALMIGHTY_GOD_We_the_People_of_Ghana. Accessed on 15/04/2020

[259] Ibid

(DGDI), (v) the Director of the Research Department (RD), (vi) the Director of the Bureau of National Investigations (BNI), and (vii) the Commissioner of Customs Excise and Preventive Service (CEPS). The President appoints three additional members to the Council when the need arises.

There is also the position of a National Security Coordinator, who serves as the professional head of the intelligence and security set-up in Ghana. The Coordinator is the head of the NSCS and is responsible for managing the day-to-day activities of all the agencies. The National Security Coordinator works closely with the NAC, whose primary role is to produce strategic threats assessments, and national intelligence estimates to help decision-makers make proactive decisions to keep the country safe. In the midst of all of these is the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), which is made up of directors of all the intelligence and security agencies who support decision-makers with expert advice. Although the national security architecture of Ghana as illustrated in the diagram above appears centralised in structure, it also has its decentralised elements. Its organisational structure enables it to perform its duties and coordinate intelligence in a decentralised manner.

In summary, intelligence is coordinated using the traditional top-down approach and can also be shared through the bottom-up method. Every agency which is part of the architecture at the national level has a subsidiary agency at the regional, municipal, district, and the local levels, forming the Regional Security Councils (REGSEC), Municipal Security Councils (MUSEC), District Security Councils (DISEC) and to some extent Local-level activities. Just as the NSC is headed by the National Security Council Coordinator, at the subsidiary levels they are headed by Regional Ministers at the REGSEC, Municipal Chief Executives at the MUSEC, District Chief Executives at the DISEC, and Local Council Leaders at the local levels, as elaborated below. The only exception is the Research Department that has foreign remit.

Regional Security Council (REGSEC)

The REGSEC is found in all regions across the country and is based in the regional capitals. It operates as committees of the NSC and performs such functions of the NSC in their respective regions as the NSC determines. The REGSEC provides early warning to the NSC about the existence or likelihood of any emerging security threat from within the region. See appendix 4 for details on its membership and functions.

Municipal Security Councils (MUSEC)

MUSEC is found in municipalities across the respective region and is mostly based in the municipal capitals. It operates as committees of the NSC via REGSEC and performs such functions of the NSC via REGSEC in their respective municipalities as the REGSEC determines under the guidance of the NSC. The MUSEC provides early warning to the REGSEC about the existence or likelihood of any emerging security threat from within their municipalities. See appendix 4 for details on its membership and functions.

District Security Council (DISEC)

DISEC is found in districts across the respective municipals and is mostly based in the district capitals. It operates as committees of the NSC via MUSEC and/or REGSEC and performs such functions of the NSC via MUSEC and/or REGSEC in their respective districts as the MUSEC and/or REGSEC determines under the guidance of the NSC. The DISEC provides early warning to the MUSEC about the existence or likelihood of any emerging security threat from within the district. See appendix 4 for details on its membership and functions.

Having in place national security institutions, that incorporate intelligence work into its activities and embrace intelligence coordination signifies an intelligence-led national security architecture, which is designed to have eyes and ears on the ground in every corner of the country. Furthermore, it also demonstrates awareness and understanding of the changing

dynamics of security challenges outside Ghana's borders in the 21st century.[260] This is what feeds into some of the counter-measures put in place to help address such threats proactively from impacting the country's long-term domestic stability. However, pursuing their duties to keep Ghana safe also comes with some degree of oversight and/or governance mechanism enshrined in the constitution. This is to ensure that the intelligence-led national security architecture operates under the law and under regular scrutiny.

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[260] "Republic of Ghana: National Implementation Action Plan on United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540." *UN/SC*. United Nations, 2016, [online resource] available from, https://www.un.org/en/sc/1540/documents/Ghana_action_plan.pdf. Accessed on 15/01/2020

Chapter 10: Security Sector Oversight/Governance (SSO/SSG)

During and in the aftermath of the Rawlings era, oversight became a key component in the intelligence-led architecture of Ghana. Here, the research provides a brief overview of how the SSO/SSG contribute to making the architecture perform its duties within the constitutional framework. This takes into consideration the negative and positive perspectives of such practices to help assess its effectiveness in maintaining a stable political and security landscape in Ghana.

SSO by definition can be defined as an "independent scrutiny of the governance and operational issues relating to the security sector by the elected authorities, independent institutions of accountability, and civil society."[261] While as far as Ghana is concerned, its SSG covers a wide range of areas, which may include the following:

➢ the role of the legislature in national security policy formulation, especially in countries emerging from prolonged authoritarian rule
➢ access to information on all security-sector issues
➢ powers to declare war
➢ powers over the budget
➢ powers of approval of senior security-sector appointments
➢ powers on the declaration of emergency powers and how these affect non-derogable rights
➢ professional autonomy of the military and prohibitions on military interference in politics.[262]

Therefore, bearing in mind lessons learned from Ghana's brutal past, including abuse of power by the military and other arms of the country's national security architecture, it became apparent that to prevent similar occurrences in the future, there was the need to put in place a mechanism that would ensure SSO/SSG in Ghana. The 1992 constitution, under Act 526 of 1996, which is now Act 1030 of 2020, had that aspect also covered to ensure that future abuse of power by the security was avoided. The SSO/SSG mechanism that was put in place

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[261] Nicole Ball, Kayode Fayemi, Funmi Olunisakin & Rocklyn Williams. "Security Sector Governance in Africa", A Handbook, Glossary. *International Security Sector Advisory Team – DCAF*, 2010, [online resource] available from, https://issat.dcaf.ch/Learn/Resource-Library/Policy-and-Research-Papers/Security-Sector-Governance-in-Africa-A-Handbook. Accessed on 15/04/2020
[262] Nicole Ball, Kayode Fayemi, Funmi Olunisakin & Rocklyn Williams. "Security Sector Governance in Africa", A Handbook, Glossary. *International Security Sector Advisory Team – DCAF*, 2010.

allocated responsibilities for the executive strand, legislative strand, the judiciary strand, and the governing role was undertaken internally. This included the creation of the NSC as the overarching body responsible for the activities of the security sector in the country.

The Role of the Executive

The oversight and governance duties of the executive strand which were put in place consisted of varied responsibilities. Such duties currently include having ministerial controls; personnel and budgetary controls; and directives and assignments to ensure that national security policies are adhered to. In addition, the President has a responsibility to appoint members for the NSC, the council of state, and the three service councils. Furthermore, it is also part of the duties of the President to appoint the directors of all the agencies, the commanders-in-chief of all the armed forces, and the commissioner of CEPS in consultation with the council of state and service councils. The council of state also advises on presidential appointments to the service councils. The President also assumes the post of the commander-in-chief of the GAF. Whilst the daily administrational and operational command and control of the three services (army, navy, and air force) is overseen by their commanders-in-chief; whose responsibilities are also subject to control and direction of the service councils on matters of policy.

As part of the executive oversight/governance responsibilities, the Vice President was required to chair the three service councils, as well as the NSC in the absence of the President. However, this was amended due to friction that arose between both parties in the past. It is now required that coordination be performed by the national security coordinator.[263] Additionally, under this strand, it is also the responsibility of the President to declare war, conclude peace and other treaties. The President also appoints senior public officials, grants amnesty (with the concurrence of the Parliament of Ghana) and maintains "national security

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[263] "Challenges of Security Sector Governance in West Africa", The Security Sector, The National Security Governance Framework, Other Public Oversight Institutions – Executive. *DCAF*, 2008, [online resource] available from, https://www.dcaf.ch/challenges-security-sector-governance-west-africa. Accessed on 15/04/2020

or public peace and order"; that is, in times of internal and/or external threats to citizens.[264]

Finally, as far as the Security Sector Governance is concerned the constitution states that;

> "No agency, establishment or other organization concerned with national security shall be established except as provided for under this Constitution."[265]

The Role of the Legislative

Ghana's constitution outlines the role of Parliament in raising revenue, preparing budgets, and tracking the expenditure of the public sector, including the security sector.[266] The parliamentary oversight/governance responsibilities require that:

➤ The Committee on Defence and Interior exercises oversight responsibilities on the armed forces, police and immigration services, as well as scrutinises the budgets for both the ministries of defence and interior.
➤ The Finance Committee, exercises oversight responsibilities over budgets for the Office of the President including that of the NSC and subsequently oversees the CEPS.
➤ The Public Accounts Committee, exercises oversight responsibilities over public accounts in general, reports of the auditor-general and therefore offering it some remit to oversee military and security expenditures.
➤ There appear not to be specific oversight committee on intelligence.[267]

The Role of the Judiciary

Just like most judicial arms of any democratic government, the responsibility to interpret and enforce the rule of law lies under this strand. Therefore, the role of the judiciary to provide oversight/governance responsibilities over the security sector in Ghana covers the protection of human rights; guards against the misuse of security powers; prevents the abuse of police and security powers; authorises warrants for investigations and communication intercepts by intelligence agencies; and reviews certain decisions of military courts. Additionally, the commission on human rights and administrative justice (CHRAJ) also has limited powers to

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[264] Nicole Ball, Kayode Fayemi, Funmi Olunisakin & Rocklyn Williams. "Security Sector Governance in Africa", A Handbook, Glossary. *International Security Sector Advisory Team – DCAF*, 2010.
[265] Joshua Addo, Raphael Apoeta, Bernard Tawiah, Eselali Dogue & Kelvin Brooks. "The Constitution of the Republic of Ghana, In the Name of the Almighty God", National Security Council. *Academia*, 2020, [online resource] available from, https://www.academia.edu/33539326/THE_CONSTITUTION_OF_THE_REPUBLIC_OF_GHANA_IN_THE_NAME_OF_THE_ALMIGHTY_GOD_We_the_People_of_Ghana. Accessed on 15/04/2020
[266] Nicole Ball, Kayode Fayemi, Funmi Olunisakin & Rocklyn Williams. "Security Sector Governance in Africa", A Handbook, Glossary. *International Security Sector Advisory Team – DCAF*, 2010.
[267] "Challenges of Security Sector Governance in West Africa", The Security Sector, The National Security Governance Framework, Other Public Oversight Institutions – Executive, *DCAF*, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces. 2008

investigate complaints concerning how the armed forces, police service, and the prison service function under (Article 218(b) of the constitution. Last but not least, the Auditor-General's Department also has a responsibility to audit all government ministries, departments, and agencies on fiscal control and financial probity and transparency and subsequently reports to parliament.[268] The SSO/SSG's influence on the abilities of Ghana's intelligence-led national security architecture has been briefly evaluated below.

Understanding the Misconceptions Regarding the SSO/SSG in Ghana

As to whether all the oversight and governance responsibilities explained are being adhered to in practical terms or not, has been a subject of discussion by many commentators in recent years. To begin with, there are aspects of the SSO/SSG that are currently working in practice as expected to be on paper. These include scrutinising some of the architecture's financial activities and ensuring that it is operating within the confines of the law as per Ghana's constitution. The constitution of Ghana clearly states that;

> "There shall be provided by Parliament from the Consolidated Fund such monies as may be required for the expenses of the Council and the Intelligence Agencies."[269]

In line with what the constitution clearly states above, in practice, request for funds towards any national security-related project and/or work is done in the open through Parliament by putting forward justifiable explanation in the public view. Such an understanding between the executive and legislative branches of government is a clear example of the public's oversight duties into the architecture's activities being enforced. Further, it also opens an avenue for the public through Parliament to put forward their suggestions regarding the standards they expect from the intelligence-led national security architecture when performing their constitutional responsibilities. Once again it is an indication that the SSO/SSG mechanism is working in line

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[268] Ibid.
[269] "Ghana's Constitution of 1992 with Amendments through 1996", Part IV: The National Security Council, Functions of the National Security Council, *Constitute Project Organisation*, 2020, p 55, [online resource] available from, https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Ghana_1996.pdf?lang=en. Accessed on 01 May 2020

with constitutional requirement. Furthermore, the acceptance by all three branches of government that there is a law in place that needs to be adhered to in ensuring that the architecture plays by the book, also adds to how the civil society is successfully exercising its oversight/governance duties in line with the constitution. Additionally, there are other SSO/SSG successes which have helped make the intelligence-led national security architecture effective in undertaking its duties to maintain domestic stability.[270]

The very few authors who have written on Ghana's national security architecture, and its SSO/SSG have frequently argued along the lines of how the country's political system undermines such a mechanism. There is a catalogue of reasons given by subject matter commentators regarding why the SSO/SSG does not really work in practice. Kwadjo attributes oversight challenges to internal practices within the security and intelligence institutions, which explains why 'relevant bodies, institutions and civil society organizations also find it challenging in performing their oversight duties.[271]

On the other hand Aning articulates these factors extensively to include Members of Parliament not being aware of Act 526 and of "ensuing obligations of the minister of security to submit an annual report to the parliament on the intelligence services." Aning also relates the issue to other factors such as, "no standing legislative body to oversee intelligence has been set up", alongside ministers who deliberately do not adhere to the "ministerial responsibility for the intelligence agencies and [the submission of] annual reports to parliament" apart from the first and last report submitted in 1998. Therefore, hiding under the cover of 'secrecy' to prevent scrutiny[272], which has resulted in an ineffective parliamentary

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[270] Jonny Kwadjo. 'Changing the Intelligence Dynamics in Africa: The Ghana Experience', in, *Changing the Intelligence Dynamics in Africa*, by, Sandy Africa and Jonny Kwadjo., eds., (GFN-SSR, 2009) pp 110-121
[271] Jonny Kwadjo. 'Changing the Intelligence Dynamics in Africa: The Ghana Experience', in, *Changing the Intelligence Dynamics in Africa*, by, Sandy Africa and Jonny Kwadjo., eds., (GFN-SSR, 2009) pp 110-121
[272] Kwesi Aning. 'Ghana', in, *Parliamentary Oversight of the Security Sector in West Africa: Opportunities and Challenges*, by, Adedeji Ebo and Boubacar N'Diaye., eds., (Geneva: DCAF, 2008), PP 117-127

oversight, a lack of national security policy framework, and little regulation of the burgeoning private and informal security sector.[273]

Although it is understandable that the SSO/SSG mechanism has been put in place as part of the drive towards achieving political stability and democratisation in Ghana[274]; realising such a goal will be difficult if the country's political and security landscape is unstable, hence democracy will not survive. Regardless of whatever measures and/or mechanisms are put in place in the constitution to help regulate activities of the intelligence-led national security architecture. Nevertheless, with the extent of destabilisation in the sub-region continuously raising significant concerns for the Ghanaian authorities who seek to protect Ghana's domestic stability against cross-border threats[275], the architecture being able to keep the country safe by performing its constitutional duties is significant. When one compares Ghana's landscape in the past four decades to most of its neighbours, the difference in relation to its consistency of long-term stability is stark. Paschal Anayenle Badong, in his work, 'Security Provision in Ghana: What is the Role and Impact of Non-State Actors?'[276] describes Ghana as 'a relatively peaceful country in a largely restless and turbulent subregion. In collaboration with Badong's description of Ghana's landscape, a major work also done by the BBC entitled, 'Ghana Country Profile'[277] considers Ghana as 'one of the more stable countries in West Africa since its transition to multi-party democracy in 1992.'

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[273] Shiv Bakrania. 'Security Sector Reform in West Africa', Ghana, *Global Facilitation Network for Security Sector Reform*, (2010), p.10

[274] Jonny Kwadjo. 'Changing the Intelligence Dynamics in Africa: The Ghana Experience', in, *Changing the Intelligence Dynamics in Africa*, by, Sandy Africa and Jonny Kwadjo., eds., (GFN-SSR, 2009) pp 110-121

[275] John Akokpari. 'Economic Dependence and Marginalised Foreign Policy-Making' in *Diplomacy and Developing Nations: Post-Cold War Foreign Policy-Making Structures and Processes*, by Justin Robertson, Maurice A. East. ed., (London: Routledge, 2005), p. 194

[276] Paschal Anayenle Badong. "Security Provision in Ghana: What is the Role and Impact of Non-State Actors?" *African Leadership Centre*, 5 (2009), pp 5-6 [online resource] available from, https://www.issuelab.org/resources/21725/21725.pdf. Accessed on 04/08/2020

[277] "Ghana Country Profile." *BBC News*, 2018, [online resource] available from, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-13433790#:~:text=Ghana%20is%20considered%20one%20of,break%20free%20from%20colonial%20rule. Accessed on 30/07/2020

Similar to Badong and the BBC's characterisation of Ghana, the Ghana Investment Promotions Center (GIPC), in their work, *The Report: Ghana 2011*[278], describes Ghana as 'one of West Africa's most politically stable countries.' Hence the GIPC characterises Ghana as a country which has been able to position 'itself as a champion of regional stability and integration.' Therefore, this dissertation assesses that regardless of whether the SSO/SSG works or not, and whether it is being undermined or not, what takes precedence is the architecture's effectiveness in maintaining long-term domestic stability in Ghana.

Additionally, the claim that the SSO/SSG is being undermined has also emerged from commentators comparing practices in Ghana with advanced democracies such as the UK and US[279], without considering the relatively young age of Ghana's democracy. For this reason, these commentators often conclude by selling short the achievements of Ghana's security sector; and rendering its intelligence-led national security architecture ineffective, as extensively argued in the literature review section. Meanwhile, these authors fail to acknowledge that to make a fair comparison one has to compare the SSO/SSG in Ghana to countries of a similar democratic age. As well as to other Sub-Saharan African countries with comparable political, economic, social, technological, environmental, legal, and organisational (PESTELO) landscape.

When considering Ghana's long-term domestic stability against the political and security instabilities of most countries in the sub-region, such a comparison rather sheds light on the effectiveness of Ghana's intelligence-led national security architecture. Further, it also highlights the architecture's pivotal role in helping to maintain political and security stability for decades.[280] On the other hand, if such a comparison is rather made against advanced

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[278] Ghana Investment Promotions Center. *The Report: Ghana 2011*, Time to Shine, Strong Political and Economic Foundation for Growth, (Oxford: Oxford Business Group, 2011), p.12
[279] Kwesi Aning and Ernest Lartey. 'Parliamentary Oversight of the Security Sector: Lessons from Ghana', *Centre on International Cooperation*, (2009).
[280] Clement K. Dzidonu. An Integrated ICT-led Socio-economic Development Policy and Plan Development Framework for Ghana, (Ghana: Republic of Ghana, 2003), P. 160

countries with much older and established democracies, it will be difficult to appreciate the architecture's effectiveness and its achievements. Especially, as these advanced democracies do not encounter the same regional challenges similar to Ghana due to its geographical location.[281] Furthermore, such a comparison is also highly disproportionate as the age of Ghana's democracy compared to that of the UK's and US' is no different from the biblical David and Goliath scenario.

As a matter of fact, the UK colonised Ghana and gave it independence in 1957 until it adopted democratic governance in 1992. Therefore, the amount of experience the UK has as a long established-democracy, in comparison to Ghana's is incomparable. Comparing how the security sector is scrutinised in Ghana against those of such advanced countries, and using that to determine the intelligence-led national security architecture's effectiveness, is disproportionate and unfair. Furthermore, the PESTELO landscape of Ghana is uniquely different from that of the UK and also that of the US. This means that the internal political and security challenges that each country face is unique to its PESTELO landscape, and will require a different approach to address such challenges. The systems in place to support the PESTELO factors in these advanced countries work effectively well compared to Ghana's. Expecting the SSO/SSG mechanism in Ghana to be as effective as that of the UK and the US is no different from wishful thinking.

Ghana is a country, which is classified as 'developing' and is located in a sub-region whereby the prevalence of the rule of law is a significant challenge. However, the country has still managed to put in place an SSO/SSG to ensure that its intelligence-led national security architecture operates within the law and as effective is any advanced democracies, which has helped stabilise its political and security landscape.[282] This in itself for a country with a

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[281] Aryeetey-Attoh, Samuel. *Geography of Sub-Saharan Africa*, (Germany: Prentice Hall, 2010), pp 132-148
[282] Jonny Kwadjo. 'Changing the Intelligence Dynamics in Africa: The Ghana Experience', in, *Changing the Intelligence Dynamics in Africa*, by, Sandy Africa and Jonny Kwadjo., eds., (GFN-SSR, 2009) pp 110-121

relatively young democracy is significant, however, whether the SSO/SSG mechanism in place is being adhered to and respected fully according to the constitution requires an entire discussion on its own.

That being said, just like in any other democratic country, there are likely to be shortcomings within Ghana's practice over scrutinising its security sector.[283] These include, (i) potential politicisation of Ghana's national security architecture by the executive branch of government, (ii) over protectiveness of the architecture's activities, (iii) prevention of scrutiny, (iv) lack of accountability to other branches of government[284], (v) the lack of ministerial responsibilities over its intelligence and security agencies, and (vi) harassment, and human rights abuse behaviours by some personnel. Unlike some commentators who sometimes go to the extent of comparing Ghana's inabilities with the abilities of some advanced democracies[285], this work disagrees with such comparisons.

This dissertation, is of the view that the architecture's ability to consistently maintain peace, stability, and freedom in the country for such a long duration, overrides all these shortcomings, which also require an upturn. Even the more advanced democracies also encounter challenges that inhibit their ability to obtain full potential in addressing evolving security concerns in the 21st century. Such inhibiting challenges may include inadequate funding[286] and timely upskilling of human resources within the security sectors of such countries.[287] Not forgetting obstacles that impede the abilities of such countries to meet security sector

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[283] Eboe Hutchful. 'Challenges of Security Sector Governance in West Africa', in Alan Bryden, Boubacar N'Diaye and 'Funmi Olonisakin., eds., *Challenges of Security Sector Governance in West Africa*, DCAF, (2008), pp 111 – 132 [online resource] available from, https://www.dcaf.ch/challenges-security-sector-governance-west-africa. Accessed on 15/04/2020

[284] Kwesi Aning and Ernest Lartey. 'Parliamentary Oversight of the Security Sector: Lessons from Ghana', *Centre on International Cooperation*, (2009), pp 6-10

[285] Obuobi, Patrick. 'Evaluating Ghana's Intelligence Oversight Regime', *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence*, 31, (2018), pp 312-341.

[286] "Reality Check, What's happening to defence spending." *BBC News*, 2018, [online resource] available from, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-42774738. Accessed on 15/01/2020

[287] Loren DeJonge Schulman. "Managing the National Security Workforce Crisis", Center for a New American Security. *BBC News*, 2019, [online resource] available from, https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2019/05/16/managing_the_national_security_workforce_crisis_114430 .html. Accessed on 15/04/2020

regulatory requirements.[288] In the UK for instance, the Intelligence Services Act 1994, coupled with the reinforcement of its powers into the Justice and Security Act 2013, indicate some degree of parliamentary oversight challenges with regards to its national security-related activities.[289] These include challenges related to policies, administration and operational expenditure of MI5, MI6, GCHQ, Defence Intelligence, the Joint Intelligence Organisation, the National Security Secretariat (NSS) and the Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism.[290]

No wonder national security expenditure-related challenges have been under focus in the UK, whereby the country has been told that excessive financial cuts put the credibility of its military 'at risk'.[291] Therefore, making the existing shortcomings associated with scrutinising the security sector in Ghana nothing out of the ordinary that should be used to minimise its architecture's effectiveness. Despite all the challenges, Ghana's intelligence-led national security architecture has still been able to adapt and make good use of what is available to help maintain domestic stability within its territorial borders for decades. Regardless of the country being located in an unstable sub-region compared to most of the advanced democracies that are situated in fairly stable regions.

Apart from the threat of international terrorism which affects every country, Ghana, unlike most of the advanced democracies has to also deal with sub-regional specific threats such as acts of banditry, civil unrest, civil wars, and other forms of instabilities next to its territorial borders. This makes the threats to Ghana's landscape extensive and complicated compared to the advanced nations. However, Ghana still maintains a stable landscape, which highlights the

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[288] John Timmons and F. Paul Pitman. "Cybersecurity and the UK Legal Landscape." *Whitecase*, 2019, [online resource] available from, https://www.whitecase.com/publications/alert/cybersecurity-and-uk-legal-landscape. Accessed on 15/12/2020

[289] "The Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament (ISC) is the committee of Parliament with statutory responsibility for oversight of the UK Intelligence Community." *Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament*, UK Government, 2021, [online resource] available from, https://isc.independent.gov.uk/. Accessed on 01/05/2021

[290] "Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament: Annual Report 2013–2014." *UK Government*, 2014, [online resource] available from, https://isc.independent.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/2013-2014_ISC_AR.pdf. Accessed on 01/05/2021

[291] "UK Military Credibility 'at Risk' Over Cuts." *BBC News*, 2018, [online resource] available from, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-43365208. Accessed on 15/01/2020

effectiveness and significance of its intelligence-led national security architecture in maintaining domestic stability. As highlighted by some security experts that Ghana's intelligence agencies have continuously utilised administrative, organisational, and institutional reforms to pursue their objectives. This approach is a testament of the country's commitment to intelligence sector reform, evidencing the foresight involved in pursuing and attaining domestic stability.[292]

Understanding Tenacity and Abilities of Ghana's Intelligence-Led National Security Architecture

Aside the discussion about the SSO/SSG's influence on the intelligence-led national security architecture's in responsibilities and effectiveness in maintaining domestic stability, there is also the architecture's tenacity and abilities to consider. The age of Ghana's democracy, the abilities of its national security architecture, and the strength and weaknesses have been used to evaluate its tenacity from an SSO/SSG standpoint.

(i) Age of Ghana's Democracy

To begin with, a comparison has been made between the age of Ghana's democracy and those of some advanced democracies. Such comparison helps set the stage to begin to appreciate how far the country's intelligence-led national security architecture has come, in such a short space of time. To put into perspective, Ghana was the first country to gain independence in Sub-Saharan Africa in 1957.[293] After independence, the country went through an era of violence with a series of attempted and successful military coup d'états, completely destabilising its landscape.[294] This was the norm until the last successful military coup in 1981,

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[292] Sandy Africa and Johnny Kwadjo, 'Changing Intelligence Dynamics in Africa', *GFN-SSR and ASSN*, (2009), pp 1-14.

[293] George Owusu., Paul Yankson., and Robert Osei. 'Youth Entrepreneurship in Ghana: Current Trends and Policies', in *Young Entrepreneurs in Sub-Saharan Africa*, by Katherine V. Gough, Thilde Langevang., ed., (London: Routledge, 2017), p. 32

[294] F. N. Hammond, Y. Antwi. *Economic Analysis of Sub-Saharan Africa Real Estate Policies*, (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010) p. 93

which was presided by 10 years of stable military rule.[295] This military administration ended in 1992 when a new constitution was put into place to return the country back to democratic rule. Since then, Ghana has been a democratic country with long-term domestic stability to date.[296] This has been possible due to an intelligence-led national security architecture being created from 1982 onwards to address security challenges to create domestic stability. Performing such duties by the architecture has still continued in line with the constitution[297] under Act 526 of 1996, now replaced by Act 1030 of 2020. Arguably, justifying the central argument of this dissertation that all three pre-conditions collectively has made the difference to Ghana turning a significant corner to stability.

Ghana, therefore, can be described as a young democracy relative to some of the advanced countries like the UK and the US, whose democracies can be traced back to 1215 and 1788 respectively.[298] In recent years, many authors who have written about Ghana's security sector and/or its national security architecture at some point compare the country's security sector with those of the named advanced democracies. They quite often conclude by highlighting more of what appears to be the shortcomings of Ghana's security sector than its achievements. Arguably, this often ends up painting an unbalanced account of the architecture's abilities, especially when the age of Ghana's democracy is not taken into consideration and compared to advanced democracies. These factors need to be taken into consideration to become vital in helping to arrive at a more balanced conclusion. How Ghana's intelligence-led national security architecture operates within its relatively young democracy has been assessed in comparison with those of the UK and US within their respective

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[295] Beatrix Allah-Mensah. 'The 2004 General Elections in Ghana: A Case for Democratic Consolidation', in *Electoral Process and the Prospects for Democracy Consolidation: Contextualising the African Multiparty Elections in 2004*, by Korwa Gombe Adar, Abdalla Hamdok, Joram Rukambe., eds., (Pretoria: African Institute of South Africa, 2008), p. 51
[296] John R. Heilbrunn. *Oil, Democracy, and Development in Africa*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014), p. 126
[297] Sandy Africa and Johnny Kwadjo, 'Changing Intelligence Dynamics in Africa', *GFN-SSR and ASSN*, (2009), pp 1-14.
[298] "7 Oldest Democracies in the World." *Oldest.org*, 2019, [online resource] available from, https://www.oldest.org/politics/democracies/. Accessed on 15/04/2020

democracies. Factors such as freedom of speech, national security coordination, the geographical landscape where each country is situated, and a defence budget, have been used to help undertake this exercise.

Freedom of Speech

Historically, 'freedom of speech' was not a used terminology that could have been associated with Ghana. The Governance of the country between 1960 and 1992 was mostly a dictatorship. Almost every regime that was in power used the country's national security apparatus to ensure its survival. Therefore, criticising the intelligence and security agencies, be it objective or subjective was likely to land critics in jail. For example, during Nkrumah's reign and subsequent leaders that followed, many opposition leaders were jailed, and others were exiled from the country. Furthermore, there was nothing like freedom of the press as the media was mostly state-owned. Consequently, making self-censorship in the media a widespread phenomenon. In addition, certain media laws and regulations were also put in place to discourage the establishment and the freedom of private media.[299]

After the 1992 Constitution, the media landscape in Ghana began to liberalise.[300] Gradually, not being able to enjoy 'freedom of speech' began to become a thing of the past. Alterations to the 1992 Constitution in 1996, especially with the introduction of Act 526 began to see some oversight responsibilities over the security sector taking place. Even though other commentators may argue that there is not enough oversight in Ghana because 'parliamentarians lack the will to exercise their oversight functions', this author sees it otherwise. For example, other commentators also cite 'the issue of excessive secrecy in national security matters' as being an obstacle for proper scrutiny over the sector's activities.

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[299] Sarfo Agyeman Offei. "Press Freedom in a Comparative Perspective, Ghana a Young Democracy with a Vibrant Press." *Journalistik och digitala medier*, 2017, [online resource] available from, http://nyttiflempan.sh.se/magister/2017-10-27/Ghana-a-young-democracy-with-a-vibrant-press-40698.html. Accessed on 15/04/2020
[300] Ibid.

That said, citing national security as a reason to prevent parliamentary, or other bodies to scrutinise security detail is also common in advanced democracies, and sometimes tougher than what occurs in Ghana. The World Press Freedom Index report ranks Ghana in 14 places above the United Kingdom and 17 places above the United States. The report claims that in the United Kingdom , government has a heavy-handed approach towards the press when it comes to reporting on national security matters. The World Press Freedom Index report further elaborates that the UK Parliament adopted the most extreme surveillance legislation in the UK's history. It referred to the Investigatory Powers Act, as a mechanism with insufficient protection for whistle-blowers journalists, and their sources, and therefore poses a serious threat to investigative journalism.[301]

Furthermore, in the US in recent years, there have been whistle-blowers who have been jailed or who have an active arrest warrant and/or extradition request for them for leaking national security-related information. These include individuals such as Julian Assange (Wikileaks founder), Edward Snowden, and Chelsea Manning cases to name a few. On the other hand, Ghana with its relatively young democracy, hardly witness situations whereby journalists are threatened with national security breaches. Therefore, as far as this author is concerned, citing national security reasons to prevent public scrutiny of the security sector, be it 'excessive' or not, is a common practice even in advanced democracies. Considering how young Ghana's democracy is, its security sector still appears to be operating effectively well without relatively being heavy-handed on institutions charged to perform oversight responsibilities over its activities.

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[301] Sarfo Agyeman Offei. "Press Freedom in a Comparative Perspective, Ghana a Young Democracy with a Vibrant Press." *Journalistik och digitala medier*, 2017, [online resource] available from, http://nyttiflempan.sh.se/magister/2017-10-27/Ghana-a-young-democracy-with-a-vibrant-press-40698.html. Accessed on 15/04/2020

National Security Coordination

There are other significantly remarkable factors associated with Ghana's national security architecture that cannot be overlooked. Therefore, these factors need to be highlighted especially considering its relatively young democracy. One such factor is the coordination of intelligence and security activities within and outside Ghana's territorial boundaries. The creation of a national security council for coordination within the country's security apparatus is significant. Especially considering that Ghana, despite its young democracy, had the exemplary vision to set up a National Security Council to coordinate its intelligence practices in the 1990s[302], which was years before the UK adopted a similar approach on 12 May 2010.[303] Ghana's democracy began in the early 1990s whilst the UK's can be traced as far back as 1215. However, such a relatively young democracy like Ghana had the vision to operate such an architecture that is now being followed by many advanced nations, as well as many countries in Sub-Saharan Africa highlights a remarkable achievement.

Geographical Landscape Where Each Country Is Situated

The UK and the US are both situated in regions that are surrounded by other advanced democracies. Therefore, their respective terrains can be described as relatively stable. Ghana, however, is situated in sub-Saharan Africa whereby the political and security landscape of the sub-region is relatively unstable. Hence, Ghana is confronted with continuous significant and different security threats than the challenges faced by the UK and US on a daily basis. The volatility within sub-Saharan Africa due to continuous civil unrest, political violence, and civil wars makes it relatively dangerous and extremely challenging for any democracy to operate. These coupled with transnational issues such as terrorism, drug trafficking, human trafficking,

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[302] Joshua Addo, Raphael Apoeta, Bernard Tawiah, Eselali Dogue & Kelvin Brooks. "The Constitution of the Republic of Ghana, In the Name of the Almighty God", National Security Council. *Academia*, 2020, [online resource] available from, https://www.academia.edu/33539326/THE_CONSTITUTION_OF_THE_REPUBLIC_OF_GHANA_IN_THE_NAME_OF_THE_ALMIGHTY_GOD_We_the_People_of_Ghana. Accessed on 15/04/2020
[303] "Establishment of a National Security Council", The Prime Minister is establishing a National Security Council (NSC), which will oversee all aspects of Britain's security, *Gov.UK*, 2010, [online resource] available from, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/establishment-of-a-national-security-council. Accessed on 15/04/2020

and cyber threats, highlights the magnitude of challenges that Ghana's intelligence-led national security architecture has to overcome daily to keep its borders safe; not forgetting the internal security challenges it faces as well. In comparison, both the UK and US are hardly confronted with issues like civil unrests, political violence, and civil wars on its doorstep.

Therefore, for an intelligence-led national security architecture operating in such a relatively young democracy like Ghana to be able to keep the country safe for decades, it at least deserves a fair assessment rather than always being criticised. There is no national security architecture that is perfect and therefore has all the answers, and Ghana is no different. Accordingly, its intelligence-led national security architecture still has a lot to learn and do. That being said, the architecture has also been able to demonstrate its effectiveness and efficiency in administering its constitutional duties by ensuring long-term domestic stability.

Defence Budget

The 2020 country-by-country defence spending budget highlights that the US and the UK are ranked 1st and 5th respectively.[304] The US has been quoted as spending $750,000,000,000 and the UK $55,100,000,000 annually on defence. Unlike Ghana which is ranked 89th and is quoted as spending $710,000,000 annually on defence.[305] When comparing Ghana's national security architecture with the national security apparatus of the mentioned advanced democracies, this is arguably unfair. As highlighted above, there is an enormous difference between Ghana's annual defence budget and that of the US and the UK. Therefore, comparing Ghana's national security architecture's capabilities with that of the US and UK is a comparison that should not be made. Hence the possibility of any such comparison resulting in an unbalanced conclusion cannot be underestimated. What makes Ghana's intelligence-

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[304] "Defense Spending by Country", Overview. *Global Fire Power*, 2020, [online resource] available from, https://www.globalfirepower.com/defense-spending-budget.asp. Accessed on 29/09/2020
[305] Ibid.

led national security architecture an effective mechanism for the country as far as this dissertation is concerned is discussed below.

(ii) Abilities of the National Security Architecture

Evaluating the effectiveness of any organisation is never an easy task to undertake. To help ascertain a more balanced judgment on the abilities of Ghana's national security architecture, such an evaluation is done under the following sub-headings. These are strategy, operational structure, leadership, people systems and processes, culture and values, customer experience, and employee engagement.[306] These factors have been used to assess whether the intelligence-led national security architecture of Ghana demonstrates all the qualities of an institution that is formidable enough, and fit for purpose in effectively countering the 21st-century challenges within its territorial borders.

Strategy

The current national security machinery of Ghana appears to demonstrate that it has a clear 'strategy' in place through the creation of the national security council (NSC). Therefore, through the NSC's decentralised coordination structure it is able to have eyes and ears on the ground across the country. This 'strategy' helps to increase the likelihood of picking up almost any potential threats that are designed to derail one of the country's strategic aims. These aims include, sustaining the country's democratic processes and upholding its stable political and security landscape. Furthermore, having in place a national security secretariat (NSS), that houses the coordinator of the NSC; as well as a national assessment centre (NAC), says a lot about this 'strategy'. Especially, considering that the NAC's primary role is to produce strategic threats assessments, and national intelligence estimates to help decision-makers make proactive decisions to keep the country safe. Among all of these is also the creation of a joint intelligence committee (JIC), which is made up of directors of all the intelligence and

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[306] "Leadership Insight, Organisational Effectiveness." *East of England Leadership Academy*, (2019).

security agencies who support the decision-makers with expert advice. Therefore, considering the prior discussion, Ghana's intelligence-led national security architecture exhibits a purposeful and carefully thought through 'strategy', which is being adhered to by the country's national security architecture to ensure its safety.

Operational Structure

The current national security architecture of Ghana coordinates its operations through a centralised hierarchical structure but undertakes its activities through a decentralised set-up. All the agencies that constitute the country's national security make-up individually have their own internal schedule, structure, coordination, management, roles, apparatus, and jurisdiction in which they operate. In addition to the individual agency set-up, there is also the set-up for the overarching intelligence-led national security architecture, which has an overarching schedule, structure, coordination, management, roles, apparatus, and national jurisdiction. Therefore, individually, all of the agencies play their part by contributing towards a collective national security work, to help build a clear threat picture. For this reason, national security recommendations including control strategies are put in place for the benefit of the country's safety. Once again demonstrating that Ghana's intelligence-led national security architecture has in place a clear 'operational structure' to act as part of a guide to help undertake its mandatory duties.

Leadership

The NSC of Ghana has a clear 'leadership' structure in place. As per the constitution, the NSC is led at the top of the echelon by the President of the Republic of Ghana who is followed by the Vice President (VP). The VP is followed by four ministers with portfolios, which consist of the Ministers of Defence, Interior, Finance, and Foreign Affairs. Further down the 'leadership' hierarchy are the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) and two members of the Armed Forces; the Inspector-General of Police (IGP) and two members of the Police, one of whom is the CID

Director; the Director-General of the Prison Service; DI Director-General; BNI Director; RD Director; and CEPS Commissioner. There is also a National Security Coordinator who is often an intelligence and security professional charged with managing the daily activities within the agencies. In addition, there is also clear governance and oversight in place by the Executive, Legislative, and Judiciary to ensure accountability of the national security architecture of the country. This demonstrates a well-organised 'leadership' structure, which exhibits a significant characteristic of advanced national security machinery.

Systems and Processes

There are clear 'systems and processes' in place that the national security set-up of Ghana follows when undertaking its mandatory functions. One of them can be illustrated by how the architecture operates through the regional, municipal, district, and local security council structures. Such a structure can follow a top-down and/or bottom-up approach. That is whereby overall tasking is generated at the national levels and if there are operational requirements for it, such a task will be delegated to the regional security council levels. Furthermore, if operational requirements demand, such a task will be passed on to the municipal levels, of which the process can follow suit through to the local levels depending on operational requirements. Highlighting a clear top-down process. On the other hand, when information is obtained as per initial tasking and/or through a standalone information finding, it is passed on through the highlighted levels to the NAC to form part of the broader strategic threat assessment. There are also checks and balances in place to scrutinise the activities of the national security architecture through executive, legislative, and judiciary oversight to ensure it operates within the constitutional framework. Therefore, such 'systems and processes' in place collectively highlight a remarkable achievement by a national security architecture operating within such a relatively young democracy; signifying an accomplishment that cannot be overlooked.

Culture and Values

Unlike the national security architecture under Jerry Rawlings' government which was mostly focussed on the campaign against "mismanagement, corruption, and black marketeering" in the country, it is unclear what the current national security architecture's 'culture and values' are. That said, Ghana's diverse population coupled with over 250 different spoken languages and dialects, highlight the cultural and ethnic complexities associated with the country. This coupled with the cultural diversity of personnel, especially within the top of the hierarchy of the national security architecture, clearly demonstrates 'values' of diversity and equality. Furthermore, despite the several changes in government, the core structure of the national security architecture and its decentralised form of operation appear to have been kept intact. Therefore, showcasing an architecture, which is bounded by a set of principles that demonstrate adaptability, integrity, and a sense of duty to serve whatever administration comes into power. This shows that the work of the national security architecture of Ghana is driven by a set of principles, which is aimed at maintaining political and security stability in the country. To conclude, this level of work ethic can only be derived from a set of 'culture and values' that drives the work of the national security set-up.

Customer Experience

One of the most important customers of any national security architecture is the head of the executive arm of government. Who quite often, is also the person at the top of the decision-making hierarchy of the ruling administration. Implying that every administration that has been in power, including the current government can be described as a customer of the country's national security architecture. The national security architecture has managed to protect the rule of law since 1992. This has ultimately resulted in sustaining peace and stability in the country for decades. Therefore, 'customer experience' for every successive government during this period can be described as being more than satisfactory. On the grand scheme of things this appears to highlight a very successful intelligence-led national security architecture.

This is a testament to how both the Ghanaian public and foreign nationals in the country freely go about their daily activities without the fear of any significant security concern. Therefore, to conclude this argument, it is not surprising that all the Five Eyes Alliance countries speak highly of Ghana's political and security landscape. Once again, highlighting another success story by the national security machinery in Ghana.

Employee Engagement

How the national security architecture of Ghana is set-up naturally requires to regularly engage with its members through the coordinating function of the NSC. Therefore, ensuring that through the activities of the REGSEC, MUSEC, DISEC, and at the local levels, there is not only regular but also broader 'engagement'. This provides the architecture with an idea of overall security challenges facing the country through its decentralised structure; as well as through the mandatory duties of all member agencies. Hence, 'employee engagement' appears to be one of the most important centrepieces of the country's national security machinery.

(iii) Strengths and Weaknesses of the National Security Architecture

Despite earlier discussions, which highlight the clear effectiveness of Ghana's intelligence-led national security architecture, there are also some shortcomings that can be alluded to and one of them is related to intelligence coordination. Many authors in recent years have in one way or another highlighted the 'reluctance' and 'impudence' of some agencies to share intelligence with fellow agencies within the architecture. One such author (Azure Junior) whose views appear to be commonly shared amongst many others attributes the flaws in managing Ghana's border crime successfully to the lack of inter-agency collaboration and cooperation. Azure Junior associates this lot of animosity among border agencies coupled with unnecessary rivalry leading to all agencies working in silos. Azure Junior claims that this assertion was derived from interviews conducted at Ghana's territorial borders with multi-

agencies. Where it was established that the Immigration Service, the Customs, BNI and National Security at all the border crossings do not enjoy a cordial working relationship.[307]

Although the point made above clearly highlights some coordination challenges, the fact that there are still representatives from all the agencies in one place discussing the issue demonstrates a sense of awareness for such a problem. This signifies the willingness of member agencies to work towards addressing such issues in the near future. However, there have also been other inter-agency coordination and collaborative works, which have yielded successes in the advancement of national development. For example the Financial Intelligence Center (FIC) has closely worked with sister agencies including Narcotics Control Board, Ghana Police Service, Bureau of National Investigation, the Economic and Organised Crime Office and the Ghana Revenue Authority, to successfully resolve complex issues.[308]

Even though it appears from preceding statement above that individual agencies are not communicating with each other, at the national level, all agencies are required to disseminate every obtained information to the NSC. This is then passed on to the NAC for a broader strategic threat assessment to be undertaken. Therefore, highlighting that whether individual agencies choose to communicate with each other or not, such information will one way or another get to the proper authorities anyway. In summary, the requirement for agencies to pass on information to the NSC and subsequently to the NAC still exhibits the effectiveness of coordination within the current national security architecture of Ghana, which is remarkable.

Secondly, there are also challenges associated with the SSO/SSG in Ghana. Many authors have in recent years written on these challenges citing executive, parliamentary, and judiciary oversight difficulties over national security activities. Quite often, conclusions by these authors

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[307] Francis Azure Junior. Francis Azure Junior. Organogram, [MBA Thesis], Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology, (2009).
[308] "Inter-Agency Collaboration." *Financial Intelligence Center*, Government of Ghana, 2019, [online resource] available from, https://fic.gov.gh/index.php/component/content/article/18-posts/67-inter-agency-collaboration?Itemid=101. Accessed on 30/09/2020

end up alluding to the notion that the lack of scrutiny inhibits effective accountability of the national security architecture, which is a fair assessment. Nevertheless, it is also important to take into consideration the age of the country's democracy. Especially, whenever governance and oversight of its national security apparatus come up for discussion. For such a relatively young democracy, which is located in a sub-region full of instabilities, having its national security architecture to fully comply with its constitutional requirements is a tough act to balance.

Nonetheless, there is still some degree of oversight in place, which includes, the defence ministry's limited oversight responsibilities over the DI and the foreign affairs ministry's limited oversight responsibilities over the RD. Furthermore, there is also a parliamentary select committee on defence and interior (PSCDI) in place; although other commentators may argue that it is ineffective. Nevertheless, the fact that it is already in place and undertaking some oversight duties is commendable for such a relatively young democracy. This highlights a remarkable achievement that cannot be overlooked.

Thirdly, unlike the UK, which created its national security council in 2010, Ghana, had the vision to establish its national security council in the early 1990's, almost two decades ahead of the UK. So, for such a relatively young democracy, to put in place such a capability to coordinate intelligence for national purposes is an accomplishment that cannot be overlooked. Once again signifying an architecture that understood the significance of intelligence sharing and coordination right from the onset of Ghana's democracy, to help counter emerging threats and maintain the stability of the country's political and security landscape. Therefore, making such an achievement a remarkable one that cannot be underrated.

Finally, in order to be effective at maintaining the stability of Ghana's political and security landscape, the national security architecture embarks on a broad range of day-to-day operational duties. These include intelligence surveillance activities by collaborating with

foreign intelligence networks to inform policymakers on emerging maritime disputes and cross-border threats. Such as political violence and civil unrest in neighbouring states and how Ghana can protect itself against such challenges. Other operational activities it performs also include rapid response and crisis management of maritime piracy/terrorism and devising measures respectively, to help address challenges within its territorial borders. Furthermore, it puts in place contingency plans and strategies to counter current and emerging threats. Additionally, the national security architecture performs covert operations to prevent and safeguard national interest.[309] All of the analysis undertaken so far show a clear correlation between Ghana's intelligence-led national security architecture and its decades of domestic stability in a sub-region full of instabilities. Thereby, underscoring the architecture's effectiveness in performing its duties.

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[309] Dickson. '21st Century National Security Architecture of Ghana', *Academia*, (2019).

Chapter 11: Assessment and Conclusion

Assessment

If one looks further back into the 20th century, especially during the 1970s, Ghana, just like most countries in the sub-region experienced significant instabilities. However, from 1982 onwards the situation in Ghana began to take a different turn at the time when most of its neighbours were heading on a downward trajectory between the 1980s and early 2000s.[310] These include the civil wars in Liberia (1989-1997[311] / 1999-2003[312]), Sierra Leone (1991-2002)[313], and not forgetting that Senegal, Mali and Guinea, all went through wars or low-intensity conflicts, while political violence in Nigeria steadily increased without ever being considered as tantamount to a civil war. Above all, after its first military coup, in 1999, in September 2002, Côte d'Ivoire also lapsed into civil war.[314]

Due to the growing instabilities in the sub-region at the time posing a cross-border threat to Ghana, coupled with the threat of a potential military coup taking place in Ghana, the security challenges to its newly-discovered domestic stability from 1982 onwards was real. However, despite these threats, Ghana has generally managed to change its difficult state of affairs.[315]

What was done differently in Ghana was that the government in power at the time transformed its security institutions into an intelligence-led national security architecture from 1982 onwards to constitute all three pre-conditions. Such changes proved pivotal as it kept at bay both domestic and foreign threats from derailing the country from its new direction of travel.

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[310] Patrick J. McGowan. 'Armed Forces & Society, Coups and Conflict in West Africa, 1955-2004', Part I, Theoretical Perspectives, Abstract, *Journals Sage Publication*, 32:1, (2005), pp 5-23
[311] Mark Huband. *The Liberian Civil War*, (Abingdon: Frank CASS, 1998)
[312] Mata Utas. Sweet Battlefield: Youth and the Liberian Civil War, [PhD Thesis], Uppsala University, (2003)
[313] Joseph Kaifala. *Free Slaves, Freetown, and the Sierra Leonean Civil War*, (Palgrave Macmillan, 2017)
[314] "Transnational Organized Crime in the West African Region." *UNODC*, 2005, p. 12 [online resource] available from, https://www.unodc.org/pdf/transnational_crime_west-africa-05.pdf. Accessed on 15/04/2020
[315] Ibid.

Fast-forwarding into the 21st century as per discussions in preceding pages, it is evident that just like any other country in this era, the scope of threats being confronted by Ghana is vast compared to those in the 20th century. These threats range from internal (domestic) challenges to the nexus of transnational organised crime and terrorism. Although from the domestic front, there are some few similarities in the types of threats encountered during the 20th and the 21st centuries, there are also other domestic threats that are peculiar to the 21st century. This makes the internal challenges in the 21st century, relatively extensive compared to the preceding century. These include the increasing negative activities of 'pastoralists'; youth recruitment into armed robbery; and warfare between media and politicians. The blending nature of some of these issues in recent years has quite often made it difficult to distinguish between internal and external threats in the country. This, coupled with the complications and sometimes the lethality of such challenges in the 21st century, makes the political and security landscape of Ghana in this era arguably, more vulnerable than it used to be in the 20th century.

Nonetheless, from this dissertation's assessment, what has made a significant difference between the chaotic environment in the 1970s to early 1980s and the current stable landscape since then to date, has been the country's intelligence-led national security architecture. Each of the earlier stated incidents and more had the potential to destabilise Ghana's landscape in the 21st century, if not for the architecture's timely interventions. Moreover, the consistency in maintaining the fundamental core of the architecture's structure by successive governments since 31st December 1981 to present, keeping intact all three pre-conditions, has been the key to Ghana's long-term domestic stability. Although, apart from the political appointments which occur at the top of the echelon of some of the government agencies whenever there is a new administration in place, the consistency has been significantly adhered to.

The structure, the set-up, and how the architecture was designed to operate at the local, district, municipal, regional, and national levels have remained unchanged. With almost every

agency within the architecture apart from the RD, having its subsidiaries operating within the regional, municipal, district, and local levels, this enables the architecture to have eyes and ears everywhere in the country. Not forgetting and including the RD which also operates outside of Ghana's territorial boundaries and the foreign intelligence it also brings to the table. Collectively, such continuous practice has made and continues to make the country's intelligence-led national security architecture situationally aware to deal with emerging challenges, which have the potential to destabilise Ghana's landscape. Therefore, reiterating this dissertation's central argument by stating that continuity within the architecture, which has made it efficient and effective in administering its duties is what has kept the country safe and stable, and not the alternate arguments discussed earlier. Had the architecture's timely interventions not taken place, there would have been no stability and peace in the country for its democratic system, economic policies and/or religious practices to succeed, let alone thrive.

In the 1992 constitution of Ghana, under Act 526 of 1996, which has now been replaced with Act 1030 of 2020, the intelligence-led national security architecture does not undertake any duties without an oversight to ensure that it operates within the laws of the country. As a result, the architecture's activities are being bound by law with more emphasis on parliamentary and civilian oversight.[316] In addition to demonstrating with earlier examples about the role being played by the architecture in maintaining domestic stability, analysis into the Security Sector Oversight/Governance below helps to put into perspective the architecture's effectiveness in performing its constitutional responsibilities towards domestic stability. This is done by evaluating whether such mechanism impedes or enhances the architecture's role.

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[316] "Security Sector Reform in Ghana", Introduction and Context of Reform, *Bonn International Center for Conversion*, 2005, [online resource] available from, https://www.bicc.de/ssr_gtz/pdf/ghana.pdf. Accessed on 15/01/2020

In addition to the functions of individual agencies previously outlined, the constitutional responsibilities of the intelligence-led national security architecture as a whole, which keeps the country safe, and ensures domestic stability, includes the following.

> (a) considering and taking appropriate measures to safeguard the internal and external security of Ghana;
> (b) ensuring the collection of information relating to the security of Ghana and the integration of the domestic, foreign and security policies relating to it so as to enable the security services and other departments and agencies of Government to co-operate more effectively in matters relating to national security;
> (c) assessing and appraising the objectives, commitments and risks of Ghana in relation to the actual and potential military power in the interest of national security; and
> (d) taking appropriate measures regarding the consideration of policies on matters of common interest to the departments and agencies of the Government concerned with national security.

To successfully execute its constitutional responsibilities, the constitution also authorises the intelligence-led national security architecture to embark on the following activities.

> (a) collect, analyses retain and disseminate as appropriate information and intelligence respecting
> activities that may constitute threats to the security of the State and the government of Ghana;
> (b) safeguard the economic well-being of the State against threats posed by the acts or omissions of
> persons or organisations both inside and outside the country;
> (c) protect the State against threats of espionage, sabotage, terrorism, hijacking, piracy, drug trafficking and similar offences;
> (d) protect the State against the activities of persons, both nationals and non-nationals, intended to
> overthrow the government of Ghana or undermine the constitutional order through illegal political,
> military, industrial or other means or through any other unconstitutional method; and
> (e) perform such other functions as may be directed by the President or the Council.

Conclusion

To conclude, many explanations have been offered for the stability of Ghana's political and security landscape. Some attribute the country's long-term domestic stability to its democratic system, religious practices, economic policies, or traditional values; whilst others argue that it is a combination of all those factors. However, considering that Ghana is situated in an unstable sub-region characterised by ethnic conflicts, corruption, economic afflictions, military interventions, civil unrest, civil wars, and other political and security issues, these alternate arguments put forward as the key to domestic stability are unpersuasive. This is because, many of Ghana's neighbours in the sub-region with unstable domestic landscape are

democracies, religious, respect traditional values and some even have stronger economies than Ghana. Furthermore, Ghana's historical journey demonstrates that some military regimes created domestic stability, whilst other democratic administrations failed to do so, and vice versa. This weakens the democratic system argument put forward by other commentators. Additionally, religious practice, traditional values, and effective/non-effective economic policies have always been part of the Ghanaian way of life, still, its landscape has not constantly been stable. All of these collectively, bring into question the viability of the different arguments put forward.

It is neither a democratic system nor a military dictatorship that brought domestic stability to Ghana. Regardless of the type of government, attaining and sustaining domestic stability in Ghana has only been made possible by having all three pre-conditions in place. In summary unlike the others, this dissertation argues that what has made the difference is the country's intelligence-led national security architecture. Without having such an architecture in place, the country stands the risk of attracting and emboldening potential perpetrators into its territorial boundaries to undertake such illegal activities without fear of any repercussion. On the other hand, even if such perpetrators already exist in Ghana, having an intelligence-led national security architecture in place, makes its landscape hostile for such offenders. Perpetrators are either at risk of getting arrested and prosecuted or look for countries deemed as soft targets (ineffective national security architecture) to go and operate in. For this reason, the very moment that Ghana's national security architecture fails to become intelligence-led will be the critical point where the tide begins to turn for the worse, risking destabilising its landscape.

When one looks over the wider span of Ghana's historical journey, the alternate arguments do not show the strongest correlation. However, in this dissertation, it has been comprehensively demonstrated that throughout Ghana's history, whenever authorities in the country get it right by having all three pre-conditions in place, thus (i) national security

institutions, (ii) embrace intelligence work, and (iii) implement intelligence coordination, is when the country's landscape is most stable. On the other hand, whenever there is non-existence of even one of the pre-conditions, the country's political and security landscape has been chaotic.

As part of Ghana's backstory pre-independence, during the pre-colonial era, none of the three pre-conditions existed. These factors explained why the Gold Coast's landscape was unstable, creating a conducive environment for colonisation to succeed. In the colonial era, the regime only had in place pre-condition 1 prior to the 1948 Riots. This explained why the riots and the after effect took the regime by surprise, as it continuously created a chaotic environment, which led to earlier decolonisation. After independence under the Nkrumah administration, the government only had pre-conditions 1 and 2 in place. This also resulted in creating an unstable landscape which ultimately led to the demise of Nkrumah's government by a military junta called the NLC.

Upon assuming office, the NLC military regime had all three pre-conditions in place; hence during its term in office, the regime was able to stabilise the country's landscape until it handed over power to Busia's democratically elected administration. From Busia's to Limann's administration, every successive government during that period only had the first out of the three pre-conditions in place. This resulted in the country almost becoming a failed state. However, when Rawlings' PNDC regime took over through a military coup d'état, the country's landscape was stabilised in the first decade that followed. This was because the PNDC regime had all three pre-conditions in place. During the subsequent eight years of Rawlings' NDC administration, the government continued to maintain all three pre-conditions and therefore was able to sustain the country's stabilised landscape. From 2002 to present, the country's political and security landscape has continued to be stable, and this dissertation argues that this has only been made possible because all three pre-conditions have since been in place.

Today, the country has an architecture that constitutes multifaceted agencies that rely heavily on intelligence work. These agencies include, (i) those charged with undertaking intelligence work for national security purposes; and (ii) security agencies that rely on intelligence work to support investigations for national security purposes. All of the agencies work hand-in-hand through intelligence coordination and sharing. This allows the primary responsibility of the intelligence agencies to ensure that the broader national security architecture is intelligence-led in administering its duties to protect national interests, becoming a prerequisite. All individual agencies under the broader national security architecture, be it intelligence or security, are also uniquely positioned to counter specific challenges as and when they pose a threat to the country's stability. The functions, schedule, structure, management, apparatus, jurisdiction, and coordination of respective agencies as explained above, also highlight the architecture's preparedness. This reaffirms the effectiveness of the architecture's control strategies put in place to counter every possible perceived threat likely to impact the country. Thereby, ensuring the sustenance and maintenance of long-term domestic stability in Ghana.

Additionally, the recently introduced Security and Intelligence Agencies Act, 2020, (ACT 1030) also expands the architecture's duties to adequately address emerging threats such as the combating of global security challenges like counterintelligence, cybercrime, and terrorism. This Act also increases the capabilities of the domestic intelligence agency, the NIB, to counter threats such as organised crimes and financial crimes, sabotage, terrorism, hijacking, piracy, drug, and trafficking. Under ACT 1030 the NIB is also given jurisdiction to arrest, detain and interrogate people associated with criminal offenses. Making the country's landscape hostile for perpetrators with intent to destabilise Ghana's domestic stability. This, alongside the fact that the intelligence-led national security architecture has sub-divisions at the regional, municipal, district, and local levels, not forgetting its external intelligence agency, collectively provide eyes and ears within and outside Ghana's borders. Subsequently, its top-down and bottom-up approach for intelligence sharing and coordination with the NSC at the helm, makes the architecture situationally aware. For these reasons, the architecture has been able to

protect the country's landscape and keep it stable for its democratic, religious, economic, and traditional policies to thrive.

The reason outlined above is why Ghana's landscape has been and continues to be stable and could not have been achieved without having an intelligence-led national security architecture playing such a pivotal role. That said, although the architecture still has a lot to learn and do, overlooking the significance of its remarkable achievement is a disservice to the intelligence and security profession as a whole. In contrast, the very moment authorities underestimate how crucial Ghana's intelligence-led national security architecture is to the country's stabilised landscape; the very instant it is likely to find itself in a similar predicament as most of its neighbours in the sub-region.

Research Limitations

Despite being able to eventually put this dissertation together, obtaining the relevant information came with some significant challenges. Most of the national security interviewees/participants interviewed, if not all of them, were reluctant to offer detailed information and/or asked not to disclose their identities. This significantly impacted on obtaining information on agency-specific structures and responsibilities; let alone details on historic operations, which averted activities with potential to unsettle domestic stability. Therefore, this dissertation had to resort to information extracted from the official website of every individual intelligence and/or security agency that forms part of the broader intelligence-led national security architecture. In so doing, a wide range of information on structures, responsibilities, functions, schedules, management, apparatus, jurisdiction, and coordination of every single agency were ascertained to help build the picture for the entire chapter. Barely relying on published secondary sources for such information.

Additionally, in an attempt to present the narrative in a more balanced form, this author in addition to using materials compiled by Western writers, also resorted to information from publications by African authors. Using the perspective of these African authors, many of whom have lived through some of the country's momentous historical events, is deemed necessary by this dissertation because it helps present past occurrences in a different context. However, striking a balance between the perspective which most Western authors take and those of the African writers (who in most cases write from a personal attachment to their storyline), when it comes to the history of Africa, created significant challenges. These challenges included ascertaining which perspective is the most accurate, and which is not, and why.

To overcome such challenges, the author had to first recognise that throughout the years, publications on Africa's history have mostly been written by writers from the West, who quite often assess Africa through the lens of Western civil society. This was necessary because it has resulted in having a certain narrative, which differs from the perspective of the African people on the African continent. Afua Hirsch, a Civil Rights Activist, and a renowned British-Ghanaian writer once stated that;

> "I think the way history has been rewritten by colonial powers has tended to downgrade stories of Africa as if they are a kind of niche issue over there, when, in actual fact, they are foundational to our understanding of culture, race, all the issues in our society that we're constantly questioning. Half of their origins in the African continent and the same is true of the U.S. And I think until we start to engage in that history and that culture in its true form, we're really missing a dimension in our own analysis of what's happening in contemporary societies right now."[317]

This is an assertion that also aligns with Joseph Henrich's view on how the 'peculiar Western mind' has shaped contemporary society today.[318] The need to present a different perspective to help balance the status quo could not have been any clearer, as it is necessary to re-engage the subject from an alternate narrative. However, with such stark contrast, the two opposing perspectives sometimes seemed far apart. Focussing more on their similarities and comparing

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[317] Amanpour & Company, PBS. (2020, August 26). *The Consequences of Britain's Denial of Its Imperial Past | Video | Amanpour & Company | PBS* [Video]. Amanpour & Company. https://www.pbs.org/wnet/amanpour-and-company/video/the-consequences-of-britains-denial-of-its-imperial-past/ Accessed on 07/12/2020
[318] Joseph Henrich. *The WEIRDest People in the World*, (London: Penguin, 2020)

their differences helped establish vital trends and patterns, which aided in developing the conceptual framework used for this dissertation. This helped to establish the relationship between Ghana's domestic stability and its intelligence-led national security architecture; which was born out of the three pre-conditions that underpin this dissertation's central argument.

Other challenges encountered included, (1) the difficulty of identifying steadfast information on essentially hidden practices; and (2) the ability to unearth intelligence-related documents, as most of them were either destroyed deliberately for security reasons or due to ill-equipped filing procedures. Despite such issues, this author resorted to combinations of numerous interviews, government declassified materials, national archives documents, political science literature, and available published security literature on Ghana, to help compile this dissertation.

In addition, there were other challenges that significantly impacted the smooth progression of this dissertation. These included the delays to the Brunel Ethics Online (BREO) application approval, coupled with the Coronavirus pandemic and its associated global lockdown collectively impacted significantly on primary source material collection. All of the mentioned challenges including not being able to meet up with the assigned Research Development Adviser due to the Adviser being on maternity leave made the completion of this dissertation a tall order to climb. That said, embarking on extensive outreach and research work, coupled with working on this dissertation 24/7, helped address some of the challenges encountered. Upon reflection, there should have been a significant effort made to personally take charge of some of the administrative and logistical requirements needed at the early stages of this research work. This would have made an enormous difference in the rate of progression to this dissertation, especially at the latter stages. Further, requesting for a temporary Research Development Adviser until the return of my assigned Adviser should have been a priority. This

would have helped address some of the structural issues encountered throughout putting this dissertation together.

Regardless of the challenges, what this dissertation represents is that it is the only piece of literature on Ghana's intelligence-led national security architecture, that analyses many decades of the country's historical journey. It also establishes the connection between findings of the historical journey and the changing phases of the architecture's outlook from the pre-colonial era to present. This then helps bring into focus how the architecture has always been pivotal in determining the state of the country's domestic landscape throughout history, be it stable or unstable. Not only that, besides accrediting Ghana's present long-term domestic stability comprehensively to the architecture's critical role, this dissertation also breaks several new grounds. Although already, there is in existence available information about the architecture's history, such materials are currently either incomplete and/or in a fragmented state, creating a significant knowledge gap. Presently, there is relatively little known about the architecture's pre-1982 history compared to its post-1982 era. This is where this dissertation helps narrow such a knowledge gap within the architecture's evolution history.

In doing so, this dissertation offers a one-stop document, which makes it relatively easy for future research work on Ghana's intelligence-led national security architecture to be conducted without having to resort to the currently dispersed information on this subject. This dissertation can also contribute towards the far-fetched solutions needed to help address instabilities in the sub-region, by using Ghana's success story as a case study and alternate approach to help bring domestic stability for countries with unstable landscapes. In summary, this is a new look at the available material, and it is key to highlight and emphasise that no one else has approached the research in this way. That is, by arguing from the narrative in which this dissertation does, and pulling the architecture's historical journey from the pre-colonial era to present in one document. This dissertation breaks new grounds by challenging the status quo.

Areas for Further Exploration

Although, all nations are being confronted by the 21st century security challenges such as, the emergence of new world orders, extremism, terrorism, the resurgence of state-based threats, technological advancement and cybersecurity threats, transnational organised crime, natural disasters, and global pandemics; understanding the uniqueness of the terrain one operates is vital in devising the appropriate strategic response in countering such threats. Therefore, with such threats growing and evolving at a rampant rate globally, in Ghana's case, the nature of the political and security landscape of sub-Sharan Africa becomes vital when seeking to sustain the country's landscape. For Ghana to continue maintaining and improving its stabilised landscape, especially with the security in the sub-region continuously becoming dangerous, authorities may wish to consider the following recommendations. These are (i) national security budget, (ii) political interference, (iii) broaden intelligence collection and sharing, (iv) intelligence work and its coordination, and (v) mandatory education

National Security Budget

Firstly, with national security being perceived as the most critical for the survival of a nation and the well-being of its citizens, by default, it should become 'a vital priority and fundamental responsibility of the government.' Therefore, it is important that the country's national security strategy is placed at the forefront of the government's agenda to drive national budget levels, and not the other way round. Especially for intelligence and defence, which is mostly placed at the heart of national security strategy. As intelligence is also a vital asset in helping policymakers make sense of events and conditions throughout the world, budgets for intelligence and defence activities must always be paramount. Such financial backing can help to put in place and subsequently embark on smart strategic national security requirements, with minimum barriers in administering such requirements. This will inform and support

policymakers to maintain a high level of preparedness for the continuous protection of the country's political and security landscape.[319]

Political Interference

Secondly, in as much as in a democracy, the role of the executive, legislative, and judiciary to scrutinise national security activities is necessary, it is also imperative that such scrutiny is done whilst bearing in mind the sensitivities associated with national security work. For instance, national security personnel undertaking intelligence work sometimes have to operate in very challenging and dangerous terrains in order to obtain the vital intelligence and/or information needed for the survival of a nation. For this reason, often associating national security work with life and death scenarios. In Ghana for instance, which is a relatively young democracy located in a destabilised sub-region, the magnitude of such dangers can be very real. Therefore, it is vital that oversight expectations on its national security activities are not measured against how it is done in some advanced democracies, such as the UK and US, which are located in relatively stable regions. This is because the longer a country's national security architecture operates within its democratic system, the better that government becomes with regards to performing its security sector oversight responsibilities.

Therefore, a much higher standard of scrutiny is expected from advanced democracies relative to how it is done in a much younger democracy. In other words, judging how well any democratic administration scrutinises activities of its national security machinery within their respective democratic systems, must be determined by how long they have been practising democracy. Therefore, in the case of Ghana, expectations need to be managed with regards to how the government is allowed to scrutinise activities of its national security architecture. As the key in determining whether the national security architecture will be effective in keeping

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[319] Peter G. Peterson Foundation. "National Security Solutions." *pgpf.org*, 2020, [online resource] available from, https://www.pgpf.org/finding-solutions/national-security. Accessed on 15/04/2020

the country safe or not is by getting the balance right, and will require a proportionate expectation.

Expand Intelligence Collection and Sharing

Whilst this recommendation is not about the day-to-day operational activities, on paper, Ghana's national security architecture is designed in a way that it has eyes and ears all over the country. That being said whether personnel operate in accordance with the concept of the design cannot be commented on at this stage. However, to be able to respond effectively to the 21st-century challenges, it is vital that the national security architecture broadens its horizon by adapting to new ways. This is not only done through the adaptation of processes, but there should be a change of mindsets across all three arms of government and the broader civil service to appreciate the complexities surrounding national security work. This would give support rather than becoming an impediment or a form of obstruction towards the architecture administering their duties. On the other hand, with far-reaching capabilities of the private and third sectors nowadays, coupled with their significant abilities in collecting information and/or intelligence, it is pertinent that the national security architecture partners with such sectors to bolster its intelligence collection capabilities. The architecture can build trust and significantly encourage intelligence sharing at the local, districts, municipals, regionals through to the national level, in accordance to how the national security architecture is designed to operate on paper.

Intelligence Work and its Coordination

Throughout Ghana's history, the difference between stabilisation and destabilisation within its landscape has always depended on whether intelligence work and its centralised coordination had been incorporated within its national security activities or not. Thanks to intelligence work and its centralised coordination within the current national security machinery of Ghana, for over four decades now the country's landscape has been stable. Continuing such stability will

require continuous centralise intelligence work and coordination that encourages even more closer collaboration between defence/security agencies and intelligence agencies within the architecture. Furthermore, it will also require continuous expansion of global security and intelligence network and partnership, to help protect the country within and beyond its borders by improving its preparedness and agility in responding to emerging threats. Most importantly, how centralised all acquired intelligence are effectively disseminated, directed, and controlled within the national security architecture will always be what will make the difference. For this reason, it is important that the National Security Council and all the other agencies that constitute the architecture continue to be centrally led by intelligence in the work they undertake. They must not lose sight of its importance, as challenges emerging from the current security environment cannot be strategically countered without such a strategy being intelligence-led.

Mandatory Education

It has to be made a fundamental prerequisite for every national security official and/or personnel to understand the history of the architecture and the decisive role it has played between stabilisation and destabilisation of the country's landscape. Understanding this history will help personnel appreciate the extent to which the architecture and the work it does has been vital in sustaining the country's political and security landscape. This could act as a motivational factor for all personnel to appreciate the importance of intelligence coordination by embracing and practising it in their line of duty. This awareness should be from the bottom-up or top-down and across all agencies at every level to help maintain the intelligence coordination culture. As it has been and will continue to be the most effective way to maintain domestic stability in the country.

Recap

Key	
✓	Existence
X*	Existence but disregarded
X	Non-Existence

🟥 Unstable Landscape

🟩 Domestic Stability

Table 15: Visual Representation of Dissertation Recap

Era	Government Type	Precondition 1	Precondition 2	Precondition 3	Result
Precolonial	N/A	X	X	X	▪ Destabilised Landscape ▪ Unable to Defend Country ▪ Conquered and Colonised by Britain
Colonial Rule	Colonial Dictatorship	✓	X	X	▪ Unable to Perceive Changing Political and Security Environment ▪ Dangerous and Unstable Landscape ▪ Unable to Maintain Regime ▪ Resulted in Decolonisation
Nkrumah's Government	Democracy	✓	✓	X	▪ Unable to Perceive Changing Political and Security Environment ▪ Dangerous and Unstable Landscape ▪ Unable to Maintain Democracy ▪ Demise through Military Coup
NLC Regime	Military Dictatorship	✓	✓	✓	▪ Averted Internal and External Threats (military coups) ▪ Stabilised Country's Domestic Landscape ▪ Maintained Regime ▪ Successfully Handed Over Power to a Democratic Government
▪ Busia Government ▪ Acheampong NRC Regime ▪ Acheampong SMC1 ▪ Akuffo SMC2 ▪ Rawlings AFRC ▪ Limann Government	Democracy Military Dictatorship Military Dictatorship Military Dictatorship Military Dictatorship Democracy	X* X X X X X	X* X* X* X* X* X*	X X X X X X	▪ Over a Decade of Violence, Dangerous and Destabilised Domestic Landscape ▪ Each Government Unable to Maintain Democracy or Dictatorship Regime ▪ Resulted in the Demise of Every Government through Military Coup (except AFRC) – Regardless of being Democracy or Dictatorship
▪ Jerry John Rawlings PNDC ▪ Rawlings NDC	Military Dictatorship Democracy	✓ ✓	✓ ✓	✓ ✓	• Averted Internal and External Threats (military coups) • Stabilised Country's Domestic Landscape • Maintained Regime and Democracy • Successfully Handed Over Power to a Democratic Government
▪ John Agyekum Kufour NPP	Democracy	✓	✓	✓	• Averted Emerging Threats • Maintained country's Democracy and Domestic Stability • Successfully Handed Over Power
• John Evans Atta-Mills NDC	Democracy	✓	✓	✓	• Averted Emerging Threats • Maintained country's Democracy and Domestic Stability • Successfully Handed Over Power
• John Mahama NDC	Democracy	✓	✓	✓	• Averted internal and external threats • Maintained country's Democracy and Domestic Stability • Successfully Handed Over Power
• Nana Akufo-Addo NPP	Democracy	✓	✓	✓	• Averting Existing & Emerging Threats • Maintained country's Democracy and Domestic Stability • Successfully Handed Over Power

In summary, it is evident that throughout the country's history, its security architecture has made the difference between an unstable domestic landscape and domestic stability. This dissertation reiterates that Ghana's ability to maintain long-term domestic stability has been because of the pivotal role being played by its intelligence-led national security architecture. Such an architecture in place has helped counter several security threats with the potential to destabilise the country's political and security environment, and this is what has ensured domestic stability. Therefore, overlooking the significance of the intelligence-led national security architecture's remarkable achievement, is a disservice to the intelligence and security profession as a whole; which could derail Ghana's current domestic stability.

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Appendices

Research Project Title: Understanding the National Security Architecture and Intelligence Machinery of Ghana Since 1948

1. Invitation

You have been selected to take part in the above research project. What this research constitutes and why it is being done is explained below. I will therefore encourage you to please take some time to carefully read the information below. Subsequently, please feel free to clarify anything concerning what has been written with me, if need be. Thank you for taking time to read this.

2. What is the project's purpose?

The purpose of this research work is to explore how Ghana, a developing country in West Africa, is organising its intelligence and security services to face challenges in the post 9/11 security environment. Furthermore, it aims to understand how the country's national security apparatus in the past has contributed in shaping its present-day security architecture. For that reason, it is the task of this author to chronologically investigate how Ghana's intelligence and security agencies have developed and evolved since 1948 to its present national security architecture. The reason for starting from 1948 is because that year was known as 'watershed' point, in the development of the country's national security architecture and its intelligence machinery.

3. Why have I been asked to participate?

You have been asked to participate because of your professional experience and/or your academic track record in the specific subject-matter under discussion. This author believes that your knowledge on this specific subject; that is both historic and/or current, is paramount to help fill knowledge – gaps that are currently unknown.

4. Do I have to take part?

Accepting to take part or not is entirely your discretion however if you accept to take part, you will help contribute to breaking new grounds. On the other hand, you can also withdraw at any time and you do not have to justify why.

5. What will happen to me if I take part?

An initial email with some dates, times and locations options will be sent to you for you to select which of them will best suit your availability. A subsequent invitation for a face-to-face interview will be sent to you. Face-to-face interviews will take an estimate of 30 minutes to complete.

6. Do I need to do anything?

Please indicate as to whether you would want to participate or not by inserting **X** next to either 'Yes' or 'No' below.

Yes	
No	

7. Will I be at a disadvantage or at risk for taking part?

This author does not envisage you being at any disadvantage for participating in this research work. However, this author is also not naive of possible political sensitivities that may surround the subject-matter in question. Such sensitivities may arise due to some historical events, which could lead to some degree of distress. Therefore, should such situation arise, which is highly unlikely, you are free to discontinue without any explanation.

8. How will participating benefit me?

Historically, the lion's share of research on intelligence institutions and their role in government has been focused on the western developed world and the former Soviet Union; and even that primarily oriented to the English-speaking democracies. Successfully completing this research work will add a different dimension of knowledge (outside the Anglosphere, Europe and Federal Russia) to the work of the global intelligence community. Hence, this will mean that all participants are automatically significant contributors to adding knowledge that will help break new grounds in the world of intelligence; in both scholastically and practically.

9. What will happen if something goes wrong?

If at any point in time you are not satisfied with how you and/or your information have been handled, and would like to make a complain, you can contact, Chair of the College of Business, Arts and Social Sciences Research Ethics Committee, email cbass-ethics@brunel.ac.uk.

10. Will my taking part in this project be kept confidential?

Yes, your taking part in this project will be kept confidential. All information which is collected about you during the course of the research will be kept strictly confidential. Any information about you which leaves the university will have your name and address removed so that you cannot be identified from it.

11. Who has reviewed the study?

The College of Business, Arts and Social Sciences Research Ethics Committee.

12. What will happen to the results of the research project?

Information provided by you will be used to write up the dissertation for my doctoral degree and that they will be stored securely on a Brunel server, password protected, and destroyed when no longer required.

13. Who is organising and funding the research?

The project is part of a PhD thesis being undertaking at the Brunel Centre for Intelligence and Security Studies (BCISS) of Brunel University. It is being privately funded by the Corporate Security Section of TJX Europe, who is the author's employers.

14. What are the Indemnity Arrangements?

Brunel University London provides appropriate insurance cover for research which has received ethical approval.

15. "Brunel University is committed to compliance with the Universities UK Research Integrity Concordat. You are entitled to expect the highest level of integrity from our researchers during the course of their research."

16. All collected data will be destroyed at the end of the project.

17. Contacts for further information

➢ Joe Eshun (Researcher / PhD Candidate) – joe.eshun@brunel.ac.uk; ispgjse1@brunel.ac.uk;

➢ Professor Phil Davies (Primary Supervisor / Director of BCISS) – philip.davies@brunel.ac.uk; Tel: +44 (0)1895 266827; Office - Marie Jahoda 226

➢ Dr. Neveen Abdalla (Secondary Supervisor) – neveenshaaban.abdalla@brunel.ac.uk; Tel: +44 (0)1895 266148; Office - Marie Jahoda 234

➢ Professor Thomas Betteridge - Dean of College (Business, Arts and Social Sciences), Brunel University, Uxbridge, West London, United Kingdom

My name is Joe Eshun, and I am a PhD Candidate at the Centre for Intelligence and Security Studies of Brunel University in the United Kingdom. My research work is looking into how the intelligence and national security architecture of Ghana has evolved into becoming arguably one of the best institutions in Sub – Saharan Africa, if not the world.

The scope of this work is grouped under two broad categories, which are pre-independence and post-independence eras. Specific years defining the research scope are from 1948 through to 2019. This research work will look into how successive regimes / governments during the following periods 1948 – 1957; 1957 – 1966; 1966 – 1972; 1972 – 1979; 1979 – 1981; 1981 – 1993; 1993 - 2001; 2001 – 2009; 2009 – 2012; 2012 – 2012 – 2017 and 2017 to date, organised their respective intelligence machinery and national security apparatus.

This author acknowledges potential sensitivities surrounding the subject-matter; therefore anonymity of participants will be respected and adhered to if required. With the above in mind, this questionnaire is designed to help gain an insight into this subject-matter by covering the bullet points below in the lines of questioning:

➢ Total Number of Institutions / agencies
➢ Schedule
➢ Structure
➢ Coordination
➢ Management
➢ Roles
➢ Apparatus
➢ Jurisdiction

Questions

Q.1 - How many institutions constituted the national security architecture under each administration / regime in question?

Q.2 – What are the names of those institutions / agencies?

Q.3 – Was every successive administration / regime's national security architecture different from the previous government?

Q.4 – Were there any changes to the national security setup after a change in government?

Q.5 – If so, how did that differ and why were those changes necessary for successive administrations?

Q.6 – In the grand scheme of things, how was the national security architecture structured?

Q.7 – What was the individual roles/responsibilities of all the institutions / agencies that constituted the national security setup?

Q.8 – What was the jurisdiction of each institution / agency that constituted the national security setup?

Q.9 – Were there any coordination and if so, did the roles/responsibilities of individual agencies and/or their respective jurisdictions encouraged or discouraged coordination?

Q.10 – How did each institution / agency's hierarchical structure looked like, including management.

Q.11 – Did the national security setup of each administration / regime lead to the demise of their respective governments?

Q.12 – How did that happen (description of brief historical context)?

Brunel University London

College of Business, Arts and Social Sciences Research Ethics Committee
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22 July 2019

<u>LETTER OF APPROVAL</u>

Applicant: Mr Joe Eshun

Project Title: Ghana: Understanding the National Security Architecture Since 1948?

Reference: 12319-LR-Jul/2019- 19888-2

Dear Mr Joe Eshun

The Research Ethics Committee has considered the above application recently submitted by you.

The Chair, acting under delegated authority has agreed that there is no objection on ethical grounds to the proposed study. Approval is given on the understanding that the conditions of approval set out below are followed:

- The agreed protocol must be followed. Any changes to the protocol will require prior approval from the Committee by way of an application for an amendment.

Please note that:

- Research Participant Information Sheets and (where relevant) flyers, posters, and consent forms should include a clear statement that research ethics approval has been obtained from the relevant Research Ethics Committee.
- The Research Participant Information Sheets should include a clear statement that queries should be directed, in the first instance, to the Supervisor (where relevant), or the researcher. Complaints, on the other hand, should be directed, in the first instance, to the Chair of the relevant Research Ethics Committee.
- Approval to proceed with the study is granted subject to receipt by the Committee of satisfactory responses to any conditions that may appear above, in addition to any subsequent changes to the protocol.
- The Research Ethics Committee reserves the right to sample and review documentation, including raw data, relevant to the study.
- You may not undertake any research activity if you are not a registered student of Brunel University or if you cease to become registered, including abeyance or temporary withdrawal. As a deregistered student you would not be insured to undertake research activity. Research activity includes the recruitment of participants, undertaking consent procedures and collection of data. Breach of this requirement constitutes research misconduct and is a disciplinary offence.

Professor David Gallear

Chair of the College of Business, Arts and Social Sciences Research Ethics Committee

Brunel University London

394

Appendix 4: Functions, Membership, Coordination of Agencies

Ghana Armed Forces (GAF)

Functions	Army – (i) To defend Ghana against external aggression[i]; (ii) To ensure the development of Ghana; (iii) Contribute to the fight for global peace[ii] Navy - (i) Enhance Ghana Navy's lead agency status in maritime security; (ii) Surveillance of coverage of the exclusive economic zone of Ghana; (iii) maintenance of ships at high operational readiness state; (iv) Establish and maintain highly skilled specialised force for various maritime security operations;[iii] (v) Protect the maritime boundaries of Ghana and "to defend the country and deter any aggression from sea, and protect Ghana's lines of communication and the resources of the sea".[iv] Air Force - (i) Provides "Air Transport and Offensive Air Support to the Ghana Armed Forces and to protect the territorial air space of Ghana"; (ii) Maintains Fighter Ground Attack capability and provide Close Air Support during operation; (iii) Provides surveillance over the air space of Ghana and over the Exclusive Economic Zone; (iv) Responsible for the coordination and direction of Search and Rescue within the Accra Flight Information Region[v]
Schedule	Army – "To provide national defence and support the promotion of peace and stability in the country."[vi] Navy – "To develop and deploy maritime forces with the capability to ensure a safe, secure and clean maritime domain of Ghana in collaboration with other stakeholders in order to ensure a sustainable use of the maritime domain."[vii] Air Force – "To provide air transport and offensive air support to the Ghanaian Armed Forces and to protect the territorial air space of Ghana."[viii]
Structure	➢ Armed Forces Council ➢ Vice President of the Republic of Ghana ➢ Minister of Defence ➢ Minister of Interior ➢ Minister of Foreign Affairs ➢ Chief of Defence Staff[ix]
Management	➢ Chief of Army Staff ➢ Chief of Naval Staff ➢ Chief of Air Staff ➢ Forces Sergeant Major[x]
Jurisdiction	➢ Army – Army Headquarters in Accra with barracks across the country ➢ Navy - Naval Headquarters in Accra with bases across the country ➢ Air Force – The main base is in Accra with other squadrons at Takoradi and Tamale.[xi]
Coordination	Through the work of Defence Intelligence, the Military work closely with the broader national security architecture to protect the interest of Ghana.

[i] Global Security Organisation. *Ghana - Military Personnel*, (2020), [online resource] available from, https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/africa/gh-personnel.htm. Accessed on 15/01/2020

[ii] Ghana Armed Forces. *Professionalism and Loyalty*, Army, GAF, (2019), [online resource] available from, https://gafonline.mil.gh/. Accessed on 15/09/2019

[iii] Ghana Navy. *Strategic Objectives*, (2019), [online resource] available from, http://navy.gafonline.mil.gh/. Accessed on 15/09/2019

[iv] GSS Training. *Ghana, Gender-related Human Resources Policies in Armed Forces*, Overview of the Ghana Armed Forces, (2019).

[v] Global Security Organisation. *Ghana Air Force*, Global Security, (2020).

[vi] ISSAT. *Ghana: Gender-related Human Resources Policies in Armed Forces*, Overview of the Ghana Armed Forces, (2019), [online resource] available from, https://issat.dcaf.ch/download/115436/2107287/Ghana-Human-Resource-Defence.pdf. Accessed on 15/01/2020

[vii] Ghana Navy, (2019).

[viii] Wiki Visually. *Ghana Air Force*, Mission, Wiki Visually, (2019), [online resource] available from, https://wikivisually.com/wiki/Ghana_Air_Force. Accessed on 15/01/2020

[ix] Ghana Armed Forces. *Military High Command*, Official Website for Ghana Armed Forces, (2019), [online resource] available from, http://www.gaf.mil.gh. Accessed on 15/09/2019

[x] Ibid.

[xi] Global Security. *Military: Ghana Air Force – History*, (2019), [online resource] available from, https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/africa/gh-af-history.htm. Accessed on 15/01/2020

[320] Image created by the author

Ghana Police Service (GPS)

Functions	➤ To identify and arrest the perpetrator(s) of the crime ➤ To prevent the perpetrator or accomplice from absconding ➤ To detect and secure the clues to the crime and articles which might serve as evidence ➤ To gather all information that might be of use for the effective conduct of investigations and prosecution.[i] ➤ Takes other necessary steps and actions to assist investigations
Schedule	The Ghana Police Service is scheduled to undertake its duties effectively with activities of the following departments: ➤ Criminal Investigations Department (CID) ➤ Motor - Traffic and Transport Directorate (MTTD) ➤ Domestic Violence and Victim Support Unit (DOVVSU) ➤ Police College ➤ Police Regional Training School ➤ Works & Housing Department ➤ Public Relations Department ➤ Medical – Hospital ➤ Marine Ports & Railways ➤ Community Policing[ii]
Structure	There is the Inspector General of Police (IGP) who is at the helm of affairs and a Deputy Inspector-General of Police. The Deputy IGP is assisted by the Director-General of the Police Administration. There are also the Regional Commanders of Police who are based in the Regional capitals across the country. They are in-charge of all operational and administrative functions under their respective jurisdictions. All police operational matters within each respective regions are handled by Regional Operational Commanders.
Management	➤ IGP ➤ Deputy IGP ➤ Director General of Police Administration ➤ Regional Commanders ➤ Regional Operational Commanders
Jurisdiction	There are 12 Regional Divisions located in: ➤ The 10 Regions of Ghana ➤ Tema Seaport & Industrial Region ➤ Railways & Ports Region
Coordination	➤ Coordinates with the Office of Public Prosecution, Economic and Organized Crime Office, Ghana Prisons Service. ➤ Refers cases involving family tribunal to the Legal Aid Scheme where the parties agree to an out of court settlement ➤ Liaises with Department of Social Welfare on child custody cases[iii]

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[i] Ghana Police Service. 'Police Handbook', General Aspects on Police Role in Preliminary Investigations, The Police Duty - Necessary Steps to take when Crimes are Committed, *Institute for International and Comparative Law in Africa*, (2019).

[ii] Buzz Ghana. *Ghana Police Service: Structure, When and How to Contact Them*, Structure of the Ghana Police Service, Buzz Ghana, (2018), [online resource] available from, https://buzzghana.com/ghana-police-service-structure-contact/. Accessed on 15/01/2020

[iii] Office of the Attorney General and Ministry of Justice. *Ghana Police Service, Legal & Prosecutions Directorates*, Standard Operating Procedures, Collaboration, MOJAGD, (2019).

Prisons Service

Functions	➢ Contributes to the maintenance of internal security. ➢ Maintains an efficient, humane, and safe reformatory penal system operated within the laws of Ghana. ➢ Reintegrates ex-convicts into society.[i] ➢ Provides Reformation and Rehabilitation programmes for successful reintegration. ➢ Tasked with the safe custody of convicted persons from the courts
Schedule	➢ Stands for humanity, vigilance, fortitude, and integrity.[ii]
Structure	➢ The Prisons Service is governed by the Prisons Service Council, "an advisory and supervisory body. Its Functions includes advising the President on "matters of policy in relation to the organisation and maintenance of the prisons system in Ghana." It is also responsible for ensuring the efficient responsible for ensuring administration of the Prisons Service and the promotion of superior officers up to the rank of Assistant Director of Prisons (ADP)."[iii] ➢ Administratively, the Service is commanded by the Director-General (DG). The DG is appointed by the President in consultation of the Service Council. The DG is assisted by two deputies and five Directors responsible for the operations and administration. Down the hierarchy are the Regional Commanders who oversees all the prisons establishments in that particular region. There are also the Officers-In-Charge (OICs) who are the administrative heads of all the establishments. The Headquarters and the Prisons Officers Training School are headed by the Commanding Officer and Commandant respectively. Under the OIC's are the Unit, Departments and Schedule heads who supervises specialised and smaller groups.[iv] ➢ **Superior Officer Ranking** = Director-General of Prisons; Deputy Director-General of Prisons; Director of Prisons; Deputy Director of Prisons; Assistant Director of Prisons; Chief Superintendent of Prisons; Superintendent of Prisons; Deputy Supt. of Prisons; Assistant Supt. of Prisons; and Officer Cadet.[v] ➢ **Other Rankings** = Senior Chief Office; Chief Office; Assistant Chief Office; Sergeant; Corporal; Lance Corporal; and 2nd Class Officer[vi]
Management	➢ Director- General of Prisons and two Deputies, eight Directors of Prisons and other principal office holders.[vii]
Apparatus	➢ Serves as an adjunct of the Criminal Justice System of Ghana.[viii]
Jurisdiction	➢ Comprises 45 prison establishment located in all the ten regions of Ghana.[ix] ➢ These are Greater Accra Region, Central Region, Eastern Region, Western Region, Ashanti Region, Northern Region, Upper East Region, Upper West Region, Volta Region and Brong Ahafo Region.[x] ➢ At the apex is the Prisons Headquarters based at the Greater Accra Region.[xi]
Coordination	➢ Work in close partnership with others in the Criminal Justice System to achieve a common objective ➢ Offering opportunities to prisoners to develop their skills through vocational training, moral and formal education. ➢ Encouraging public/private participation in the provision of skills training.

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[i] Ghana Prisons. *Vigilance, Humanity and Fortitude, Ghana Prisons Service*, (2019), [online resource] available from, http://www.ghanaprisons.gov.gh/aboutus.html. Accessed on 15/01/2020
[ii] Ibid.
[iii] Ibid, Command Structure
[iv] Ibid.
[v] Ibid, Superior Officer Ranking
[vi] Ibid, Other Ranking
[vii] Ghana Prisons. *Vigilance, Humanity and Fortitude, Ghana Prisons Service*, (2019), [online resource] available from, http://www.ghanaprisons.gov.gh/aboutus.html. Accessed on 15/01/2020
[viii] Ibid.
[ix] Ibid.
[x] Jasmine Alabi. 'Ten Regions in Ghana and Their Capitals', Be Familiar with Your Nation Read more, *YEN*, (2019).
[xi] Ghana Prisons. *Vigilance, Humanity and Fortitude, Ghana Prisons Service*, (2019), [online resource] available from, http://www.ghanaprisons.gov.gh/aboutus.html. Accessed on 15/01/2020 ³²¹

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[321] Image created by the author

Customs Excise and Preventive Service (CEPS)

Functions	➢ Collect and account for all duties, taxes, revenue, and penalties payable under this Law.[1] ➢ Collect export and import duty tax on behalf of the government ➢ Impose and supervise imports and exports restrictions and prohibitions put in place ➢ Protects Ghana's boundaries by preventing external aggressions imposed by militias Acts as the country's watchdog when it comes to border revenue collections by preventing entry of smuggled goods into the country[2] ➢ Monitors, regulate and inspect exports into Ghana. ➢ Compliance office that undertakes risk assessments to identify medium to high risk consignments at port of entry.[3]
Structure	Commissioner; Deputy Commissioner; Assistant Commissioner; Senior Collector; Principal Collector; Senior Collector; Collector; Assistant Collector; Collection Assistant 1st Class; Collection Assistant 3rd Class; Collection Assistant 2nd Class; Junior collection assistant 1st Class; Junior collection assistant 2nd Class; and Junior collection assistant 3rd Class[4] [5]
Management	Excise and Preventive Service Board (the Board), which is the governing body. It consists of the Chairman and six other persons appointed by the Council; the Controller and Accountant-General; and the Commissioner of the Customs Excise and Preventive Service.[6] ➢ Ensures the effective and optimum collection of all duties, taxes, and penalties due to the State under relevant laws that are for the time being in force; ➢ Generally, control the management of the Service on matters of policy; ➢ Appoint, promote and discipline (including dismissal of) employees of the Service; ➢ Draw up a scheme of service prescribing the terms and conditions of service as well as the remuneration of the employees of the Service; ➢ Delimit customs surveillance zones, approve routes for customs purposes and build and manage Government warehouses for the purposes of this Law; ➢ Make recommendations to the Secretary on policy governing customs and excise duties, sales taxes as well as other imposts and exemptions as may be required from time to time ➢ Ensure that all amounts collected by the Service are paid into the Consolidated Fund unless otherwise provided by law.[7]
Jurisdiction	➢ There are over 50 frontier stations spread along the borders of Ghana with the Republic of Togo, Burkina Faso, and the Ivory Coast. ➢ Amongst them include (i) AFLAO, Ghana's south-eastern border with Togo and (ii) ELUBO on the south-western border with the Ivory Coast. These two are described as the 'two major land frontiers' in the country.[8]
Coordination	➢ CEPS obtains and processes international trade data from customs declarations submitted by declarants at the country's points of entry and exit. Periodically, such data are made available to the Ghana Statistical Service for the purpose of incorporation into the national trade database. The Bank of Ghana also requests from time to time data on international trade by specific formats for the preparation of its balance of payments reports.[9] ➢ CEPS officials, alongside Police Service, Immigration Service, BNI and the National Security personnel undertake boarder security duties by manning the sea and land frontiers of Ghana.[10] ➢ Undertakes boarder security intelligence collection on threats to the country such as armed robbery, arms trafficking, vehicle theft, human trafficking, drug trafficking and money laundering. ➢ However, there is lack of inter-agency collaboration. Hence, resulting in CEPS Intelligence Officers undertaken limited intelligence sharing with counterparts working alongside them, which include, Intelligence Officers from the Police Service, Immigration Service, BNI and the National Security.[11]

[1] WIPO. *Republic of Ghana, Customs, Excise and Preventive Service (Management) Law, 1993 (P.N.D.C.L. 330)*, Object and function of the Service, World Intellectual Property Organisation, (1993) [online resource] available from, https://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/gh/gh007en.pdf. Accessed on 15/01/2020

[2] Shemcy Shem. *Ghana CEPS Ranks and Their Symbols*, The Roles of CEPS, YEN, (2019).

[3] United Nations. *Workshop on the Compilation of International Merchandise Trade Statistics (Addis Ababa, 8-11 November 2004)*, Declaration validated and selected by Risk Assessment Module, United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, (2004), [online resource] available from, https://unstats.un.org/unsd/trade/WS%20AddisAbaba04/Country%20presentations%20on%20paper/CountryPresentationCustomsGhana.pdf. Accessed on 15/01/2020

[4] Shemcy Shem. *Ghana CEPS Ranks and Their Symbols*, The Roles of CEPS, YEN, (2019).

[5] Francis Azure Junior. Organogram, [MBA Thesis], Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology, (2009).

[6] WIPO. *Republic of Ghana, Customs, Excise and Preventive Service (Management) Law, 1993 (P.N.D.C.L. 330)*, Object and function of the Service, World Intellectual Property Organisation, (1993).

[7] Ibid.

[8] United Nations. *Workshop on the Compilation of International Merchandise Trade Statistics (Addis Ababa, 8-11 November 2004)*, United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, (2004).

[9] Ibid.

[10] Francis Azure Junior. Organogram, [MBA Thesis], Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology, (2009).

[11] Ibid.

322

[322] Image created by the author

Ghana Immigration Service

Functions	➢ The first line of defence and the first and foremost agency at the country's borders ➢ Guards against infiltration to Ghana of unscrupulous foreigners who aim at destabilising the country[i] ➢ Operates fair but firm immigration controls that regulate and facilitate the movement of people through Ghana's borders ➢ Ensures that people who do not qualify for entry under the various Immigration Laws and Regulations do not enter Ghana ➢ Ensures that people who have no entitlement to remain in Ghana are removed expeditiously[ii] ➢ Takes firm action is taken against people who facilitate or harbour illegal migrants ➢ Conduct court prosecution of foreign nationals in Ghana without permits ➢ Investigates breaches of the Immigration laws and regulation ➢ Vetting of passport applications in the regions and the districts ➢ Examination of travellers entering or leaving Ghana[iii]
Schedule	The Immigration Service of Ghana is scheduled to undertake its duties effectively with activities of the following departments: ➢ Regionals and Sectors ➢ Public Affairs (P.A) ➢ Management Information System (M.I.S) ➢ Migration Management Bureau (M.M.B) ➢ Intelligence Unit ➢ Mid Far East Section ➢ American Section ➢ Issuing Room Section ➢ Audit Unit ➢ Procurement and Stores Unit ➢ Work Permit Section ➢ Receiving Counter ➢ Training section ➢ Border Patrol Unit ➢ Resident Permit Section ➢ Sports Section
Structure	➢ Helm of Affairs is the Immigration Service Council ➢ Underneath the Council is the Comptroller – General ➢ Next are Internal Audit and Chief Staff Officer who are parallel ➢ Under Chief Staff Officer are Comptroller - General's Secretariat & Confidential Registry ➢ Under Internal Audit is the Immigration Professional Standards & Ethics ➢ Beneath the Immigration Professional Standards & Ethics are the Complaints and Investigations / Ethics[iv]
Management	Overseen by three Deputy Directors of Immigration who report directly to the Comptroller – General. They are; ➢ Deputy Comptroller – General (Command Post & Operations) ➢ Deputy Comptroller – General (Finance & Administration) ➢ Deputy Comptroller – General (Legal Research & Monitoring)
Jurisdiction	Operational areas include, Hamile; Tumu; Bauwku-Missiga; Kulungugu; Mognori; Namoo; Paga; Pulimakombole – Chache; Tatale; Yawgu; Atuna; Dormaa – Ahenkro; Nkrankwanta; Kofibadukrom; Kwameseikrom; Sampa; Kotoka International Airport; Tema Harbour; Menusu; Nyive; Wli Afegame; Ellanda Wharf; Dadiesu; Elubu; Half Assini; Newtown; Jewi Wharf; Oseikojokrom; Sewum; Takoradi Harbour; Yaakese; Aflao; Akanu; Baglo; Batume; Have-Ave; Honuta; Kpoglo; Leklebi – Dafor; Leklebi – Kame; TinJase; and Shia[v]
Coordination	➢ Cooperate fully with other agencies that have a legitimate interest in the movement of people in and out of Ghana, and of their presence in the country[vi] ➢ Liaises with other agencies with responsibilities for security, the combating of crime and other issues relating to the public good ➢ Performs its duties collaborates with Customs Excise and Preventives Service, Police, Narcotic Control Board, Bureau for National Investigations and other security agencies at the borders and within to check drug trafficking, human trafficking, smuggling, subversive activities and others that threaten the economy of Ghana and create a bad image for Ghana in international circles[vii]

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[i] Ghana Immigration Service. *The Border Patrol Unit*, Introduction (2019), [online resource] available from, http://home.gis.gov.gh/border-patrol-unit/. Accessed on 15/01/2020
[ii] Ibid. Corporate Information, Aims and Objectives
[iii] Ibid. Corporate Information, Functions and Services to the People
[iv] Ibid. Organisational Structure
[v] Ghana Immigration. *Corporate Information*, Map of Ghana showing operational areas of Ghana Immigration Service, (2019), [online resource] available from, http://home.gis.gov.gh/corporate-information/. Accessed on 15/01/2020
[vi] Ibid, Aims and Objectives
[vii] Ibid, Border Patrol Unit, (2019).

323 Image created by the author

National Intelligence Bureau (NIB) / Bureau of National Investigations (BNI)

Functions	➤ Domestic Intelligence Agency of Ghana that operates from within its territorial borders by providing predictive intelligence for national security protection ➤ Responsible for the collection, collation, processing, analysis, and dissemination of intelligence to support decision making within the broader national security set-up. ➤ Duty to provide timely intelligence to the broader national security apparatus for the protection of the country from within its territorial borders. ➤ Ensures that threats to the country's security and territorial integrity are put in check and where necessary are thwarted with the support the broader national security architecture. ➤ "Generally responsible for monitoring and securing interior security in Ghana, including counter-terrorism, CFT and counter proliferation. They also investigate and prosecute crimes relating to terrorism, WMD, threats against national security and government, and espionage."[i]
Schedule	As part of its schedule, it has enforcement powers to help undertake responsibilities such as helping to protect the country within its territorial borders from the following perceived threats: ➤ Cyberwarfare ➤ Espionage ➤ Counterintelligence ➤ Internal security challenges ➤ Foreign intelligence and security agencies operating illegally within the country's territorial borders that are deemed as concern to national security[ii]
Structure	At the top of the echelon is the Director, who is appointed by the President of the Republic of Ghana, in consultation with the Council.
Management	➤ Director ➤ Deputy Director ➤ Departmental Heads ➤ Senior Management ➤ Management
Jurisdiction	Headquartered in the capital Accra but has a remit to operate across the country through the REGSEC, MUSEC, DISEC and local levels systems.
Coordination	➤ As part of the broader national security setup, the BNI liaises and supports the military (army, navy, and air force), immigration and CEPS with intelligence support in order to protect the country's borders from external threats that might end up within. Subsequently, it provides intelligence to sister agencies to help prevent identified threat within from escaping outside Ghana's territorial borders. ➤ It liaises and supports the Financial Intelligence Centre (FIC) and Economic and Organised Crime Office (EOCO) information and sometimes intelligence to help safeguard the economic well-being of Ghana.[iii] ➤ Offers support by cooperating and assisting the Criminal Investigations Department (CID) of the Ghana Police Service to investigate criminal issues of major national security concerns.

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[i] GIABA. 'Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorist Financing Measures: Ghana', Key Functions, *FATF-GIBA*, (2017), p. 8, [online resource] available from, https://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/mer-fsrb/GIABA-Ghana-MER-2018.pdf. Accessed on 15/01/2020

[ii] 'Bureau for National Investigations', Purpose, *IPFS.IO*

[iii] GIABA. 'Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorist Financing Measures: Ghana', *FATF-GIBA*, (2017), pp 54-55, [online resource] available from, https://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/mer-fsrb/GIABA-Ghana-MER-2018.pdf. Accessed on 15/01/2020

324

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Research Department (RD)

Functions	➤ Undertakes external intelligence work on political, economic, social, technological, environmental, legal, and organisational with potential implications on national security. ➤ Provides intelligence to support government policy ➤ This is done through first of all tasking by the NSC and then proceeds by collecting, collating, processing, and analysing information to develop premises, of which through that create intelligence to be disseminated to the NSC. ➤ Through the NSC it plays an advisory role by informing, alerting, cautioning and/or warning government on emerging threats posed by hostile foreign entities, international organisations, terrorism, espionage, and sabotage activities. ➤ Supports the Ghana's diplomatic mission to maintain good relations with countries and partners abroad.
Schedule	As a civilian agency, its schedule requires that it falls under the architecture of Ministry of Foreign Affairs. However, operates under the direct administrational command and control of the Ministry of National Security.[i]
Structure	➤ National Security Council Headed by the President of the Republic of Ghana. ➤ Operates as an independent department within the Foreign Ministry. ➤ Direct administrational command and control from the Ministry of National Security. ➤ Task by the National Security Council based in the capital Accra.[ii]
Management	This is done through specified diplomatic mission departmental structures.
Jurisdiction	Mainly operates outside the territorial boundaries of Ghana through diplomatic missions. However, with bare minimum participation of internal intelligence work through its contribution the broader national security architecture and also through its liaison work with the BNI, DI, Immigration Service, and other nationally based stakeholders.[iii]
Coordination	It works in collaboration with the broader national security set-up to receive and provide intelligence to help protect Ghana and its interest abroad. This is attained through playing its role as an important member of the National Security Council.[iv]

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[i] Joshua Addo, Raphael Apoeta, Bernard Tawiah, Eselali Dogue & Kelvin Brooks. *The Constitution of the Republic of Ghana, In the Name of the Almighty God*, National Security Council, Academia, (2020)
[ii] Ibid.
[iii] Joe Eshun. 'Understanding the National Security Architecture of Ghana', Interview with a Ghanaian Official, 07 February, (2012)
[iv] Ibid.

325

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[325] Image created by the author

Defence Intelligence (DI)

Functions	- Undertakes human intelligence (HUMINT) work. - Provides strategic intelligence capability to support policy at the national level. - Provides intelligence to support military operations. - Collects, analyses, and evaluates information to produce intelligence assessments that feeds into the national intelligence estimates via NSC.[i] - Provides intelligence on intentions, plans, military strength, and capability of other armed forces - Preserves and protects military secrets from unauthorised disclosures. - Provides intelligence on "armed militant activities, insurgency or illegal military activities of other armies, movements of troops, weapons etc to enable the Ghana Army (infantry and other land forces) to tackle the threat with military force."[ii]
Schedule	It is mandated to provide intelligence to protect the territorial boundaries of Ghana from land, sea and air. - Directorate of Army Intelligence and Plans is scheduled to oversee the provision of intelligence to protect the country's land borders from (i) insurgency activities, (ii) hostile movement and reconnaissance of foreign entities at countries borders, (iii) movement of illegal weapons and armed militant activities at borders.[iii] - Directorate of Navy Intelligence is scheduled to oversee the provision of intelligence to protects Ghana's maritime boundaries. It covers illegal activities on Ghana's seas, such as (i) piracy, (ii) shipment of illegal drugs and weapons, (iii) protects country's oil installations.[iv] - Directorate of Air Intelligence is scheduled to oversee the provision of intelligence to protects Ghana's airspace. It covers activities like illegal military aircrafts activities, illegal reconnaissance, and hostile air surveillance activities.[v]
Structure	It is designed to function under three separate directorates structures, and these are; - Directorate of Army Intelligence and Plans - Directorate of Naval Intelligence - Directorate of Air Intelligence
Management	Consists of (i) Chief of the Defence Staff; (ii) Chief of the Army Staff; (iii) Chief of the Naval Staff; (iv) Chief of the Air Staff; (v) Chief of Staff; and (vi) Forces Sergeant Major[vi]
Jurisdiction	Although headquartered in the capital Accra, it operates through the Ghana Armed Forces bases / barracks across the country.
Coordination	- Collects, analyses, and evaluates information to produce intelligence assessments that feeds into the national intelligence estimates via NSC. - Collaborates and Trains with foreign agencies. An example is training with the German Armed Forces Technical Assistance Group (GAFTAG) at the defence Intelligence Training Centre and Office Complex to help enhance the Military Intelligence Unit of Ghana.[vii]

[i] Patrick Peprah Obuobi. 'Defence Intelligence, Evaluating Ghana's Intelligence Oversight Regime', *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence*, 31:2, (2018), pp 312 - 341

[ii] Jatuat, Moses.Y. *Role of Intelligence, Institutions and Legal Framework in Ghana*, National Security, Academia, (2020), [online resource] available from, https://www.academia.edu/40038957/NATIONAL_SECURITY_Role_of_Intelligence_Institutions_and_Legal_Framework_in_Ghana. Accessed on 01 May 2020.

[iii] Interview with a Ghanaian Government Official, (2012).

[iv] Ibid.

[v] Ibid.

[vi] Ghana Armed Forces Official. *Military High Command*, GAF, (2019), [online resource] available from, https://gafonline.mil.gh/. Accessed on 15/01/2020

[vii] Juliet Akyaa Safo. *Defence Intelligence Training Centre inaugurated in Accra*, Graphic Online, (2017).

326

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[326] Image created by the author

Criminal Investigations Department (CID)

Functions	Ensures a proactive and professional approach to the prevention and detection of crime, protection of life and property and the apprehension and prosecution of offenders.[i]
Schedule	Scheduled to take up the lead role for the country's criminal intelligence work in support of national security duties. Its personnel are required to operate in plain clothes under the following CID Units: ➢ Interpol ➢ Criminal Data Services Bureau – [CDSB] ➢ Homicide Unit ➢ Anti-Armed Robbery Squad – [AARS] ➢ Commercial Crime Unit – [CCU] ➢ Drug Law Enforcement Unit – [Narcotics] ➢ Anti-Human Trafficking Unit – [AHTU] ➢ Forensic Science Laboratory – [FSL] ➢ Central Firearms Registry – [CFR] ➢ Financial Forensic Unit – [FFU][ii]
Management	The CID comes under the unified command of the Inspector-General of Police (IGP). The IGP, subject to the direction of the Minister of Interior, is responsible for exercising general day-to-day supervision over the operation and administration of the service including the CID. The department is headed by Deputy Commissioner of Police (DCOP) who is the Director of CID. The Director is deputised by an Assistant Commissioner of Police (ACP) who is the deputy Director – General.[iii]
Jurisdiction	CID has subordinate regional offices across the country located in all regional capitals.[iv]
Coordination	The CID works closely with and support the broader national security architecture on criminal cases that have national security implications

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[i] Ghana Police Service. *Criminal Investigation Department – CID, Mission Statement*, (2019), [online resource] available from, http://police.gov.gh/criminal-investigation-department---cid.html. Accessed on 15/01/2020
[ii] Ibid.
[iii] Ibid.
[iv] Ibid.

327

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[327] Image created by the author

Financial Intelligence Centre (FIC)

Functions	➢ Set up to tackle "the twin-menace of money laundering and terrorist financing" to protect Ghana's economy and its financial integrity on the global stage.[i] ➢ Request, receive, Analyse, interpret, and disseminate financial intelligence in Ghana and abroad.[ii] ➢ The functions of the FIC are provided under section 6 of the Anti-Money Laundering Act, 2008, (Act 749), as amended: ➢ Request, receive, analyse, interpret, and disseminate information concerning suspected proceeds of crime and terrorist property, as provided for under the Act or any other law. ➢ Retain information in the manner and for the period required under the Act. ➢ Cooperate with the Ghana Revenue Authority to ensure compliance of the Act by Designated Non-Financial Businesses and Professions (DNFBPs). ➢ Inform, advise, and co-operate with investigating authorities, supervisory bodies, the revenue agencies, the intelligence agencies, and foreign counterparts; and ➢ Monitor and give guidance to accountable institutions, supervisory bodies, and other persons on the discharge of their duties and in compliance with the Act.[iii]
Schedule	➢ Established in accordance with section 4 of the Anti-Money Laundering Act, 2008 (Act 749) as amended – as a body corporate with perpetual succession mandated by law to request, receive, Analyse, interpret, and disseminate financial intelligence in Ghana and abroad.[iv]
Structure	➢ Board of Directors chaired by a Chairman ➢ Chief Executive Officer
Management	➢ The FIC is headed at the top of its echelon by a Chief Executive Officer.
Core Values	Confidentiality, Integrity, Responsiveness, Team-Spirit, Excellence, Professionalism, Security, Honesty and Accountability[v]
Jurisdiction	Based in the capital, Accra Ghana but has remit that covers the entire country.[vi]
Coordination	Works in collaboration with the broader national security set-up as well as the with the international community to combat financial crimes. These include Ghana Police Service; Ghana Immigration Service (GIS); Bureau for National Investigations (BNI); Economic and Organized Crime Office (EOCO), Narcotic Control Board (NACOB) and Internationally are FATF, UNODC, GIABA and EGMONT[vii] [viii]

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[i] Republic of Ghana. *Financial Intelligence Centre* (2019), [online resource] available from, https://fic.gov.gh/. Accessed on 15/01/2020

[ii] Ibid

[iii] Ibid, FAQ

[iv] Ibid, About Us

[v] FIC. *Financial Intelligence Centre: Annual Report 2016*, Core Values, Ghana Government, (2016), [online resource] available from, https://fic.gov.gh/annual/2016-Annual-Report-FIC.pdf. Accessed on 15/01/2020

[vi] Financial Intelligence Centre. *Contact Information*, (2019), [online resource] available from, https://fic.gov.gh/index.php/component/content/article/18-posts/67-inter-agency-collaboration?Itemid=101. Accessed 0n 30/09/2020

[vii] FIC: *Financial Intelligence Centre: Annual Report 2016*, Core Values, (2016).

[viii] Financial Intelligence Center. *Inter-Agency Collaboration*, (2019).

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[328] Image created by the author

Economic and Organised Crime Office (EOCO)

Functions	Monitors and investigates economic and organised crime that result in financial or economic loss to the Republic or any State entity or institution in which the State has financial interest. These include: ➢ Money laundering, ➢ Human trafficking, ➢ Prohibited cyber activity, ➢ Tax fraud, and ➢ other serious offences; ➢ recover the proceeds of crime ➢ monitor activities connected with the offences specified in paragraph (a) to detect correlative crimes; ➢ take reasonable measures necessary to prevent the commission of crimes specified in paragraph (a) and their correlative offences; ➢ disseminate information gathered in the course of investigation to law enforcement agencies, other appropriate public agencies, and other persons the Office considers appropriate in connection with the offences specified in paragraph (a); ➢ co-operate with relevant foreign or international agencies in furtherance of this Act; and ➢ perform any other functions connected with the objects of the Office.[i]
Schedule	Scheduled to lead a unified national effort in the fight against economic and organised crime by: ➢ Detecting, investigating, preventing, and prosecuting all serious economic and organised crimes in Ghana. ➢ Developing and sustaining an effective approach to combating economic and organised crime in Ghana. ➢ Developing partnerships with domestic and international agencies to combat economic and organised crime. ➢ Providing safety and security for our community and financial markets in order to ensure an investor friendly atmosphere. ➢ Rendering organised crime unattractive by taking away the proceeds of crime from organised criminals.[ii]
Structure	➢ A Chairperson; ➢ The Executive Director, ➢ One representative of the Inspector General of Police (IGP) not below the rank of Assistant Commissioner; ➢ One representative of the Narcotic Control Board not below the rank of Director. ➢ One representative of the Attorney-General's Office not below the rank of Principal State Attorney. ➢ One representative of the Ghana Revenue Authority not below the rank of Director. ➢ One lawyer in private practice with at least ten years experience nominated by the Ghana Bar Association; ➢ A chartered accountant with at least ten years experience nominated by the Institute of Chartered Accountants; and ➢ One person with intelligence background and not below the rank of Director nominated by the Minister responsible for National Security.[iii]
Core Values	Dedication, Professionalism, Justice, Integrity and Vigilance[iv]
Jurisdiction	Based in the capital, Accra Ghana but has remit that covers the entire country.[v]
Coordination	Works in collaboration with the broader national security set-up to combat financial crimes. These include Ghana Police Service; Ghana Immigration Service (GIS); Bureau for National Investigations (BNI); Financial Crime Centre (FIC) and Narcotic Control Board (NACOB).

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[i] Office of the Attorney General and Ministry of Justice. *Economic and Organised Crime Office*, Functions of the Office, MOJAGD, (2019), [online resource] available from, http://www.mojagd.gov.gh/economic-and-organised-crime-office. Accessed on 15/01/2020

[ii] Ghana Government. *Economic and Organised Crime Office*, Mission [online resource] available from, http://eoco.org.gh/. Accessed on 15/01/2020

[iii] Ibid, Governing Board.

[iv] Ibid, Our Values.

[v] Ibid, Office Location.

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[329] Image created by the author

National Security Council Secretariat (NSCS)

Functions	➢ Responsible for producing strategic threat intelligence and acts as a policy-making decision body as far as national security matters are concerned; however not without some oversight from the judiciary. ➢ Considering and taking appropriate measures to safeguard the internal and external security of Ghana; ➢ Ensuring the collection of information relating to the security of Ghana and the integration of the domestic, foreign and security policies relating to it so as to enable the security services and other departments and agencies of the Government to co-operate more effectively in matters relating to national security; ➢ Assessing and appraising the objectives, commitments, and risks of Ghana in relation to the actual and potential military power in the interest of national security; and ➢ Taking appropriate measures regarding the consideration of policies on matters of common interest to the departments and agencies of the Government concerned with national security.[1]
Schedule	➢ National Security Council Secretariat – Acts as focal point for the coordination of intelligence collection across the country ➢ National Analysis Centre (NAC) – Nerve centre for national intelligence analysis ➢ Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) - Provides national intelligence estimates. It is made up of the Directors of the intelligence and security agencies. Meets weekly under the leadership of the National Security Coordinator ➢ National Security Adviser (NSA) - Advises the President on national security matters ➢ The NSC Secretary serves as a bridge with top echelon in government. ➢ 'National Security Council Secretariat analyses all security information presented by BNI and RD and then takes appropriate action.'[2]
Structure	Consists of the President of The Republic of Ghana who is the Head, the Vice President Defence Minister, Interior Minister, Finance Minister, and Foreign Affairs Minister. Other members include the Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) and two members of the armed forces; the Inspector- General of Police (IGP) and two members of the police, one of whom is the Director of CID; the Director General of the Prison Service; Director General of the Defence Intelligence; the Director of the Research Department (RD); the Director of the Bureau for National Investigations (BNI); and the Commissioner of Customs Excise and Preventive Service (CEPS). The President appoints three additional members to the Council.
Management	➢ President of the Republic of Ghana who is the Head, ➢ Vice President ➢ Defence Minister, ➢ Interior Minister, ➢ Finance Minister, ➢ Foreign Affairs Minister ➢ The National Security Coordinator, who is responsible for the day-to-day management of the activities of the agencies. The Coordinator also heads the National Security Secretariat (NSCS), and is the professional head of the intelligence community of Ghana
Jurisdiction	➢ National Security Council (Headquarters) based in Accra, Ghana ➢ Regional Security Councils (REGSEC) based in all 10 regional capitals ➢ Municipal Security Councils (MUSEC) in every municipal capital ➢ District Security Councils (DISEC) in district capitals across the country ➢ Local Levels intelligence collection activities
Coordination	➢ The National Security Council, in collaboration with the National Security Council Secretariat (NSCS) and the National Analysis Centre (NAC) act as the focal point for the nationwide intelligence collection, collation, processing, analysis and timely dissemination of national intelligence estimates for the security of the country. ➢ The NSCS has 'eyes and ears' in every corner of the country in the form of a decentralised structure that has been adopted. These are REGSEC, MUSEC, DISEC and Local Levels. These are made up of intelligence and security personnel at subsidiary levels; and are headed by Regional Ministers, Municipal Chief Executives, District Chief Executives and Locally Appointed Leaders respectively; who are also decision makers. Therefore, ensuring that there is 'bottom – up and top – down intelligence flow for the protection of the country.

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[1] Joshua Addo, Raphael Apoeta, Bernard Tawiah, Eselali Dogue & Kelvin Brooks. *The Constitution of the Republic of Ghana, In the Name of the Almighty God*, National Security Council, Academia, (2020), [online resource] available from,
https://www.academia.edu/33539326/THE_CONSTITUTION_OF_THE_REPUBLIC_OF_GHANA_IN_THE_NAME_OF_THE_ALMIGHTY_GOD_We_the_People_of_Ghana. Accessed on 15/04/2020
[2] Republic of Ghana. *Ministry of National Security*, Budget Programme Description, MOFEP, (2017), [online resource] available from https://www.mofep.gov.gh/sites/default/files/pbb-estimates/2017/2017-PBB-MNS.pdf. Accessed on 15/01/2020

330

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[330] Image created by the author

Regional Security Council (REGSEC)

Membership Composition	Functions
➢ Regional Minister, who shall be the Chairman ➢ Deputy Regional Minister or Ministers ➢ Chief Executive of the Metropolitan, Municipal or District Assembly in the regional capital ➢ An Officer of the Armed Forces nominated by the Chief of Defence Staff ➢ Regional Police Commander ➢ Regional Crime Officer ➢ Regional Officer of the Internal Intelligence Agency ➢ Officer-In-Charge of the Regional Customs, Excise and Preventive Service (CEPS) ➢ Officer-In-Charge of the Regional Prisons Service ➢ Officer-In-Charge of the Regional of the Immigration Service ➢ Officer-In-Charge of the Regional of the Fire Service ➢ Two other persons nominated by the Regional Minister in consultation with the National Security Co-ordinator	➢ Performs such functions of the NSC in respective region as the NSC may assign ➢ Provide early warning to Government about the existence or likelihood of any emerging security threat from within the region. [331]

Municipal Security Councils (MUSEC)

Membership Composition	Functions
➢ Municipal Chief Executive who is the Chairman ➢ Municipal Police Commander ➢ Municipal the District Crime Officer ➢ Municipal District representative of the Internal Intelligence Agency ➢ Municipal Officer-In-Charge of the Customs, Excise and Preventive Service, if any ➢ Municipal Officer-In-Charge of the Immigration Service if any ➢ Municipal Officer-In-Charge of the Fire Service ➢ Two other persons nominated by the Municipal Chief Executive in consultation with the Coordinator.	➢ Performs such functions of the REGSEC in respective municipal as the REGSEC may assign. ➢ Provide early warning to REGSEC about the existence or likelihood of any emerging security threat from within the municipal. [332]

District Security Council (DISEC)

Membership Composition	Functions
➢ District Chief Executive who is the Chairman ➢ District Police Commander ➢ District Crime Officer ➢ District representative of the Internal Intelligence Agency ➢ District Officer-In-Charge of the Customs, Excise and Preventive Service, if any ➢ District Officer-In-Charge of the Immigration Service ➢ District Officer-In-Charge of the Fire Service ➢ Two other persons nominated by the District Chief Executive in consultation with the Coordinator.	➢ Performs such functions of the MUSEC in respective district as the MUSEC may assign. ➢ Provide early warning to MUSEC about the existence or likelihood of any emerging security threat from within the district. [333]

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[331] Image created by the author
[332] Image created by the author
[333] Image created by the author