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## Re-Turning to *The Show*: Repetition and the Construction of Spaces of Decision, Affect and Creative Possibility.[{note}]1

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### Introduction: On necessary re-turns

There are some works that, despite our falling in love with new work, we return to again and again. There are some works that become ghosts -- friendly ghosts -- that stay with us, because they have affected us in a certain way; because they have produced certain effects on our thinking and feeling not only about art, but about the world, how we relate to it and to others. This haunting, this remaining present, is often because something about them has been left unsaid; something has not been articulated about their importance. Or perhaps, as times and the socioeconomic landscape change, they become relevant, again, for different reasons. In our contemporary moment, the governing rationality of neoliberalism[**{note}**]2 'economizes' all areas of life (Brown: 2015), affecting our relationship to others, to ourselves, to time and space, and exacerbates inequality and injustice. This moment demands that, if we are to intervene in and radically change the current social and economic system, we perform an act of repetition: that we rethink, relook, reimagine, that we return to, re-articulate and redefine concepts, goals, desires and relations. And these haunting works become places where we might want to look in order to rearticulate our place in the world, our relationship to multiple others, our place in and the function of current systems. For me, one of these works is Jérôme Bel's *The Show Must Go On*.

Jérôme Bel, again? *The Show Must Go On*, again? Yes. Again. The work itself is a repetition; one that exposes its construction and repeats, in front of our eyes, again, how systems work and how we might function in them. The ongoing discussions by theorists, artists and reviewers of dance and performance on Bel's work in general and *The Show's* construction and relationship to dance in particular[**{note}**]3 have made him and his manner of making work an institution, despite and *because* of both: a) his uneasy relationship with the contested and ill-defined economy of

contemporary dance, where financial, institutional and ideological interests interact as the 'field' of 'contemporary' dance; and b) his critique of theatre as an institution. The continuing discussion of this particular work is also a result of its many re-performances in several different countries since its first presentation in Paris in 2001 (Bel: 2015). The work has met increasing success. In a review of *The Show* and interview with Kristin Hohenadel (2005), Bel shares incidents during and reviews of *The Show* that reveal the 'negative' responses to the work in the earlier years of its presentation. 'Spectators yelled and hissed, stormed the stage, demanded refunds...one critic slapped another...When [it] toured Israel last year a woman in the audience mooned the house, and someone jumped on stage and kicked a dancer' (Bel cited in Hohenadel 2005). Eleven years after its presentation in Israel and fourteen years after its premiere in Paris, *The Show* continues to be performed and is receiving high praise, as evidenced by recent reviews of the 2015 performance with Candoco Dance Company at Sadler's Wells in London (Mackrell 2015).

In this article, I return to *The Show* to offer a different articulation. Drawing on the thinking of cultural and political theorists, philosophers and sociologists, I examine the work's economy of relations<sup>[note]4</sup> and its consequent production of the social. In particular, I investigate the role of repetition in the sociality produced by the work through the economy of relations it creates within itself -- with the spectator and through its dramaturgy -- and with the economies in which it is embedded: the economies of theatre, contemporary dance and neoliberal capitalism. I have deliberately chosen to discuss this through its very first presentation at the Théâtre de la Ville in Paris in 2001 for three reasons. First, because this was a time when neoliberal policies enacted in France significantly affected art making (Paramana 2015: 188-9). Second, because I will be commenting on *The Show's* relation to participatory performance, which, influenced among others by Nicolas Bourriaud's *Relational Aesthetics* (2002 [1998]), began to be made during the late 1990s, early 2000s. Finally, because, as I will argue, this presentation best illustrates what this performance and the theatre as a performance space is (still) capable of, its potential for change outside of the theatre walls. I focus my attention on the sociality produced in a specific moment in the 2001 presentation, suggesting that, in that moment, a shift in the system of the work afforded the spectators' repetitive intervention in it, allowing for the work's potential to emerge. I believe that the return to this work is

important because the potential that emerges from the work's production of the social has not been fully addressed. I argue that the work's production of *sociality*, with repetition playing a crucial factor, created a space of -- in Jeremy Gilbert's terms -- 'creative possibility', 'shared joyous affect' and 'decision' (2014), that enabled practices, which need to be repeated outside the frame of the artwork: practices of thinking, relation and action that any democratic institution should be informed by, enable and repeat, if we are to construct a democratic reality that is characterised by equality and social justice. I will refer to these practices as *ethical encounters*.

I have argued elsewhere that despite its good intentions, participatory or socially engaged performance work can end up reproducing neoliberal ethics and rationalities (Paramana 2014). On the other hand, while *The Show* is not conventionally considered to be a participatory or socially engaged work, I will maintain that it achieves some of the claimed or intended, but often not delivered work of contemporary participatory performance. I suggest that *The Show* is -- and, as Shannon Jackson (2011) also argues, an artwork in general can be -- both aesthetically and socially meaningful. I propose this is the case because, despite the fact that *The Show's* spectators sit in their seats (unlike the spectators in the participatory work that has emerged and thrived since the 1990s), what the work *does* through the relationships it creates suggests a mode of sociality that is much more crucial and might better benefit us in the contemporary moment (Paramana 2015).

In my description of *The Show*, I will use the pronoun 'we' to emphasise that, in his work, Bel directs the gaze and attention of the spectator in such a way that 'we' all look at what he points to. I suggest this is the case because the relative bareness of the stage and the specificity with which signs are entered onto the stage make the work function like fireworks: once they go off, everyone turns to look at them. Most importantly, I move between the pronouns 'we' and 'I' to draw attention to the address of the spectators as individuals who are part of a collective of individuals; who relate to and can affect each other and the economies in which they live.

## **This is *The Show***

In *The Show*, we hear twenty-one popular songs. Onstage, nineteen performers and the theatre lights do as these songs say. For example, a song says 'Let the sunshine in' and a pool of light appears on and slowly covers the whole of the previously dark theatre stage. A song says 'Let's dance' and the dancers dance. From the beginning of the work to its end, we are slowly told that everything we see and hear matters; the space, its making, our understanding of it, the people that labour to make spectacle happen, us watching it, sitting down with our expectations under dimmed light, or no light at all, anonymous, expectant, demanding and hopeful. And from the beginning we start to understand that this will be a different kind of spectacle. This is exactly because the work itself tells us that it will be 'different'; it points it out. It points it out through its use of repetition that exposes the work's function as a system, making us re-see theatre conventions and the function of elements of performance: the space, the audience, the lights, sound, the representation of bodies onstage.

But the moment on which I want to focus is this:

The previous song has left us in the dark. John Lennon's 'Imagine' starts playing:

Imagine no possessions  
I wonder if you can  
No need for greed or hunger  
A brotherhood of man  
Imagine all the people  
Sharing all of the world....

To my surprise, I have an emotional reaction to the lyrics, although I have heard of them many times before. The audience sings along with the song; some hold lighters aloft as if in a concert. It seems that this started as a sarcastic gesture to the song, but has turned into something else: a collective reaction to the song's lyrics. Seeing the number of lighters, I think that many people in this audience smoke and at the same time try to hold back tears. At the end of the song we all clap.

We remain in the dark. Simon and Garfunkel's 'The Sound of Silence' starts playing:

Hello darkness, my old friend  
I've come to talk with you again  
Because a vision softly creeping  
Left its seeds while I was sleeping  
And the vision that was planted in my brain  
Still remains  
Within the sound of silence....

At 'the sound of silence', the music stops. Some in the audience start speaking and others shush them. We remain in silence for the length of the verse and until the next time the words 'the sound of silence' are sung. As soon as the phrase is heard, the sound is again muted. Not only darkness, but silence has 'come to talk with [us] again'. We are again in silence, but some of us will not have it: some spectators bark, meow, whistle, clap. We are certainly not listening to the sound of silence. In fact, we seem to not be able to stand it. Or, perhaps, some cannot accept that we, like the performers, are asked to follow, to play the rules of the game. Some therefore disrupt it, change the rules. Whenever in silence, it is our time to do what we choose with it. A few start clapping rhythmically, and a large portion of the audience joins them. The clapping is infectious and it sounds as if we are all now participating. We have taken control of the show and I wonder whether we will allow it to continue. But we do. At 'the sound of silence' all noise stops. We seem to just want to be part of the show in our own terms. The song ends and a woman yells to the rest of us something, I think in Portuguese, that I interpret as probably meaning 'is this how you understand silence?' She is the disciplinarian, the kindergarten teacher, 'the protector' of the show, the dissatisfied audience member with the rest of the collective's behaviour. Her admonishment provokes laughter from the rest of the audience, perhaps because we recognised ourselves as having behaved like schoolchildren, or

because the idea of someone judging our behaviour as if we were schoolchildren is surprising and amusing.

What is certain is that this audience wanted to be part of the show in a material way, and it succeeded. I wonder, though, whether it was the anonymity of the darkness that allowed for our sense of freedom to interrupt, disrupt, change the rules and roles. Had we been under lights, would so many people have participated in the clapping and vocalizing? Perhaps not. We already know the spectators' reaction earlier in the work, when the song 'La Vie en Rose' played and stage and auditorium were under the same purple-pink light. We were left to our own devices there as well, with no performers onstage creating the anticipation of something about to happen, that we would not want to miss. In 'La Vie en Rose' audience members looked at each other, talked to their friends, even their stranger-neighbours, but did not initiate or participate in a collective action of any kind nor draw attention to themselves as the surrogate spectacle of *The Show*. But in darkness, almost everyone participated. Its anonymity allowed -- or compelled -- us to do as the moment required without consideration for appropriateness or theatre conventions. Could this have happened with a different audience? Why not? Does it not always take one -- maybe two -- people to make it ok to behave in a certain way, to reveal through their behaviour that things *could be happening differently*? Things *can be* different. Is it not what Bel is doing: constructing systems that reveal to the audience their function through repetition, exposing how we normally see the theatre, its construction, the body onstage, its representation, technique and virtuosity, the use of scenography, the role of the audience? Perhaps this audience, in the dark, made Bel's dream come true. Not only did it understand and play the game, but made it its own. We took control and responsibility for how we can play it, our role in it and still allowed for *The Show* to go on. Is taking control and responsibility for our role and intervening in the function of systems of which we are part not what is of utmost importance in the contemporary neoliberal moment? The song comes to an end and the audience claps. But in this instance we are also clapping for each other, for our collective participation in the game.

This is *The Show*. It told us everything -- that 'Tonight, tonight' it will all begin (Leonard Bernstein's 'Tonight'), that the performers will 'come together' (The Beatles) and dance (David Bowie's 'Let's Dance') -- and then did as it said. It kept its promises and we therefore trusted it. And by keeping these promises, it exposed for the spectators not only *The Show's* construction, but also the construction of all shows, our expectations as spectators, the function of the theatrical stage. It was able to do this because its function as a system and its use of repetition put the point of focus elsewhere: on *how* things are being done, on the *relations* amongst elements and people, on the apparatus of theatre as a whole. By exposing existing systems (of representation, of thought) but also the system of its construction, *The Show* allows for the spectator not only to *understand how it is built*, but also how she can *enter and intervene* in it. And, in this manner, it points to our ability and, I would add, the urgency to intervene in larger systems. What makes this intervention possible in *The Show* is the sociality -- the relationship between the 'we' and the 'I' -- the work produces through its construction. It is this potential rethinking of the relationship between (and in-between) the individual and the collective that I want to explore further in relation to the work as a whole, the moment of 'The Sound of Silence', and the potential that emerged from it.

### **On the 'we' -- 'I' / On creative possibility**

Many thinkers have addressed the relationship of the individual to the collective and the problems in, as well as the potential that can emerge from, the different understandings and configuration of the two. **[note]**5 For example, sociologist Dave Elder-Vass argues that the potential for societal change emerges from groups of individuals, whose specific relation to one another in the group result in 'causal emerging properties': properties that the individuals did not possess before entering the group (2010). However, the theory that I find most constructive in relation to the 'I' in *The Show*, and the potential that emerged from its relation to the 'we', is Gilbert Simondon's theory of individuation (2005) as articulated by Jeremy Gilbert (2014). While Elder-Vass is interested in group-formation, Simondon is concerned with how individuality occurs: how 'we recognise the existence of distinct entities -- personal, social or political' (Gilbert 2014: 108). He argues that 'there is no such thing as the individual as such', but that there are 'only various events and processes of

“individuation”, which are never fully complete’ (ibid.). These individuations always take place in a field of relations, ‘the preindividual’, which pre-exists the event of individuation. He argues that the preindividual ‘is not simply an aggregation of elements but primarily a set of relations’ (ibid.). This set of relations (‘the preindividual’) exists itself within another field of relations, ‘the transindividual’, which remains ‘a part of every individuated being’ and ‘never become[s] fully individuated’ (ibid.).

Let us think of each individual spectator in *The Show* in this manner. Each spectator is an entity, a moment and an effect of a series of events and processes of individuation, which are nevertheless incomplete. For example, a spectator who loves to watch dance can be considered the result of an individuation, which is the outcome of a field of relations (‘the pre-individual’) that pre-existed the individuation. This pre-existing field of relations can include, for example, the existence of dance in the cultural field, the existence of spaces to present dance, the economy in which these events are presented. The relations amongst these preindividual elements are what Simondon calls the ‘transindividual’ (Gilbert 2014: 108) and which contributed to the entity’s individuation: to value art and specifically to love to watch dance. This, along with a series of other individuations, lead to the (individuated) spectator in that moment of watching *The Show*.

Now, let us examine the formation of a group, and by extension the group of *The Show*’s spectators, according to Simondon’s theory. Simondon understands group formation as a process of ‘collective individuation’.

Entry into the collective should be considered as a supplemental individuation...an amplification, in a collective form, of the being which consisted of a preindividual reality at the same time as individual reality. This supposes therefore that the individuation of beings does not exhaust completely their potential for individuation, and that there is not only one state of completion of beings. (Simondon 2005: 317)

In Simondon’s terms, the collective of *The Show*’s spectators can be understood as an ensemble formed of individuated spectators and their preindividual reality who,



upon their entrance into the group, undergo yet another process of individuation -- a 'collective individuation' -- due to this entrance. Using Simondon's theory of individuation allows us to see that neither the individual nor the group are ontologically prior, but that it is 'the general field of relations and potentialities' that have the prior status (Gilbert 2014: 111). Importantly, Gilbert argues, Simondon's theory points to sociality as 'a general condition of creative possibility' (ibid.).

This view of sociality echoes Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri's theorisation of the 'multitude' as a 'constant process of metamorphosis grounded in the common' (2009: 173). Gilbert embraces and builds on Hardt and Negri's proposition. He argues that the term multitude refers to the kind of group that (unlike Lennon's song) cannot be imagined by the 'Leviathan logic' of the practice of neoliberalism, which sees the individuals in a group as related to one another only by their individual vertical relationship to a supreme authority (2014: 60). Multitude, he suggests, refers to a group that is 'organized on the basis of lateral relations between its members, defined neither by an over-homogeneity or by a condition of general disorganization, possessing an ontological specificity which is quite different from that of the individual' (75). This latter understanding of the societal collective points to our interconnectedness and therefore to our power. It is also how I view the collective of *The Show's* spectators.

Perhaps the group of spectators in *The Show* cannot be exactly described as a multitude -- it is too temporary a collective to be characterized as such. But the relationship amongst the members of the audience can be understood as lateral due to their position as audience members. In addition, this group was neither homogeneous nor characterized by a general disorganization. It could be argued that a perceived hierarchy existed between the audience and Bel, reinforced by the proscenium stage, and that the group was formed on the basis of a 'constitutive outside' (Gilbert 2014: 101): Bel and his choice of playing with/failing the audience's expectations. However, what is most important here is the relationship amongst the audience members and its potential to oppose the 'Leviathan logic' of neoliberalism. What defines the relationship of members to a collective is not how they relate to the leader; it is instead the equality that characterizes their relationship with one another (Canetti 1962: 29-30).

What I would like to suggest here, drawing on Simondon, Gilbert, Elder-Vass and Canetti's thinking, are two things. Firstly, that *the potential of the sociality* (what Elder-Vass [2010] would call the 'causal emerging property'), which resulted from being a spectator among other spectators watching *The Show in the theatre* (from what Simondon would call 'collective individuation'), was increased by *The Show's specific economy of relations*. That is, the work produced lateral and equal relations by means of its dramaturgy, lack of technical virtuosity, and its use of repetition and construction as a system that allowed the spectator to not only watch it function, but intervene in it, creatively interacting with the work. Secondly, that this potential existed throughout the work, but was exemplified in the moment of 'The Sound of Silence', due to a particular shift in the work that afforded the spectators' intervention. This shift constitutes what Simondon would refer to as a 'crystallisation': a process which 'only occurs in a solution that has reached a certain level of supersaturation, which can be understood as an extreme disequilibrium between the solution's constituent elements' (Gilbert 2014: 109). As a result of a disequilibrium in this moment -- of the lack of sound and sight, of a lack of a show in *The Show* -- some spectators 'crystallised' from the audience and seized the opportunity to become authors and performers and disrupt *The Show*, expressing the political potential latent in the temporary collective of the spectators. I would argue that this group's formation was an experience of 'transindividuality': a set of shared expectations of the performance and feelings about the situation 'formed the basis of [their] sense of collective purpose, despite the fact that every one of [them] would have attributed quite different sets of personal, ethical or political meanings to [their] actions' (109). And this depended upon 'the existence and functioning of the general transindividual milieu' (110) (itself constructed -- as was the audience's expectations of this performance -- through the repetition of norms, conventions, ideas and values that establish them as dominant) within which the idea of what a show and a 'dance' work should be and look like was widely understood. It is important here to emphasise that it was a *part* of the larger group of spectators that was initially crystallised -- the audience was not homogeneous or any sort of unified 'community'. The crystallized group formed as a result of dissensus -- a crucial element, along with antagonism, for democracy -- with regard to what was happening both onstage and in the auditorium. The shift in the role and actions of the spectators ('crystallization') was an outcome

itself of a shift in the work ('disequilibrium'): a removal of the elements -- sound, light and bodies onstage -- that conventionally constitute a 'show'. It is this disequilibrium and ensuing crystallization that contributed to the emergence of the work's potential.

### **On affect and decisions**

The potential that emerged from the sociality produced in this particular moment was also a result of an affect that resulted from the audience's engagement with *The Show* up to that moment. Although *The Show* failed the expectations of some audience members, the recognition of themselves as able to do what the performers onstage did, the familiarity with the pop songs and the work's playfulness allowed them to engage with the work and see themselves as potential performers in it. In addition, in the moment of 'The Sound of Silence', the spectators would have carried with them Lennon's words -- 'imagine' -- from the preceding moment, which would have influenced them at the level of affect. 'The Sound of Silence' benefited from that shift in affective state, in the 'experiential state of the body', which augmented the 'body's capacity to act' (Massumi in Deleuze and Guattari 1998: xvi). Whereas the individualist tradition and Leviathan logic can only understand social relations as ultimately *limiting* the capacity of individuals (Gilbert 2014: 147), John Protevi and Gilbert believe that affect is crucial to effecting change: that '*our capacity to act* in the world is [...] *dependent upon our relations with others*' (Gilbert 2014: 144, my emphasis) and that 'joyous affect', an affect that 'increase[s] the puissance of the bodies', enables them to 'form new and mutually empowering encounters' (Protevi 2009: 51).**[note]**<sup>6</sup> Having already shared such joyous affect through their collective participation in the work through singing, in 'The Sound of Silence', spectators acted: they appropriated the work's rules, performed in it and made it their own.

Simondon argues that what binds groups is not a 'commitment to some common activity or project' (Gilbert 2014: 143) -- 'too discontinuous to be a solid base' (Simondon 2005: 248) -- nor 'their identification with consciously identifiable images or ideas' (Gilbert 2014: 144) -- 'too broad and too continuous to allow the segregation of groups' (Simondon 2005: 248). What binds groups in the end are the 'shared sentiments and sensations' that function at a 'subconscious' level (Gilbert: 144). I also believe that sentiment not only is not a 'bad' thing, as it is often perceived, but is in fact what brings us together before the work on ideas can happen and decisions to

act can be made. Affect, in the moment of 'The Sound of Silence', functioned as a precondition and driver for a *decision* to act -- to intervene in the work.

For Gilbert, agency is exercised and therefore decisions are taken in 'the ongoing and perpetual self-problematisation of the group and its constituent identities' (2014: 200), 'in the interstices between bodies and between conscious intentions' (175). A *space of decision*, he argues, is created through sociality and is one

within and from which new individuations and new becomings can emerge. This is not to say they are necessarily spaces within which actual conscious choices are made (although they might be). In fact they are spaces within which we can only experience the ultimate *impossibility* of making a 'decision' or 'choice' according to the classical liberal model of the rational, intentional, autonomous and autochthonous subject: a decision which is final, which is ours alone, and which is an expression of only our rational interests. But it is by virtue of this fact that they are spaces conducive to the expansion of a field of potentiality and possibility, without which no new decisions, no new individuations, no collective joy, and hence no democracy are ever possible. (Gilbert 2014: 201-2)

*The Show's* spectators adjusted in their role as spectators in relation to the work and in relation to each other. The decisions of different spectators affected and were affected by those of others in the group. I suggest that, as we saw in the differences of action and reaction of *The Show's* spectators, Bel's work became a *space of decision*: one where we realise that decisions are always a result of our relation to multiple others; that our decision to act affects and is affected by others. Despite the fact that neoliberalism tries to convince us of the opposite, this relationality is not a restriction; it is instead a well of potentiality, including of potential shared joy, and our only way out of neoliberalism's production of the social and to effect change. Making *decisions* based on this kind of realisation regarding our relationality -- and as distinct from neoliberal *choice* which gives a false sense of freedom -- not only requires taking into consideration the relationship to an other, but acknowledges that what is necessary is the negotiation of this relationship and of the decision to be made.

### **Conclusion: On ethical encounters -- The necessity of sociality and repetition**

I have argued that, as made most evident in the 2001 performance of *The Show* -- a time when a great deal of participatory work began to be made -- the work's economy of relations, with repetition and the work's function as a system playing a crucial factor, produced a sociality in *The Show* that created a space of creative possibility, affect and decision. This was despite the work's lack of solicitation of the spectators' physical participation -- the mere fact of which is considered political by some participatory work. I suggest that *this specific sociality* was able to produce what I consider to be *ethical encounters*. By an ethical encounter, I am referring to one that recognises that, although this distance to the other(s) exists, the other(s) is(are) connected to the 'I' by relations to the world, by an inescapable and always present sociality. This sociality can bring joy and it is wherein the potential to effect change is located. It is these ethical encounters that I suggest emerged from the work, and I believe that such encounters need to be repeated by any democratic institution in order to effect a much-needed change in the contemporary neoliberal moment. In the pre-Socratic demarcation of disciplines, *economy* was subordinated to *politics* and *ethics* (Baloglou 2012) and human's *eudaimonia* could only be conceptualized in relation to *justice in the Polis* (Aristotle 1935). In our neoliberal moment however, *politics* and *ethics* are subordinated to *economy*, leading to inequality and injustice. **[[note]]**<sup>7</sup> Art, simultaneously with all other spheres, needs to support an effort towards *justice* in the *Polis* through its production of relations, through its production of *ethical encounters*.

*The Show* reveals that these ethical encounters *can* take place in the theatre. It reveals the reason why the theatre, when critiqued as an institution in the manner Bel (by acknowledging the problems of people in the dark watching others labour in the light [Ridout 2006] and how the economy of this institution relates to larger economies) is still -- even after all the arguments about participatory performance and 'relational aesthetics' (Bourriaud 2002[1998]) -- an important place of presentation. This is because of its specific conditions of time and space and the relationships and sociality these produce. We agree and promise to be there and on time, to watch together and think about what we watch for the duration -- most likely - of the work. Theatre is a space of collective attention, where, much like in protests, individuality is not suppressed, but many people give attention to the same thing at the

same time. When we experience something in the presence of others there is a different sense of responsibility, a different relation to the work and to others. Unlike the museum's production of the social, where the individual, her freedom of movement and her rhythm is emphasised without a consideration of her relation to 'others', to a collective, theatre's sociality enables us to give time to something together in a designated space. **[note]**<sup>8</sup> In our contemporary moment, it is important to *be* with others, find joy in affecting and being affected by them, negotiate with them, make decisions, organise and act; through art and any other sphere we support by our relation to it. And then, do it again and again.

## Notes

1 This article, which uses Jérôme Bel's *The Show Must Go On* to discuss the production of the social in the *theatre*, might be seen as a companion piece to my 2014 article in *Performance Research*, in which I use Tino Sehgal's *These Associations* to discuss the production of the social in the *museum*. Together, these two articles contribute to a larger argument regarding what constitutes social engagement and the role and potential of performance in the contemporary neoliberal moment (examined in depth in Paramana 2015).

2 As I do not have the space here to nuance the term, I will briefly mention that the development of neoliberalism is contested. Some suggest that it was initially a theory and ideology with roots in the 18th century (in the thinking of classical liberal theorists like John Locke, Adam Smith and James Mill, who emphasised the importance of the individual, her freedom and happiness, and of free markets); that it turned policy at the end of the 1960s with Friedrich von Hayek, Ludwig von Mises and Milton Friedman, the fathers of neoliberalism; and that from the late 1970s onwards, the neoliberal ideas were 'transformed into a political-economic programme' (Gauthier et al. 2013: 14). Others, argue that neoliberalism is a governing rationality that did not evolve from liberalism in the manner articulated by Gauthier et al. (2013), but that it was a *reprogramming* of liberalism: that unlike the latter, which considered the human a *homo oeconomicus* in the sphere of the market, neoliberalism considers, treats and expects the human to be *homo oeconomicus* in all spheres of life, for they are all treated as markets (Brown: 2015).

3 For example, Etchells 2004, Hohenadel 2006, Lepecki 2006 and Bauer 2008, Mackrell 2015 to name a few.

4 I believe that Bel's work and the relations it produces are most constructively read through the lens of *economy* because the term reveals most strikingly the function of elements within his work (the work's economy of time, representation, movement and relations), the work's production of economies of thought, relation and encounter, but also how the work is complicit, resists or reveals the economies in which it is embedded: the theatre, contemporary dance and neoliberal capitalist economies. (This is an argument that I develop in Paramana 2015).

5 For a brief overview, see Paramana 2014.

6 According to Gilbert, affect is 'a dimension of experience which is at once physical and psychological, a domain of varying intensities which are not fully articulated, individuated and represented in consciousness; "emotion" might be understood as what we experience once we have identified an affective shift and represented it to ourselves as something which can be named and which can be understood as happening to us internally as individuals' (Gilbert 2014: 144-5).

7 At the time of writing (5 July 2015), it is this subordination of *politics* and *ethics* to *economy* what was protested against in Greece through a referendum.

8 In the museum one can visit and look at the artwork as a singular spectator and at any time during its opening hours.

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